Culture, Power, and Authoritarianism in the Indonesian State

Cultural Policy across the Twentieth Century to the Reform Era

Tod Jones

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PREFACE

Two sets of experiences helped me clarify the direction of my research. When I was on fieldwork in Sumatra, two people in different provinces who were actively involved in the arts said independently to me that they did not know what Indonesian culture was. They felt it was something alien, talked about by, and used to justify the actions of, a far-away central government. While most other Indonesians I talked with did not hold this view, there was a widespread confusion over the purpose of cultural policy and dismay at the effects of centrally generated policy on local practices. While at a seminar in Australia, after discovering that I was researching Indonesian cultural policy, a senior academic asked, with a roguish smile, whether Indonesia had a cultural policy. While this was a dig from a political economist, it also indicated that while it had been established that other countries had cultural policies, this was not the case for Indonesia. These experiences identified cultural policy as a puzzling, blurry space within two disparate communities.

My understanding of what I was doing grew from the question of how best to explore and map this space. I do not view my research as charting the linear stages of development of cultural policy. Instead, I have endeavoured to write about the contingency of the present condition of cultural policy—a history of what Michael Shapiro calls 'what we are now'. "This 'what we are now' is not means as a simple description of the current state of things. Rather, it is an attempt to show that the 'now' is an unstable victory won at the expense of other possible nows" (1992: 12). I have tried to write about cultural policy in a way that allows for different possibilities and choices, both in Indonesia and abroad. My goal has been to contribute to the debate, in particular in Indonesia, about the state's role and relationship to culture in its myriad forms. This book in many ways arises from the long discussions with numerous friends and colleagues in Indonesia who have an interest in cultural policy. I hope that my research can clarify issues and assist reflection about future directions.

Modern Indonesian spelling is used in the body of the text. Where names and titles use earlier conventions, I have followed the original spelling with two exceptions. I have used the modern Indonesian spelling for Pujangga Baru and Balai Pustaka,[1] as this has become the convention after considerable contemporary research. I adopt the English language

convention of citing an author's last name because many Indonesian authors publish in English as well as Indonesian and I have applied this convention to Indonesian publications for consistency. In the case of articles from the Indonesian daily newspaper Kompas, I have used the journalists' abbreviated names as the difficulty of associating abbreviated names with full names makes the abbreviated names the easiest way of tracking down the original articles. All of the translations in the text are mine except when otherwise indicated.

This book is based on my doctoral research at Curtin University in Perth, Australia, which was made possible through a John Curtin Scholarship. I am also grateful for Curtin University for offering me a Targeted Research Fellowship that provided me with the resources to bring the book to completion. A version of chapter VI was first published as an article in *Indonesia*, with the citation T. Jones, 2012. 'Indonesian Cultural Policy in the Reform Era'. Indonesia 93: 147–176.

I would like to thank KITLV for their ongoing commitment and support of this publication. KITLV, Curtin University's Faculty of Humanities and the Research Unit for the Study of Societies in Change (RUSSIC) generously contributed the funds that made the Indonesian translation and publication of this book possible. The final stages of publication were completed while I was undertaking a Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) Fellowship for the first six months of 2013, for which I am very grateful.

The most important influence on my academic life during my doctoral research was my supervisor Krishna Sen, whose advice and time was invaluable to me. I would also like to thank Roy Jones, David Wood and Michael Hughes for their professional advice and friendships while I have been a staff member at Curtin finalizing this book.

I would like to thank my colleagues in Indonesia for their time and assistance, in particular Taufik Rahzen, Rusdi Muchtar, Bisri Effendi and my friends at Desantara, Edy Utama, Endo Suanda, and staff at the Directorate of Culture.

For their comments and input into this research, I would like to thank Greg Acciaioli for his generosity with his time and his considered comments, and Bart Barendregt. For personal and intellectual support, I would like to thank Nick Herriman, Siti Zuhro, Budi, Fifi and Ahma Irawanto, and Rachel Diprose. I am also grateful for the time and input of David Hill, Colin Brown, and Greg Fealy. I would like to thank Greg Fealy for generously allowing me access to his LESBUMI documents.

Finally, I need to acknowledge the personal support of my family for this project. Thanks to my parents, Brant and Neva Jones, and my siblings, Tamsin and Simeon Jones. Thanks to Christina and Bara for their understanding and open hearts. Thanks to Gabriel, who only endured the tail end of my writing. Most of all, I thank Kate, who experienced the highs and lows alongside me, endured the breaking of many promised deadlines, was my most committed editor and critic, and greatest source of support.

GLOSSARY

Badan Musyarawah Kebudayaan Nasional (BMKN)	Consultative Committee on National Culture, a peak body that operated in the 1950s and 1960s
Balai Pustaka	Dutch colonial administrations publishing house for Malay and other indigenous language publications
Bunkajin	Japanese cultural workers during the Japanese military occupation
Bupati	The head of a regency (Kabupaten) who holds a similar position to a mayor
Departemen Pendidikan, Pengadjaran dan Kebudayaan (DPPK)	Department of Education, Training and Culture, this name changed to DepDikBud during the New Order era.
Department Pendidikan dan kebudayaan (DepDikBud)	Department of Education and Culture
Dewan Kesenian Daerah Jawa Barat (WJRAC)	West Java Regional Arts Council
Dewan Kesenian Jakarta (JAC)	Jakarta Arts Council
Dewan Kesenian Riau (RAC)	Riau Arts Council
dewan kesenian	arts council
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR)	People's Representative Council, the national legislature
Direktorat Kebudayaan (DikBud)	Directorate of Culture (name of Cultural Office after 1964)
Direktorat Kesenian	Directorate for Arts
Direktorat Pembinaan Penghayat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, (Ditbinyat)	Directorate of Local Beliefs
Direktorat Perlindungan dan Pembinaan Peninggalan Sejarah dan Purbakala	Directorate for the Protection and Management of Historical and Archaeological Artefacts
Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai-Nilai Tradisional (Ditjarahnitra)	Directorate of History and Traditional Values

Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN)	Broad Outline of State Policy, five-yearly planning documents begun during the Development Cabinets of the New Order era
Golongan Karya (Golkar)	Translated as Party of the Functional Groups, the Suharto-led party that held power from the 1971 elections until one year after the fall of Suharto in 1999, and continue to be one of the largest political parties in Indonesia
gotong-royong	mutual-help, a term used during the Sukarno and New Order eras to signify an indigenous Indonesian model for decision making
Kabupaten	A regional regency, the third tier of government in Indonesia (along with kotamadya)
Kantor Kebudayaan	Cultural Office (name of Directorate of Culture before 1964)
Keimin Bunka Shidosho	The Japanese run Cultural Centre that operated as an auxiliary organization of the Propaganda Department
Kotamadya	A city regency, the third tier of government in Indonesia (along with kabupaten)
Lembaga Kebudayaan Indonesia (LKI)	Institute of Indonesian Culture, created in 1950 by the newly independent state
Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (LEKRA)	People's Institute of Culture, the PKI affiliated artists movement in the 1950s and 1960s.
Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat (MPR)	People's Consultative Assembly
Manifes Kebudayaan (Manikebu)	A document signed by liberal artists in 1963 that opposed the LEKRA and state position of social commitment in the arts and culture, instead emphasizing artistic freedom

Manifes Politik (Manipol)	Political Manifesto, Sukarno's speech outlining the key tenants of Guided Democracy
musyawarah-mufakat	consultation-consensus, a term used during the Sukarno and New Order eras to signify an indigenous Indonesian model for decision making
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)	A bloc of newly independent countries that emerged in international politics following World War II
Pancasila	State ideology of Five Principles: belief in the one and only God; just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia' democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives; and social justice for all the Indonesian people
pan-Indonesian culture	contemporary cultural practices and objects that use the national language and address all Indonesians
PDI	Indonesian Democratic Party
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party
Pujangga Baru	A literary journal of the cultural nationalists in the 1930s where national culture was debated
Poetera	People's Power Movement, the nationalist political organization established by the occupying Japanese and Indonesian nationalists
Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional	National Research Centre for Archaeology
regional culture	cultural practices and objects linked by history, language or culture to a particular region, and often ethnicity
Sendenbu	Japanese propaganda department during the Japanese military occupation

Taman Budaya Jawa Barat (WJCP)	West Java Cultural Park
Taman Budaya Surakarta (SCP)	Surakarta Cultural Park
taman budaya	cultural park
Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM)	Ismail Marzuki Cultural Park, a large arts space housing a variety of performance venues in Jakarta
Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Taman Mini)	Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Theme Park
ToR	Terms of Reference used to manage a cultural publication in the Directorate of Culture
universal humanism	A liberal-leaning approach to the arts and culture that emerged during the War of Independence and became dominant during the New Order era
USDEK	A clarification of Manipol by Sukarno outlining five principles: the 1945 constitution, Indonesian socialism, guided democracy, guided economy and national identity

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURE AND POLITICS IN INDONESIA

An rash of large cultural conferences in provincial capital cities across Indonesia closely followed the fall of Suharto. My doctoral fieldwork coincided with the International Conference on Sundanese Culture (Konferensi Internasional Budaya Sunda, KIBS) in Bandung, West Java in August 2001. Decentralization of political power had increased the importance of local constituencies, driving the scale and intensity of KIBS beyond the scope of the more academic conferences I also attended. The conference was sponsored by the Province of West Java and the Japan Foundation, a Japanese government funded body that specializes in international cultural exchange. The features and location of KIBS provide many connections to previous and current pressures in Indonesian cultural policy.

While the Sundanese are the largest indigenous ethnic group in West Java and therefore an important focus for politicians, the province is also home to large number of Javanese and Chinese people, and the category of Sundanese is also contested due to regional differences and histories. A focus on Sundanese culture both unites and excludes, draws internal and external boundaries, and raises questions of what is Sundanese and what are 'foreign' influences. The opening address at KIBS was given by the Sundanese writer and academic Ajip Rosidi, who headed the Sundanese cultural organization Rancage that administered KIBS. Now working in a university in Japan, Rosidi was affiliated with the liberal-leaning group of Indonesian cultural workers who were caught up in a nasty confrontation with leftist cultural workers in the early to mid 1960s. Although this group was not involved in the killings, the massacre and imprisonment of the political left (and at times even people with loose affiliations) meant these liberal artists and writers were ascendant in New Order Indonesia. Rosidi's opening address asserted that Sundanese culture has suffered from the afflictions of historical turmoil, globalization of culture, and state neglect. He particularly takes the Indonesian state to task for the state of cultural education and not having the 'political will' to support Sundanese culture. KIBS was held in the same building as one of the most

important political gatherings of the twentieth century: the Asia-Africa Conference of 1955. Capturing the enthusiasm and excitement at the gathering of new nation-states before that conference, Sukarno inaugurated the space as the 'Freedom Building'. The Asia-Africa conference was the genesis of the nonaligned group of nations in the UN and UNESCO, who pushed for changes in international political, economic and information systems to address their structural deficiencies, and also prevented the world dividing into two sides during the Cold War. These events remind us that postcolonial countries like Indonesia were engaged with international organizations, and their opinions about culture and governance differed from Western models while borrowing heavily from them. These nations also shared postcolonial nationalism, along with legacies of colonial pasts.

The closing ceremony contained a performance that points to a different set of influences on Indonesian culture. Asep Sunandar Sunarya is a Sundanese *wayang golek dalang* (Sundanese rod puppet master) who has managed to bridge the divide between popular and ethnic audiences. The son and grandson of famous dalangs, I first saw Asep on his half hour television show that was broadcast nationally in 2001. Despite the declining number of wayang performers and performances, Asep adapted his craft for mass cultural forms, and could still attract and entertain large crowds at performances of traditional *wayang golek* stories. Asep performed his wayang in Sundanese and had the locals laughing so hard they had tears in their eyes. While the growth of mass culture was viewed by many officials as a threat to indigenous Indonesian cultural practices, Asep has used television to become a superstar.

My description of these disparate elements KIBS illustrates how ideological conflicts, struggles over resources and constituencies, and social and political changes relate to culture. Cultural policy amounts to the attempts by institutions to manage these forces. While I could observe Asep's puppetry and the laughter of his audience, I could not understand his words as I cannot speak Sundanese. My position as a foreigner with limited access to ethnic cultural forms, but access to Indonesian language materials and national cultural forms, and privileged access to information and archives, reflects the focus of this book. It is about how culture, particularly national culture, has been constituted in policy from the colonial era starting in 1900, across Japanese occupation and the early years of independence, within the authoritarian Suharto regime that unceremoniously ended in 1997, into the current Reform era. Cultural policy in Indonesia has a rich history across these epochs, connected to a range of broad and complex shifts in Indonesian society and politics during the

twentieth century: from colonial to postcolonial; negotiating ethnicity and nation; and the shifting boundaries between freedom and control. While the details of these shifts are addressed in the chapters that follow, this chapter outlines a cultural policy approach that is appropriate for Indonesia, and also provides insights and tools for postcolonial cultural policy analysis more broadly.

I have written this book with two audiences in mind: readers interested in Indonesian political and cultural theory, and readers who are more narrowly interested in the events and changes that shaped culture in Indonesia across the twentieth century and into the Reform era. This introduction is the location of the theory and previous research that informs my approach. In case this does not interest you, I have written the book in such a way that it is possible to start from Chapter 1 and read it as a historical work complimented by two case study chapters. I do recommend that you read the last section in this Introduction so that you have a sense of the book's structure and my position on cultural policy research in Indonesia. Where relevant in the later chapters, I will briefly recap concepts, and cross reference more detailed information from the introduction.

The Dangers of Cultural Research

The findings of cultural research can have political implications. John Pemberton, a well known expert on Javanese culture, notes the convergence 'between anthropological disciplinary interests in culture and repressive interests' (1994a: 9) like certain interests within the Suharto regime. Pemberton argues that any research that posits a general cultural order independent of political interests can reinforce the political order in the name of culture. He writes: 'What appears to remain is a purely *tradisional* culture free of political and historical implication, a culture dedicated to, as if by nature, its own celebration'[1] (1994a: 15). Under Suharto, the state borrowed heavily from a version of Javanese culture that confirmed and strengthened the regime's political authority by emphasizing the avoidance of conflict and the importance of ritualistic power and hierarchical relationships. The features of cultural orders are coupled to politics and power. Cultural research either interrogates this relationship, or accepts it.

[1] Pemberton uses the Indonesian spelling for traditional.

Most cultural research about Indonesia acknowledges these relationships. Anthropology has long recognized that cultural and community practices are formed in negotiation with state power and local politics, and that cultural practices can reinforce the political hierarchy, and at other times can subvert political power.[2] A second body of cultural research in Indonesia into cultural expression has focussed more explicitly still on the state's conceptualization of culture in cultural policy due to the state's numerous interventions, including censorship, and the political commentary of many cultural forms.[3] A third body of research has addressed cultural institutions and industries. Phillip Kitley argues that the regime's 'national cultural project' was central to the creation and regulation of Indonesian television (2000: 3–4). Similarly, Krishna Sen's account of New Order cinema also demonstrates the importance of the regime's regulation of Indonesians to its regulation of cinema, in particular the representation of the nation in film (1994).[4] In contrast to the focus on cultural texts and symbolism in research into cultural expression, research into cultural institutions and industries concerns itself with the pressures on institutions and their effects on cultural products and everyday experience. The concerns of this book with cultural regulation by state cultural institutions link it most closely to the cultural institutions and industries perspective.

Culture in Research on the State

While cultural research has generally analysed and recognized how culture is shaped in part by political power, political research during the Suharto era struggled to make the same acknowledgment. While the strongest and

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[2] See the work of Greg Acciaioli (2002) and Anna Tsing (1993). Well-regarded anthropologist Tom Boellstorff (2002: 25) comments that anthropological study in Indonesia has been 'responsive to the methodological challenges of the contemporary period'.

[3] This research includes both broad reflect on the New Order regime's impact on cultural expression and cultural developments in Indonesia, through both its economic and cultural policies (Hatley 1994; Hooker and Dick 1993; Zurbuchen 1990), and more focussed research on topics including Indonesian literature (Foley and Sumandhi 1994; Foulcher 1980, 1986, 1993b; Maier 1987, 1993; Tickell 1982), fine arts (Supangkat 1990,1994) and the popular performing arts (Arps 1991; Hefner 1987; Suanda 1995; Widodo 1995; Yampolsky 1995, 2001).

[4] Similarly, the state's conceptualization of national culture has played a vital role in arts educational institutions (Hellman 1999; Hough 2000), regulating cultural tourism (Hoskins 1987; Picard 1997, 1999; Vickers 1989; Volkman 1990) and in museums (Acciaioli 2001; Taylor 1994; Wrath 1997).

most concerning division between culture and politics was in the political culture research of the 1960s and 1970s (Jackson and Pye 1978; Pye and Verba 1965), such divisions have continued. Ken Young's comment still has some force today:

> [Political science research about Southeast Asia] stresses culture as an explanatory variable above all others, yet it contributes so little to the study of culture itself, preferring to use it as a catch-all which tidies up all the otherwise inexplicable connections between the State and civil society. (1991: 99)

Culture often acquires explanatory force without attention to the relations of power that shape its usage, the multiple ways it is deployed, and the ways it changes in different contexts. While this criticism holds for many of the approaches to culture in the study of Indonesian politics (Philpott 2000), it is worthwhile focussing on how culture is treated in the most popular framework: what has been labelled 'liberal state-society' approaches (Berger 1997), and in particular the role of patrimonialism.[5]

Mark Berger defines liberal state-society approaches to politics in Indonesia as revisions of modernization theory that took root in the 1950s and 1960s.[6] The most popular approach uses the concept of patrimonialism.[7] Patrimonialism refers to vertically structured patron-client relationships in Indonesia where resources were channelled to 'clients' with different patron-client cartels competing for rewards dispersed by the ruler, and was placed in opposition to 'modern' (meaning western) governance based on the transparent application of policy, that was thought to be desired by a growing middle class (Crouch 1978; Mackie and MacIntyre 1994). In this model, politics is characterized by conflicts over resources rather than being driven by ideological differences or policy issues.

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[5] Other approaches are commonly identified as the neo-Marxist (possibly more accurately termed a political-economy) approach of Richard Robison (1986; Robison and Hadiz 2004), and the state-society approach of Benedict Anderson (1990b). For more detailed reviews of the approaches, see Berger (1997), MacIntyre (1990), Philpott (2000) and Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken (2007a).

[6] Benedict Anderson's excellent article analysing political research in Indonesia following World War II identified modernization theory as the basis of the two dominant approaches to Indonesian politics before 1965 (1982). He labelled the approaches (1) anti-colonial liberalism and the historical method, which centred around George Kahin and dominated the beginning and middle of the 1950s, and (2) imperial liberalism and the comparative method which came to the fore at the end of the 1950s and was reliant on the doctrine of modernization and related universalist assumptions about political systems and societies. Both approaches focussed on the political elite.

[7] Both MacIntyre (1990)and Berger (1997) identify patrimonialism as the most used or 'conventional' approach to Indonesian politics.

Cultural policy is a poor fit with patrimonialism for two reasons. The first is use of culture as an explanatory tool in patrimonial approaches without interrogation of the role of policy in shaping culture's features, and linking culture to policy goals. Howard Crouch's early writings on patrimonialism held that the political system under Sukarno (Guided Democracy) and Suharto (the New Order) was still characterized by the 'patrimonial politics of earlier, precolonial Javanese empires' (1979: 571–573) that continued to shape Indonesian political and social structures.[8] Such a division splits politics into 'Western' and 'traditional' elements following respectively 'rational' and 'cultural' explanations. The primary issue with this splitting is that an essentialized and unchanging understanding of culture can underlie the traditional/cultural explanations of political behaviour, which then reinforces the existing political order. One of the cruder cultural explanations for political behaviour is the portrayal of the mass killings of accused communists in 1965–66 in books and newspapers as Malays running amok (see excerpts in Sulistyo [2000]). The more deterministic elements of political analysis from the 1970s were not repeated in the decades that follow. However, Simon Philpott (2000) argues that similar divisions have been used within later liberal state society approaches, which fall back on cultural explanations without interrogating how culture is shaped by political power.

The second and broader issue relates not to culture but to policy. Research into Indonesian politics has separated the state and civil society and focussed its attentions almost exclusively on the state, and the question of whether society can influence the state (MacIntyre 1990). Where revisions did occur (such as MacIntyre [1990]), they tended to demonstrate that society could influence the state, which still posited society as constructed by forces somehow independent from state influences. While research into culture quite clearly identified the influence of state power and policy, this was ignored in political analysis. Following the fall of Suharto, criticism of the analytical distinction between state and society in Indonesia has begun to crystallize a new approach to the study of politics focussing on the shadow state (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007a). The core of this critique is that the state in Indonesia is not just constituted by its formal apparatus, but also consists of a 'shadow state' system of authority and regulation (including of violence via paramilitary

[8] An example of a similar position is Karl Jackson who, drawing from Benedict Anderson's analysis of the idea of power in Javanese culture (1978), posits that the Indonesian political system is based on Javanese concepts of power and social organization.

groups) that is integrated with the formal state. By including the shadow state in political analysis, the politics of ethnicity and religion, as well as the influence of private interests, can be demonstrated to be tied to state policy and practices (Schulte Nordholt 2007; Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007b).

While the shadow state critique is an important extension of political and policy analysis (which is particularly important to case studies in Chapter 9), it still ignores many of the ways that the New Order's sustained authoritarian rule relied on particular constructions of the Indonesian subject in policy as well as the use of coercive force, and how these constructions had effects on behaviours and subjectivities. In other words, the effects of New Order policy on the views, identities and practices of Indonesians still need to be accounted for in policy analysis.[9] Philpott writes:

> A striking feature of the discourse of Indonesian politics is that it ignores the full range of practices lumped together under the rubric of the state's other, civil society. [...] Practitioners of the discourse of Indonesian politics have commonly asserted, explicitly or otherwise, that the Indonesian state had distinct interests and, in that sense, is autonomous of civil society. However, the specific ways in which the New Order's will to govern was realized in civil society have been neglected. (2000: 5)

The study of the relationship between the state and culture needs a methodology that brings into focus the more complex and indirect forms of power that exist, including when relevant the shadow state, in addition to the direct application of state power.

The Problems of a Patrimonial Approach to Cultural Policy

In one of the few articles to be focused exclusively on cultural policy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia expert Jennifer Lindsay argued that the continued presence of patrimonialism is the primary determinant of the features of cultural policy in the region (1995). There are two key points in Lindsay's article. Firstly, she argued that in Southeast Asia, 'state cultural agencies act as patrons bestowing project funds and rewards rather than as service organizations' (1995: 661). Artists are 'clients' within this 'system of

[9] It should be noted that the construction of ethnicity in political research now acknowledges the role of political power and the state due to the new focus on local politics (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007b). However, the influence of the state is broader than is currently acknowledged in this literature.

patronage' that began in pre-nationalist Southeast Asia and continues to be 'perpetuated in a modern setting' (1995: 663). Lindsay writes:

> From the performers' point of view, then, the context of employment [...] is not essentially different from a pre-national context. [...] The government acts in the way a patron is traditionally expected to act—nominating the kind of performance, choosing the performers, vetting undesirable elements, favouring those whose performance pleases, and rejecting from favour those whose performance offends. (1995: 664–665)

According to Lindsay, the continued centrality of the patron-client relationship to the role of government in cultural life differentiates cultural policy in Southeast Asia from cultural policy in the West where the state commissions artists and audiences pay to view performances in a commercial context where demand influences content.

The second point is that Southeast Asian governments, as 'the most significant sources of [...] patronage' (1995: 664), have introduced new concerns 'with ideas of national identity, acceptability and image' (1995: 663). They use their status as patrons to enforce a particular set of standards appropriate for the nation. Lindsay lists the governments' requirements as 'brevity and formality', 'accessibility' and 'dignified and entertaining' display (1995: 666). She writes: 'It is important that the performance is not offensive to other ethnic and religious sensibilities, or to a sense of official decorum and respectability' (1995: 666). The patron-client relationship places these government concerns in the forefront of the artists' considerations in contrast to the West, where Lindsay contends artists both comply less with government priorities and are more responsive to public opinion.

Lindsay's article provides two important signposts for cultural policy research. It can be used to assess the desirability of focusing on the patron-client relationship. Placing the patron-client relationship at the centre of cultural policy analysis skews the argument in a way that leaves important areas unaddressed and leads to misleading characterizations of cultural policy in Southeast Asia. First, Lindsay attributes the characteristics of Southeast Asian cultural policy to the desires of governments without interrogating why and how Southeast Asian governments chose particular cultural policy content. Second, emphasizing the continuity of the patron-client relationship across both space and time neglects important breaks both between nations and, more importantly, within nations. Lindsay does not explore the cultural policy differences between different political regimes in Indonesia nor the extent to which institutions and policies were inherited from or influenced by the Dutch colonial and the Japanese occupying administrations. A third issue is her reliance on

a divide between cultural policy in Western nations and Southeast Asia. Governments in all locations attempt to bring about particular outcomes when they formulate and implement cultural policies (see, for instance, Bennett [1998: 87–164]). The reasons Lindsay herself gives for subsidies in Australia, Europe, and the United States (culture's 'educative, moral, heritage, aesthetic or [...] spiritual value to society') is not all that different to her reasons for subsidy in Southeast Asia ('national identity, protection of moral and religious values, or protection of indigenous cultural heritage' [1995: 668]).

The second signpost in Lindsay's article points towards an alternative focus for Indonesian cultural policy analysis. While noting that culture is commonly linked to education in many Southeast Asian nations, Lindsay writes that in Indonesia 'the educative value of culture itself as a civilizing agent of human behaviour' was never questioned in nationalist debates about culture. The links between culture and education (and the project of civilization) suggest that alternative histories exist that predate the Indonesian nationalists. Culture has long been used in Europe as a method of civilizing unruly elements of society (Bennett 1998) and putting to use its civilizing function was a central concern to the creation and regulation of public libraries, art galleries and museums in Britain in the eighteenth century (Bennett 1998: 107–134). Additionally, the Dutch colonial administration implemented its own programmes that at times encapsulated a civilizing mission aimed at the colonies' indigenous inhabitants. The recurring emphasis on the task of civilizing subjects suggests cultural policy is shaped through its capacity to extend state power beyond the formal apparatus of the state, and that the relationship between Indonesian, colonial, and Western cultural policy is close, complex, and cannot be ignored in analysis of Indonesian cultural policy.

The State in Cultural Research

During the New Order period, four key perspectives evolved in Indonesian research on Indonesian cultural policy. The first perspective grew through research into local community practices and performing arts, commonly identified as rituals connected to ways of life.[10] In this research, the state's interventions have been interpreted as bringing a different understanding

[10] Such assessments have generally been heavily influenced by anthropological understandings of culture. Greg Acciaioli (1985) uses Pierre Bourdieu's idea of doxa (1977) where the natural and the social world corresponds.

of cultural practices into a community or, in the words of Greg Acciaioli in one of the first articles to address this issue, 'culture has become art' due to the policies of the state (1985: 162). Philip Yampolsky's assessment of the state's impact on regional performing arts provides a more detailed analysis of official cultural policy (1995) that for the most part agrees with Acciaioli's assessment that state intervention breaks the links between regional communities and their community arts due to the 'redesigning' of art forms for 'external consumption' (1995: 714). However, he also provides examples of different forms of resistance to government policy, due in particular to confusion and imprecision about the implementation of policies, leaving open the possibility of individuals using government policies in ways that reinforce the links between communities and their arts (1995).

This perspective emphasizes the political importance of aesthetics to ideas of community and nation, and needs to be linked to the importance of aesthetics, or taste, to cultural policy analysis. Contemporary academic understandings about aesthetics have revolved around the writings of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu rejected the Kantian notion of disinterested judgement (Kant 1987), instead preferring to understand aesthetics as a product of education, family, and the social trajectories of economic class and status (Bourdieu 1984). The importance of aesthetics for cultural policy analysis is the question of how taste relates to politics. John Street argues that:

> judgement is not simply a product of [...] discourses; it is also the legitimation of these discourses and the processes which include or exclude particular forms of discourse. Aesthetic judgement is the product of a process in which authority is assigned and legitimated. (2000: 48)

Aesthetics therefore can function in a normative system designed to reinforce existing power structures or can be used to resist such normative systems. Miller and Yudice tie aesthetics to the nation-state:

> An aesthetic of truth and beauty is, as per Kant, the internal monitor within each person that provides a collective, national, categorical imperative. Its very *ethos* of singular appreciation becomes, ironically, a connecting chord of national harmony, binding individual goals to an implied national unity. (2002: 10)

Aesthetics has the potential to both manage and potentially transcend class and ethnicity through the internalization of knowledge of what is desirable and 'normal'.

The effects of cultural policy on local arts scenes should not be automatically characterized as negative. For instance, Kathy Foley writes that

'The time, place, and context of the Bali arts Festival have allowed it, by virtue of its emphasis on secular arts, to become a significant forum for modern experimentation and development' (1994: 276). From a broader perspective, Lyn Parker argues 'against the assumed opposition of society and state and shows that we can only understand the longevity of the Suharto regime by understanding that villagers wanted to participate in the version of modernity offered by the Indonesian nation-state' (2003: 1). While assessments of cultural policy focused on the regional performing arts are, with a few exceptions, negative appraisals, an analysis framed by the state's use of culture to shape a national community with a broader definition of what constitutes cultural policy would view the impact of state policy on regional performing arts as a negative aspect of a larger set of policies which had a much wider array of impacts across a number of different areas.

The second perspective is that Indonesian national culture is a version of Javanese culture. While acknowledging that Javanese culture is a construction that has been shaped by a number of influences including political power, many researchers hold that the New Order's understanding of culture was still Java-centric.[11] Pemberton's book (1994a), *The Subject of Java*, is the most prominent text about the construction of Javanese culture and its use by the New Order regime. *The Subject of Java* begins with historical research into the archives of Central Javanese royal palaces. Pemberton explores how the idea of Java and Javanese traditions emerged through interactions with Dutch colonizers and their methods of government. For instance, he notes a Javanese text describing a royal wedding appeared in 1830, and texts that used the notion of a 'generalized Javanese person' began in 1890 (1994a: 23). The idea of 'Java' and the 'Javanese' as a culturally bounded group was shaped by the colonial encounter, and reinforced by colonial anthropological research which rapidly grew early in the twentieth century. The New Order regime drew on the constructed tradition of the Javanese courts in order to legitimize itself by presenting its authority as cultural and its use of ritual to represent Javanese society as inherently stable and ordered. Thus Pemberton's account of the changing use of practices deemed culturally Javanese demonstrates how state power has shaped and continues to shape Javanese tradition, ritual and

[11] For instance, Tsing, drawing on the work of Pemberton and patrimonial conceptions of political culture, argues that a constructed notion of Javanese culture dominated the cultural politics of the New Order regime (1993: 22–25).

culture, firstly during the colonial period, and then during the New Order period.[12]

Perhaps the strongest metaphor of the privileged place of Javanese culture is Acciaioli's (1996) description of the posters of different Indonesian ethnic couples at the state-run cultural park, Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah). In Taman Mini, the posters of the Javanese and Balinese are accurate, but as the ethnicities depicted move away from the cultural and geographical centre of urban Java, the posters ignore or trivialize unique ethnic symbols and features in favour of clothing and even models that appear Javanese. The attention to Javanese culture needs to be considered alongside the middle class elite's drive to educate and civilize Indonesians across political persuasions and political eras. Ruth McVey's (1986) study of efforts to transform wayang, by Indonesian nationalists, communists and New Order elite, demonstrates that these groups shared similar visions for the Javanese shadow puppetry despite intensely felt political differences. Wayang was closely linked to world view of a large proportion of working class Javanese for much of the Twentieth Century, and was often performed at important functions. *Wayang purwa* was a long (generally nine hour) performance of Hindu-derived Javanese epics that imparted moral teachings as well as including comments on current events. Nationalists, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and the New Order era wayang conferences all debated the place of wayang, and all suggested shortening the performance, using Indonesian rather than Javanese, the inclusion of new stories, and that dalang use their performances to educate and uplift the masses who attend. The middle-class desire to modernize and civilize both the aesthetics of cultural practices, and their audiences, were

[12] In *The Subject of Java*, Pemberton skips the 1942–65 period because it constitutes a period of 'discontinuity' between eras where Java was constructed as based in tradition and ritual. He states that those years 'trouble the virtual identity one might now read into 'Java' (1994a: 26). The 1942–65 period was highly politicized and involved a number of struggles and debates between competing institutions over the constitution and use of Indonesian culture. Although certain perspectives on culture were systematically excluded after 1965, there were other constructions of Indonesia and Indonesian culture that also informed the New Order regime. For instance, the New Order regime borrowed and reconfigured ideas from both Sukarno (Bourchier 1996) and artists influenced by Western liberalism (Supartono et al. 2000: 5–6). Vickers (1997) makes a similar criticism of the absence of the 1942–1965 period in *The Subject of Java*. Although Pemberton's emphasis on rural resistance to a degree ignores urban resistance, he is overt in his reasons for skipping the 1942–1965 period.

important features of cultural policy across all eras, and to ethnic cultural practices that the state identified as targets of cultural policy.

The third perspective concerns the effects of growing capitalist consumption in Indonesia and the government's response through the discourse of Asian values. Consumption has become an important method of establishing and maintaining differences between groups as well as a widespread tool of social mobility (Bourdieu 1984, 1989). Symbolic consumption has experienced a rapid growth in Asia since the expansion of globalized capitalism in the 1970s (Chua 2003). The largest body of work on this phenomenon in Indonesia has focussed on 'the New Rich'[13] beginning with the February 1984 issue of the Indonesian journal *Prisma*. English language research soon followed (Dick 1985; Lev 1990) and, from 1996, *The New Rich in Asia* series of books continued to pursue analysis of these groups (Chua 2000b; Pinches 1999; Robison and Goodman 1996; Sen and Stivens 1998).[14] Ariel Heryanto's analysis of the 'new rich' in Indonesia demonstrates the centrality of consumption to the cultural construction and contestation of the identity of the groups identified as 'middle class' (1999). Heryanto identifies an increase in conspicuous consumption in the 1990s and interactions between consumerism and constructions of both 'West' and 'East', attitudes towards Chinese and Islam. Other research into consumption and the urban poor has demonstrated that consumer culture has also influenced the habits of the urban poor and the lower middle class (Gerke 2000; Jones 2008; Murray 1991). The state's economic policies drove these cultural changes in Indonesia, which are important to official cultural policy because they evoked a response from the New Order regime.

In the Southeast Asia region, the spread of consumer culture and the increasingly rapid movement of information associated with capitalist goods and services created some consternation amongst the regional governments. The governments of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, China and

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[13] New rich is another way of referring to what others, such as Dick (1985), have termed the middle class while avoiding confusion over the more specific meaning given to the term by others such as Robison (1996) to differentiate them from the bourgeoisie.

[14] A major problem with research into the new rich has been the variety of groups which fall into the category (see, for instance, Heryanto (1999) and, in the context of the Asia region, Richard Robison and David Goodman (1996)). If the category is divided by religion, ethnicity and political affiliations, it begins to lose its theoretical usefulness. However, a few traits run across all of the groups: their lives have been transformed by the economic growth of the New Order period and they all partake in the consumption of middle class lifestyles.

Burma (Birch 1998a; Bourchier 1998) opposed the cultural changes and the related political and social messages brought by international capitalism with a discourse of 'Asian values' which emphasized hard work, family values, respect for authority, social responsibility, discipline and support of leaders. In the name of preserving Asian values, governments consolidated their political power through populist opposition to the bogeyman of negative Western values and maintained their political control through the rejection of press freedom and human rights by labelling them 'Western' and therefore incompatible with an Asian way of life (Birch 1998a, 1998b; Chua 2000a).

The New Order regime employed a version of Asian values in its attempts to influence the habits of its populace (Birch 1998a; Bourchier 1998; Vickers and Fisher 1999). Adrian Vickers and Lyn Fisher, for instance, write:

> All the elements of 'Asian values' can be found in the way the New Order attempted to clarify and institutionalize 'Indonesian values'. The ideals of family and authority were there, as was a construction of a Western 'Other'. (1999: 398)

An important feature of the Indonesian values discourse has been the political justification of a more authoritarian political system against criticisms from advocates of liberal democratic models and associated individual rights.[15] However a more widespread and pervasive use was how Indonesian values functioned as a form of control over cultural practices associated with the nation. The regime used the official state ideology of the *Pancasila* and associated programmes to instill a model of conduct into the population through education in schools and the workplace (Bourchier 1998). In this regard, David Birch's comment about Asian values could also apply to Indonesia:

> What we need to understand is that new realities, new definitions and new structures are being determined by powerful forces within the Asian region, driven by powerful economic capital and, aligned to that, the developing cultural capital of what constitutes the public cultures of 'Asianness'. (1998a: 198)

Indonesian values discourses, as noted by Bourchier, also had a 'proactive aspect' in its creation of Indonesian citizens (1998: 207). While the regime's cultural policy response to greater integration with the outside world and growing consumption is examined in chapters four and five, other research

[15] It should be noted that the 'Indonesian values' discourse strengthened pre-existing discourses about Indonesian identity. Thus was not a new phenomenon as much as a strengthening of a conservative understanding of Indonesian culture.

has also noted the proactive elements and results of the regime's use of Indonesian values discourse. Researchers have assessed how it has been used in the construction of Indonesian citizens through education (Leigh 1991; Parker 1992), through alternative readings of government discourses such as the *Pancasila* to argue in favour of democratic reforms (Ramage 1995) and also through opposition to official discourse, such as opposition to the regime's assertion that individual rights are not important to being Indonesian (Bourchier 1998; Vickers and Fisher 1999). The increasing importance of consumer culture across the second half of the Twentieth Century is a worldwide phenomenon that cultural policies globally have needed to address.

The fourth perspective is from left-wing critics in Indonesia. One of the forums for leftwing criticism of the cultural policy of Indonesian governments from the late 1990s has been the magazine *Media Kerja Budaya*, published by cultural workers in Jakarta. The position of *Media Kerja Budaya* on national culture is that it should be diverse, inclusive (particularly of Indonesian urban and rural working class cultural practices), and promote involvement of diverse groups and people in cultural work. According to this analysis, the New Order regime nurtured 'a military culture' that was homogenizing and limited. What triumphantly surfaced was a military culture! Ceremonies and drills, *P4*[16] indoctrination, the standardization of curriculum, the sole foundation [*Pancasila*] in politics, the banning of art activities are only several examples from the strength of the spirit of militarism in our culture for the last three decades (Supartono et al. 2000: 15).

The background of the New Order leadership, particularly in its early years, to some degree supports the above statement. When the New Order regime came to power, its leaders had generally received a military education and many had been influenced by their training under the Japanese, experiences during the revolution and their political conflict with the PKI including its bloody resolution (Crouch 1978). While this is a reminder of the political outlook of groups within the New Order elite and the kinds of pressures they put on cultural policy, the discussion of culture and the state in the preceding sections demonstrates that a single perspective never determined policy related to culture and neither was the resulting

[16] P4 is the acronym for Pedoman, Penghayatan dan Pengamalan *Pancasila* (Orientation in Life and the Implementation of the Principles of the *Pancasila*), the New Order regime's civic education programme that was implemented in schools, universities and workplaces in Indonesia.

cultural policy purely oppressive in either intention or results. Instead, the work of the Indonesian cultural left should be viewed as a reminder of the negative elements of the New Order government,[17] and of the importance of researchers interrogating the politics of culture rather than accepting culture as an ahistorical category that reinforces the political order.

The characterization of the New Order state as having a single rationale is an issue in more than one of the perspectives reviewed here. There is a tendency in research about the New Order regime and culture to present the state as a homogenous entity. For instance, Pemberton's research does not acknowledge differences within the state itself, particularly between the national government and the provincial and local governments, leading Vickers (1997: 178) to write that Pemberton's homogenization of the New Order state is 'an essentialized explanatory key to different kinds of changes in ceremonial action and representation' within his research. Similarly, Acciaioli's (1985) focus on state interventions from the perspective of marginal communities presents the state as a singular external force that seeks to impose its understanding of cultural practices on the community. This representation has been compounded by the tendency to draw strong distinctions between Indonesian state and society. Cultural policy research needs to rest on theories of the state that explain how modern governance relies on shaping the behaviours of a populace through a range of fields, including culture, that blur the state-society boundary. Such a theory would pay attention to how politics shapes culture, and take into consideration ambiguities both within the state and in the boundaries of the state.

Foucault, the State and Policy

Although not overly concerned with legitimacy and consent, the division of state and society in Indonesian political research falls within a criticism levelled by Michel Foucault in an interview in 1977:

> What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory that has still to be done. (1980: 121)

[17] Particularly impressive is the Jaringan Kerja Budaya's (1999) research into book bans during the New Order era.

Foucault's move to broaden political theory hinges on a revision of the concept of power. Analysis of Indonesian politics has generally viewed power negatively. Philpott writes: 'Power is almost exclusively understood as militarized, violent, repressive, and censorious' (2000: 147). Foucault, on the other hand, labels this kind of power relations 'domination' and considers it to be one of many structures of power. Foucault's definition of power does not privilege a single set or type of power relations. Power, at its most basic level, 'designates relationships between partners', which refers to 'an ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another' (1982: 217). As such, power is inherently unstable, ambiguous, reversible, and is dispersed throughout the network of human relations.

Between domination (where there is little room for resistance) and the flowing, easily reversible type of power described above, Foucault identifies the category of power relations which is the most useful for understanding cultural policy: government. Government is defined as 'the conduct of conduct' or the regulation of the ways people regulate their own behaviour. In the lecture, Foucault traces the emergence of increasingly complicated forms of government since the sixteenth century around the changing answers to questions concerned with the best possible forms of governance not just of states and nations but also of the individual and of families. However, the dissemination of new forms of government throughout a population is linked to a particular form of government: the type of government concerned with managing the nation-state as a whole, the 'art of the state' (1991: 90). The state became increasingly concerned with the correct management of individuals, people and goods, rendering the state's use of domination far less important than the use of government. It is in this sense that Foucault (1991: 102–3) referred to the 'governmentalization of the state'. Within this formulation, the task of regulating conduct is not just that of the state. Instead the agencies of the state are one set of instruments of government amongst others, leading Foucault (1991: 103) to write that 'maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important for our modernity [is the] governmentalization of the state'.

Central to Foucault's research into governance is recognition of the importance of the particular rationalities of government (which he termed governmentalities)—the discourses that construct the logic of governmental powers—at work in any given situation. Discourses, in Foucault's work, are the building blocks of knowledge and power. Discourses are not just ways of speaking but also ways of thinking and acting that are held

together by a particular set of relations (Foucault 1972). Hence Foucault (1972: 49) talks of discourses not 'as groups of signs [...] but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak'. Discourses then do not describe pre-existing objects but imbue objects with meaning and purpose. Through the concept of discourse, Foucault (1972: 29) attempts to disrupt the groupings that 'purport to be natural, immediate, universal unities'. By describing the specific operations of a statement or practice in a particular historical moment in order to engage with the set of relations that regulates its operation.

Foucault (1990: 101) writes that 'a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy'. Meaning, in other words, is socially constructed across a number of sites through discourses. Rationalities of government are discursive formations—combinations of discourses held together by sets of relations that produce a certain network of material relations. However, as Foucault notes, discourses within discursive formations can contradict and oppose as well as reinforce, and can form the basis for opposition. The use of 'strategy' in the previous quote from Foucault deserves some attention. Discourses and rationalities of government do not presuppose a consciousness of a contest over meaning. A strategy, however, includes an element of choice in the designation of means, actions, or procedures in order to come up with winning solutions (1982). Discourses can be strategically deployed in a calculated effort to overcome resistance.

Despite the array of governmental rationalities that operate in modern society independently of the state, Foucault still views the state as important and as having become more important recently. Foucault (1982: 224) writes: 'power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions'. The different areas which have come under state surveillance have become increasingly diversified and, even though the state is not seeking to dominate many fields of possible intervention, it has greatly increased its regulatory role and become increasingly reliant on non-state rationalities of government. The state is therefore still worthy of attention as an important and large set of institutions in the web of governmental power relations that underwrite social institutions and subjectivities.

The implications of governmentality for political analysis are best explored through the example of liberalism, the most widespread political doctrine of our time. Liberalism is commonly defined as a political

doctrine concerned with ensuring the liberty of individuals, in particular from the encroachment of the state (Hindess 1996: 123). Following Foucault, a number of scholars[18] have taken a view of liberalism that emphasizes its use of governmental methods to secure a specific 'form of life' (Dean 1991: 13) concerned with creating a society of free individuals. Essential to liberalism is the notion of 'naturally occurring' processes that cannot be prescribed by the state but are essential to government, the exemplar of these processes being the economy (Dean 1999). In a liberal rationality of government, securing individual liberty is essential to securing these 'natural' processes. Foucault argues:

> The setting in place of [. . .] mechanisms of modes of state intervention whose function is to assure the security of those natural phenomena, economic processes and the intrinsic processes of population: this is what becomes the basic objective of governmental rationality. Hence liberty is registered not only as the right of individuals legitimately to oppose the power, the abuses and usurpations of the sovereign, but also now as an indispensable element of governmental rationality itself (Foucault on 5 April 1978, quoted in C. Gordon 1991: 19–20).

The state's concern with security extends then to ensuring that people have developed the thoughts and behaviours the state deems appropriate for free and independent people in order for the 'natural' processes to properly function. Forms of indirect regulation, such as education, are therefore central to governance. In the case of groups considered to deviate from the supposed norms of free and independent people, the state is obliged to guarantee the security of processes generally considered beyond the state's purview.

Recent writings on governmentality have explored the connection between liberal and authoritarian governmentalities through examining their shared understandings about what constitutes government. Although liberalism is generally associated with freedom, the operation of government in liberal societies has incorporated elements of what Barry Hindess (2001: 94) has termed 'unfreedom' or 'authoritarian rule'. Liberal rationalities of government are based on the assumption that freedom is the ideal condition for individuals to make rational decisions. However, this raises the problem of ensuring that individuals have the appropriate capacity for 'autonomous' action, or in other words, make their choices rationally where their 'rationality' concurs with the logic of the state. The

[18] See Dean (1999), Gordon (1991), Hindess (1996), and Rose (1996a, 1996b).

result has been that large populations (by far the majority of subjects of liberal rule before 1945) have been excluded from full liberal citizenship. Hindess (2001) identifies three categories of response within liberal thought to these populations: extermination (such as John Locke's suggestions about the native inhabitants of America); compulsion of these populations to acquire the required capacities through the imposition of discipline; and, in the case of 'relatively civilized populations', that government facilitate their development through providing a 'benign and supportive environment' (such as welfare recipients). Colonized peoples, such as the indigenous populations of India and also Indonesia, fit into the second category. According to another important liberal philosopher, John Stuart Mill (1977: 567), these populations benefited from continued enslavement since they were not sufficiently advanced 'to be fitted for representative government'.

Foucault's own work was focussed on Western Europe and most of the Governmentality literature is focussed on Western liberal democracies. However, Foucault's concepts have been used in Asian and Latin American contexts.[19] In *Rethinking Indonesia*, Philpott begins the methodological work of considering how Governmentality would operate in the Indonesian context. Philpott argues that Indonesians were not just subject to domination while being under the New Order regime, although this form of power was more widely used than in Western liberal democracies, but were also subject to governmental relations of power. He writes that:

> [The] New Order regime also attempted to regulate, both directly and indirectly, the behaviour of citizens. This regulation sought the realization of certain aims, desires and goals, suggesting that the New Order's practices manifested more than a simple desire for domination [...] The bodies of Indonesians are targets of particular technologies and strategies that seek to construct productive, regulated, controlled, adapted and ultimately, 'governed' subjects. (2000: 150)

Philpott (2000: 166–177) suggests that an 'authoritarian governmentality' existed in Indonesia with its own specific rationality and effects.

A governmental perspective addresses some of the methodological concerns raised previously. It recognizes that power is productive and moves beyond the conception that power is limited to political power. A governmental perspective also provides the analytical tools to differentiate between different discourses within the state and recognizes that the

[19] See Stoler (1995), Said (1993) and Escobar (1984–1985).

state is heterogeneous. Most importantly, it recognizes that government exists beyond the state and begins to move beyond the state-society divide in seeking to understand how people are governed. It focuses attention towards the discourses, strategies, rationalities and institutions that are implicated in forming Indonesians and the continued existence of the nation-state. Culture, within this framework, is of strategic importance as an element of social life that is closely related to group and individual identity. It offers a means for the state and other institutions to target populations and as such is a form of government that can be analysed through the discursive structure that gives it meaning.

Discourses and Culturalities

A criticism of Foucault's concept of power is that although he allows the notion of oppositional discourses, his own work emphasized the one-way moulding of subjectivities because he focused on the institutions of power rather than the situated actions of subjects.[20] There is a danger in using Foucault that 'discussions of agency assume structures of power against individual negotiation' (Boellstorff 2005: 6). However, the absence of structures would also mean the absence of agency. Tom Boellstorff makes this point using the example of language:

> I can, at will and as often as I please, create a well-formed sentence never before produced in the history of the English language . . . Yet I cannot invent new grammars at will; my speech takes place within a horizon of language. Similarly, my agency is produced through (not 'constrained by') culture. (2005: 6)

The ways to avoid overemphasis on institutional power is by considering the contradictions and confusions of discursive formations, and including people in research. People make choices, reinterpret and misunderstand language, and use the power of discourses for their own ends, often at cross-purposes to the goals of institutions. While the state is the largest and most influential set of institutions that seeks to utilize culture, it is not either the only institution or a single unified entity. Many institutions seek to regulate, make use of and contribute to culture, and therefore can

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[20] This criticism is reinforced by his pronunciation of the death of the subject in the context of political debates in the 1970s (referred to as the 'excitable Foucault' by Mark Bevir (1999: 68)), which contradicts with his later writings where the subjects have the capacity to constitute themselves within a regime of power.

impact how culture is understood and used, although the state often takes a regulatory role (directly through censorship, but primarily indirectly through funding, education, classification, promotion, providing venues, amongst other means).

A way of moving away from the notion that state or non-state institutions determine the way people use discourses is the concept of culturalities. A culturality is defined as a combination of discourses that produce culture as a social field, and give meaning to cultural objects, practices and spaces, in a specific time and location. Just as culture is not simply rooted in the logic of the state, culturalities have a much broader basis—including family, ethnic, global cultural flows, and discourses about popular and high culture. Put less formally, culturalities are the historically constituted way that people think and talk about culture at a given moment, and its implications for their and others' behaviour, affiliations, and identity. While state and other institutions are important in regulating a number of fields that influence culturalities, they are not all powerful, since they cannot determine all of the elements of a discourse, or how they interact. How they are put together in a specific place and time is a culturality.

This book focuses on state-run cultural institutions and how their constructions of culture in discourse changed over the twentieth century and during the Reform era. Focussing on formal state discourses about culture is an important way of tracking changes across time, and discourses help constitute culture, but they cannot and do not completely define culture. Using culturalities is a way of mitigating the focus on the state, emphasizing that many discourses shape culture, and acknowledging that culture is constituted in multiple ways across time and space in Indonesia, in spite of the presence of national discourses about culture.

Cultural Policy Perspectives

The use of culture by the state has long been a concern of intellectuals and visionaries. Matthew Arnold's (1994) *Culture and Anarchy*[21] deals extensively with the state's use of culture to create a model society. Arnold takes an aesthetic view of culture that limits it to a narrow selection of practices which he considers to be close to human perfection. Writings about culture and the state by Marxist theorists also privileged the role of

[21] First published in 1882.

a few experts in identifying cultural quality and perfection (for instance, Adorno, [1991]) forming a general point of agreement across the political spectrum. In the fifties, sixties, and seventies, more pluralistic conceptions of culture began to challenge the cultural elitism of older theories particularly in the research relating to popular and working class culture[22] and writings about race and colonialism.[23]

Also in the 1970s, social scientists began to bring new forms of analysis to culture and the arts in particular. Some of the current trends in cultural policy research hark back to this time: 'Cultural Policy Studies' was named and undertaken through the creation of the Association of Cultural Economics and the Centre for Urban Studies at the University of Akron; Herbert Gans published his work on 'taste cultures' (1974); and social science journals such as the *Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society* (est. 1969), and the *Journal of Cultural Economics* (est. 1973) began ongoing publication. Although beginning at the same time as the changes in other disciplines, this body of research was oriented towards the needs of states, which were involved in their own processes of cultural policy reform. Previously, many Western countries had limited cultural policy to arts funding, which was generally directed to activities considered to be elements of high culture. From the 1970s until the present, the scope of cultural policy in Western countries has expanded to include a widening variety of practices and objects along with a broader set of objectives. Cultural policy research in the West has a reciprocal relationship with the changing scope and priorities of states whose policies and institutions generally are the research topic.

Three broad directions in the analysis of cultural policy have developed in the last thirty years. The first perspective is cultural economics which brought economic theory to the field of cultural activities. This method began with the publication of William Baumol and William Bowen's book *Performing Arts: the Economic Dilemma* (1968) and the founding of The *Journal of Cultural Economics* five years later. The more narrow scope of this research, and its propensity to focus on the methodological devices of individualism and rational choice, make it a poor fit with a more holistic and historical examination of a postcolonial cultural policy.

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[22] For instance, Hoggart (1972) Thompson (1963), and Williams, (1965).
[23] For instance, Fanon (1963, 1967).

The second perspective I term the regeneration-through-culture perspective. Rather than understanding policy as being directed at the field of cultural activities, 'cultural regeneration' recognizes culture's utility as a tool of the state. The definition of culture is expanded to include the cultural industries (such as media, fashion, leisure, and tourism), the activities of community groups, lifestyles, and heritage, along with the arts.[24] Culture became a means for generating jobs and income as well as a tool for building community and increasing the quality of life of the populace. Franco Biancini's research into urban regeneration through cultural policy provides an example of this genre or research and how it has developed in tandem with changes in how governments use and administer culture (1987, 1993). Biancini (1993) notes the changes in the strategic objectives of cultural policies in Western European cities between the 1970s concerns with social and political issues to the 1980s focus on economic and urban development. The current concerns with cultural industries (for instance, Hartley [2005]) and debates over creative cities and creative classes (Florida 2002; Landry and Biancini 1995) are often an extension of this approach.

The third perspective on cultural policy takes a wider and more critical view of what cultural policy is and what it does. It focuses on issues of identity formation and power that inhabit the cultural connections between institutions and people. This perspective broadens the scope of cultural policy beyond the current cultural policy developments and regeneration strategies to focus, in the words of Toby Miller and George Yudice (2002: 2) in their book *Cultural Policy*, on 'those cultural knowledges and practices that determine the formation and governance of subjects'. The critical perspective includes a broader range of policies and asks more detailed questions about how culture is used by institutions to influence groups and individuals. The critical perspective brings a rich understanding to the history of cultural policy and historicizes its current developments. It recognizes that the language and race policies of colonial powers are as much cultural policies as urban regeneration strategies in Europe. Similarly, the present cultural policy moment is understood as the product of a particular historical junction and holds within it the mechanisms, inequalities and assumptions of present and past times.

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[24] The inclusion of cultural industries was a particularly important development as it moved away from the elitist division between art and administration and recognized that most cultural goods in Western capitalist societies are provided through the market.

A key figure in formulating the critical approach to cultural policy is Tony Bennett. Bennett's (1992) formulation of cultural policy was framed by the way that contemporary understandings and uses of culture can be traced back to a change that began to occur late in the eighteenth century when culture was put to work within emerging fields of social management. Culture was figured as object or target, as it refers to the morals, manners and ways of life of a populace, and as instrument, because in its more restricted sense culture refers to the domain of artistic and intellectual activities which can be put to work in governmental programmes intervening in and regulating behaviours and attributes of target populations. Initially, artistic and intellectual practices were focussed on the symbolic exclusion of the vast mass of the population from inter-elite communication or, as in the case of Elizabethan theatre, used to disseminate lessons about monarchical power.

Through and after the Enlightenment, artistic and intellectual practices came to be understood as capable of improving the mental and behavioural attributes of the general population and were put to work in programmes. Through these programmes, cultural practices were harnessed to particular types or regions of subject formation in different ways depending on the prevailing notions of a particular historical period. Within Bennett's formulation, the semiotic properties of cultural practices take a back seat to the 'programmatic, institutional, and governmental conditions in which cultural practice are inscribed—in short, the network of relations that fall under a properly theoretical understanding of policy' (1992: 28) because it is the latter that determine how practices are connected with different parts of life and function to achieve specific effects.

Bennett's focus on the governmental, programmatic, and instrumental conditions that give rise to cultural practices clearly informed his definition of culture:

> Culture is more cogently conceived, I want to suggest, when thought of as a historically specific set of institutionally embedded relations of government in which the forms of thought and conduct of extended populations are targeted for transformation—in part via the extension through the social body of the forms, techniques, and regimens of aesthetic and intellectual culture. (1992: 26)

Bennett further elaborated on this definition when he stated that culture should be thought of as:

> a historically produced surface of social regulation whose distinctiveness is to be identified and accounted for in terms of (i) the specific types of attributes and forms of conduct that are established as its targets, (ii) the techniques that are proposed for the maintenance or transformation of such attributes or forms of conduct, (iii) the assembly of such techniques into particular programmes of government, and (iv) the inscription of such programmes into the operative procedures of specific cultural technologies. (1992: 27)

In this formulation, culture is linked to relations of power that permeate society and the state and determine the conditions of its operation within governmental programmes.

Bennett's ideas about cultural policy analysis were strongly opposed by some Cultural Studies practitioners. The main thrust of Bennett's critics was that moving towards a position of easily engaging with institutions (particularly state institutions) was at odds with the critical vocation of Cultural Studies and compromised its independence (Curthoys 1991; During 1993; Grace 1991; Jameson 1993; McGuigan 1996). In reply, cultural policy researchers connected Bennett's advocacy of a greater engagement with policy to a particular political moment in Australia while the centre-left Labour government was in power (S. Cunningham 1992; Miller 1998).

Similarly to the broader criticism of governmentality about the power of institutional discourses, Clive Barnett has criticized the governmental perspective in cultural policy analysis as tending 'to assume a high degree of fit between the political rationalities of institutions and actual processes of subject-formation' (1999: 377). This has been reinforced in Bennett's own work by his focus on official documents and officials (Bennett 1995). Like governmentality research, this book needs to address the contradictions and confusions of cultural discourses and include people. Many aspects of a culturality may be influenced by the state, but it is an unstable and shifting field that facilitates resistance, and is capable of turning against the state, markets and other institutions. The many uses of culture since the fall of Suharto (discussed in Chapter 6) and the different ways culturalities were interpreted during Suharto within regional state-funded cultural institutions (the case studies in Chapter 7) demonstrate that this is regularly the case in Indonesia.

Positions and Issues for Analysis of Indonesian Cultural Policy: Culturalities in a Postcolonial Location

Taking a culturalities approach to Indonesian cultural policy raises a number of issues. First, as has already been addressed, it cannot assume that

state discourses are effective without proof, or the state will be represented as determining the features of either culture of cultural subjectivity. The concept of culturalities emphasizes the broad basis of cultural discourses and the immense difficulties of even powerful institutions completely defining cultural subjects.

The second issue is the relationship between broad and narrow definitions of cultural policy. Bennett (1989: 6) notes culture's importance 'as a set of artistic and intellectual forms' because of its ability to act on and influence the attributes and behaviours (ways of life) of particular populations and the relations between them. The deployment of 'culture' in a narrow sense was therefore the instrument for transformation of culture in a broad sense as 'ways of life'. Bennett (1998: 110) traces the process of this now widespread splitting back to the emergence of 'liberal forms of government' in the nineteenth century where the deployment of culture would 'help cultivate a capacity for voluntary self regulation in the general population'. The deployment of artistic and intellectual forms through institutions and programmes is, as suggested by the literature on Indonesian cultural policy and in the chapters that follow, an important cultural strategy of government and part of the governmental conditions that produce culture. Although this book focuses on cultural policy in its narrow sense, interactions with both broad definitions of culture and cultural policy are important elements of how cultural policy is devised and deployed. A third issue is the application of a governmentalities approach in a postcolonial location. A problem when applying contemporary cultural policy analysis to a postcolonial setting like Indonesia is the underlying assumption of a Western setting. Clive Barnett's criticism of the critical cultural policy perspective is perhaps even more apt for the other two perspectives:

> cultural policy studies [...] assumes the existence of the characteristic institutional arrangements of liberal, representative democracy, and the existence of an elaborate public sphere of cultural institutions mediating the relationship between nation-state and citizenry (1999: 374).

All three perspectives outlined above have grown out of debates in the Western academy and have largely focussed on cultural policy developments in the West. Virginia Dominguez and Sasha Welland, in their introduction to an edited book about national cultural policies in East and Southeast Asia, make the point that 'contemporary culturalism is not regionally restricted, not primarily European, and not simply a case of mimicry by Europe's former colonies' (1998: 5). Additionally, as Anne Stoler (1995, 1996) demonstrates in her research into race and culture, the work of culture for

the colonial administrations used the same logic as Western nation-states but with different purposes and results. Cultural policy was put to work in different ways in Indonesia than the West, and thus requires a methodology that is capable of reflecting on its own assumptions and histories.

Governmentality (paired with culturalities) presents itself as a methodological solution to this problem for two reasons. Firstly, as was demonstrated previously, it provides a method for assessing the complex relationship between Western, colonial, and authoritarian regimes that is necessary for an analysis of cultural policy history in a postcolonial setting. Secondly, previous cultural policy research in Asia has successfully employed Foucaultian tools to analyse how culture has been constructed as a discursive formation due to its location within different governmental discourses. Chua Beng Huat and Eddie Kuo's analysis of cultural policy in Singapore identifies Singaporean national identity and Singaporeans as the results of discursive practices with 'temporally changing characters' that are "called into existence' by statements that circulate in different discourses, in different spheres of social practices' (1998: 37). By recognizing Singaporean culture as discursively constructed rather than an object with determined features, Chua and Kuo are able to map changes to official Singaporean culture due to changes in government policies and strategies.[25]

Fourth, a cultural policy approach needs to address the issue of cultural policy scales in Indonesia. There are four levels of the state in Indonesia which employed cultural bureaucrats: the national bureaucracy, the province, the regency or city (*kabupaten* or *kotamadya*), local government (*kecamatan*). The national government also had line offices based in the regions, which are addressed in the appropriate chapters. Royal houses also exist across Indonesia, who were cultural patrons during the colonial period, but whose wealth and prestige has declined during the national period, although there are signs of a return to political importance in some areas since decentralization owing to the local political alignments. There were and still are a number of Indonesian non-government organizations that were concerned with culture. Their perspectives and affiliations are linked to the political and social context in different historical periods. Foreign government and international NGO cultural institutions are also

[25] Governmentality is also used to analyse Singaporean cultural policy by Kwok and Low (2002).

active in Indonesia, with the French Cultural Centres, the Goethe Institute, the Japan Foundation and the Ford Foundation all having cultural programmes. Finally, supranational institutions can have important influences on culturality. One institution looked at in detail in the chapters that follow is UNESCO, in particular its cultural policy programmes and its changing approach to culture in Indonesia. Indonesia has also been involved with ASEAN, although concerns about sovereignty prevented a far reaching cultural influence. International economic institutions can also have an influence through enforcing cultural deregulation (Miller and Yudice 2002) or through the effects of broader policies like the World Bank's push for decentralization after the fall of Suharto (addressed in Chapter 6).

Finally, research into Indonesian cultural policy requires an understanding of the classifications Indonesians use to cleave culture into workable chunks. The key division is between *tradisional* culture (Indonesian spelling), which captures indigenous cultural practices that are generally linked to indigenous ethnic groups and *moderen* culture, which refers to contemporary cultural forms from Indonesia and overseas that are addressed to all Indonesians and/or humanity in general. But in order to avoid the value judgements that can accompany traditional/modern designations, most commentators (for instance, Foulcher [1990] and Yampolsky [1995]) prefer the terms 'regional' (or in some cases 'local') and 'national' or 'Indonesian' (which captures the national framing of international forms). Yet in Indonesia 'national' has applied to patriotic pieces rather than genres. Following Yampolsky (1995), I use the term regional culture to refer to those linked by history, language or culture to a particular region and often ethnicity, and pan-Indonesian to refer to contemporary culture that uses the national language and addresses all Indonesians.[26] Beyond this division, Indonesians have used culture to refer to a range of practices deemed cultural through either their inclusion in a category of the arts, connections to rituals or language, when the term is used in the context of cultural policy.

[26] It should be noted that ethnic culture that is not indigenous falls outside of this division, and is generally ignored in cultural policy. This has created difficulties in gaining cultural recognition for large migrant ethnic groups, in particular Indonesian-Chinese, who also had their culture suppressed by the state throughout the New Order era (Coppel 1983, 2002).

Two Postcolonial Cultural Policy Tools: Authoritarian Cultural Policy and Command Culture

Cultural policy influences culturalities in different ways due to the logic of different political regimes. Within a contemporary liberal democratic regime, the state theoretically respects the freedom of choice of the majority of citizens (more accurately, those citizens the state decides have the faculties to exercise responsible choices), so cultural policies tend not to be heavy handed. Instead, cultural policies operate within a framework where they attempt to alter behaviours through seeking the engagement of individuals with cultural activities in order to educate and refine. The first culturalities tool for Indonesia is authoritarian cultural policy, or cultural policy formulated with the assumption that the majority of a state's subjects do not have the faculties to exercise a responsible citizenship, and are in need of state guidance in their cultural choices. Authoritarian cultural policy has a different dynamic as the state is assumed to have the knowledge to cultivate individuals to their full capacity, and therefore has a greater propensity to intervene in and censor cultural practices in order to assert its desired version of culture.

The second tool is the command culture model of cultural policy. Toby Miller and George Yudice use the term 'command culture' to differentiate state-based models of cultural provision from models which privilege the market. They write: 'The notion of a non-market form of cultural provision always already centres the state in planning, creating, policing and revising cultural practice' (2002: 107). The state's role as a provider of culture is emphasized in particular through broadcasting and subsidizing cultural activities, educating residents, and training arts workers. They use the idea of the command-culture to challenge the assumption that the market-based model is 'natural' and state intervention is somehow 'a distortion' (2002: 107) and to identify cultural provision as it occurred under fascist and socialist governments. Of course within the command culture model there are a wide variety of methods of cultural provision. Miller and Yudice are careful to distinguish between state-socialist and fascist models (the former characterized as proclaiming an 'egalitarian, worker-oriented world', the latter as 'dedicated to chauvinistic nationalism and the heroization of conquest and domination',) which are primarily linked through the increased role of the state and opposition to the market-based provision of culture (2002: 108). Additionally, and importantly for discussion of Indonesia, they address the idea of a postcolonial model, 'which intersects with command-cultural models and profit-based ones' (2002:

108). I argue in the chapters that follow that Indonesian cultural policy has demonstrated elements of command-culture and market-based models as it has struggled to come to terms with issues of national identity, ethnic difference and cohesion, internal political conflict, the need for economic development, and the pressures of an increasingly integrated international capitalist system.

Tracking the extent to which both authoritarian cultural policy and a command culture model were in operation and their effectiveness provides a way of assessing trends and developments across political regimes, and the growth and implications of mass-produced consumer culture in Indonesia.

Structure and Approach

This book is divided into two parts. Part I provides a historical account of how cultural policy has been constituted in Indonesia from the late colonial period to the post-New Order 'Reformasi' era. I make use of the periodization of Indonesian history by political regimes that has become standard in most Indonesian history texts that encompass the twentieth century (see, for instance, Cribb and Brown (1995) and Ricklefs [2001]). The use of political regimes to mark eras is fitting here because the governmental changes brought by new political regimes are considered the key generators of cultural policy change. However, my use of political eras does not assume that policy change naturally occurs with regime change. Considerable attention is given to the reasons for cultural policy changes and continuities, both between and within political eras.

The first five chapters demonstrate how technologies of government developed in Europe were translated to and put to work in Indonesia and altered across time due to both internal and external circumstances. This requires analysis of the changing governmental discourses in Indonesia across the twentieth century and its implications for cultural policy. The five chapters are chronological and follow a similar pattern. They begin with a discussion of how culture was formulated in governmental discourse before moving to the details of official cultural policy in order to identify the distinctive features of the cultural policy of particular eras. The exceptions to this method are chapters three and four that analyse the New Order era. Chapter three provides important background information through presenting an account of the causes of the changing articulation of culture in governmental discourses while chapter four analyses

the impact of these changes on official cultural policy, thus replicating the pattern across two chapters.[27] While the focus is on government discourses in Part I, the implications of these discourses for culturalities are considered in each chapter.

Part II consists of two case studies of cultural programmes run by the Directorate of Culture. The chapters explore the links between cultural programmes and governmental rationalities as well as demonstrating how different culturalities formed in different locations and affected the operation of cultural policies. The chapters focus on the technologies and techniques of cultural institutions that were inscribed into cultural programmes, how these were spread across Indonesia and how the broader political and social changes since 1998 have influenced the actual operations of cultural policy. Instead of assuming uniform outcomes generated by a centralized, singular state, the case studies explore the possibility of a plural and diverse array of outcomes and occurrences. Additionally, these chapters recognize the resistances both within institutions and by the subjects of cultural policy to the strategies and designs of Indonesian governments, and as such are the best example of the capacity in culturalities for resistance to power and diverse outcomes. The two case studies tackle quite different cultural institutions. The first case study chapter investigates the creation and operation of two kinds of arts institutions across Indonesia: the *taman budaya* (cultural parks) and the *dewan kesenian* (arts councils). The cultural parks and the arts councils were located within the provincial capital cities and were therefore situated within a diverse range of locations. The second case study chapter examines a

[27] My emphasis in Part I is on official policies and the discourses that informed them, rather than the activities and criticisms of non-state individuals and groups. I seek to explore the changing ways the state used culture and include the activities and writings of non-state actors only where they intersected with cultural policy programmes or changes in cultural policy. Focussing on official cultural policies that were applied across Indonesia excludes two noteworthy categories. These are Chinese Indonesians, who have been subject to state policies that at different times have aimed to differentiate them from and assimilate them into the indigenous population and were rarely addressed in cultural policy, and Bali, which has been granted a special status as a culturally-rich 'living museum' since the Dutch conquest of Bali in 1908 (Picard 1997: 185). The treatment of Chinese Indonesians and Bali require more extensive analysis than is possible here and have both been the subject of considerable scholarly attention. On the forces that shaped Balinese cultural identity including governance during the colonial and independence periods, see Picard (1997, 1999), Schulte Nordholt (1986)and Vickers (1989). On Chinese Indonesians, see, Coppel (1983, 2002), Godley and Lloyd (2001), Heryanto (1998), Mackie (1976) and Suryadinata (1993).

series of national cultural research projects coordinated by the Directorate of Culture.

Criticism of governmental cultural perspectives has, as I have explored throughout this chapter, centred on advocates like Bennett's' calls for greater engagement with institutions and in particular the state. Advocates of greater engagement have been taken 'to task for overstating the case for a 'useful knowledge' of an involvement in governmental practices over the cultivation and deployment of a critical knowledge' (Yudice 1999: 2). In contrast to Bennett's model of engagement, much Foucaultian research has been aimed at upsetting rather than working with the structures of intelligibility that organize practices, identities and institutions. Michael Shapiro writes that Foucault's genealogical method is one of disrupting and defamiliarizing the familiar. He writes that:

> the genealogical imagination construes all systems of intelligibility as [...] false arrests, as the arbitrary fixings of the momentary results of struggles among contending forces, struggles that could have produced other possible systems of intelligibility and the orders they support. (1992: 2)

The end of the Suharto era has been a time of review and change, which is where a culturalities perspective can contribute. I hope to present a historical analysis of contemporary practices, indicating and exploring the struggles and choices, and opening up new narratives and histories for exploration in the area of cultural policy. The timing is right for critical disruptions of the present as a pathway to new policies and approaches to culture.

PART ONE

A SHORT HISTORY OF INDONESIAN CULTURAL POLICY

CHAPTER II

THE GENESIS OF MODERN CULTURAL POLICY IN INDONESIA: CULTURE AND GOVERNMENT IN THE LATE COLONIAL AND JAPANESE OCCUPATION PERIODS, 1900–1945

> It is easy to forget that minorities came into existence in tandem with majorities [...] They were born of the political and cultural revolution brought about by the maturing of the colonial state and by the rise against it of popular nationalism. The former fundamentally changed the structures and aims of governance, the latter its legitimacy.
>
> Benedict Anderson (1987a: 1) in *Southeast Asian Tribal Groups and Ethnic Minorities*.

Indonesian cultural policy was born within the complex relationship between Indonesian populations and the policies of foreign administrations. Renowned Southeast Asian scholar Benedict Anderson's observation about minorities highlights that when the Indonesian nationalists declared independence, they declared popular dominion over a territory that was already profoundly shaped by modern methods of government. The resistance of anticolonial nationalists was defined against the colonial state, often using ideas shaped through the lens of Western educations, then influenced by Japanese occupation during World War II. Dutch colonial cultural policy and Japanese occupying cultural policy should not be understood as fundamentally different from post-independence cultural policy, but as its precursors.

This chapter begins by exploring the connections between the emergence of cultural policy and changes to governance in Europe. Changes in Europe are the context for the focus of this chapter—how culture was shaped through its use by three different groups attempting to influence the behaviour and practices of indigenous Indonesians. I examine the colonial state through the example of the colonial administration's publishing house for Malay language literature, Balai Pustaka. The second group is the cultural nationalists, who I explore through the example of the cultural polemics, a series of high-profile debates amongst Indonesian nationalists about Indonesian culture that took place in the mid to late 1930s. Finally, I turn to the cultural policy of the Japanese, and its relationship to the ideas of nationalists and the cultural institutions of the new republic.

This chapter also uses the two analytical tools discussed in the introduction that help measure the shifts in Indonesian cultural policy and charts differences to the cultural policies of Western nations. The first is the authoritarian/liberal scale, which focuses on the subject of cultural policy. While liberal models of cultural policy assume fully-developed, rational subjects capable of making their own choices, the flip-side of the liberal model are subjects that are not capable of making rational choices, in which case the state grants itself an authoritarian license to take greater control of decisions, including in the cultural realm. This authoritarian flipside of liberalism is present in colonial cultural policy. The second is the command culture and market models, which differentiate state-based and market-based models of cultural provision.

The cultural policy link between the colonial administration, the occupying Japanese and the nationalists is the common 'improving' or 'civilizing' function attributed to culture discussed in the Introduction. Culture was understood as being able to change the attributes of populations through addressing the behaviours of individuals, making it a useful field for governmental programmes. Culture was used to 'improve' the indigenous populations/Indonesians, although towards very different ends and using different models of improvement. However, there are also commonalities. An important shared component is the way it was used to prescribe behavioural standards using a cultural field (such as literature), where some practices could be condemned and others promoted as appropriate behaviour or ideas. Tony Bennett (1998: 91) identifies that culture has 'functioned to lay open the ways of life of different sections of the populace to reformist programmes of government'. Drawing from Robert Young (1995: 29), Bennett notes how culture is usually thought of as opposed to something or as itself internally divided. The resulting sectors are rarely on equal terms. Instead, there is typically a hierarchical ordering of relations between sectors. He states:

> It is this hierarchical ordering of the relations between the different spheres of culture that results in a strategic normativity in which one component of the cultural field is strategically mobilized in relation to another as offering the means of overcoming whatever shortcomings (moral, political or aesthetic) are attributed to the latter. This results in the establishment of a normative gradient down which the flow of culture is directed in reformist programmes through which cultural resources are brought to bear on whatever might be the task to hand. (1998: 92)

Uncovering and examining the 'hierarchical ordering' inscribed into culture through cultural policies will help reveal and compare the different dynamics of cultural policy.

Late Colonial Rule in the East Indies (1900–1942)

A feature of liberalism is its constant critique of its own methods, including colonial administration, and its constant review of the extent of its interventions. One such critique of colonial government in the Dutch East Indies coincided with the turn of the twentieth century, which is where I begin my analysis of Dutch colonial administration. While it cannot be said that the ethical period of Dutch colonial rule (1900–1930) was the start of the colonial government's concern with education or welfare or that it was successful at achieving far-reaching gains in either of these areas, it can be said that increased attention and energy was given to these areas during the period, and that these changes had a formative influence on a small but important group which became nationalist leaders. The state's concern with education began in 1848, the same year that the Fundamental Law was passed in Netherlands to guarantee everyone in the Netherlands a free education, with a grant of money to educate Javanese to become officials, and slowly increased throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century (Saunders 1984: 26). The rationale of the liberal period (1870–1900) was also aimed at improving the welfare of the indigenous population through the removal of barriers to free enterprise, which it was hoped would stimulate economic development. However, by the turn of the next century there was a realization amongst administrators and observers in the Indies and Netherlands that the welfare of indigenous farmers had declined under these policies (Wertheim and The 1962). The most noted expression of the changing attitude in the Netherlands towards the Indies is an article by the Netherlands politician C. Th. van Deventer entitled 'A debt of honour' and published in 1899 in the Dutch journal de Gids. Van Deventer argued that the Netherlands owed a debt of honour to the Indies to repay the fi87 million that was taken from the Indies between 1867 and 1878 when the Netherlands' finances were sound, and to ensure the good government of the Indies' inhabitants. His sentiments gained broad support from a number of political parties and individuals including Queen Wilhelmina (Furnivall 1967). The Indies debt of f40 million was taken by the Netherlands in order to encourage spending on social services, and the colonial administration began to take a greater interest in the living standards, work practices, and education of the indigenous populace (Wertheim and The 1962).

Frances Gouda has linked the ethical policy to the advent of social liberalism and the social policies it advocated in the Netherlands (2000: 14–20). Social liberalism advocated an increased role for the state in the Netherlands, making the state responsible for securing the basic necessities

that were distributed by entrenched interest groups within Dutch society, what are known in the Netherlands as 'pillars' . Gouda writes that:

> social liberals envisioned the primary purpose of state policy to be educating and civilizing both the disorganized, unruly poor and the more politically mobilized working class in order to elevate them to virtuous citizenship within their semi cloistered circles. (2000: 14)

The architects of the ethical policy envisioned a related change of policy in Indonesia that would nurture the material, educational and cultural well-being of indigenous subjects. The views about indigenous Indonesians that circulated between 1900 and 1942 generally shared an evolutionary rhetoric about the relative stages of development of 'native' and 'European' populations (Gouda 1995: 155). Overseeing this process of evolution was a historical task of the Dutch that bordered on the religious. Hence Johan Christian van Eerde (Van Eerde 1928: 54, in Gouda 1995: 39), a Professor in the Colonial Institute in Amsterdam, could say in 1914 that the Dutch provided the best guarantees that it will 'implement the appropriate policies' in order to administer 'the gradual adjustment process and evolutionary development that indigenous people must go through in order to achieve a higher level of civilization'.

After 1901, the state greatly expanded its programmes aimed at improving the welfare of the indigenous population. The programmes that absorbed the bulk of the resources and energy of the colonial administration were education, irrigation, and emigration, and although not receiving the same level of financial support, there was a tenfold spending increase on health (Ricklefs 2001). Despite these reforms, most assessments of the outcomes of the period are scathing. W.F. Wertheim and The Siauw Giap (1962) highlight the failure of the ethical policy to achieve its lofty ideals due to its limited scope, the reformers' inability to assess the needs of the indigenous population, and the stultifying social stratification of colonial society by race. Historian Merle Ricklefs (2001) assessed it as a token gesture aimed more at alleviating the consciences of the colonizers than achieving real change amongst the indigenous population. Although the ethical period did not bring meaningful reforms, a new appreciation of culture emerged within colonial administration, as is evident in Gouda's research. Her book, *Dutch Culture Overseas* (1995), provides a broad appraisal of life and governance in the Dutch East Indies in the twentieth century. Gouda's work assists in locating Dutch colonial administration as a version of liberal colonial governance and to explain why culture becomes more prominent as an area of policy during this period.

The method through which the Netherlands pursued colonial administration was a point of Dutch national pride. As a minor player in Europe, the Dutch felt that they could not and should not rule with brute force. Instead, many Dutch colonial administrators 'saw their primary role as one of governing their districts with more anthropological learning, greater cultural sensitivity, and better political skills than any other imperial power in Asia' (Gouda 1995: 41). Cultural knowledge was an element of Dutch colonial governance as it provided a resource for 'skilled' government. Gouda writes:

> Since the late nineteenth century, Dutch colonial governance revealed a remarkable symmetry between the desire for knowledge and the desire for power. [...] In other words, *adat* scholarship in colonial Indonesia, which had become deeply entrenched by the 1920s, was unequivocally beholden to the logic of colonial rule. (1995: 43)

The Indies state, which had shown relatively little interest in cultural research before the ethical period, 'embraced its role as a faithful sponsor' of cultural research, in the process reconstructing what was previously considered 'esoteric wisdom' or the 'whimsical hobby' of oddballs into 'a tool that was essential to the pursuit of a truly 'enlightened' colonial administration' (1995: 225).

Adat was defined in the *Encyclopaedia of the Dutch East Indies* as 'customs and practices that guide every aspect of indigenous life: social relations, agriculture, treatment of the sick, judicial arrangements, ancestor worship, burial of the dead, games and popular entertainment, etc' (*Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indie* 1917: 6). *Adat* research furnished the colonial state with discrete categories and knowledge that it put to use within its administration. Nineteen or twenty different *adat* regions were charted based on ethnographic research. Gouda writes in relation to the legal field that:

> the task of Dutch *adat l*aw experts was to enumerate and index the data on each separate realm of customary law. This would lead to the construction of an overall taxonomy that might enable European civil servants and their native retainers to employ the kind of judicial reasoning that fostered, as much as possible, due process of law across the enormous expanse of the archipelago. (1995: 57)

Good colonial government was to lean on knowledge of the practices and processes of the native populations.

Adat scholarship's entry into colonial administration allowed the colonial state to reformulate its task in line with its new 'ethical' commitment.

The Dutch saw their task as nurturing 'the organic development of indigenous people in order to enable them to flourish' (Gouda 1995: 39). In contrast, Sri Lanka where local customs and traditions were to be overwritten by a British model of civil society (Scott 1995), the 'unofficial spokesperson' for Dutch colonialism Arnold de Kat Angelino (1931: 464) writes that the Dutch had to respect the 'organic diversity' of Indonesians' lives and 'orchestrate the proper role of all the individual organisms that compose the whole' in order to oversee the 'right functions, the right organs, the right ligaments.' A central concept of the Dutch form of colonial management was cultural synthesis that Gouda writes 'entailed a happy marriage between the systematic, and above all, sensitive insights of European civil servants and pristine Indonesian customs and institutions that had organically grown over time and would continue to do so under Dutch tutelage'[1] (1995: 51).

Dutch colonial governance during the ethical period did not aim to reshape Indonesian society but to guide natural 'organic' cultural processes towards their evolution and in doing so oversee the improvement of the indigenous populations. From this perspective, the emergence of culture in policy at this time was a product of the governmentalization of the state in a colonial location. Culture was being brought within the broad custodianship of the state and became an ongoing spatial organizing principle of the state in Indonesia. Indigenous Indonesians fared poorly within the cultural taxonomy that supported the continuation of Dutch rule. They were categorized as lacking the capacities for full participation in colonial society and the rights of full citizenship. The 'organic process' that was to result in a stage of maturation suitable for Indies autonomy was going to take, according to Governor-General de Jonge in 1936, another 300 years.[2] In addition to legitimizing colonial rule, the pluralism of the

[1] Benda too comments on the 'modernizing' Dutch model that underlay the basis of reforms until the late 1920s (1966: 601). He also observes that the reforms of the 1930s aimed to reverse this trend through two moves. Firstly, a form of indirect rule that was based on ethnic groupings was to replace territorial groupings and, secondly, the position of the regional Dutch administration was strengthened without providing any education or opportunities to indigenous rulers or civil servants. Despite these changes, both sets of reforms were evolutionary and utilized cultural taxonomies. The difference was that the former aimed to modernize more quickly along a Western model while the latter took a much more conservative approach that emphasized continued Dutch control and a slower pace of change.

[2] De Jonge, a conservative who was opposed to Indies autonomy, said this in an interview with the North Sumatran daily Deli Courant. The quote has been reproduced in Benda (1966: 90–91, fn8). See Gouda (1995: 25) for a longer discussion of de Jonge's attitude

cultural categories also supported the 'divide and rule' tactics of the Dutch state in the face of the threat of unified opposition from either nationalist or Islamic groups.

The use of cultural knowledge within colonial governance should not be understood as an isolated event but as an element of a broader change in governmental techniques. Ann Stoler's (1995) research explores how technologies of race and class developed in Europe and its colonial empires informed the taxonomies that underlay the emergence of new techniques of government in Europe. Stoler argues that a racial taxonomy was used to differentiate populations in order to define the internal and external boundaries of the nation and to link individual morals and behaviours with national strength within liberal rationalities of government (1995).[3] For instance, although 1848 marks the beginning of the Dutch liberal-parliamentary state 'identified with philanthropic bourgeois interventions to uplift the home environments of the domestic working class,' it also was the year where racial dualism was enshrined in legislation in the East-Indies (Stoler 1995: 120). Thus while race tended to unify populations in Europe and led to greater inclusion in social programmes, it further stratified the East Indies. Although the ethical policy introduced programmes that targeted indigenous Indonesians, racial stratification still both divided European from indigenous Indonesian cultural programmes and underlay the so-called 'civilizing' function of the programmes themselves.

Cultural Policy for Europeans

It was no coincidence that cultural policy began at a time when bourgeois states were increasingly attempting to alter the attitudes and behaviours of its citizens. Tony Bennett, in a study of museums in England, observes:

> In the nineteenth century [...] the most ardent advocates of public museums, free libraries and the like typically spoke of them in connection with courts, prisons, poorhouses and, more mundanely, the provision of public sanitation and fresh water. For [early museum advocate William Stanley]

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to colonial governance. Similarly, the Royal Decree of 16 November 1938 in reply to the Soetardjo petition for self-government held that 'maturation' to the stage of independence would take many decades if not centuries (Gouda 1995: 63).

[3] Many authors have noted how the colonies were used as social laboratories for developing technologies of government and scientific knowledges before being imported back to the metropole. See Gouda (2000) and Rabinow (1989).

> Jevons, free libraries were merely one among many engines 'for operating upon the poorer portions of the population.' (1998: 109)

The English state sponsored a capillary system of cultural diffusion because of the belief that exposure to bourgeois culture would alter the behaviour of the working class, creating more refined social conduct. Cultural institutions were viewed as necessary concomitants to sanitation and education initially because of the cultural object's assumed near-mystical power to transform through its aesthetic properties, but later because of its educative value if framed correctly within the context of a well-run cultural institution.

Hierarchies of race became more important to cultural institutions with the growth of the natural sciences in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century. The natural science collections, including emerging disciplines such as ethnology, anthropology, geology, and archaeology, provided the state with an educational tool structured around Darwin's concept of evolution (Bennett 1998), with broad similarities to the cultural taxonomies in the Dutch East Indies. The importance of Darwin for museum practice was that visitors could see themselves on an evolutionary scale. In the same manner that evolutionary succession ordered displays, liberal governance asked its citizens for an ordered development. The museum, Bennett (1998) argues, was more than a tool for justifying the dominance of white Europeans in the colonies and policing racial, gender and class hierarchies within the nation. It also was an important educational device that made use of race, class, and gender to shape European citizenries.

In the East Indies, institutions were either established for Europeans or for indigenous Indonesians, often with different purposes. A notable example of the trajectory of European cultural policy was one of Asia's earliest museums, established in Batavia in 1778.[4] Paul Michael Taylor says of the museum:

> Still, the collecting institution and its spectatorship were European, as was the scientific method which upheld the collecting tradition and was celebrated by the museum. Thus museums summarized and reinforced

[4] The birth of the Indonesian National Museum is tied to the history of Dutch scholarship on Indonesia. Debates within the Dutch Society of the Sciences (Hollandsche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen, est. 1752) over the establishment of a colonial branch in Batavia led to the founding of an independent scientific organization called the Batavia Society for Arts and Sciences (Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen), whose beginning marks the start of the museum and whose collection later became the national collection.

> Europeans' sense of having a hierarchically more advanced culture, even in the guise of celebrating the cultures of other peoples whose objects were assembled. (1995: 106)

A museum thus existed for Europeans in Indonesia since the end of the eighteenth century. However, European cultural activities and institutions experienced their biggest expansion only after 1900.[5] The colonial state began to invest much more heavily in archaeology at the same time and established a Commission of Antiquities (Oudheidkundige Commissie) in 1901, and paid for Borobudur to be restored between 1907 and 1911. An example of the simultaneous growth of non-government activities was the Culture Circles (Kunstkringen). The first was established in 1901 in Batavia and soon other Culture Circles were established in cities and towns where there was a Dutch presence. By 1930, the Culture Circles had a combined membership of ten thousand and promoted concerts by famous European musicians and exhibitions of European pictures, patronized indigenous arts, and promoted theatre and cinema (Furnivall 1967).

Cultural Policy for Indonesians

A prime example of the different trajectory followed by cultural institutions for indigenous Indonesians is the government printing house Balai Pustaka. Balai Pustaka has its origins in a committee that was established in 1908 to study the problems of popular reading (Commissie voor de Volkslectuur) which became the Office for Literature (Kantor voor de Volkslectuur) in 1917. In 1920, it acquired its own printing house specializing in book printing and binding. Balai Pustaka was the product of two trends within Dutch colonial administration. First, it was part of a long term goal of the standardization of the local languages and, in particular, Malay in order to assist in the efficient and effective administration of the Indies colonies (Maier 1993). Second, its creation was an expression of the ethical policy's attention to social welfare in that it was trying to alter the behaviours and attributes of the indigenous population through engagement with literature. This goal is confirmed by an entry about literature in the *Netherlands Indies Encyclopaedia* of 1917, which stated that the government was aware 'that the ability to read could bring about all

[5] Furnivall (1967) gives a broad survey of the growth of cultural activities amongst Europeans. He states: 'The Ethical movement started a new era in intellectual progress' (1967: 416).

kinds of unwelcome results except in the case that there would be taken care of providing good and inexpensive materials' ('Volkslectuur' 1917, in Kimmen 1981: 88–9). Balai Pustaka was, in other words, an instrument through which the state attempted to assert a measure of control over the cultural development of its indigenous subjects where it considered the market inadequate.

Balai Pustaka published three kinds of books: children's books, practical books (about things like cooking, planting, and animal breeding), and adult literature. Within its literary publications for adult readers, Merle Ricklefs (2001) asserts that Balai Pustaka had three tasks: the publication of older classical works in regional languages; translations and adaptations of Western literature into Malay; and publication of new Malay language literature. However, Balai Pustaka's first Director, Douwe Adolf Rinkes, planned to publish periodicals 'in a number of Indonesian languages' and Balai Pustaka's popular almanac, which sold 100 000 copies, was published in four languages: Javanese, Malay, Sundanese and Madurese (Drewes 1961: 432–3). Papers were also published in Malay, Javanese and Sundanese on a weekly, bi-weekly or monthly basis.

The Office for Literature greatly assisted the circulation of Balai Pustaka books. The primary form of circulation was the creation of libraries in the public Malay language schools for indigenous children. By 1914, there were 680 libraries, 1618 in 1920 and 2528 in 1930 (Furnivall 1967).[6] Local agents were appointed for book sales where demand indicated buyers may be found. However, the agents did not last long owing to the small size of the market. Instead, the state sent out book motor vans to aid sales and distribution. Balai Pustaka had a remarkable circulation given the low literacy rates. In 1920, for instance, 100,000 books were sold and one million borrowings recorded (Ricklefs 2001). Balai Pustaka was established because of a perceived shortcoming in the literature being produced in the Indies for its indigenous inhabitants in the eyes of the Dutch administrators. According to Rinkes, Balai Pustaka was to provide reading materials that would 'satisfy the people's desire to read and advance their knowledge, as much as and according to contemporary standards of order. In doing so, all things which could damage Government power and state security must be purged' (Rinkes 1923: 13, in Tickell 1982). Rinkes lists another of Balai Pustaka's functions as preventing 'undesirable consequences that may

[6] These numbers exclude Dutch language libraries.

Table 2.1: The strategic splitting of Balai Pustaka and bacaan liar publications

Balai Pustaka	*Bacaan Liar*
Apolitical	Political
Moral	Immoral
Good literature	Substandard literature

destroy law and order' due to 'dangerous reading matter from booksellers whose intentions were less than pure and by persons who wished to stir up feelings' (Rinkes 1923: 13, in Tickell 1982). Balai Pustaka's editorial policies corroborate with Rinkes' comments. Balai Pustaka would not publish books with clearly religious overtones since it took a neutral stance on religion; it would not publish works that contained political views contrary to the government; and it would not publish any 'immoral' literature (Teeuw 1967: 14). The pre-Balai Pustaka literature criticized by Rinkes above is now known as *bacaan liar* (literally, uncontrolled readings). *Bacaan liar* is characterized by a degree of independence from state control in both its form and content. In many cases, the material was 'unashamedly political', linked directly to nationalist movements and written by politically active figures (Tickell 1982: 11).

The operation of hierarchical ordering in culture mentioned in the introduction to this chapter can be identified in the strategic splitting between *bacaan liar* and Balai Pustaka literature inherent in Rinkes comments and Balai Pustaka's editorial policies. Political writing was labelled 'subversive' and not considered good literature. Of course, the hierarchical relations between the two forms of reading materials constructed by Balai Pustaka (detailed in table 2.1) were closely related to the colonial state's cultural management of its indigenous population. The state was marking out for reform those attitudes and behaviours that it considered obstructed its goals for the improvement of its indigenous subjects.

Paul Tickell's research about Balai Pustaka provides a number of insights into the institution's practices, in particular its editorial policies. While Tickell's argument is about the formation of the Indonesian literary canon, his account of the changes made to Balai Pustaka novels, such as *Salah Asuhan* (Muis 1928) illustrates Balai Pustaka's reforming function. The original draft of *Salah Asuhan*, submitted by author and active nationalist Abdul Muis, was judged to offend 'the moral and political sensibilities' of the Balai Pustaka editors (1928). The major cause of offence was the depiction of a major female character, a Dutch woman, who was in

the original novel 'morally suspect, the cause of a marriage breakdown, greedy, rapacious and ultimately [depicted] as a prostitute' (Tickell 1982: 197). In the rewritten version, the Dutch woman becomes half-French, half-Indonesian and the cause of the marriage breakdown is shifted to a male Indonesian character and his betrayal of tradition. Other novels were rejected for moral reasons, such as Armijn Pane's *Belenggu* due to its depiction of adultery. Suwarsih Djojopuspito's original Sundanese language manuscript for *Buiten het Gareel*, identified by some commentators as the pre-eminent novel of the period (Teeuw 1967), was originally rejected because of it contained too little instruction and was not written in a simple enough style (Foulcher 1993b). Since Balai Pustaka had a near monopoly over defining what was serious literature, subjects and attitudes labelled immoral and politically subversive by the colonial state were labelled inappropriate for serious literature and manuscripts including such subjects and attitudes were more difficult to get published and suffered from a lower circulation.

Bacaan liar publications were effectively wiped out by the end of the 1920s. A second effect of the cultural strategies used in Balai Pustaka was the establishment of new aesthetic standards that identified literature with apolitical writing. Tickell writes:

> Balai Pustaka never expressed its role in direct political terms, viz, the elimination of politically partisan oppositional literature, although it did see itself as 'improving' the standards of publishing and literature. The standards that it used were however loaded—excluding the politically motivated, anything that may have been construed as anti-Dutch, labelling all but officially published material as *bacaan liar* and its publishers as those 'with impure intentions.' (1982: 196)

New forms of literature which did not conform to the standards, such as the commercial popular fiction, *roman picisan*, were dismissed as 'popular' and therefore substandard. The aesthetic standards established by Balai Pustaka have had long and ongoing effects on literary criticism that fed into later Indonesian literary debates (Foulcher 1993b). In the 1920s and 1930s the Dutch began to move away from the ethical policy and turned towards cultural relativism and racial determinism. Changes in the administration's policies were reflected in Balai Pustaka, which became more conservative and less tolerant. The social changes that had been kicked off by the ethical policy had assumed by the 1930s a degree of independence from the Dutch state. Harry Benda writes:

> The progressive abandonment of the Ethical Policy was primarily caused by the fact that political and administrative reforms, Western education and welfare legislation, however well intended they had been, had combined in unloosing a whirlwind of unexpected and highly perturbing repercussions which seemed to threaten the very foundations of colonial society. The tides of change, in other words, were running faster than ever before, but they were to all intents and purposes spilling over the banks chartered by the proponents of the Ethical Policy. (1958: 36)

Benda's 'unexpected and highly perturbing repercussion' refers to Indonesian nationalism.

Cultural Debates Amongst the Nationalists in the 1930s

Nationalists had a complex relationship to the emerging European ideas about government, traditional power structures, and the colonial state. They accepted and rejected elements of colonial governance and local practices and many different nationalisms developed across the first half of the twentieth century. A key factor in the growth of the nationalist movement was the Westernized education provided by the ethical policies of the colonial government. Almost all of the nationalists had received such an education (Van Niel 1960). Nationalist organizations began to grow after the formation of *Budi Utomo* in 1908 and proliferated in the first half of the twentieth century, often in the face of repression by the colonial state. In the second half of the 1920s young nationalists from different regions and ethnicities formed a number of study clubs in educational institutions in Java. At a conference in 1928 they took the 'Youth Pledge' to three ideals: 'one Fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one language, *bahasa Indonesia*, the language of unity'. However, Dutch repression soon followed and the nationalist movement was effectively out-manoeuvred by the Dutch throughout the thirties despite growing nationalist sentiment.

Two key groups of young nationalists exerted a large influence over Indonesian politics and policy after 1927. Sukarno emerged as a broad-based nationalist leader advocating a position that enveloped aspects of Islam, Marxism and nationalism.[7] The alternative was a group of

[7] Sukarno was the most popular nationalist figure in Indonesia in the two decades before independence, and was the first President of Indonesia. His background and ideas are examined in the next chapter due to his influence on all policy, including cultural policy, from 1950.

Western-educated socialist-nationalist leaders (Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Sukiman Wirjosandjojo) with international (mainly Dutch) educations who favoured a strategy of cadre formation. Both groups favoured political resistance against Dutch colonial rule to cooperative methods. However, in the face of the arrest or exile of the more radical leaders and growing Dutch repression of political activities and politically active organizations, the nationalist movement increasingly came under the leadership of moderates who favoured dialogue with the Dutch in order to achieve independence through the existing political institutions (Ricklefs 2001).

In the early 1930s, a group of Western educated Indonesian intellectuals began an attempt to articulate a cultural counterpart to the nationalist political movement. The primary forum for nationalist Indonesian discussion of culture was the literature journal *Pujangga Baru*, which began through collaboration between the editor of a literary column in the Balai Pustaka Malay language publication, *Pandji Poestaka*, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana and the author and poet, Armijn Pane. The emergence of the journal elicited some criticism from amongst the political nationalists who were at the time committed to a noncooperative, politically radical nationalist vision. They questioned the journal's links with Balai Pustaka and the importance of a literary journal's contribution to Indonesian awareness. The linkages between the group defined by Heather Sutherland as the 'cultural nationalists' (1968: 116) and the political movement became much closer over the course of the 1930s. The colonial state, while increasing its repression of political activities, left cultural avenues of nationalist expression open and *Pujangga Baru* was redefined by its editors to be located within this space.

Pujangga Baru was central to the debates about defining Indonesian culture conducted by Indonesian intellectuals from the mid 1930s until 1942. *Pujangga Baru*'s initial volume was orientated towards literary criticism. , In his monograph on *Pujangga Baru*, Keith Foulcher identifies a change in its editorial policy at the beginning of its second volume in May 1934 to include 'widely based social and cultural issues' (1980: 19). This change was confirmed in 1935 at the start of its third volume, when the editorial described *Pujangga Baru*'s aims as the 'formation, organization and promotion of a new culture, the culture of unity' ('Tahun yang ketiga' 1935). The political and cultural nationalist movements thus coalesced in their focus on Indonesian culture and led to a situation where *Pujangga*

Baru 'dominated the intellectual world' of Indonesia from 1935 until the Japanese invasion in 1942[8] (Sutherland 1968: 127).

The background of the cultural nationalists has a large degree of similarity as can be demonstrated by an examination of the main contributors to *Pujangga Baru*. Virtually all of the main contributors were Dutch-educated, had undergone the consciousness transforming bureaucratic pilgrimage of that system to the colonial headquarters of Batavia,[9] and used Dutch as their main means of communicating with Indonesians from other ethnic groups. The ethnic spread of the *Pujangga Baru* writers reflects the Sumatrans' greater familiarity with Malay and therefore the Indonesian language they were trying to develop. Of the twenty five major contributors, sixteen were Sumatran, three Javanese and six from other ethnicities. However, the ethnic differences were minimized by a central similarity, summarized by Sutherland as 'the modernizing impact of Dutch colonialism in the twentieth century and resultant rise of a Western educated urban intelligentsia, to which they belonged' (1968: 110).

Cultural Policy and a Cultural Polemic

The 'Great Debate', despite its singular connotation, was actually a series of exchanges between different authors over a range of issues related to the formation of a national culture. It gained full momentum in 1935, which saw the first of a series of cultural polemics, some of which are collected together in Achdiat Mihardja's *Polemik Kebudayaan* (first published in 1948/49). These debates, much like the literature produced by the cultural nationalists, suffered from the limitations of their authors' background and confidence. Foulcher, for instance, characterizes the debates as 'a series of assertions and counter-assertions of nationalist pride and self-confidence' (1980: 25) rather than an attempt to build concrete solutions for cultural problems. Despite their limitations, the debates are still an important historical moment for discussions of Indonesian identity and

[8] While Pujangga Baroe and the cultural debates that took place in its pages were the most highprofile and prominent of the time, it should be noted that artists in other fields such as painting (in particular the Persagi artists (Sudarmaji 1990)) and theatre (Brown 2001) were also involved with the nationalist movement and developed their own perspectives regarding Indonesian culture.

[9] The colonial name for Jakarta.

culture. Most analysis of the cultural debates, despite their broad scope, has focussed on their relationship to the development of Indonesian literature (Foulcher 1980; Teeuw 1967).[10] Below I analyse the initial cultural polemic, republished in Polemik Kebudayaan (Mihardja 1998), from a cultural policy perspective. This entails grappling with a culturality, defined in the introduction as a combination of discourses that produce culture as a social field, and give meaning to cultural objects, practices and spaces, of the nationalists in the 1930s. Despite the constraints of these times, the nationalists still contest the representations of the colonial administration while borrowing heavily from its ideas and practices.

The initial cultural polemic began as an exchange between Alisjabhana and Sanusi Pane, two of the most prominent cultural nationalists and most active participants in the cultural debates. This first exchange has been the most reviewed (Foulcher 1980; Teeuw 1967) and the positions taken by both authors do not greatly alter throughout the period. As such this exchange has become representative of the debates and is an excellent place to analyse how culture was being used by cultural nationalists. Alisjabhana was the dominant personality within *Pujangga Baru*. Born in North Sumatra, Alisjabhana was educated at a Dutch language elementary school at Bengkulu, North Sumatra, primary teacher's school in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, and teacher's training college at Bandung, West Java. He then moved to Batavia (now called Jakarta) to work for a headmaster's certificate, and began working for Balai Pustaka, first as the editor of the magazine *Pandji Pustaka*, later as a literary editor and author. Sanusi Pane was also a Batak from North Sumatra. After graduating from a Dutch language elementary school at Bengkulu, Sanusi studied between 1922 and 1927 at the Gunung Sari Teacher's Training College which was run by the Theosophical Society. In 1929 he travelled to India on a trip that greatly influenced his opinions and writings (Foulcher 1980).

Alisjabhana began the first cultural polemic with an article entitled 'Towards a New Society and Culture' ('Menuju Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Baru') published in *Pujangga Baru* in August 1935. In the article, Alisjabhana identified his purpose as 'cleaning-up' understandings about 'Indonesianness'. He argued that Indonesianness was a product of the twentieth century that should be differentiated from the cultures that

[10] An exception is the article by Sutherland (1968) titled 'Pudjangga Baru: Aspects of Indonesian Intellectual Life in the 1930s'.

preceded it, which he labelled 'pre-Indonesian'. The dynamic and unifying spirit of Indonesianness was a result of interaction with the West and represented a new stage in the development of the region, much like the coming of Indian and Arabic cultures to the archipelago in the previous centuries. However, Alisjabhana argued that Indonesia should look to the 'dynamic' (Mihardja 1998: 7) culture of the West as a model and opposed attempts to link Indonesia to 'pre-Indonesian' cultures which he viewed as impeding cultural development (Mihardja 1998: 10).[11]

Sanusi was one of the first to respond to Alisjabhana's theory. In his article 'Indonesian unity' published in the newspaper *Soeara Oemoem* on 4 September 1935,[12] Sanusi voiced his opposition to Alisjabhana's division between Indonesian and pre-Indonesian cultures, instead positing that the future was dependent on the past. Moreover, Sanusi held that common Indonesian cultural characteristics had existed in art and *adat* before Indonesians had developed a consciousness of their shared identity and, in fact, there was a shared basis for all of the different local cultures. Sanusi also opposed Takdir's promotion of Western culture over all other cultures. Sanusi rejected the materialism, individualism, and intellectualism of the West which, in his opinion, privileged the material over the spiritual and subjugated nature. In contrast to the West, Eastern culture was at one with nature, and nurtured the spirit. Sanusi argued that ideally the material and the spiritual should be combined, placing the East and West on equal terms in the development of an Indonesian culture.

In contrast to Balai Pustaka which involved the concrete use of a cultural resource, the cultural polemics were more idealistic and conducted at an intellectual level. Alisjabhana and Sanusi made use of an abstract idea of culture, within which can be identified a similar strategic normativity to that used by Balai Pustaka. Both Alisjabhana and Sanusi were articulating a similar agenda for the reform of Indonesians and both used a strategic splitting of desirable and undesirable cultural attributes. Alisjabhana's division is the more straightforward of the two. He divided pre-Indonesian culture from a Westernized Indonesian culture. Indonesian culture, as set out in Table 2.2, is dynamic, free to change, modern and is the result of a people united. Pre-Indonesian culture, on the other

[11] Alisjabhana's model does allow some elements of local cultures to become 'assimilated' into Indonesian culture but only after careful consideration that those elements are not linked to impediments to cultural development (Alisjahbana 1998: 10).

[12] Reprinted in Mihardja's Polemik Kebudayaan (1998: 13–24).

Table 2.2: Sutan Takdir Alisjabhana's division between Indonesia and pre-Indonesia

Indonesia	Pre-Indonesia
Westernized	Traditional
Dynamic	Static
Free to change	Chained (*terikat*) by tradition
United	Divided

hand, is represented as static, chained by tradition, traditional, and was the result of a people divided. In the emotional closing sections of the article, Alisjabhana urged his readers to take up his vision of Indonesia and leave behind the traits he associates with pre-Indonesian culture.

Sanusi's split was more complicated because his model was articulated against the Alisjabhana model with its simple splitting of past and future. Instead, he identified the past with healthy Eastern spirituality and divided Western influence into desirable material attributes and undesirable spiritual attributes. He then began to articulate his preferred model which was a mixture of the desirable attributes of his characterizations of Eastern and Western culture while rejecting the attributes he labelled undesirable. Sanusi characterized his model as a mixture of Faust representing the West and Arjuna representing the East:

> The perfect direction would be to unify Faust with Arjuna, fusing materialism, intellectualism and individualism with spiritualism, feeling and collectivism. (Mihardja 1998: 17)

Sanusi held that Indonesian culture should be drawn from as broad a basis as possible including Western cultures. His division was thus between a balanced mixing of Eastern and Western culture, which he contrasted to one-sided cultural models that privilege either East or West. Sanusi argued that Indonesia had always possessed an underlying cultural unity and that pursuing 'provincialism' that would only draw from earlier regional cultures would be to limit the development of Indonesian culture.

Both Alisjabhana and Sanusi's cultural models can be read as reformist programmes. Due to their political persuasion, they shared the desire to spread the nationalist spirit amongst Indonesians. Both the cultural models they promoted encouraged Indonesians to put aside regional divisions and unite behind a progressive vision of an emerging Indonesia. Both also articulated attitudes and attributes that should be, in Alisjabhana's model, rejected as elements of an outmoded past, or, in Sanusi's model, as part

Table 2.3: Sanusi Pane's divisions between a balanced East-West culture and either Eastern or Western culture

Balanced East-West	East	West
Harmony	Harmony	Competition
One with nature	One with nature	Subjugates nature
Technology	Undeveloped	Technology
Science	Undeveloped	Science
Economy	Undeveloped	Economy
Spiritual and material	Spiritual	Material

of an undesirable future. They were not describing cultural attributes as much as identifying the cultural attributes Indonesians should strive to produce. In other words, they were grappling over the shape of a normative definition of Indonesian culture within the culturality of the nationalists in the 1930s.

The abstract civilizing function attributed to culture in the exchange between Alisjabhana and Sanusi Pane was only supported by a few concrete courses of action. For instance, Alisjabhana attempted in his writings to 'put into practice his theory of the role of the artist as a leader and guide in the process of social change' [Foulcher 1980: 26]). When criticized for the obviously didactic themes that ran through his novel *Layar Terkembang*, Alisjabhana argued that, in a time of national construction, didacticism is an essential element of art (Foulcher 1980). Similarly, in a *Pujangga Baru* article, Alisjabhana (1934) encouraged Indonesian youths to follow the example of a Spanish youth movement which sent groups of wandering players out to tour villages to put on theatre performances for the education and entertainment of villagers. The problem for cultural nationalists from a cultural policy perspective was that they lacked the means and know-how to turn their abstract ideas into concrete programmes that reached beyond the small circle of urban Indonesian intellectuals who subscribed to the magazine and participated in the debates. Nevertheless, their debates demonstrate a similar reformist impulse to the programmes of the Dutch and a similar adherence to culture's civilizing function, albeit in a much more abstract and idealist form.

The key difference between the cultural policy of the colonial state and the nationalists can be located primarily through the concept of authoritarian cultural policy. The colonial state viewed its subjects as needing guidance, which from the colonial state's perspective was expressed through improving Indonesian publishing and literature. Significantly,

this included the omission of political and immoral themes and attitudes. Literature's civilizing function was central to Balai Pustaka's operation, as literature was used to 'improve' indigenous Indonesians. Balai Pustaka illustrates how cultural policy operates as a form of government here through how it targets the understandings and behaviours of individuals in order to shape the attributes of populations, in this case defined as different ethnic groups or indigenous readers of Malay-language literature. Balai Pustaka is also an example of how the cultural policy of a liberal state can incorporate elements of the command culture in regards to the populations it deems backwards or in need of special guidance. Colonial interventions were intrusive, as the state both defined the desirable attributes of culture and implemented programmes to intervene in the cultural sphere. The state control required by authoritarian cultural policy generally requires a command culture model, rather than leaving cultural provision to a less-certain market mechanism. It is not surprising that the cultural nationalists articulated versions of culture that incorporated a civilizing function given their Westernized education, linkages with Balai Pustaka and their desire to reform Indonesian society. Like Balai Pustaka, the cultural nationalists targeted certain behaviours and attitudes as undesirable and sought to eliminate them through articulating models of cultural development. The essential difference between Balai Pustaka and the cultural nationalists was not their operation, but the way they defined their target population. In contrast to the colonial regime, the cultural nationalists viewed their audience as a modernizing, national population slowly but surely headed towards independence—in other words, they rejected the authoritarian cultural policy model. Unlike Balai Pustaka, the cultural nationalists did not have the financial or logistical support of a state and their arguments remained highly abstract and theoretical although they did acquire a much broader influence during the Japanese occupation. In spite of the differences in methods and goals, the governmental function of culture—its role as a tool to shape the attributes and behaviours of individuals and groups—was central to both colonial era cultural institutions and nationalist cultural politics. A state did not harness the mass-appeal of national culture until the Japanese armies arrived on Java.

Cultural Policy during the Japanese Occupation

The Japanese army invaded Indonesia on 10 January 1942 and the Netherlands Indies administration surrendered on 8 March 1942. Japanese occu-

pying administrations were quickly put into place. The first priority of the Japanese occupiers was to meet the needs of the Japanese war effort. The *Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied Southern Areas*,[13] adopted on 20 November 1941, had as their first objective:

> For the present, military government shall be established in occupied areas to restore public order, expedite acquisition of resources vital to national defence, and ensure the economic self-sufficiency of military personnel. (Benda, Irikura, and Kishi 1965: 1)

However, their methods for meeting wartime military demands differed across Indonesia and altered as the tide of war turned against the Japanese. Indonesia was divided into three administrative areas run by three distinct military entities with different policies towards their region's indigenous populations. Java was administered by the Sixteenth Army, while the Twenty-fifth Army administered Sumatra (initially from Singapore) and the Navy governed the rest of the Indonesian archipelago (Reid 1980). The Japanese strategy in Java was centred around mobilization based on the nationalist movement, whereas the two other occupying administrations relied more on traditional leaders to muster support. Both the Twenty-fifth Army and the Navy initially had little time for nationalist movements and placed much less emphasis on generating mass movements until Japanese Premier Koiso's declaration in 1944 that Indonesia would be granted independence.

The Japanese policy for meeting wartime needs planned to utilize the existing structures of the societies they occupied. The Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied Southern Areas make this clear in their first principle:

> In the implementation of military administration, existing governmental organizations shall be utilized as much as possible, with due respect for past organizational structure and native practices. (Lebra 1975: 114)

Despite this policy, the Japanese embarked on extensive social and economic reforms in the pursuit of wartime goals, including taking control of the mass media and banning all organizations at the beginning of the occupation. Shigeru Sato (2003: 289), in his assessment of the impact of Japanese policy in Indonesia, writes that in Indonesia, like in Japan, the aim of the social and economic intervention was 'to construct an economic and social structure that would withstand the stress of war, at the

[13] Nanpo Senryochi Gyosei Jisshi Yoryo.

same time enabling the maximum mobilization of human and natural resources for the war effort'. However, Aiko Kurasawa (1990) notes that the attention to rediscovering and reviving indigenous values, in addition to reviving indigenous pride, was also linked to revealing basic similarities between Indonesia and Japanese culture, indicating that the imperatives behind Japanese policy were a mixture of ideological reform and the demands of wartime.

The politics of Japan in the 1930s informed the ideology of the Japanese occupying administration. In the 1930s, the Japanese military increasingly agitated to assert more control over economic relations and social life (Gordon 2003). As war in China escalated from 1937, the Japanese state took greater control over more areas of social and economic life to address wartime needs—a trend that continued until the end of World War II. The state increasingly came under the influence of the military, who were seeking to orchestrate a smooth modernization to meet an escalating war. As preparations for war intensified, the state apparatus increasingly promoted theories that championed the harmony of state and society, culminating in 1940 with the abolition of the labour unions and political parties and the establishment of a new non-party body, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Bourchier 1996).

One of the features that clearly distinguished Japanese from Dutch rule was the use of mass mobilization.[14] John Legge (1977: 138) notes that the Japanese occupiers, in the circumstances of the Pacific war, sought to 'mobilize Indonesian support positively behind their regime.' To do so they employed methods already employed in the mobilization of Japanese society in the 1930s—constructing mass organizations with close ties to the bureaucracy and new consultative bodies. In her study of social change in rural Java, Kurasawa characterizes Japanese rule as a combination of 'mobilization and control' (1988: 16). Mobilization refers to the exploitation of economic resources, manpower and the cooperation of the Indonesian population while control refers to the use of tight controls, including censorship and suppression of ideas deemed opposed to the

[14] One consequence of mobilization that was to have a considerable influence over future political events in Indonesia was its effect on Indonesian youths. A large number of youths underwent training in the Japanese organized youth militias such as PETA in Java and the smaller Giyugun in Sumatra (Reid 1980). The young officers of the youth movements, who were soon to come to prominence during the War of Independence, were influenced by the Japanese ideology of the period. They became an important political block in the post-independence period and assumed national leadership in 1966 (Crouch 1978).

war effort, to direct and contain mobilization. The period of Japanese rule in Indonesia involved a highly interventionist, controlling state, which contrasts with the Dutch model of ordered development and stability.[15]

For the occupying administration, 'culture' was a means through which to manage the population and mobilize groups and individuals to sustain Japan's imperialist vision. The notion of pan-Asian identity and the formation of a bloc of Asian nations under Japanese leadership were central to Japanese cultural policy. The original idea for a bloc of nations was developed in the 1920s and 1930s and encompassed Japan, parts of China, Korea and Taiwan. By 1940, the bloc had come to encompass Southeast Asia including Indonesia and was labelled the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Yosuke 1975). Premier Tōjō Hideki, in an address to the House of Peers in 1942, outlined some of the features of the body. He stated that the aim of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was:

> [...] to enable each country and people in Greater East Asia to have its proper place and demonstrate its real character, thereby securing an order of co-existence and co-prosperity based on ethical principles with Japan serving as its nucleus. [...] The regions which will newly participate in this work of construction are those which, though they abound in various resources, have had the progress of their civilization and culture greatly impeded due to the ruthless exploitation by the United States and Britain for the past hundred years. (1975: 79)

Tōjō's statement demonstrates the key features of Japan's model. It was pitched as a cooperative body for the mutual benefit of the nations involved but with Japan, as the most progressed and mature nation, as leader and builder. However, Japan still justified its privileged position and control of other countries through presenting itself as an Asian 'model for modernity' (Narangoa and Cribb 2003: 8), and an already revitalized Asian civilization. The underlying argument, and contradiction, of Tōjō's speech is that American or British imperialism should be replaced by a form of Japanese imperialism that was represented as more appropriate due to a shared Asian identity.

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[15] Scholars of the Japanese occupation have generally contrasted Japanese romanticism and emphasis on self-sacrifice and discipline to Dutch emphasis on expertise and scientific superiority, characterized in the title to Reid's (1980) well-known essay, 'Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword'. However, this has the effect of downplaying the Japanese emphasis on bureaucratic control and rational decision making that emerged in 1930s Japan and was transported to Indonesia along with the Japanese occupying administration.

In the case of Indonesia, the Japanese replaced the Western-centred cultural-racial policy of the Dutch era with a 'pan-Asianist principle of homogeneity under the slogan of Asian superiority over Europe' (Goto 1997: 16). The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere linked Indonesia to Japan through the promotion of Asia as an economic and cultural group that had suffered from a Western imperial presence. The sphere was represented as cooperative and economically mutually beneficial and leading to world peace. Japan was positioned as a beneficent sponsor and leader that would assist in modernizing the countries that had suffered from Western imperialism such as Indonesia. Japan was particularly keen to recruit nationalists through its support of local nationalisms against the Western colonial powers and to make use of nationalism's popular appeal. Nationalists were made the spokespeople for Japanese programmes, most prominently in Java but also in Sumatra. However, there was a tension between the nationalist desire for complete independence from Japanese control (as well as Japanese exploitation of Indonesian resources and Japanese police cruelty) for the length of the occupation. Nationalists were closely monitored and their activities curtailed.

The relationship between Japan, Indonesia, and the West reflected the treatment of the three different populations within Indonesia for the duration of the war. Indonesians were made to bow to Japanese whenever they passed them on the street and the Japanese calendar was introduced. The Dutch and English languages were banned and Japanese was promoted in educational institutions and newspapers. A primary goal of the Japanese cultural programmes was to spread Japanese culture as an example of a mature Asian culture that had succeeded in overcoming Western influences. A number of Japanese cultural workers (*bunkajin*) were sent to the occupied territories for the purposes of developing Asian arts (Goodman 1991; Kurasawa 1991). The Japanese intended to intern all Europeans (except Germans) but were initially forced to leave out Europeans whose skills were needed to run vital industries. Within a year, those Europeans were also interned in camps with terrible conditions and high death rates.[16]

Japanese cultural policy went beyond promoting Indonesia's place in Greater East Asia. It also sought to alter the behaviours and attributes of individual Indonesians. Kurasawa's research into Japanese propaganda in Indonesia provides extensive information about its goals and

[16] In the male civilian internment camp, forty percent of internees died (Ricklefs 2001).

methods. She identifies the 'long term' goal of Japanese propaganda as 'mental indoctrination'. Japanese propaganda was aimed at 'encouraging particular Japanese virtues and morals, such as piety, modesty, motherly love and diligence' (1991: 61). Kurasawa links the goal of transforming 'the mentality of the Indonesian people into that of the Japanese' with the goal of total mobilization for the war effort (1991: 61). Japanese propaganda also included a number of short-term goals that are more directly linked with mobilization. The short term goals were more practical with more concrete aims focussed on immediate social-economic needs, such as recruiting Indonesian volunteers, promoting increased food production and entertainment. The first year of the occupation was more oriented towards the long-term goal but this changed as wartime hardships multiplied and became more severe and Indonesian aversion to Japanese indoctrination grew. Within Indonesia, there were a number of forces working against the achievement of the occupying administration's cultural policy goals. In addition to the intervention of pressing wartime demands that required propaganda resources, Indonesians themselves did not passively participate in Japanese programmes or simply accept Japanese propaganda. Instead, they took advantage of the opportunities provided by Japanese cultural policies in order to achieve their own goals.

The Occupying Japanese Cultural Policy Infrastructure

Japanese cultural policy was centred on the production of wartime propaganda. Propaganda was an important part of the war effort and was present in all of Japan's occupied territories. The propaganda models show some similarities and were broadly based on programmes from Nazi Germany (Goodman 1991). However, there were significant differences between the varoius territories. The use of the nationalist movement in propaganda by the Sixteenth Army in Java significantly differs from the policies of the Twenty-fifth Army that controlled Sumatra and the Navy in Eastern Indonesia. Outside of Java there were few concessions to the nationalists.

The key department for Japanese cultural policy in Java was Sendenbu, the Propaganda Department. Sendenbu was established in Jakarta in August 1942. It was composed of three sections: Administration, News and Press, and Propaganda. As the military structure became more complex, a number of specialized centres were established as extradepartmental bodies in the areas of print media, reporting, radio broadcasting, theatre,

movie production and movie distribution. In addition to the Sendenbu, five district operation units were established and each residency office had its own propaganda section. Within this administrative framework, two organizations in particular were focussed on the development of nationalist arts: the Cultural Centre and the cultural section of the nationalist-run mass organization, Poetera.

In April 1943, the Cultural Centre (Keimin Bunka Shidosho) was established as an auxiliary organization of Sendenbu. Its tasks were to promote traditional Indonesian arts, to introduce and disseminate Japanese culture, and to educate and train Indonesian artists (Kurasawa 1988). The Cultural Centre consisted of five sections—administration, literature, music, fine arts, and performance arts (theatre, dance, and film). Indonesians headed each of the sections and worked as full-time staff. The Centre also produced a yearly magazine, *Eastern Culture* (*Keboedajaan Timoer*), edited by Sanusi Pane of *Pujangga Baru* fame. Although promoting the Japanese version of Indonesian culture, the magazine also contained discussion of various art forms (film, fine arts, literature) and promoted Indonesian poets and writers.

The People's Power Movement (Poesat Tenaga Rakjat, Poetera) was established on 9 March 1943. Although better known as a political organization, Poetera also ran cultural programmes and had a cultural section. It was a Japanese-funded organization headed by leading nationalist figures who viewed it as a potential vehicle for mobilizing and organizing the populace behind the nationalist cause. Sukarno was the head of Poetera and promoted it vigorously. Poetera formed committees across Java under the supervision of a large central office. The central office was divided into sections dealing with education, propaganda, culture, health, social welfare and 'enlightenment'[17] (Kanahele 1967). The Japanese were heavily involved in the financing, organization and appointments process of Poetera, and hoped it would assist them in achieving their wartime goals. As a price for Japanese support, Poetera's leaders were forced to participate in Japanese propaganda. Poetera provided a platform for the nationalists with a larger degree of autonomy from the Japanese than the Cultural Centre, greatly encouraged Indonesian nationalism and also initiated some of its own cultural programmes. Differences between the Japanese administrators and the nationalists hamstrung Poetera from its inception and resistance from the indigenous colonial bureaucracy, who now worked for the

[17] 'Enlightenment' referred to teaching nationalist philosophy.

Japanese, restricted their activities outside of the large cities in Java (Kanahele 1967). Poetera became a part of the even more tightly controlled Jawa Hokokai mass movement on 8 January 1944, modelled on Japan's Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokysankai).

The Cultural Centre and Poetera became important centres for the development of Indonesian art and cultural expression. They provided resources, published works, and ran training workshops. Nationalist artists, writers, and performers quickly gathered around the Cultural Centre and Poetera, were given key positions in the cultural apparatus, and were provided with state resources. Nationalism began to assume a central position in the development of the arts in Indonesia within Japanese-sponsored cultural institutions.

Japanese Cultural Policy's Impacts and Effects

The impact of Japanese cultural policy was tied to the use of a wide variety of cultural forms for the purposes of propaganda. The production and distribution of propaganda impacted film production, radio, the print media, fine arts, theatre, music, wayang and introduced a new art form for the duration of the occupation, *kamishibai*.[18] The following discussion deals mainly with the fine arts.

In the fine arts, Japanese cultural policy further stimulated a movement that began four years before Japanese soldiers arrived in Indonesia. In October 1938, a small group of Indonesian artists formed the Union of Indonesian Fine Artists (Persatuan Ahli Gambar Indonesia, or Persagi) began in Jakarta. They were politically aligned with the nationalist movement and incorporated Indonesian themes into their work. Persagi's basis was a shared critique of the state of the fine arts in Indonesia based on the nationalist vision of an autonomous and free nation and its goal was to develop fine art among the Indonesian people through seeking the 'style of New Indonesia' (Sudarmaji 1990: 75), predominantly through adopting early twentieth century European techniques with Indonesian subject matter. Persagi was disbanded when the Japanese invaded along with all other social organizations, Persagi artists increased their profile during the occupation. Persagi artists held important posts in both the Japanese

[18] A Japanese-style picture-story show involving a series of pictures accompanying a story. Kamishibai is not examined here as it virtually disappeared with the Japanese administration in 1945.

Cultural Centre and Poetera. The fine arts section of the Japanese Cultural Centre was headed by Agus Djajasoeminta (often shortened to Djaja), the ex-Chairman of Persagi, while Poetera's fine arts section was headed by Soedjojono, who was the most well-known Persagi artist (Kusnadi 1990). Persagi ideas and techniques were institutionalized in the key cultural organizations. A great number of influential Indonesian artists from the 1940s and 1950s were affiliated with either Poetera or the Japanese Cultural Centre. Soedjojono and Agus Djaja are well regarded artists. Affandi, one of the outstanding Indonesian artists of the second half of the twentieth century, launched his career from Poetera in a solo exhibition in 1943. Kartono Yudhokusumo, a pioneer of the 'decorative' art style in the 1950s, was also associated with Poetera as was Hendra Gunawan, Henk Ngantung, Mochtar Apin, and Zaini. Another outstanding artist, Barli, was associated with the Japanese Cultural Centre's branch in Bandung and, as part of the Japanese programme, taught a number of young artists, including Popo Iskandar and Suparto (Supangkat 1996). These artists now constitute the fine arts canon of the revolutionary and early independence periods.

Training and exhibiting were core activities of the fine arts sections. Takashi Kohno, a Japanese instructor of the fine arts section of the Cultural Centre, viewed training as central to developing the future of Indonesian fine art. He emphasized the encouragement of new artists and that art 'should not be above but right in the middle of society' (1942: 22).[19] Many new artists were trained in the Japanese-sponsored institutions and numerous exhibitions were organized by both the Japanese Cultural Centre and Poetera. In December 1942, the first all-Indonesian exhibition of paintings was held in Jakarta in the Cultural Centre and toured around Java. Two more such exhibitions occurred in 1943, along with five single artist exhibitions organized by Poetera. In April 1944, a fourth general exhibition was held.

Both the Cultural Centre and Poetera actively promoted Indonesian artists who were using Western techniques. To all appearances, such work contradicted a central principle of Japanese cultural policy, which aimed to rid Indonesia of European influence. At the opening of the Cultural Centre, Seizaburo Okasaki, a representative of the Japanese Central Administration in Java, stated:

[19] He wrote under the phonetic spelling of his name, Kono, which would have been easier for Indonesians to spell.

> In particular the greater part of the Asian continent, including Indonesia, which had been oppressed by the Western nations up until then, was subjected to a culture which destroyed Indigenous Eastern Culture. The Greater East Asia War is like an eternal flame which has rebuilt Eastern Culture. (1943: 1)

However, Indonesian artists did not view their style as 'Western' but as contemporary. Jim Supangkat writes Indonesian modern art's aesthetic basis is 'quite different from that of traditional Indonesian art' and that the 'various popular styles in the development of modern art in Western Europe and the Unites States also appear in Indonesian modern art development' (Supangkat 1990: 158). Indonesian artists viewed their art as uniquely Indonesian because of their focus on Indonesian themes and their nationalist commitment. The nationalist artists explored modernity from an Indonesian perspective that involved combinations of themes and conventions from traditional and new sources. Supangkat labels the style of painting that emerged 'romanticism' as it was influenced by the romantic style of 'early nineteenth century Europe' that initiated international modern art. Paintings were dominated by themes of 'rebellion, struggle, oppression, and poverty' as well as political themes and were strongly symbolic (1990: 159). The romantic imagery of revolutionary struggle continued into the 1970s.

Poetera and the Cultural Centre generated artists who broadly shared a perspective about painting and to Indonesian culture. The overlap between Indonesian modernism and Japanese occupying doctrine created a space where Indonesian modern art could flourish. The artists of this time had a sense of taking Indonesian art from its current state (characterized by Kohno as a 'blank sheet') towards a new destination and place. Kohno wrote in 1943:

> The effort we must make is now very evident in front of our eyes. Therefore Indonesian painters must shape a basis of painting and sculpture that is healthy in spirit, that is based on the new consciousness of artists and understands the new world, because it is a consciousness that is based on the new climate. (1943: 10)

The 'new consciousness' desired by the emerging Indonesian artists had some commonalities with the 'new consciousness' promoted by the Japanese occupying government. The overlap is also obvious in an article by Agus Djaja. Djaja describes Javanese culture and art as having undergone three centuries of 'hypnotism' because of Western colonialism and capitalism. He then highlights the opportunity to develop painting in the 'new

climate' of free East Asia and the need to develop 'Eastern' painting. Paraphrasing the famous Indonesian modern poet Chairil Anwar, Djaja writes: 'We the artists truly must feel lucky to live in these times. Though they are tough, we may want to live and die a thousand times' (Djajasoeminta 1943: 8).

The affiliation between nationalism and modern art strengthened further in the years after 1945. As the newly formed Republic declared independence and then fought the Dutch, fine artists withdrew with the republic, eventually ending up in Yogyakarta as the Republic's troops retreated to that city. A number of artists recorded the war but unfortunately their pictures, along with many of the pictures from the Japanese interregnum, were lost when the Dutch sacked the city of Yogyakarta and in the turmoil of the period. After the end of the war in 1949, a number of artists elected to stay in Yogyakarta. Holt states (1967) that in the 1950s two-thirds to three-quarters of Java's painters lived in Yogyakarta. The romantic themes established by Persagi and developed during the Japanese years continued to be pursued in Yogyakarta and were particularly prominent in the arts college established there in 1950. A smaller group of artists in Bandung (including Barli, Iskandar and Suparto) moved away from realism and towards a more abstract style that became affiliated with the arts college at the Bandung Institute of Technology. These two art movements have exerted a prolonged influence over Indonesian contemporary art.

State control over production and distribution of film followed the model that was already in place in Japan. In Indonesia, the Japanese used confiscated movie production houses to make their films and also took control of all existing cinemas and ran open-air movie screenings (Kurasawa 1991). Viewing options changed immediately. A large number of Japanese films were imported and the occupying administration stimulated local film production of both news and movies for the purposes of propaganda. The various types of film were all oriented towards government approved themes, technical instruction and moral teachings. News films also reported speeches by prominent Indonesian leaders, most frequently Sukarno. Ticket prices were reduced substantially from pre-war prices to facilitate attendance. The Japanese administration also expanded the use of mobile cinemas. Fifteen projection teams travelled the countryside giving free screenings of propaganda films for the rural population, many of whom had never seen film before (Kurasawa 1991). The Japanese use of film for political purposes also survived the war, with Indonesian film-makers documenting historic events in the War of Independence (Sen 1994).

The Japanese administration also stimulated the production of radio programmes and the spread of radios. Around 1500 radio 'singing trees' (*pohon nyanyi*) were spread around Java to disseminate propaganda (Sen and Hill 2000) and the Declaration of Independence was first broadcast through the nationalist capture of a Japanese radio station on the evening of 17 August 1945. The Republic of Indonesia Radio (RRI) began as a consortium of eight stations from within the Japanese network. The Japanese administration's takeover of the press offered Indonesians increased opportunities to take positions of responsibility formerly held by Dutch journalists and training although the occupying administration also increased censorship (D.T. Hill 1994).

The Japanese also needed new historical narratives, myths and heroes to replace the Dutch histories that had dominated textbooks and street names before 1942. Anthony Reid notes that the nationalist histories written for use during this period consolidated 'a new nationalist orthodoxy which has proved remarkably durable' (1980: 25). Key nationalist figures who held senior posts in the occupying administrations, such as Muhammad Yamin, the poet and highest ranked Indonesian in Sendenbu, and Sanusi Pane promoted and developed nationalist histories with two elements that would become standard fare in nationalist history texts. First, the texts represented Indonesia's pre-colonial past as a time of political unity and prosperity brought by the great Hindu kingdoms. Second, the 350 years of Dutch rule were represented as a time of oppression with resistance at some time or another of each Indonesian region and people. In these histories, the Indonesian 'villains' of Dutch histories were made into resistance heroes in their narrative about the struggle for independence (Reid 1979: 297–298). The new historical orthodoxy had its roots in nationalist intellectual attacks on the Dutch VOC and Netherlands Indies state-centred version of history used to educate Indonesians from the 1920s. Sanusi Pane's *Sejarah Indonesia* (1965)[20] became the standard national history and its structure, according to Reid (1980), has been replicated in many local histories.

The explosion of nationalist poetry and literature began during the Japanese Occupation although much of it was not published until after the Japanese surrender due to censorship. Literary critic A. Teeuw states: 'There can be no doubt that the spiritual revolution in Indonesia, and closely interwoven with it the new literary movement, started in 1942' (1967: 107). An important development for literature was the Japanese

[20] First published in 1943.

discouragement of the Dutch language, which was widely used amongst the Western-educated elite from which many Indonesian writers were drawn, and the encouragement of Indonesian. Some books were published within the Cultural Centre and included Japanese themes and slogans. Other books were written during this time but were not published until after independence. *Keboedajaan Timoer* was an important forum for the discussion of literature and poetry and included excerpts of new works. Chairil Anwar also had a small number of poems published in *Keboedajaan Timoer*, although he was generally critical of the Japanese and much of his poetry was published after the end of the occupation.

Within the material produced for propaganda purposes, the driving force of change in the content of cultural forms was the pressure to conform to the principles of pan-Asian culture. Nationalist cultural workers, through their participation in Japanese cultural institutions, were able to continue to promote overlapping nationalist themes, in particular liberation from the Dutch. The wartime content and the idea of pan-Asian culture ended with the Japanese occupation as did the promotion of Japanese culture. The brutality of elements of the Japanese occupying forces, Japan's ambiguous relationship with nationalist leaders and the Japanese defeat in WWII made for an easy departure from Japanese influences. Narangoa and Cribb (2003) also note that the disruptions of war prevented the development of institutions that may have opened up opportunities for local elites within the Japanese empire, preventing greater commitment to the idea of pan-Asian culture and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Certainly nationalist artists, writers, and cultural workers involved in the mass media of the time were more interested in the relationship with Western ideas and techniques than with ideas and techniques from Japan and quickly moved away from the 'propaganda' of the period after 1945.

The more important and long-lasting effects of Japanese cultural policy were not listed in its goals and principles. Japanese cultural policy facilitated two important trends that were central to cultural provision within Indonesia in the following years. The first trend, which was the most important for the historical development of cultural policy, was how Japanese cultural policy laid the foundations for the official orthodoxies of the independence years. The promotion of Indonesian art and culture encouraged an explosion of arts that entrenched some art forms and styles in the public imaginary as representative of Indonesia. Japanese cultural policy in particular catalysed the modernist arts which were aligned with nationalism, such as modernist fine arts and Indonesian language

literature. The nationalist artists of this era and the traditions associated with them proceeded to become established in state-sponsored teaching and cultural institutions as elements of national culture.

The second trend was the development of the mass culture industries, in particular film and radio and their relationship to national culture. It was through film and radio that many Indonesians gained access to the wider world and first heard and saw their national leaders. The spread of the new culture industries was in many ways linked to the spread of a new consciousness of being Indonesian and the emergence of the Indonesian nation. Kurasawa states that despite its failure to achieve its stated goals, the propaganda was significant

> in the sense that it provided most rural people with accessibility to modern entertainment media such as movies[...] Those media enlarged their mental environment and surroundings and brought the people into contact with the larger society. Through the screen, they first saw the faces of their national leaders and the great capital city of their 'nation', and thus came to be more familiar with the events going on outside their immediate society. (1991: 65)

Although the new culture industries would not be national in scope for many years, from the time of the Japanese occupation they were national in perspective.

Conclusion

While Dutch colonial policy displayed features of the command culture model in its treatment of indigenous Indonesians, the model was most in evidence during the period of Japanese occupation than any other in Indonesia's history. Previously existing cultural institutions were disbanded and state-approved or state-run institutions provided the cultural infrastructure as part of the occupying administration's propaganda apparatus. Within this model of cultural provision, the administration's cultural policies were applied within administration-run or approved programmes. Cultural policy during the occupation had two sets of objectives. First, the material objective to address war problems and needs. Second, the ideological objective serving the needs of the Japanese imperial state articulated through the idea of pan-Asian culture. The latter set of objectives have continuity with colonial cultural policy: occupation-era cultural policies included both a 'civilizing' function and lessons about relations between populations that could be seen within Dutch colonial cultural

policy and nationalist ideas about culture. The modernizing imperative of the Japanese imperial state sought to 'improve' indigenous Indonesians based on a Japanese, rather than Western, set of normative cultural values. The racial hierarchies of culture were thus restructured in Japanese cultural policy but not thrown away. For the duration of the Japanese occupation, culture was implicated in a much more ambitious attempt at transforming Indonesian society than it was under the Dutch due to the interventionist streak in Japanese governance, which was amplified by the pressures of fighting a war.

Authoritarian cultural policy was a feature of both the Dutch and Japanese administrations. Colonial cultural policy was authoritarian in the way it justified greater intervention and state control through its assumption that its indigenous subjects were not capable of exercising a responsible freedom. The Japanese were authoritarian in their policies at home and abroad due to the strong interventionist streak aimed at quick modernization. However, the justification for greater control in Indonesia also relied on the idea that Indonesians were developmentally behind the Japanese and therefore the occupying administration was obliged to take greater control. The cultural nationalists differed in that they rejected the authoritarian elements of both administrations, instead viewing Indonesians as a modernizing, national population that was ready for independence.

Japanese cultural policies in Indonesia, although successfully implemented and administered, failed to achieve their stated goals. Indonesians did not accept the idea of a pan-Asian culture or ape Japanese culture as a 'mature' Asian culture. Putting aside its failures, Japanese cultural policy did have some long term effects. The Japanese ideological opposition to and erasure of Dutch and Western cultures and narratives created a situation that nationalists exploited to spread their own ideas about Indonesian culture and history through their involvement with Japanese propaganda. Japanese cultural policy, which reinforced and encouraged aspects of Indonesian national culture in order to unite rather than divide Indonesians and put them on par with their European ex-colonial masters, greatly strengthened the nationalist elements of cultural policy. This formed the basis for programmes to build a national culture, which was the focus of the cultural policy of the fledgling nation state after 1945.

CHAPTER III

FROM CULTURAL REGULATION TO CULTURAL LEADERSHIP: THE CHANGING USES OF CULTURE IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1950–1957) AND GUIDED DEMOCRACY (1957–1965)

While the War of Independence (1945–49) was a formative period for the fledgling nationstate, the near complete disruption of state authority prevented the development of both national institutions and the implementation of national policies. The conflict between the new Indonesian state and the Netherlands made the coordination of state activities near impossible given the small area under the control of the new republic. Renowned scholar Benedict Anderson (1990b: 99) wrote of this period that 'in many areas of Java and Sumatra the state almost disappeared in the face of popular insurgence.'[1] The Indonesian state, through the military, only consolidated its position in the 1950s and established its authority across Indonesia, in the process overcoming regional uprisings in Ambon, Sumatra, Sulawesi and West Java. My account begins in 1950 with the advent of a new Constitution following the end of warfare, when thoughts turned to developing new institutions and governing the new nation.

Like many nations that gained their independence from colonial powers at the end of World War II, clashes occurred between promoters of Western methods of administration and critics who viewed such models as inappropriate and neo-colonial, and preferred to define their own methods of administration drawing on nationalist sentiment and quasi-traditional concepts. In Indonesia the relationship between these two approaches influenced all policy areas. To understand the changes to cultural policy, it is necessary to trace the shift between these two understandings of the state before turning to cultural policy content and implementation, including the decline then the return of the command

[1] See also Anderson (1972) and Cribb (1991) for discussions of control by popular insurgent groups rather than the state during the revolution.

culture model of cultural provision.[2] While this clearly has implications for the state's role in cultural provision, it also had far reaching consequences for non-state cultural organizations, leading to the deaths and imprisonment of many artists aligned with the political left and the suppression of their legacy, and hegemony of an anti-political approach to art and culture in the New Order period that placed a high priority on supporting economic development.[3]

Politics and Governance after the War of Independence

In his 'Governmentality' lecture (1991), discussed in the introduction, Michel Foucault traces the historical change in governmental rationalities that have shaped the exercise of power over conduct by rulers. For instance, Foucault looks at the changes in how governance was conceived from Machiavelli's focus on the relationship between a Prince and his principality, to La Perrière's conception of government as extending from the government of a household, to the current liberal models of government of populations and the contemporary economy. While governmental rationality is important for the broad parameters it sets for the exercise of government, its examination in Indonesia between 1950 and 1965 would not reveal great differences. The Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy periods are both relatively short and sequential and did not involve great administrative innovations. Instead, what is needed is an examination of the political rationality of two distinct political periods. Mitchell Dean defines political rationality as "the relatively systematic, explicit, discursive, problematization and codification of the art or practice of government, as a way of rendering the objects of government in a language that makes them governable" (1994: 187).

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[2] As discussed in the Introduction, this draws on Toby Miller and George Yudice's (2002: 107) definition: 'The notion of a non-market form of cultural provision [that] always already centres the state in planning, creating, policing and revising cultural practice'.

[3] No extended research has focussed specifically on official cultural policy during this period although Yampolsky (1995) provides a very brief overview in his article about New Order cultural policy. Foulcher's (1986) research into LEKRA provides the most detailed insight into cultural politics and policies while focussing on an arts organization while Maier's (1987, 1996) research into literary history provides insights into the cultural politics of the period and McVey's (1986, 1990) detailed analysis of PKI policy and internal debates regarding wayang and education provides insights into the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI).

The same governmental practices may be quite differently configured within different political rationalities. Political rationalities can therefore explain the differences between governance in, for instance, a country that has experienced a change of administration but little or no technical innovation or, like Indonesia between 1950 and 1965, a country with a relatively unchanged political elite and social structure but with a changing language of government and policy priorities.

The seminal text on the Constitutional Democracy period is Herbert Feith's (1962) *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. The key division in Feith's analysis is between 'administrators' and 'solidarity makers'. He defines administrators as 'men with administrative, legal, technical and foreign language skills, such as are required for the running of a modern state' (1962: 24). They had received a Western education, normally up to university level, or were needed for 'central organization and strategy' (1962: 24) and negotiations with the Dutch during the War of Independence. Solidarity makers, on the other hand, possessed 'what may be called integrative skills, skills in cultural mediation, symbol manipulation, and mass organization' (1962: 24). Solidarity makers generally had received a primary or senior secondary Western education or a Muslim education and the basis of their authority was 'traditional or charismatic authority or (most usually) a combination' (1962: 25). Feith (1962) characterizes the period as changing from an administrator oriented understanding of government to a solidarity-maker understanding. Other Indonesian researchers have used similar characterizations to explain the changes during the period. For instance, Daniel Lev (1966: 1–2) views the change from Constitutional Democracy to Guided Democracy as the abandonment of 'copies' of Western European institutions for institutions that represented a return to Indonesian traditions. From a governmental perspective, Feith's notions of administrators and solidarity-makers can be understood as two competing political rationalities used by different elements of the political elite. The two groups were promoting differing policy priorities linked to differing understandings of how Indonesia should be governed. In Feith's words:

> The conflict between 'administrators' and 'solidarity makers' was sometimes one between different groups of government leaders stressing different and conflicting aspects of government activity. At other times it was a conflict within government parties, usually involving antagonism between 'administrator'-controlled factions advancing pragmatic arguments in support of government policies and 'solidarity maker'-led factions opposing these policies in the name of the nationalist ideology [. . .] And at other times again it

> was a direct conflict between an 'administrator'-led government and a 'solidarity maker' led opposition (or in later years between a 'solidarity maker'-led government and an 'administrator'-led opposition). (1967: 115)

Feith also states that the two groups were not mutually exclusive and that certain leaders could exercise both type of 'skills' (1962: 25). Another way of understanding the ability of certain leaders to move between the groups is to understand the groups as discursively constructed. Certain leaders were adept in making appeals using the discourses of either administrators or solidarity makers to achieve outcomes.[4]

This chapter adopts Feith's administrator/solidarity-maker distinction in order to explore the changing political rationalities of the two periods while acknowledging that analytical innovations within Indonesian studies research have questioned elements of Feith's analytical framework. For the purposes of this chapter, one criticism in particular needs to be addressed: Feith's (and Lev's) focus on elite politics, meaning the national institutions and the political parties in Jakarta. This narrow focus on the upper stratum of the state and political parties provides detailed insights into national politics that greatly assists understanding of national policy making during the 1950s. However, it also raises problems. First, analysis of the centre, when combined with a liberal philosophical framework, depicts regional opposition to the Indonesian state as manifestations of instability or disorder rather than as the expression of alternatives to the Indonesian national state (Philpott 2000). Second, the 1950s saw a proliferation of cultural institutions that were not included in analysis of the political elite. The analysis that follows includes these non-state organizations in policy analysis and argues that they became increasingly important to cultural policy during the Guided Democracy period.

Policy and Culture during Constitutional Democracy

The cultural clause of the 1950 Constitution, which used the same wording as the 1949 Constitution of the Indonesian Federal Republic (Republik Indonesia Serikat), states:

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[4] Lev (1966: 1–2) also notes changes in how government was understood and executed when he argues: 'the dominant elite simply gave up trying to maintain itself according to one set of rules and turned to another set [...] Thus if the leadership appears to be the same, the political institutions of the [Guided Democracy] period have become very different from those of [Constitutional Democracy.]'

> The government will protect the freedom to partake in culture, the arts and science. Respecting this principle, the government will, to the greatest extent possible, promote the development of nationalism in culture, the arts and science.[5]

The emphasis on freedom and what can be assumed to be individual rights reflects a liberal current that runs through the 1950 Constitution and can be expected to run through the cultural policy of the period of Constitutional Democracy. To understand why this liberal current was introduced, it is necessary to first explore the rationality of administrators. The administrator political rationality of the Constitutional Democracy period can be characterized as a Western-style liberal form of government. While political analysts and historians have disagreed about the causes for its demise,[6] it is clear that the four cabinets that cover the 1949–1953 period were oriented towards the use of Western-style expertise in their policies and committed to parliamentary democracy along Western lines. These cabinets were committed to institutional development and made gains in the areas of education, health, and macro-economic policy (Feith 1994) although it should also be noted that there were widespread problems with policy development and implementation.[7] The commitment to a liberal democratic system of rule is also reflected in the regulation of other institutions. The press enjoyed a large degree of freedom, the courts were independent even when dealing with ministers or army officers, and there was a commitment to the rules of parliament and parliamentary debate. Feith states that these cabinets 'concentrated their attention on normalization, the restoration of secure conditions, and the establishment of

[5] The clause is section 40 of the 1950 Constitution and section 38 of the RIS Constitution.

[6] The early and persisting division over the causes of the decline is between Feith's 'quasi-structuralist' (Mackie 1994: 27–28) account in *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, which stresses the difficult barriers to Guided Democracy and the growing strength of the opposition, and Benda's (1982) cultural critique of Feith's argument, which argues that the 'Western' system of Constitutional Democracy was unsuited to Indonesia's past history and cultural traditions. For reviews of this debate see, Feith (1994), Lev (1994), Mackie (1994), and McVey (1994). Given my critique of the use of culture in Indonesian Politics Studies in the Introduction, I disagree with the cultural explanation while acknowledging Feith's preference for the 'problem solver' perspective.

[7] Three problems stand out. Firstly, the number of parties needed to form a cabinet meant that the large parties had an effective veto over government policy (Cribb and Brown 1995). Secondly, the bureaucracy increasingly tended to respond to pressure from groups outside of government when implementing policy and frequently vetoed policies that would adversely impact its own membership (Feith 1962). Thirdly, political appointments politicized the bureaucracy and impeded smooth administration (Cribb and Brown 1995).

strong, unified and efficient government' although their brief terms in office and the economic and social issues they faced concurrent with the political hurdles of the times reduced their effectiveness (1962: 303). It also needs to be acknowledged that policy was viewed through the lens of a new postcolonial nation that emerged into a polarized Cold War environment, and was sensitive to domination of larger international powers, particularly western nations' economic and military strengths. The administrator oriented political rationality began to wane from 1953 with the Sastroamidjojo cabinet (1953–1955) as it excluded the parties with the strongest commitment to that rationality and continued to weaken until the end of Constitutional Democracy in 1957[8] when Sukarno began to reassert his power.

Cultural Policy Debates in Four Cultural Conventions[9]

Four state-sponsored cultural conventions held between 1948 and 1954 constitute an important window into the cultural policy formulations of the political and cultural elite, including Ministers, high-ranking bureaucrats and prominent cultural commentators of the early independence period. The Ministry of Education and culture began on 19 August 1945 as one of twelve ministries created to administer the two day old state of Indonesia and the nationalist educator Ki Hadjar Dewantara was named the first Minister of Education and Culture (Menteri Pendidikan, Pengamatan dan Kebudayaan).[10] The Cultural Office (Jawatan Kebudayaan) within the Ministry of Education, Teaching and Culture (Kementerian Pendidikan, Pengadjaran dan Kebudayaan) was the primary locus of cultural policy formation and programmes. The Department of Education, Training, and Culture (DPPK) organized a series of three cultural congresses between the years of 1948 and 1954. In addition to the three cultural congresses, a Cultural Conference was held in 1950 to address the relationship between Indonesian and foreign cultures, a thinly veiled reference to the 1949 Cultural Accord between Indonesia and the Netherlands made as part of the Round Table Agreement with the Dutch.

The first cultural congress was initiated and organized by the Yogyakarta Cultural Office with the support of the Governor of Yogyakarta and

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[8] The 1955 elections and the PRRI and Permesta regional rebellions further weakened and marginalized of the administrator-oriented parties (Masyumi and the PSI).

[9] Two more cultural congresses have been held in 1991 and 2003, demonstrating the historical importance that is placed on the early conferences.

[10] See *Voice of Free Indonesia, 1*(1): 24.

the Ministry of Education and Culture. The conference followed two other meetings (Sukabumi in November, 1946, Solo in April, 1947). However, this was the first large congress and was attended by the President and Vice-President, who both gave speeches to mark the occasion. The congress was held at a time when Indonesia was trying to represent itself to the United Nations and the Western powers as a united country with a national culture.

The first congress, more than any other, regenerated the themes of the nationalist cultural debates that preceded World War II. The binaries around East/West structured most of the participants' arguments about culture. The regeneration of the cultural debates quickly was apparent in the presentations of two of the most prominent statesmen of the period. Vice President Hatta (1950: 15), after defining culture as the opposite of nature and the product of 'humankind's struggle [...] to reach a higher plane of existence', divided culture into two types: material and spiritual. According to Hatta, the West excelled in the production of material culture but had fallen behind in the pursuit of spiritual culture whereas cultural prosperity was the result of a balance between the two kinds. Similarly, the then Minister of Education and Culture and future two-time Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo (1950a: 22), called for a 'harmony' between the material and the spiritual. Both men emphasized the use of Indonesia's existing methods and cultures alongside new measures to enliven and renew national life.

Although some participants postulated an unassailable gap between Western and Eastern culture,[11] the majority of participants resolved the dichotomy between East and West through a synthesis in a 'new Indonesian culture'. However, problems were already starting to make themselves felt with the 'synthesis' formulation. Two incidents in particular were problematic because they raise the issue of internal divisions. The first occurred in the discussion after the first session when a participant, Mohamad Zain, raised the issue of the 'antithesis' between different cultures within Indonesia, in particular the antithesis between Java with the other Islands ('Bertukar pikiran' 1950: 46). He was immediately addressed by the Chair who told him that the topic of discussion was Indonesian culture and that he should not differentiate the cultures of the various islands.

[11] For instance, bureaucrat Kuntjoro Purbopranoto (1950: 38) quotes Kipling in English that 'East is East and West is West, and never the twain will meet.'

The second disagreement followed Dewantara's paper on national education. Dewantara's ideas were important to the conceptualization of Indonesian culture during the period and he is the most likely source for the definition of Indonesian culture that accompanied the 1945 constitution (Yampolsky 1995). Dewantara was an innovative educator and the founder of the Taman Siswa school movement that educated and employed a large number of nationalists. His educational policies reflected a syncretic perspective on Indonesian culture. Dewantara thought that Indonesian culture should be comprised not just of Western elements but also various indigenous traditions and practices. He still viewed Indonesian culture of the future as unitary and singular and that it would arise from the mixing of different regional and foreign cultures.[12] Dewantara defined Indonesian culture as the 'peaks of all of the regional cultures in all Indonesia' (1950a: 88). The writer Armijn Pane disputed the definition, arguing "The new generation does not want a federative culture, but a single culture. The definition is not able to fulfil our desires now, and means that we are tied to old constructions" (1950a: 91). According to Pane, discussions of difference and plurality were not important because old forms of cultural practices would make way for the forms of 'New Indonesia' (1950a: 91). In fact, as the examples above demonstrate, they were discouraged in favour of a theoretical social change that would simultaneously resolve the pressures within Indonesian society. Sastroamidjojo (1950a: 21–22; 1950b) drew attention to a related issue in both of his speeches: the gap between the 'young generation' who want to 'improve culture they feel is not in accordance with the times' and an 'old generation' who want to preserve older cultural forms.[13]

The first Cultural Congress was one of the first forums to discuss the relationship of the state to Indonesian culture. The state was given an important place from the beginning of the congress and the importance of culture to administration was acknowledged. Even so, there was no clear consensus on how the state relates to culture. In his address, Vice-President Hatta recognized the governmental importance of 'culture' for

[12] For a longer discussion of his life and ideas, see Pranata (1959) and Foulcher (1986).

[13] It is also worth noting that the editors of *Indonesia* included a note at the end of the proceedings that clarified their own position on the relationship between regional culture and the 'culture of unity' (kebudayaan kesatuan). The editors state that regional cultures should be able to develop in their own regions (but not 'imperialistically' in other regions) and that national culture should develop across Indonesia as the culture of unity. The editors (Editor 1950b: 1–2) note that while this view would previously have been considered 'provincialist', it was no longer viewed that developing regional cultures would impede the development of a national culture.

state administration: "A state's administration is able to prosper if culture is at a high level, because culture influences also the characteristics of a state's administration" (1950: 14–15). Later in his address, he combined the importance of culture for a state together with the goals of the state: "The goal of a state is to provide a reasonable lifestyle for all of its populace, and a state can only survive if culture there is healthy and of a high standard" (1950: 15). These statements raise the question of responsibility for the development of a 'healthy' culture. Hatta did not address or clearly answer this question but at the end of his address he encouraged all of the participants to work towards a 'higher culture' which suggests that he viewed cultural development as the task of both society and the state (1950: 16). Two later papers by Ki Mangunsarkoro (1950) and Kuntjoro Purbopranoto (1950) asserted a more central role for the state in shaping Indonesian national culture, with little discussion of society.

In marked contrast to the determining elements in the formulations above, Sastroamidjojo was careful to distinguish the style of the new government from its Japanese predecessor. He argued:

> I take the position [. . .] that we from the Ministry of PPK should not interfere so that it appears as if there is pressure or a decree from above to organize something that is wanted by one group only. That is our express undertaking because we remember past periods, mainly the Japanese period, where culture was directed, led by the centre with a particular purpose. (1950b: 12)

Sastroamidjojo viewed the role of the state as facilitating the activities of non-state groups rather than determining cultural attributes. In his speech he emphasized that the conference was the initiative of the Kedu Cultural Centre and called the involvement of the Ministry of PPK 'passive' (1950b: 12). The role of the state Sastroamidjojo defines is a departure from Japanese practice and has some parallels with the Dutch liberal model of supervising 'natural' cultural developments.

The Congress also settled on a broad definition of culture. The 'Conclusions' of the Congress state that 'culture includes all aspects of humankind's life in society (both physical and spiritual). Not just art' ('Kesimpulan-kesimpulan' 1950). Finally, an important institutional development was the creation of the Institute of National Culture (Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional, LKN) whose name later changed to Institute of Indonesian Culture (Lembaga Kebudayaan Indonesia, LKI). The debates about the creation of the Institute at the first Congress were dominated by the need to include both the young and the old generation in its committees and operation, ensuring that it was inclusive ('Pembentukan organisasi

kebudayaan' 1950). The legislation for the beginnings of LKI was put in place at the congress but the opening had to be postponed due to the Dutch invasion of Yogyakarta. The body was formed in Jakarta in March 1950.

One of the first acts of LKI was to organize the Indonesian Cultural Conference in August 1950. The theme of the conference was 'National Culture and Its Relationship with the Cultures of Other Nations'. The topic and papers were focussed on the 1949 Cultural Accord between Indonesia and the Netherlands that listed specific measures that both parties had to undertake in the other's territory and guaranteed the free movement of people and materials related to culture and the arts. It also safeguarded the Dutch cultural presence in Indonesia,[14] creating a backlash from the many Indonesian artists and intellectuals that had been inspired by the revolution and were relying on it to create New Indonesia (Foulcher 1986). The three plenary sessions were given by Sutan Takdir Alisjabana, Ki Hadjar Dewantara and Trisno Sumadjo.

The speeches themselves were restatements of earlier positions so I will not dwell on the papers at length. Ki Hadjar Dewantara (1950b) restated his more syncretic perspective on national culture. Dewantara was critical of the Dutch control of cultural exchange during their tenure in Indonesia. According to Dewantara, during the colonial period all cultural exchange occurred via the Netherlands causing Indonesia to neglect relations with her immediate neighbours in Asia and only have access to other European countries through the Dutch. Dewantara thought that the Cultural Accord was a mistake and that Indonesia should itself experience the cultures of many different countries in order to equip itself to develop a national culture. Trisno Sumadjo, a painter and writer from the younger generation of artists, took a similar position in his attack on the Cultural Accord. Alisjabana repeated the position he held during the Pujangga Baru debates discussed in Chapter 2. Alisjabana, who was a participant in the Round Table Agreement, stated that Indonesians should utilize links to the Netherlands to access both international culture and the largest body of knowledge about Indonesian culture. Alisjabana (1950: 30) viewed Indonesian culture, which he understood broadly as all aspects of life, as 'very far from being native to our state' and also far from the prosperity of the modern era. He stated that 'it is already proper that we open our nation as wide as possible to the riches of all the culture of the new era' (1950: 30).

[14] At the time there were some assertions that the cultural provisions would be used to gain a trade advantage (Editor 1950a).

The consensus that emerged from the conference followed the thought of Dewantara. It emphasized the requirement that Indonesian culture be free to follow its own path and demonstrated a commitment amongst artists and cultural bureaucrats to a liberal understanding of artists as requiring freedom to be at their most creative. However, the conference also was the catalyst for the creation of an artists' group with an alternative understanding about culture and the role of artists. The People's Cultural Institute (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, LEKRA) was formed just ten days after the conference as a response to disillusionment at the direction that the participants were taking with regard to Indonesian culture (Foulcher 1986). LEKRA became increasingly prominent during the Guided Democracy period.

The second congress was organized by the LKI and held in Bandung in 1951. Whereas the first congress had been focussed on general concerns about Indonesian culture framed by a general and theoretical perspective,[15] the second congress was much more focussed on institutional development and the practicalities of encouraging cultural activity.[16] The binaries that dominated discussion in the first congress were pushed aside as attention turned to the issues of institutional development. The five topics chosen for discussion are an example of the altered focus: cultural policy, copyright, art criticism, film censorship, and literature.

The two papers that dealt most thoroughly with cultural policy and received the most attention in the subsequent discussions were by Kuntjoro Purbopranoto and Muhammad Yamin. Purbopranoto began with the definition of culture that was agreed on at the first congress before limiting himself to art as a 'concrete' focus for cultural policy. He continually emphasized the need for 'concrete' and 'practical' discussion, arguing that "The goal of arts and cultural organizations [...] is to care for and foster the expertise of its members (artists) and strengthen national identity" (1952: 392, 388). He then developed his ideas for a network of arts organizations reaching from the village to the national level, which were enthusiastically received.

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[15] At the beginning of the second congress, the Chair of LKI, Bahder Djohan (1952: 12) stated in the opening speech that the central point of the first congress was the discussion of the 'bases of culture' and that 'the cultural problem mainly was viewed from the perspective of its relationship with State Development and Societal Development'.

[16] The Minister of Education and Culture, Mr. Wongsonegorov (1952: 17), encouraged participants to 'discuss as completely as possible how organizations can best implement this culture'.

Yamin, who was a prominent nationalist leader during the War of Independence and Japanese periods and held important positions during both the Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy periods, presented a comparative study of different countries' cultural organizations. He assessed cultural policy in China, Russia, France, the United States of America, Egypt, and India-Pakistan. Yamin's long paper called for a 'decentralized' system with a 'place for representatives of regional cultures in the central leadership,' acknowledging the growing need for recognition of regional cultures (1952: 425). Yamin attempted to formulate cultural institutions that can further stimulate cultural activity in an enlivened and diverse cultural milieu. He argued for the creation of a new cultural organization to coordinate the fields of education, science and culture including conservatories of art, libraries and a University 'of international quality' (1952: 428).[17] Like Purbopranoto, Yamin viewed cultural policy centred on the development of a national culture[18] despite the 'geographic' and 'racial' differences in Indonesia (1952: 432). The difference between the first and second congresses reflects the changing political climate. The first congress, held during the War of Independence at a time when the fate of the Republic of Indonesia was uncertain, reflects the feeling that a new society and a new type of human—the Indonesian—was emerging. The second congress was held when administrators held political power. They had turned their attention to the problems facing Indonesia with a perspective informed by their Western education. Their attention was primarily focussed towards institutional development. However, Yamin in particular looked beyond the West in his search for a suitable model. A concern remained that Indonesia not copy the West but develop a unique culture, a concern that was replicated in other post-colonial nations in Asia.

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[17] The conference did birth a new organization with greater scope than a focus on the arts and culture. The idea for the National Council for Sciences (Masyarakat Ilmu Pengetahuan Nasional), which later became the Indonesian Council for Sciences (Masyarakat Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, MIPI), was formulate in the months following the conference (Prawirohardjo 1952). MIPI's scope reflects the breadth of the definition given to culture which includes almost all aspects of life of the populace. MIPI was established with Law No. 6, 1956. Initially under the Department of Education and Culture, MIPI was transferred to a newly created Ministry for National Research in 1962 before becoming LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia) in 1967 and being made directly responsible to the President (LIPI 1971).

[18] For instance, as the name of his new cultural organization, Yamin suggests (1952: 426) 'Proclamation Institute' (Lembaga Proklamasi), based on the proclamation of independence.

The debates in the second congress also demonstrate a raised awareness of the need to accommodate a number of different cultures within Indonesia. Bujung Saleh (1952), a prominent writer and LEKRA activist raised the issue of cultural autonomy and minority cultures. An attendee from Bali, Utusan (1952), discussed the position of art in Bali. He stated that the Balinese have an investment in their art, unlike Indonesian culture, which was the province of educated nationalists and that the relationship between culture and religion in Bali was different to Islam. He then discussed the issue of tourism and the need for tourists to understand Balinese art rather than simply viewing it as a spectacle. However, a concern with the development of a singular national culture still dominated the debates. The ideas of LEKRA also were represented at the conference but were not central to discussion. A.S. Dharta (1952), one of LEKRA's most eloquent spokesmen of the early 1950s, expressed the need for artists to side with progressive political forces and their obligation to contribute to societal transformation.

The third cultural congress was held in Solo in September 1954. Rather than focussing on cultural policy generally, the congress focussed on the issue of culture in education. The third congress was organized by the Consultative Committee on National Culture (Badan Musyarawah Kebudayaan Nasional, BMKN). The three topics covered were: cultural education for the school community, for the city community, and for the workers and farming community. The narrower scope of the third congress was accompanied by a narrowing of participants and ideas. The congress focussed almost exclusively on education and the concerns of the DPPK. The conclusions made recommendations to expand the DPPK's role and power in the social sphere without calling for any reforms to the actions of DPPK itself ('Beberapa kesimpulan kongres kebudajaan Indonesia' 1954). In contrast to the excitement and possibilities of the second cultural congress, the third congress promoted increasing state intervention, control and leadership.[19]

The proceedings of the four conventions provide a resource for identifying the positions of the politicians, bureaucrats, and cultural commentators that had the attention of the makers of cultural policy. Three key features from the cultural conventions provide an interesting and important

[19] Sapardi Djoko Damono's (1987) analysis of the three Cultural Congresses reflects the marginal interest of the third congress. In a twenty-one page article, he spends under three pages discussing the third congress.

picture of the terrain on which cultural policy was being made and the key issues of the period. The first feature is the use of synthesis to create a single national culture from elements considered antagonistic. Synthesis was regularly used to solve the Eastern culture and Western culture dichotomy, but was also used to overcome the differences between the 'old' and 'young' generations and such as their desires to protect 'old' cultural forms and foster new forms. The national culture that was supposed to eventuate from this vague, theoretical and unproven process was to overcome the divisions between different groups within Indonesia. Synthesis also involved a level of state intervention in order to control the synthesis to avoid the normalization of particular cultural attributes (like the negative elements of Western culture). In other words, there were elements of a command culture model alongside liberal notions of artistic freedom. It should also be emphasized that in most cases the resulting culture was singular. At the time of the first Cultural Congress, it was a commonly assumption amongst the Western-educated cultural elite that Indonesia would develop one culture and all other cultures would fade away. This assumption was highly problematic in the case of ethnic cultures and, even during the early years of the republic, there was a quiet acknowledgement by some participants of the issues raised by indigenous ethnic cultures.

Secondly, the Cultural Conference in particular and, to a lesser degree, the second Cultural Congress took the position that artists required artistic freedom in order to produce the highest quality of work possible. The commitment to artistic freedom correlates with the liberal notion that freedom is a requirement for optimum performance, be it the production of a commodity or work of art. The third feature is the changing position of attendees in regards to the role of the state in cultural policy. The first Cultural Congress was awash with theories about the state's relationship to culture while the state was generally designated responsibility for national culture. In the second Cultural Congress, attendees were concerned with institutional development where the state was to provide the infrastructure for cultural activities that would secure the conditions for the development of national culture. The emphasis was on practical plans for a cultural policy infrastructure.

The dominant faction in the cultural conventions, all of which were organized by the state or, in the case of the Cultural Conference, a state-sponsored institution, was the Western-educated, liberal-leaning elite. Islamic or Left-wing positions about the arts were marginalized at this time by a liberal, modernizing position. The communists were still ostracized

and in the process of regrouping after the events in Madiun in 1948 (Thomas 1981)[20] and Islamic groups were split on questions of culture and the form that Islamic cultural and artistic expression should take (Maier 1987). These other perspectives rarely arose in the debates and only in the question times of the sessions.

Cultural Policy during Constitutional Democracy

A good starting point for an analysis of cultural policy is a 1951 article about culture by the Head of the Cultural Office, Soedarsono (1951). After emphasizing the importance of the moment for the development of culture in Indonesia, Soedarsono turned his attention to the controversial Cultural Accord with the Netherlands. Much like the majority opinion at the Cultural Conference the preceding year, Soedarsono stated that the ideal and only acceptable condition for the development of Indonesian culture was absolute freedom: Where old ties are retained, of course these forced ties are not free, so the 'free development' of independent peoples is just a myth (1951: 73).

Soedarsono (1951: 74) discussed at length the repercussions of 'forced' cultural relationships (the periods of Dutch colonialism and Japanese occupation) and emphasized the positive results of 'natural' relationships with neighbouring countries (such as India and China) that produced Borobudur, Prambanan and great mosques. Soedarsono then turned his attention to national culture that he defined as the basis of the nation and therefore an important resource to be developed. He lists the four basic goals of the Cultural Office which can be summarized as follows:

1. Democratization of every cultural field until they penetrate to all of wider society and become popular (but also 'protected so they do not become vulgar');
2. Verticalization of DPPK (the spread of cultural offices to lower levels);
3. Leading culture towards 'national universal culture' and away from provincialism; and
4. A harmonious prosperity where all cultural field's (language, the arts and archaeology) receive attention. (1951: 74–75)

[20] The Indonesian Communist Party staged an uprising in 1948 in Madiun against the Republican government during the conflict with the Netherlands. They were soundly defeated by the Indonesian army.

He also emphasized an international orientation in cultural policy where culture is to be used to foster relations with other countries and the inclusion of a cultural attaché in international trips. Soedarsono (1951: 75) finished by emphasizing that the 'path of synthesis is more constructive than analysis that enlarges differences' in the case of indigenous cultures.

Soedarsono's emphasis on freedom should be viewed in the context of the broad definition of culture that underlay the operation of the Cultural Office and sanctioned greater intervention than was the case in most Western countries. The 1953 outline of policy for DPPK provides an insight into the definition of culture:

> The function of Culture in a free nation-state is not only limited to investigating objects, but those objects in all fields must live in the natural culture of all of Indonesian society and become the basis of life for all of the nation ('*Garis-Garis Besar Politik Pendidikan, Pengadjaran dan Kebudajaan*' 1953: 4).

This definition is reminiscent of the Dutch emphasis on the daily lives of indigenous Indonesians in adat research but also reflects the struggle in newly independent countries to develop national cultures that united different ethnic, religious and social groups. A consequence for the Cultural Office of using a broad definition was that it took on an extremely wide range of the tasks. The scope of the Cultural Office's self-apportioned brief burdened policy makers with almost impossible tasks that were well beyond their capacity.[21]

The four divisions within the Cultural Office can be divided into two types: newly formed divisions and institutions appropriated from the colonial regime. The appropriated institutes were the National Museum and the Institute of Archaeology (Dinas Purbakala).[22] In an article that discussed museum display in 1945, Soedibio Soewardipoetro, a writer for English language magazine, *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, observes the change that independence had brought to museum management:

> The museum is justly renowned for its ethnographical collections. Formerly exhibited in dark and unattractive rooms, they are now in brilliantly lighted halls. The visitor is strongly impressed by a sense of space, good taste and novelty. The exhibits are not shown as curious or strange quaint people and

[21] For instance the Cultural Office (1951: 5) was expected to implement supervision and maintenance for all natural structures and ancient structures as national monuments, a huge undertaking in a country as large and diverse as Indonesia.

[22] The two were initially joined before a Division of Museum Management was established in 1956 (Soebadio 1985).

> many a prejudiced foreigner finds himself revising his opinion regarding these 'savages'. (1945: 17)

From the racial hierarchy of the colonial period, colonial era institutions were reoriented to represent the heritage of a civilized and unified people, while using contemporary methods of museum display.

Moh. Amir Sutaarga (1968), the most important figure in museum management in the 1950s and 1960s, made a similar argument in a long article.[23] Sutaarga began by reviewing a speech by the Dutch Head of Oudheidkundige Dienst (Bureau of Archaeology), Dr. F.D.K. Bosch, and incorporating a new goal within museum management: "[Museums] are not only a tool to combat the cultural poverty of a nation—as has already been proven by Dr Bosch in his speech analysed earlie—but museums are also an institution that advances the civilization of a nation" (1968: 8). In Sutaarga's article (1968), two functions of museums emerge as central to their contribution to the achievement of an advanced civilization: first, museums are to protect the nation from cultural poverty by keeping and collecting cultural objects and knowledges; and second, a didactic function that spreads knowledge about the past and the future, including through technological museums that focus on the sciences. Sutaarga's article demonstrates how the functions (and the critique) of museums in independent Indonesia shared a number of continuities with colonial practice with the important difference that Indonesians were now also addressed as national subjects.[24]

The new divisions in the Cultural Office were Arts, Historical Documentation, and Language. Arts policy encompassed both modern forms and traditional forms that were still relevant to Indonesian society. Early arts policy was focussed on developing the Arts Section as the developer of national artistic forms. The three central tenets of the Division's early plans can be summarized as:

1. A 'scientific' approach to developing the arts ('using psychology, ethnology, aesthetics, etc.') where all the various types of art are collected together, studied, then suitable foundations identified as an embryonic 'basis' for Indonesian national arts;

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[23] The article was first published in *Siasat 2* (May, June, July, August) in 1958.

[24] Balai Pustaka also came under the control of the new government (Sen and Hill 2000). However, it lost its place as the primary publisher of Indonesian fiction in the face of increasing competition.

2. Educating Indonesians about arts through the mass media, in schools and organizing artistic events 'with high values'; and
3. Increasing the technical proficiency of Indonesian artists and providing artists with scholarships and tools (Bagian Kesenian 1951: 5).

The first tenet reflects the synthetic perspective about Indonesian culture where a single culture was going to eventuate with elements of the different cultures present within Indonesia. The state's role here was not just to oversee but to study (using the natural sciences) and identify the basis of the national arts. However, there is no suggestion in the policy that artists' activities were to be directed by the Arts Section, even though this Section was attempting to define the national arts and shape popular tastes. Artists were to be taught technical skills and to be provided with tools and grants. The Arts Section had a supervisory role in relation to artists where creative expression was not directed to a particular ends. The contradiction with the Arts Section's attempts to define the national arts highlights the presence of two discourses about the regulation of the arts and the role of the state. The arts were also to be taught in schools but only those arts 'with high values', indicating the presence of hierarchies of different kinds of arts within policy. Arts policies were very broad in scope[25] and well beyond the capabilities of a small government department with limited resources. It was not until increased government spending in the 1970s that the Cultural Office would develop the capacity to implement large-scale projects in accordance with its own formulation of its role.

An important legacy of the 1945–65 period for Indonesian artists was the creation of arts colleges. By 1953 there were four state-sponsored art schools operating within Java of which three were under the control of the Fine Arts Section. The Indonesian Academy of Fine Arts (Akademi Seni Rupa Indonesia, ASRI) in Yogyakarta was the first arts college in Indonesia. ASRI was established in 1949 in a city which had a large number of nationalist artists (Editor 1951). The Indonesian Karawitan Conservatory (Konservatori Karawitan Indonesia, KKI) was established in 1950 in Solo, Central Java. R. Anderson Sutton suggests that one of the aims of establishing the KKI was to provide a place where all the regional arts could blend together which is in accordance with the goals of the Fine Arts Section

[25] For instance, the Division of Arts was responsible for all ancient arts which had disappeared, organizing all art that was currently being performed in Indonesia, demonstrating Indonesian art to the international community, supporting artists and running three art schools (*'Garis-Garis Besar Politik Pendidikan, Pengadjaran dan Kebudajaan'* 1953).

during this period (1991). The third institution controlled by the Cultural Office was the Western Music School (Sekolah Musik Barat) in Jakarta. All three of these institutions were established on the understanding that they would contribute to the development of nationalism and the Indonesian arts. An art teacher training programme was established in Bandung in 1947 as part of the University of Indonesia's Bandung campus. It later became part of the Bandung Institute of Technology in 1959.

Throughout this period the Cultural Office was developing sub-branches at the lower levels of government. Regional offices responsible to the national office in Jakarta were built in all provincial capital cities in the 1950s. However, development was not uniform as provinces and regencies could also sponsor their own cultural offices which were responsible to a lower level of government. An extreme case is Yogyakarta, which had four cultural offices with overlapping activities in the mid 1950s: the national Cultural Office, the Cultural Office of the Province of Central Java, the Cultural Office of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta, and the Yogyakarta municipality's Cultural Office. By the end of the 1950s there were individual cultural technicians (teknisi budaya) who worked in particular sub-regencies (kecamatan) although it was not until the 1990s that every sub-regency had its own cultural technician.[26]

Indonesia's enthusiastic participation in international affairs in the 1950s influenced cultural policy. In a letter dated 31 December 1949 hot on the heels of Dutch recognition of Indonesia, Prime Minister Hatta requested that Indonesia be admitted to UNESCO (Hatta 1949). Indonesia's admission was rushed through in five months, demonstrating UNESCO's commitment to self-determination in colonial territories. UNESCO's earliest orientation was towards culture as works of art, and the belief that the value systems of different nations could approach unity through UNESCO activities. This orientation was quickly challenged by the growing group of newly independent nations. These new nations emerged into the international climate of the Cold War, and many of their positions and desires fit with neither the Soviet nor the Western bloc. As one of the first of this group of nations, Indonesia was an early leader. In the field of culture, Minister for Education and Culture Muhammad Yamin expressed as early as 1954 in a letter to UNESCO Indonesia's dissatisfaction with the lack of representation of Indonesian culture in Western countries, and the

[26] The position title was changed to *penilik budaya* in the mid-1960s.

comparative advantage that Western culture had, including in Indonesia, due to its dominance in mass communications, while emphasizing the 'spiritual richness in the east' (1954). These comments were reinforced in 1956 in their report to the UNESCO General Conference when the Indonesian representative Soebardjo stated 'that products of Western cultures in general were properly disseminated in Indonesia, but on the other hand no flow of Indonesian cultural values to Western countries was to be observed' (UNESCO 1956: 54). From its inception the Cultural Office was engaged in international activities and dialogue. A 1951 report indicates that the Cultural Office had a UNESCO Bureau and an International Division and Soedarsono's report of the same year also emphasized an 'international orientation' in cultural policy (1951: 75). The 1953 policy outline places a high importance on introducing and promoting Indonesian culture to the international community in order to influence opinions about Indonesia, assist the development of Indonesian art and demonstrate that the Indonesian nation is interested in supporting the development of culture ('*Garis-Garis Besar Politik Pendidikan, Pengadjaran dan Kebudajaan*' 1953). In 1955, an Indonesian became a member of UNESCO's Executive Board ('*Garis-garis besar politik pendidikan, pengadjaran dan kebudajaan*' 1955).

Indonesia's concerns about the international political dynamics of the 1950s was shared by other countries, and Indonesia was central to the organization of what became the Non-Aligned Movement through its organization of the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, West Java in 1955. One of the four goals of the conference was 'to consider social, economic, and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented' (Yamin 1955: 9) which resulted in the formation of the Committee on Cultural Cooperation during the conference. The Conference's Final Communiqué strongly endorsed cultural cooperation as a means of 'promoting understanding among nations' (Yamin 1955: 34). The Communiqué expressed a desire to renew 'old cultural contacts' between Asian and African cultures that had been 'interrupted' by colonialism and develop new ones through the means of bilateral arrangements (1955). The Conference took care to state that 'true to the age old tradition of tolerance and universality', that cultural contacts with non-Afro-Asian countries should be pursued simultaneously to promote worldwide cooperation (1955: 35). One of the goals for the conference outlined by the Indonesian parliament was to organize a 'special group' of nations in the United Nations based on shared positions and the Final Communiqué recommended collective action in the United Nations and other arenas. While Afro-Asian solidarity was fleet-

ing due to the events of the next ten years, the Asia-Africa Conference gave impetus to the idea of non-alignment at a time when nations were coming under intense pressure to choose a side in the Cold War, leading to the Non-aligned Movement of nations and the Group of 77 (Mackie 2005). Non-alignment and Asian solidarity had an international influence on cultural policy, most directly through the actions of UNESCO, but also through elements of the internal cultural policies of countries like Indonesia.

The east-west division apparent in the debates and policies about culture in Indonesia was also at the forefront of Indonesia and other nation's criticisms of UNESCO, in particular regarding the global flow of cultural values[27] and of UNESCO appointments and programmes. UNESCO responded through a programme that was launched in 1957 and ran until 1966: the Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, which came to be known as the East-West Major Project. The purpose of the project was to remove 'psychological and political obstacles to mutual understanding', linked to the social and political shifts following World War II, through intensive programmes in educational institutions, cultural institutions and the mass media (Wong 2008). Project activities included textbook conferences, translation programmes, scholarly exchanges, the creation of specialized institutes, research, popular publications and radio broadcasts. Indonesia was receptive of the East-West Major Project as a way of addressing the West's perceived cultural domination (UNESCO 1956: 54). While the majority of UNESCO's Indonesian programmes focussed on education, cultural engagement generally occurred within the framework and rationale of the East-West Major Project. By 1958, Indonesia was involved in cultural worker exchanges, overseas exhibitions, textbook seminars and production, language seminars, and cultural films. By 1960, the Cultural Office had arranged 15 Cultural Agreements with other countries. Indonesia continued to be involved in the East-West Major Project, particularly through exchanges, until its withdrawal from UNESCO in 1965.[28] UNESCO's influence on Indonesian

[27] The concept of cultural values was uncritically linked to the consumption of cultural goods, in particular mass entertainment. The relationship between identity and consumption of popular culture has since been demonstrated to be much more complex, in particular through recognizing the agency of consumers to read and use mass culture in a variety of different ways, including as citizens (Ang 1985; Hartley 1999).

[28] Interestingly, the end of programme assessment noted that the east-west dichotomy had been challenged in the 1960s by the entry of Latin American and African nation states who also had concerns about cultural maintenance and heritage, and that the programme

cultural policy in the 1950s was primarily through providing an intergovernmental forum where a number of postcolonial nations could articulate their perspectives and concerns about culture. Involvement with UNESCO reinforced the east-west cultural division, and the resolve of Indonesian governments to address the influence of western culture relative to Indonesian culture. The exchanges that occurred through the East-West Major Project tended to be scholarly in orientation, rather than influencing broader public opinion. Hence while UNESCO's conclusions about this project emphasized the introduction of nuance into the terminology and greater understanding, Indonesian political rhetoric in the early 1960s increasingly emphasized the east-west division.

A final point about the early years of cultural policy in Indonesia is the activities of state sponsored institutions. LKI was active in the early years with the publication of the cultural magazine *Indonesia*. In 1952 it was replace by the BMKN, which took control of *Indonesia*. BMKN was a nongovernmental arts organization funded by the state. It was an apolitical body with individuals including artists, intellectuals and bureaucrats, and groups represented. BMKN adopted a broad engagement with culture that was symptomatic of much of the cultural policy of the period. Holt notes that its goals and programmes were 'all encompassing' and that its 'wide-ranging aims were rarely implemented with concrete, detailed and systematic programmes of action' (1967: 246). BMKN's liberal perspective about culture was soon contested by LEKRA from within as a member association. LEKRA's position (which I discuss in the final section below), combined with sporadic government funding, increasingly weakened the BMKN as the 1950s progressed. Claire Holt, whose book *Art in Indonesia* is a valuable insight into Indonesian arts and culture in the early independence period, observes that in the early 1960s, BMKN 'became a somewhat impotent residue of the 'liberal' orientation toward the arts' [1967: 248]).

Arts organizations were active during the period. For instance, Holt notes that fine arts collectives proliferated and multiplied in Yogyakarta during and after the struggle for independence (1967: 201). During the early 1950s the Cultural Office was attempting to provide an institutional framework that arts organizations could use. BMKN provides an example

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itself had introduced nuance and greater analysis into the debate (UNESCO 1968). Wong identifies UNESCO's contribution to the deconstruction of East-West prejudices as 'its commitment to the provision of an inclusive theoretical and political space, which accommodated multiple and often conflicting visions to promote dialogue' (Wong 2008: 373–374).

of this cultural policy model since it was a government-organized body that involved artists and arts organizations in order to facilitate their activities. An article by a representative of the Cultural Office in East Java, Karyono Js., notes both the multiple activities of cultural groups in the area and provides an example of the place of cultural groups in cultural policy (1953). He stated that the potential is high, although 'the features in several things and several places are still very elementary' (1953: 33). He then turned to the application of cultural policy. Karyono emphasized the need to take forward-looking steps towards these cultural groups that were 'more active and concrete' such as giving subsidies.

Cultural policy during Constitutional Democracy was characterized by two contradictory models regarding the role of cultural policy. The first model was a commitment to institutional development that can be characterized as a broadly liberal model of cultural regulation. This commitment can be seen in the development of a cultural infrastructure including groups like LKN and BMKN whose members were also drawn from outside the bureaucracy, arts schools, as well as a network of cultural bureaucrats throughout Indonesia. The state was understood a facilitator of national culture rather than a leader as reflected in its organization of BMKN and the notion that if the state established the right conditions national culture would develop. An important condition that was repeatedly emphasized was freedom from outside interference, a common element of liberal cultural policies.

The second model was a command culture orientation centred on the process of synthesis that it was assumed would create a national culture. The Cultural Office took responsibility at times for supervising, at times for instigating the process of synthesis itself and included encouraging desired elements and discouraging bad. Although the notion of 'supervision' accorded with certain elements of liberal models (for instance, encouragement of high culture rather than popular culture), the Indonesian state's role often extended beyond that of most Western countries. The commitment to synthesis and a single culture was peculiar to the early 1950s and was an inheritance from the War of Independence and earlier nationalist movements when there was a commitment to the development of a unified, new national culture for the new nation.

The cultural policy of Constitutional Democracy demonstrated some continuity with late colonial and Japanese occupying cultural policy in its use of culture to alter the behaviours of individuals and manage populations. However, the underlying rationale differed markedly from the

perspectives of the occupying administrations. Cultural policy was structured around building an independent nation that was an equal with other nations in the international system. The aim of the different fields of cultural policy was to facilitate the continued development of a national population understood as a group of free individuals with a national commitment through their understanding of Indonesia's cultural and historical development. The central goal was, in the words of Sutaarga (1968: 8), to make 'the civilization of a nation prosper'. In comparison to the more directive cultural policies of the preceding periods, Constitutional Democracy's cultural policies were more focussed on facilitating cultural development although there were elements of a command culture in some of its plans and programmes surrounding the use of synthesis. However, this was minor relative to what it preceded and what was to follow in Guided Democracy. The administrator political rationality is most obvious in the state's liberal model of cultural provision when compared to the Japanese Occupation and Guided Democracy, particularly the understanding of the state's role as a facilitator. However, the commitment to institution building was often thwarted by the highly idealistic and vague definitions of culture. The cultural policy goals and brief were well beyond the capacity of the Cultural Office and often resulted in vague and impracticable policies.

Policy and Culture during Guided Democracy

The cultural policy changes brought by Guided Democracy occurred during, and to a large degree because of, the advent of the solidarity-maker political rationality. The problems of the Constitutional Democracy period reviewed earlier, combined with the opposition of Sukarno and the army (Lev 1994; Mackie 1994), made it susceptible to intense solidarity maker critique between 1957 and 1959, led by Sukarno who soon gained great influence over policy. Below I provide a brief synopsis of Sukarno's critique of Constitutional Democracy, followed by a summary of the solidarity-maker political rationality that shaped governance from 1959.

Sukarno was particularly scathing of the 'liberal' system which he regarded as 'alien' to Indonesia (Lev 1966: 50) and 'imported' (Sukarno 1970: 84). Daniel Lev identifies two themes in Sukarno's attack (1966: 50–51). Firstly, Sukarno attacked the adversarial aspects of parliamentary democracy, relating them to the worsening economic and social problems in Indonesia. Secondly, Sukarno emphasized the return to Indonesia's

own identity. According to Sukarno, the problems Indonesia faced were a result of the adoption of a foreign system that was inappropriate for Indonesia. In contrast, Sukarno presented his own 'concept' as true to the spirit of Indonesianness: "I want to propose something that is in harmony with the Indonesian spirit, the real spirit of the Indonesian Nation, that is: the spirit of family life" (1970). The 'fifty-percent-plus-one' method of parliamentary democracy was to be replaced with a system that emphasized consensus through concepts that Sukarno represented as uniquely Indonesian: mutual-help (*gotong-royong*) and consultation-consensus (*musyawarahmufakat*). Sukarno also stated his preference for single-party states like China and Russia where development 'runs smoothly' (Lev 1966: 57).

Sukarno's critique of government, supported by the army leadership under Nasution, was successful in overcoming the opposition of the supporters of Constitutional Democracy and Sukarno reintroduced the 1945 constitution on 5 July 1959 strengthening his position as President and taking up the position of Prime Minister.[29] Sukarno's ideas and slogans dominated Guided Democracy (Legge 1972). The new power of the President moved authority from discussions in parliament to Sukarno's speeches (Maier 1987: 12). Perhaps the most important example was his Independence Day speech of 1959 that the Supreme Advisory Council a few months later called the Political Manifesto (Manipol) and declared it provided the general programme of government.[30] One political observer noted that the 'President, formally detached from political parties, is the sole agency to issue fundamental decisions' (Soemardjan 1963: 77), although other groups, in particular the army, were able to exert substantial political pressure.

The central element of the solidarity-maker political rationality was the integration of different groups. Revolution, the most frequent theme in Sukarno's speeches in the Guided Democracy period (Feith 1967; Legge 1972), was the most used of Sukarno's integrative ideas with which he

[29] For a detailed summary of the events of the period, see Feith (1967) and Lev (1966). Cribb and Brown (1995: 82) write: 'In his series of reforms from 1957 to 1959, however, Sukarno did away with the checks and balances which had enabled the politics of stalemate to flourish and put into place institutions which would enable him to shape Indonesia according to his own visions.'

[30] See Supreme Advisory Council (1970) and Sukarno (1970b) for extracts of both documents.

attempted to unite Indonesians. He urged people on to the task of nation-building and attempted to turn attention away from the deteriorating economy and the divisions between different groups. much Like Feith, John Legge recognizes that 'a good deal of Sukarno's radicalism [...] was designed to serve the goal of preserving a social status quo' (1972: 353). Legge notes that Sukarno desired to mobilize Indonesians through the idea of revolution but he gave no specific direction, provided no detailed plans and supported a regime that was 'essentially representative of an existing elite' (1972: 352–354).

Despite his aversion to detail, policy during the Guided Democracy period was increasingly influenced by Sukarno's ideas and rhetoric. Particularly important to policy making was Manipol and the USDEK doctrine that Sukarno claimed was a clarification of the five main points of Manipol (see Table 3.1). Feith (1967) identifies the most appealing aspect of Manipol-USDEK, as they came to be known, as the sense of purpose it gave people after a long absence of shared direction. The remaining political parties and most voluntary organizations were forced to make a statement declaring their support for Manipol-USDEK and the *Pancasila*. The notion of 'national identity' in USDEK was particularly important to cultural policy and is examined in the next section. Feith (1967) also demonstrates widespread opposition to the doctrine and multiple interpretations to modify it according to the desires of particular individuals and groups. Despite the veneer of adherence as the government extended its influence across state and non-state institutions, there are strong indications that the doctrine was not uniformly interpreted or applied.

The central thrust of Guided Democracy was to provide unity after the divisions of the 1950s and in a climate of ongoing opposition between different groups. The use of ritual and symbolism in the pursuit of integration overtook an expertise-based perspective on policy. However, Guided Democracy also struggled to secure the conditions for effective government. As Legge puts it: 'Indonesia's problem was [...] that the new regime,

Table 3.1: Sukarno's USDEK doctrine pronounced in his speech on 28 May 1960

U	*UUD Proklamasi 1945*	Constitution Proclaimed in 1945
S	*Sosialisme Indonesia*	Indonesian Socialism
D	*Demokrasi Terpimpin*	Guided Democracy
E	*Ekonomi Terpimpin*	Guided Economy
K	*Kepribadian Bangsa*	National Identity

Source: (Sukarno 1961: 54)

like the old one, was unable to mobilize the power that was needed if government was to be effective and if the gigantic problems of the economy were to be tackled seriously' (1972: 318).

The Cultural Office during Guided Democracy

As Sukarno's political power increased and was strengthened with the return to the 1945 constitution, his ideas and concepts increasingly dominated cultural policy from 1956. However, given the ambiguity of Sukarno's statements, attention needs to be paid to the programmes and policies of the cultural institutions to find anything more than the general direction of cultural policy. A useful starting point for cultural policy analysis is the cultural Clause 32 that came into effect with the 1945 constitution, which was reinstated in 1959. It provides the mandate:

> The government shall advance Indonesian Culture.

Gone was the 'freedom to partake in culture' and emphasis moved towards the government's responsibility for the advancement of national culture. The 1945 constitution itself was linked to a romantic nationalism associated with the struggle for independence, that emphasized the importance of society (often represented by the will of political power holders) over the individual. The clause was accompanied by a Clarification that states:

> The culture of the nation is culture that arises as the product of the character of the entire people of Indonesia. Old and authentic culture is found in high cultural achievements [Lit. peaks of culture] in regions throughout Indonesia [and is] considered the culture of the nation. Cultural effort must be directed to the advancement of civilization, culture and unification, and should not reject new materials from foreign culture that can develop and enrich the culture of the nation and raise the level of humanity of the Indonesian nation.[31]

Phillip Yampolsky (1995) identifies three points of confusion within the explanation. First, the first sentence provides little explanation about anything and avoids addressing whether Indonesian culture was created

[31] This is based on Yampolsky's translation (1995: 702). Yampolsky also notes that Clause 32 evoked some consternation within the Exploratory Committee on Efforts to Prepare for the Independence of Indonesia (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) due to the absence of any mention of regional.

along with the concept of Indonesia or encompasses all of the cultures of the various ethnic groups. Second, the second sentence contradicts the first in that it limits national culture to 'old and authentic' forms (1995: 704). Thirdly, the clarification provides no guide about how to determine what qualifies as a 'high cultural achievement' (1995: 704). This clause did not have much impact on early cultural policy due to the upheavals of the revolution. Its return placed its ideas and rhetoric at the centre of cultural policy where its ambiguity caused much debate.

The change in the Cultural Office was assisted by a new Minister of Education and Culture who held office from 1957 until the army gained political power and forced him from office in 1966. Professor Prijono had earned a Doctorate from Leiden University and was the Dean of the Arts Faculty at the University of Indonesia when Sukarno appointed him Minister. Prijono has been linked to the left-leaning, Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) affiliated Murba party (Thomas 1981) and was considered a strong supporter of the President's ideas. He received the Stalin peace prize in 1955 and was Chairman of the Indonesia-China Friendship Association from 1955–1957. Prijono interpreted Sukarno's proclamations for application in cultural policy and education. In 1959, for instance, he issued a statement called Nation Building and Education (1970) which Feith and Castles state 'was sometimes regarded as a kind of educational supplement to the Political Manifesto of August 1959' (1970: 327).

A trend that began in 1956 was an increasing recognition of regional cultures.[32] This trend first became apparent in the 'Independence Day Review' of 1956 where the cultural office began to position local cultures as elements of national culture. The review states: To give an opportunity for the growth of the national culture, the Government also gives good opportunities to local cultures to develop. Local cultures of a high quality will enrich national culture. (Setjonegoro 1956: 568)

Prijono (1958a: 11) continued to acknowledge the place of regional cultures.[33] In 1958 he repeated a formulation, 'our art must be national art in spirit but can be regional in its form,' in a series of speeches.[34] Prijono's

[32] Feith (1962) identifies 1954 as the year that more attention turned to regionalism due to the increasing demands for autonomy in Sumatra and Sulawesi However, I did not find any evidence of such a change being mirrored in cultural policy until 1956.

[33] A speech of the Minister of Education and Culture who preceded Dr. Prijono, the conservative nationalist Sarino Mangunpranoto, also emphasized the importance of regional cultures from 1956. Mangunpranoto highlighted that national culture is derived from regional cultures: 'National culture should have its roots in regional cultures. Regional cultures must give the life essences to national culture' (1956: 611–612).

[34] This was also the title of a speech he gave on 20 July 1958. Interestingly, LEKRA's interest in regional cultures also began in approximately 1955 (Foulcher 1986), which perhaps

formulation marks the beginnings of a policy that positions regional arts to accord with national goals and the behaviours of Indonesians. He argued for a mixture of Western and Indonesian arts that builds high moral quality (1958a), although his emphasis was on the indigenous forms, and was scathing of art that is "full of 'sex' " and of low moral character. Within this formulation, Prijono emphasized that commitment be to the nation and not a particular ethnicity. He stated in 'Nation Building and Education' that 'we must, if possible, abolish ethnic-consciousness and raise men's consciousness to the level of the nation' (1970: 328).

Cultural policy after 1959 became increasingly dominated by Sukarno's notion of 'national identity' outlined in the USDEK doctrine. Sukarno related 'national identity' to a number of different areas including science, politics, the arts and the economy. However, the only definitive statement he made was that 'Indonesia has a socialist identity' (1961: 64). In August 1960, a large Consultation Concerning the Meaning of National Personality was held in Salatiga. According to the Chair of the organizing committee, the goal of the conference was to develop the 'practical guidelines for the implementation of cultural tasks and activities in the framework of the President's Political Manifesto' (Sindoesawarno 1960: 3). Six fields were covered: religion and philosophy, education, ethics, the arts, law and society. I limit my discussion below to the field of arts policy.

Prijono's message to the conference provides an insight into how 'national identity' was used within the bureaucracy. Prijono (1960: 19) recognized that Indonesian culture is a synthesis of different elements including Hindu, Muslim, and Western, and made reference to the existence of regional cultures by calling culture in the Republic of Indonesia 'multiform'. He then argued that nation building requires a synthesis of cultures into one, if not in shape (*bentuk*), then in essence (*isi*). The division of essence and shape was an important element of the main thrust of his argument, as is demonstrated by his statement:

> We can and we must shape modern Indonesian identity, which I feel has not yet been formed as deeply and as broadly as it could be, using what we have inherited from our ancestors, in a way consistent with the Political Manifesto and USDEK. In this way, modern Indonesian identity will be a national Indonesian identity whose characteristics are widely shared and whose spirit is socialist. (1960: 20)

Prijono rated whether a culture was national by its accordance with the ideas and positions put forth in the state's political doctrine. For instance,

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dates a sea change in how regional cultures were understood in Indonesia that also coincides with the increased regional discontent that followed the 1955 elections.

he turned to Manipol-USDEK to determine which elements were desirable and undesirable within his ancestor's cultures (1960: 19). He continued to identify the 'best tools' for growing modern Indonesian identity as 'culture broadly defined' which included 'art, literature, traditions and way of life' which, he added, 'must be empowered by our modern character' (1960: 20).

The three papers about arts policy are all focussed on elaborating how the arts contributed to 'national identity'. All of the papers also included a division similar to essence and shape which reflects the problems of trying to link diverse cultural forms and traditions to a single 'national identity'. The first speaker, Soebagio Sosrowardojo, spent most of his paper critiquing the overlapping dichotomies of Western/Eastern culture and modern/traditional arts. He defined art that comes from 'a world view that is positive, tends towards realism and has a people-minded attitude' as reflecting Indonesian identity (1960: 12). Although he critiqued Sanusi Pane's resolution of the dichotomy in a 'synthesis' as 'impossible', the themes of his talk remained similar including the inclusion of elements of Western culture (1960: 8). The second speaker Hoemardani followed Prijono's formulation more closely than either of the other two speakers. He used the same terminology (*isi dan bentuk*) although, rather than centring the 'essence' on Manipol-USDEK, Hoemardani used the more vague term 'spiritual possession' (1960: 25).

The third speaker, Achdiat Karta Mihardja (1960), held that the national identity was based on the *Pancasila*. He defined the work of the arts as enriching knowledge and seeking truth which he viewed as vital to the life of the nation. He defined 'good art' as art that 'contains elements of truth, goodness, beauty' and 'is related to ethics and characteristics that are considered vital to a particular time and place' (1960: 48). From this position, he made two suggestions about developing 'dynamic and effective cultural politics' (1960: 49) that would fit within his framework. His first suggestion was to increase opposition, including state opposition, to 'cheap and sensational entertainments' that had 'damaging effects' (1960: 49–50). Mihardja's second suggestion was educating people about how to appreciate good art as a way of combating the imported commercial forms. He called for greater integration of the activities of the state cultural apparatus and artistic groups to achieve his vision for cultural politics.

All three speakers combined elements of the previous orthodoxy with the more radical agenda of the state. Both Hoemardani (1960) and Mihardja (1960) discussed the need for freedom alongside calls for greater state intervention. Hoemardani argued that excessive rules impoverishes

art and that there was a 'responsible freedom' within society that extends to artists (1960: 22). The responsibility of artists was to be oriented towards the national interest, indicating a lesser degree of freedom when compared to the calls of the early 1950s. Mihardja took a position closer to the earlier orthodoxy. He held that a dynamic cultural politics required freedom from rules and taboos (1960: 49). Prijono himself had, in an earlier speech in 1958, criticized the formulation of 'art for art's sake' that had become associated with the Western-oriented liberal artists of the period. Instead, Prijono (1958a: 10) supported 'engaged art' or art that promoted 'peace and happiness [. . .] through state development.

Interestingly, the aesthetics of the state can be seen to have similarities with the preceding period. Art that was in accordance with a vague national identity was considered to hold high values and morals including certain forms of Western art. Through educating artists and the people about such arts, the national identity could become complete as people acquired the values associated with those arts. Ruth McVey (1986), in her study of attitudes to wayang in the PKI, notes how 'technical' reform was broadly understood as inevitable within the party and how many of the 'technical' reforms had been suggested by other groups not linked to the PKI. McVey (1986: 38) suggests that these 'technical' reforms were in fact 'ideological, reflecting new ideas as to proper cultural models' and were linked to the PKI leaders place in the metropolitan 'superculture' of the Indonesian middle class. Aesthetic reforms in cultural policy will be demonstrated in the next two chapters to have a continuity of understanding with cultural policy during the New Order regime.

During Guided Democracy, the formulation of national arts had widened to include regional arts within the definition of 'national arts'. Certain arts deemed by the Cultural Office to be of high quality and moral character and that therefore build the nation were to be encouraged and developed in the community. Much like the formulations before it, the state and elites were well positioned to pressure Indonesians about their decisions and behaviours. They could pronounce what arts and behaviours were 'high quality' and 'national' and which were not. Tying regional cultural forms to the discursive framework extended the discursive power structure into the most popular forms in all of the regions across Indonesia at the same time as the Cultural Office was extending its reach down to the sub-national levels of government.

The cultural bureaucracy began to assert a state view about acceptable and unacceptable cultural forms, which followed Sukarno's opinions

including his attitude to the West.[35] In a statement issued on 30 October 1959, representatives of DPPK asserted:

> Crazy-looking Western dances like rock 'n' roll, cha-cha, samba and the like are not acceptable to the DPPK, if performed by Indonesian boys and girls either in their own homes or in public places. (Departemen Pendidikan Pengadjaran dan Kebudajaan 1960: 60).

In the statement, a series of guidelines are put forward setting forth the official position about what constitutes Indonesian dances and music, acceptable Western dance and music and unacceptable Western dance and music. Ballet and artistic dance are acceptable as are their accompanying music, opera and chamber music. As a 'balance', DPPK promoted national dances, in particular lenso, saputangan and serampang duabelas. Serampang duabelas was invented around 1954 by a bureaucrat from Medan's Arts Office in conjunction with a member of a local royal family (Sedyawati 1987). After quickly developing a local following, the state started supporting it as an alternative to Western dances and it became a state-supported dance craze across Indonesia. Another state-led endeavour to create a national cultural form was a genre of music called Hiburan Daerah. Yampolsky describes the genre as 'songs sung in regional languages and derived from regional cultures . . . adapted to standard Western tunings and idioms and were accompanied by cocktail-lounge combos' (1995: 706). Multiple recordings of Hiburan Daerah were made and broadcast through Republic of Indonesia Radio.

The international elements of cultural policy varied in line with Sukarno's diplomatic manoeuvres. Although not as prominent in cultural policy as was the case during the early 1950s, cultural exchanges continued but tended towards Sukarno's international allies (Prijono 1964). Cultural programmes and speeches also incorporated support for Sukarno's foreign policy goals and views, such as the campaign to gain control of Irian Jaya[36] from the Netherlands and opposition to the 'colonialist and imperialist bloc' (Prijono 1958b: 6). A broader and perhaps more fundamental parallel can also be drawn between the changing international climate, Sukarno's foreign policy and the features of cultural policy. There were increasing divisions amongst the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, which Sukarno exacerbated due to his radical positions, particularly as his

[35] Feith (1967: 370) notes that Sukarno 'repeatedly denounced' rock-and-roll, jitterbugging and various other imports from American popular culture as 'against the Indonesian national identity'.

[36] Now called West Papua.

domestic position became more tenuous. In 1961, Sukarno divided the world into two groups: the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO) (Legge 1972).[37] He became increasingly scathing of what he called continued 'colonialism and imperialism' through the continued domination of international political and economic relations by the great powers (Legge 1972: 344). Sukarno's increasingly radical positions took a toll on Indonesia's international prestige. From its position of leadership in 1955, Legge argues that Indonesia's moves away from the West and her use of the politics of the Sino-Soviet rift 'had lost the sympathy of many of those who had supported her initiatives at the Afro-Asian Conference' (1972: 160). The confrontation with Malaysia in 1964 further undermined Indonesia's leadership. In a letter to the Secretary-General of the UN dated 20 January 1965, the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Subandrio confirmed that Malaysia's seat on the UN Security Council was the reason for the withdrawal and accused the UN of being 'neo-colonial' and manipulated by 'neo-colonial powers'. Indonesia withdrew from the UN and its specialized agencies (including UNESCO). Although the NAM movement took non-alignment in a different direction from 1960, due to the Sino-Soviet rift and the internal politics of many of the participating nations (Mackie 2005), many concerns continued to be shared around the ideas of cultural domination and exchange. These concerns brought change to UNESCO policy in the 1970s and 1980s when the NAM began asserting its numerical weight, resulting in the debates about creating a New International Economic Order and New World Information and Communication Order.[38] The NAM countries argued for a reshaping of existing economic and communication structures to protect the cultures of developing nations from the economic and cultural imbalance of the existing system (McBride and Roach 1994).

The years between 1956 and 1965 brought changes to cultural policy which can only be understood against the broader political climate under Guided Democracy. Defining and spreading national identity and the development of socialism became the central focus of cultural policy. Institutional development, such as the building of arts educational institutions, took a back seat with the period of Constitutional Democracy. Instead, the Cultural Office was engaging with the politics of the Guided

[37] Although the division was defined largely in terms of former colonies and former masters, other elements occasionally were attached including wealth-poverty, socialist-capitalist, and, underlying all of these categories, Sukarno's friends and foes (Legge 1972).

[38] Indonesia's support of America in the Cold War may have prevented it and other South East Asian nations from taking a leadership role in the movement.

Democracy period through its attempts to mobilize artists and Indonesians behind Sukarno's political agenda. An example of its leadership is the summarized message that Prijono sent out to artists at a conference in 1960: "[Permit] things that accord with all the characteristics of our Revolution and especially those that accord with Indonesian socialism, and reject everything that opposes or is contrary to those features" (1963: 95). Compared to the preceding period, the government's guidelines were more prescriptive, such as the case of dance and music, as cultural activities were linked to political positions.

Examining the concepts of 'artistic freedom' and 'synthesis' provides a method of gauging the changes of Guided Democracy. The concept of artistic freedom was increasingly sidelined as a 'liberal' position regarding culture while politically oriented cultural expression was embraced as long as it was aligned with Sukarno's concepts and terminology. In their rhetoric, supporters of Sukarno like Prijono demanded a commitment to their goals and increasingly attempted to narrow the field of possibilities for what constituted 'national identity' and national culture. The civilizing function of culture was harnessed to Sukarno's political agenda and attempts to mobilize the national population. From facilitating the development of a national culture, the goal of cultural policy became to encourage participation in the political programmes of Sukarno through the rhetoric of creating a socialist society. These moves were controversial and contested as will be examined in the next section about non-government arts organizations. In these circumstances, a command culture model of cultural provision gained the upper hand, and the liberal notion that freedom was the optimal condition of artistic creativity became a minority position.

The notion that a singular national culture was to develop through 'synthesis' was absent from cultural policy from 1956. The central reason for this absence was the introduction of indigenous ethnic cultures into cultural policy and the framing of ethnicity as an element of the national population. Two occurrences assisted this change. First, Sukarno's emphasis on indigenous traditions turned attention towards indigenous cultures. Second, acknowledgment of the culture of the 'regions' as national culture in the constitutional definition of national culture also excluded perspectives that viewed regional culture as obsolete due to the advent of a new national culture. While there was still to be acculturation and the inclusion of some Western elements, the Cultural Office promoted a cultural plurality rather than assisting the development of a single national culture. Ethnic cultures became a focus of management as elements of the national culture.

Non-government Arts Organizations

An important change between Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy was the relationship between non-state cultural organizations and cultural policy. From the mid-1950s but increasing markedly in the 1960s, artists' associations became involved in Sukarno's remobilization of Indonesia and began to actively support his ideas and concepts. Anderson writes:

> The punctuational rhythms and legislative focus of parliamentary constitutionalism were replaced by an accelerando of mass politics penetrating ever more widely down and across Indonesian society. The major political parties of the period [. . .] threw themselves into expanding not merely their own memberships but those of affiliated associations. (1990b: 107)

Artists' associations played a prominent role in the application of Sukarno's concepts when it came to culture. The vagueness of Sukarno's concepts allowed them to be broadly interpreted to fit with a range of political programmes and ideologies. The greater involvement of artists' associations with cultural policy interpretation and implementation during this period is the primary concern of this section. Additionally, the interaction of the artists' associations during Guided Democracy has implications for the direction of cultural policy during the New Order period.

The DPPK encouraged cultural workers to engage with the politics of Guided Democracy, in particular including political positions and messages into their work. In his 1963 speech, Prijono enunciated a definition of the role of the nationalist artist. First, he established the 'point of departure' for artistic activity which is the revolution and socialism as defined within Sukarno's Manipol. From this position, Prijono linked culture together with the political position of the government:

> [The] best works are those works that give energy, support, spiritual strength, happiness to work, self-belief, especially to the working class, the farmers and our armed forces. (1963: 94)

Prijono then called on the administrators of the Cultural Office and the DPPK to 'get or invite our artists and writers to create works that are like that' (1963: 94). Prijono's direction of cultural workers extended to condemning abstract works and directing artists and writers towards realism (as Prijono thought that style was more easily understood by the three groups he, and the PKI, viewed as needing to be incorporated in the nation building effort—farmers, the working class and soldiers), the adoption of particular themes (such as paintings and stories about national heroes) and the active opposition to imperialists. The prescription of the cultural

workers' role and interventions into cultural expression within cultural policy contributed to the growing divisions between Indonesian artists. The largest and most important artist organization of the 1945–65 period was the People's Arts Institute (LEKRA). LEKRA was formed by a group of fifteen cultural workers on 17 August 1950 in response to the Cultural Accord (which LEKRA termed 'imperialist') and Alisjabana's advocacy of Western style modernization in the Cultural Conference earlier that month (Foulcher 1986: 17). The group included two leaders of the newly reformed PKI, D.N. Aidit and Njoto along with A.S Dharta, Joebaar Ajoeb and Henk Ngantung, all of whom were prominent LEKRA leaders of the future. LEKRA used a Marxist framework to resolve the issue of the development of Indonesian culture. They promoted the development of a 'People's culture' to oppose the 'anti-People, feudal and imperialist culture' of the Indonesian ruling class (Foulcher 1986: 18). The cultural workers were to be responsible for building of a socially just and democratic Indonesia through cultural activities. LEKRA was, as Foulcher notes, a product of its times and environment:

> In its formulation of an approach to the Indonesian culture question, it indicated its descent from the Pujangga Baru debate, with all the optimism and idealism of the 1930s in the face of the Indonesian future. (1986: 19)

LEKRA was committed to modernization and nationalism much like the groups that participated in the cultural meetings previously discussed and who dominated cultural life in Jakarta in the 1950s.[39] However, it differed in its commitment to a particular vision of national culture and how it envisioned the role of the artist and their links to society. LEKRA expected national culture to emerge from the Indonesian people and relied on a definition of socialist realism that promoted a commitment to social justice. According to the LEKRA perspective, art should both demonstrate the inequalities present in social reality and promote a process of revolutionary change (what was labelled *kerakyatan* or people mindedness).

LEKRA thus involved itself in what it termed a 'cultural struggle' against the more liberal visions of other cultural commentators, such as the people who had dominated discussion in the early 1950s, and began to promote its version of socialist realism. LEKRA began a period of increased mobilization following its 1959 National Congress in Solo, Central Java

[39] See Maier (1987) for a discussion of the ideas holding sway in Jakarta in the early 1950s.

(Foulcher 1986: 105–107). They identified that the political climate was becoming increasingly conducive to its vision and responded through a closer alignment with Sukarno's guidelines and increased mobilization of its members. LEKRA had always maintained a commitment to the August 1945 Revolution which was apparent in its initial 1950 statement of belief, the Mukadimah, and its revised Mukadimah adopted at the 1959 Congress. The revised Mukadimah in particular positions LEKRA as continuing the struggle against colonialism started with the revolution. At the congress, Njoto introduced a new slogan that came to summarize LEKRA artists' commitment to political involvement: 'politics is the commander'.[40] The directions of Sukarno and his supporters during Guided Democracy confirmed for the movement that 'a cultural revolution was now underway' (Foulcher 1986: 107). LEKRA also became more aggressive in putting forth its position, as did its opponents in the early 1960s.[41] The polarization into two sides within debates over cultural issues was aligned with the broader political polarization. The friction escalated.

In 1963 a group of writers affiliated with the literary magazine Sastra, many of whom had already engaged LEKRA members in cultural debates, published a challenge to Manipol as the basis of national cultural life. Known as the Cultural Manifesto (Manifes Kebudayaan, Manikebu), the document opposed LEKRA's social commitment in the arts with liberal universal-humanism and a commitment to 'artistic freedom'. Henk Maier (1987: 24) summarizes Manikebu as a 'challenge in the struggle for authority over the literary world'. In particular, it was a challenge to the LEKRA concept that 'politics is the commander' (Maier 1987: 24). After a four month hiatus, LEKRA responded with ferocious attacks on the Manikebu signatories and the literary magazine Sastra. Foulcher says of LEKRA's reaction to Manikebu:

> It was seen as an act in open defiance of the direction of state ideology, and a particularly audacious challenge to LEKRA's role as the only legitimate voice of Indonesian artists and cultural workers. (1986: 126)

LEKRA managed to do more than attack its opponents in its publications and speeches. The radical nationalists, led by LEKRA, gave the document the acronym Manikebu (which sounds like the Indonesian term for buffalo sperm). Under pressure from his advisors, Sukarno banned Manikebu

[40] 'Politik sebagai Panglima' (Foulcher 1986: 107).

[41] See Maier (1987: 23) and Foulcher's (1986: 117–118) discussion of LEKRA and anti-LEKRA activity in the early 1960s.

in May 1964 after accusing it of weakening the spirit of the revolution and signatories were attacked in the press, their works were banned, and some were demoted from their positions or sacked. The ferocity of LEKRA's response should be viewed in the context of the intensification of conflict between powerful political groups for who much was at stake.

LEKRA was affiliated with the PKI although in practice they generally operated autonomously with little guidance from party leadership.[42] In the 1960s other parties and artists associated with different parties began to establish their own cultural organizations. The Indonesian National Party (PNI) established the National Cultural Institute (Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional, LKN) under the leadership of Sitor Situmorang.[43] Created in 1959, the LKN supported Sukarno's Manipol-USDEK doctrine and was aligned with LEKRA against the supporters of Manikebu. In the early 1960s, LKN became the proponent of the 'official' nationalist line instead of the weakened BMKN. Like LEKRA members, LKN members were also jailed, censored and banished after 1965. Nahdlatul Ulama established the Institute of Muslim Artists and Cultural Workers of Indonesia (Lembaga Seniman Budayawan Muslim Indonesia, LESBUMI) and began to explore the meaning of Indonesian culture from the perspective of Islamic artists.[44] Other artists' organizations with political party affiliations were the Cultural Institute of Indonesian Christians (Lembaga Kebudayaan Kristen Indonesia, LEKRINDO) and the Cultural Institute of Catholic Christians (Lembaga Kebudayaan Indonesia Katolik, LKIK). Many of these

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[42] Foulcher (1986) emphasizes this point although LEKRA did come under pressure from the PKI in 1964.

[43] For a longer analysis of LKN, see Maier (1996).

[44] LESBUMI was started in 1962 (Sjamsulridwan 1963) by a number of Muslim intellectuals associated with NU. The important players were also significant figures in the film industry (Djamaluddin Malik, who was chairman, Usmar Ismail, Asrul Sani) who drew many workers from that industry into LESBUMI. LESBUMI was opposed to the PKI affiliated Film and Arts Workers Union (Serikat Buruh Film dan Seniman) (Sen 1994). A case could be made that LESBUMI was created in Jakarta with this purpose in mind although its focus and attitude differed in branches outside the capital. The LESBUMI branch in Riau focussed on teaching Q'uranic arts and banned Western dancing and more traditional dancing styles with sexual connotations (*Program kerdja lembaga seniman budayawan Muslimin Indonesia pemimpin daerah Riau di Pekanbaru* 1963). LESBUMI disbanded in 1966 because of the decreasing importance of (and increasing state and societal antipathy towards) political association and the opposition of more conservative Muslims (a letter from Situbondo in 1965 gives notice of NU's decision to disband LESBUMI due to its endangering of the authority of the party through its more open attitude to the arts and racy artistic displays by NU standards. He specifically cites a dancing display at a Performance Night).

organization were involved in semi-governmental bodies, in particular the National Front established by Sukarno, where political allegiances intersected with historical and aesthetic trends and divisions between artists.

One of the few examples of how these relationships impacted specific culturalities, defined in the introduction as a combination of discourses that give meaning to cultural objects, practices and spaces in a specific time and location, is Andrew Weintraub's analysis of changes in the rod puppet performance genre, *Wayang Golek* (2004a). Weintraub examines the changing status of *sinden*, female singers in *Wayang Golek*, in relation to *dalang*, the puppet masters who traditionally held the highest status. The *sinden* had been experiencing a steady rise in popularity in West Java relative to the *dalang*, and their income, status and their staging in wayang golek performances had changed to reflect their increasing status. This was a result of innovations amongst *sinden* to command more respect and prestige, such as composing and recording songs, emphasizing their expertise, and using their real names. In a time of economic and social uncertainty, *dalang* and other conservative commentators were threatened by their changing role. This change contributed to the establishment of the Wayang Foundation of West Java (Yayasan Pedalangan Jawa Barat) in 1961 and a meeting in 1964 to specifically address the 'crisis of the sinden'. An alliance of *dalang*, military commanders, and affiliated cultural commentators ratified recommendations on how the *sinden* should be staged in order to reassert order on wayang golek performances. *Sinden* had previously performed at PKI and LEKRA events, and had been accused of being pro-communist. Weintraub argues that in this time of social conflict and loss of state control, the assertion of male control over the bodies and status of the sinden also asserted the authority of the state and *dalang*. The dominant, state-supported meaning of the *sinden* as 'disruptive, disorderly and dangerous' (Weintraub 2004a: 77) is based in the culturality of the 1960s.

Cultural policy was an element of the increased mobilization of the period. The vagueness of Sukarno's agenda and terminology led many groups with diverging views to support his ideas but also caused much dissent between groups with different interpretations linked to different agendas. State rhetoric encouraged further intensification of recruiting and educating LEKRA members and the active pursuit of the 'people's culture'. However, Maier notes that LEKRA's slogans, like Sukarno's, may have increased political awareness but they did not 'offer clear directions as to how socio-political changes could be realised' (1987: 21). Instead, cultural mobilization became part of maintaining the delicate political

balance. The government also became increasingly implicated in the left-versus-right cultural politics of the period. The ideas of Sukarno were increasingly aligned with the more radical groups, in particular LEKRA, which alienated the Western-educated artists whose positions had previously been much closer to the positions of the state. It culminated in the murder and repression of LEKRA members and the suppression of their legacy.

Conclusion

The key cultural policy change of the periods is how the state defined its role. From a regulatory role where the state provided an institutional structure for activities that focussed on fields that were defined as national culture, the state assumed a leadership role where it attempted to mobilize the populace behind its political programmes. The model of cultural provision during this period can be understood as postcolonial in that it included elements of a liberal model and a command model. However, the role of the state demonstrates that the features of the command culture model declined in the early 1950s before returning with increasing strength from 1957, due in no small part to Sukarno's understanding of governance and preference for a one-party state.

The force that drove the changes in cultural policy was the exchange of the 'administrator' political rationality for a 'solidarity-maker' political rationality, marked by Sukarno's ascent to political power between 1957 and 1959. Understandings of the acceptable limit of state intervention changed dramatically as did the definition of the role that cultural workers should play in achieving the state's political goals. Both periods used culture as a tool to 'civilize' and unite the diverse Indonesian populace. However, the two periods were attempting to shape very different societies and adopted different methods. From attempting to facilitate the development of a population of free individuals with a nationalist commitment and outlook, cultural policy became a tool for mobilizing the national population behind Sukarno's political agenda. In as much as they were attempting to 'improve' individuals and shape the attributes and behaviours of populations, the cultural policies of 1950–1965 demonstrate a broad similarity with late colonial and occupying Japanese cultural policies.

An important change in cultural policy across both periods that had wide ranging effects was the move away from the understanding that cultural 'synthesis' would result in the creation of a single national culture to

an understanding that a diversity of cultures could signify national culture. This change brought ethnic cultures within the realm of cultural policy, expanding cultural policy into a wide range of cultural forms including both ceremonial and community arts and practices. But cultural policy's aesthetics were brought from the 'metropolitan superculture' (H. Geertz 1963: 35) of the Indonesian middle class and differed greatly from the variety of aesthetic understandings within the indigenous ethnic groups. However, it was not until the New Order era that the state had the resources to undertake broad and sustained interventions into indigenous ethnic practices through its cultural policies.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW ORDER AS A 'CULTURAL PROCESS': NATIONAL CULTURE UNDER AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

The formidable New Order strategist and architect of the New Order regime's early political and social policies, Ali Moertopo (1978: 36), acknowledged the importance of cultural change to the New Order regime when he wrote: 'The New Order is a cultural process'. The New Order regime viewed cultural change as both a desirable and inevitable aspect of its policies and, as a close reading of Moertopo's quote indicates, intended to direct cultural development. However, the regime could not exercise complete control over the cultural processes present within Indonesia during the New Order era. This chapter explores the 'cultural processes', both generated from New Order governance and from other groups and dynamics, from which cultural policy arose. While the official cultural policy programmes and institutions are analysed in the following chapter, this is only possible after an exploration of how broader political and social changes shaped the characteristics of national culture, particularly amongst political power holders.

Indonesian national culture, far from being a pre-existing set of attributes, has a temporally changing character. Philip Kitley (2000: 5–7), in his discussion of Television in New Order Indonesia, argues that the changing 'national cultural project' from Guided Democracy to the New Order era should be understood as 'three entwined processes of cultural denial, affirmation and invention, which together have attempted to map a unitary and unifying cultural identity across [Indonesia].' Chua Beng Huat and Eddie Kuo (1998: 38) similarly draw attention to the processes of deployment and suppression or erasure of different 'elements' in their discussion of the invention of 'Singapore' and 'Singaporeans'. They write: 'In each deployment, some elements of the past will be discursively suppressed or erased, others accented and given added semiological significance' (1998: 38). These authors all highlight the importance of discourse in the construction of national culture and identities. Chua and Kuo (1998: 37) argue that national identity is 'necessarily the results of discursive practices that formulate them as objects [...] which are 'called into existence' by statements that circulate in different discourses, in different spheres of social practices.'

National identity from this perspective is a discursive formation—a combination of discourses that creates a set of material relations defining the ideal characteristics and behaviours of a national population. Questions of discursive deployment and erasure are important to understanding the discursive formation that informed the version of national culture present in state policy discourses, and provide insights into why the New Order's version of the command culture model of cultural provision took its particular shape. The authoritarian politics and policy of the New Order regime also opens up the question of authoritarian cultural policy and its links to the colonial and early nationalist eras.

Understanding why particular discourses were important to national culture requires historical analysis of politics (in particular political strategies that had implications for cultural practices) and cultural debates of the early New Order period. After a brief historical introduction, I examine five areas of decision making and debate that shaped the articulation of national culture from the 1970s. These are: the use of culture in the thought of New Order ideologues, in particular how culture was conceived as a tool for shaping the conduct of Indonesians; the broad discourses and political strategies of the New Order regime; the supporters of the concept of universal humanism that dominated the national arts and national cultural debate in the New Order era; and the governmental uses of ethnic cultural practices including the construction of New Order's sanitized version of Indonesian cultural diversity. The final section addresses the impact of social changes in the 1980s and 1990s brought about by sustained economic growth. Through these fields a version of national culture emerged that informed the cultural programmes within the Directorate of Culture (Direktorat Kebudayaan, the new name for the Cultural Office)[1] which are the subject of the next chapter.

Historical Background: The Political Climate of the Early New Order Period

The core of the New Order political elite was a military faction that had built alliances with anti-communist civilian groups in the last years of the Sukarno regime. In the months following the attempted coup of 1 October 1965, a broad coalition of groups who had suffered in the political

[1] The name of the Office of Culture changed to Directorate of Culture in 1964. Although the name change occurred before Suharto took control of the government, the different names are a convenient way of separating the two periods.

polarization of Sukarno's guided democracy supported the army's tough handling of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Two groups were particularly important sources of support: the urban middle class and Islamic mass organizations. Many university students, academics and professionals rallied to the army. Students' and scholars' action fronts (such as KAMI, KAPPI and KASI)[2] agitated initially against the PKI and later against Sukarno, providing crucial support for Suharto's political manoeuvrings. The Islamic organisations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama openly supported the army, and Nahdlatul Ulama in particular was involved in the killings and suppression of rural communists (Cribb 1990; Sulistyo 2000). The New Order regime was reliant on the support of these groups to maintain power and this reliance was reflected in how the regime responded to the problems of governance it faced when it first came to power.

Suharto's faction consisted of officers of similar age and, most importantly, similar experiences from the War of Independence and the pre-1965 period. The military had been increasingly caught up in politics in the fifteen years preceding 1965 and developed substantial links with various political groups and business concerns. By 1965 the military were part of the political elite with a deep involvement in politics, civil administration and economic management (Crouch 1978). On taking power, Suharto and his supporters were not primarily concerned with instigating social change. They wanted to consolidate their position.

The stabilization of power in the hands of the New Order elite corresponded with the breakdown of the coalition that was so effective in 1965. Opposition began to surface as early as 1967 with student protests in Jakarta as the urban middle class became disillusioned with the economic policies and the level of corruption.[3] The Malari riots,[4] sparked by the visit of the Prime Minister of Japan and growing anti-Japanese sentiment at Japanese investment in Java, and the subsequent political crackdown galvanized civilian critics of the government. Edward Aspinall (2000) identifies the end of the civilian coalition as 1977–78 with large

[2] Indonesian University Students' Action Front (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, KAMI), Indonesian Youth and High School Students' Action Front (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda dan Pelajar Indonesia, KAPPI), Indonesian Graduates' Action Front (Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia, KASI). These groups were formed around (ex-)members of the anti-communist political parties (the PSI and Masyumi) and Catholic groups.

[3] Feith (1968b) identifies the beginning of the end of the coalition in the full parliamentary special session of March 1968.

[4] Malari is an acronym for the January Disaster (Malapetaka Januari).

student demonstrations and public dissent surrounding the elections and parliamentary session followed by state occupation of campuses and a wave of arrests.

An important tool the New Order state used to assert control was violent anti-communist repression. The usefulness of the violent actions of the army was not limited to the elimination of the politically powerful Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). Repression provided a deterrent for potential political opposition and the techniques used on the communists were later used on other political opponents including student opposition. Ken Ward (1973: 67) describes the killing of thousands of communists and sympathizers as the 'fundamental fact of the New Order'. Ward writes:

> By continuing to inflict extreme penalties, whether execution or imprisonment for indefinite periods, against those who had participated in communist politics, the new government had at its disposal an example with which to threaten critics from all parties and to discourage any from engaging in active politics. (1973: 71)

Anti-communism also made important new alliances possible in the international arena. Suharto quickly abandoned Sukarno's foreign policy stance (particularly the confrontation with Malaysia and alignment with China) and pursued economic aid from Western countries. Indonesia's non-communist creditors formed themselves into the Inter-Governmental Group (IGGI) on Indonesia and from July 1966 began making arrangements to reschedule Indonesia's debt repayments. Anti-communism strengthened both the domestic and international position of the new regime.

The price of Western aid was economic policy reform.[5] The Suharto government's early economic policy focused on stabilization and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and encouraging foreign investment. A significant economic policy change in 1967 stimulated foreign investor interest in Indonesia. The New Order regime reversed the highly restrictive foreign tariff and investment policies of its predecessor between 1967 and 1972. In 1973 the regime began to again restrict foreign investment, a decision that was made possible through revenue increases caused by the boom in oil prices. Following Malari in 1974, which counted amongst its

[5] Anderson notes that the lowest IGGI commitment per year between 1967 and 1974 was higher than total net government expenditures and receipts in 1957 and 1960. In some years aid covered 50 percent of the cost of all imports (1990b).

causes the worsening situation of indigenous businessmen and the growing influence of foreign capital, investment restrictions intensified and all foreign investments required a local partner (until 1992). The commitment to a liberal economic order since 1972 has thus been 'half-hearted and ambivalent' and economic policy has fluctuated between liberal policies, economic nationalism and pay-offs to Suharto's supporters (H. Hill 1994: 66). The liberal economic policy reforms of 1967–72 should be considered an element of broad cultural policy change in the early New Order period due to the increase in imported cultural goods, in particular mass media and luxury products. However, the impact of economic reform on practices of consumption and identity were more regularly and severely criticized in the 1980s and 1990s, as is discussed in the final section of this chapter. In the regime's early years, the problems of providing the ideal conditions for fast modernization and securing its political position had a much greater influence over how culture was articulated within governmental discourse.

Culture in the New Order Regime's Rationality of Government

Although a variety of governmental discourses, strategies, and techniques were part of New Order governance, many of which are considered in the discussion below, the discourse of development (*pembangunan*)[6] had the most influence on the articulation of culture. Ariel Heryanto (1988: 8) identifies *pembangunan* as one of the two most consequential 'keywords' in New Order era language, meaning terms that are 'significant', 'binding', and 'indicative [...] in certain forms of thought'.[7] Heryanto's exploration of *pembangunan* followed Raymond William's keywords approach (1983) where a term's semantic history and relationship to social and historical formations is explored. The analysis of development/*pembangunan* below follows a slightly different, but related, understanding of development suggested by Simon Philpott: that the 'government of development/growth' was an element of a 'particular form of governmentalization of the state' that arose in Indonesia following the fall of the Sukarno regime (2000: 166–167).

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[6] In this chapter, I use the term pembangunan to refer to the use of development in Indonesia during the New Order era.

[7] The other term is *Pancasila* which I touch on below.

The usage of the term 'development' that is relevant to government in Indonesia began after 1945 around the term 'underdeveloped'. According to Raymond Williams , two ideas became connected at this point in time: firstly, the 'development' of natural resources; and secondly, that economies and societies pass through 'stages of development' (1983: 103). From 1945, the concept of development became increasingly focussed on a group of societies, which included Indonesia, identified at the time as the 'Third World' (Arndt 1981). The peak of development's popularity coincided with the years when the New Order regime was at its most confident in the 1970s and 1980s.

In his Foucaultian critique of development, Marc DuBois focuses on the 'new relations of power' that development introduces into the 'Third World'.[8] According to DuBois development aims to restructure 'the behaviour and practices of individuals and populations' with the goal of increasing 'economic productivity, the wealth of the nation, the level of health or education of the people-in short, to increase public welfare' (1991: 10). DuBois contends: "Particularly in the Third World, [the masses] are not only presented as human resources, but as resources in need of modification, adaptation, and change-in other words, development" (1991: 10).

Barry Hindess connects development's 'improving' function to the features of liberal imperial administration discussed in chapter one (2001: 108). Much like the colonial subject, the subject of development requires capacity building in order to achieve the goal of autonomous action. He asserts:

> The aims of the [liberal] project have barely changed, but the end of empire has transformed the conditions in which it can be pursued [...] The liberal project of improvement [...] can no longer work through what it once saw as the civilizing effects of a benign imperial rule [...] Instead, the liberal project is now pursued by significant minorities in non-Western states, many of whom have adopted some version of the earlier liberal view of the people among whom they live, and also, more remotely, by western states themselves working through a different range of indirect means. (2001: 108)

While the central thrust of Hindess' argument about the continuities of imperial rule and development is accepted here,[9] I would be more cautious

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[8] For other critical assessments of development, see Illich (1969), Arndt (1981), and Escobar (1984–5).

[9] The existence of a form of continuity is also suggested by the emergence of the contemporary meaning of development in 1945 when many colonies became nation-states. My purpose is to note the existence of a continuity rather than chart its complex history,

about characterizing development as a 'liberal project' given its many forms and implication in different state-systems, many of which have been decidedly non-liberal and have loudly rejected liberalism.

An alternative characterization lies within DuBois' understanding of development as a form of biopower exercised over and within non-Western nations (1991: 9–10). Like cultural policy, 'biopower' is concerned with both monitoring and regulating the norms of populations and changing the conduct of individuals and both culture and 'biopower' became a focus of state activities around the same moment (Foucault 1990: 137–138). Yet 'biopower' refers to a different range of governmental fields that are concerned with the processes and evolution of life.[10] Dubois (1991) illustrates the concern with populations through the policies of population control and the introduction of 'scientific' norms regarding family size, methods of birth control and child rearing. DuBois also identifies the other side of biopower in the disciplinary power that development exercises over the practices of individuals in non-Western nations. Development introduces methods that firstly make individuals' actions calculable and secondly, inserts individuals into training regimes. However, DuBois tends to downplay the agency of the non-Western states in the operation of development. Authors such as Heryanto (1988) as well as Jonathan Rigg, Anna Allott, Rachel Harrison, and Ulrich Kratz (1999) all stress the particularities of *pembangunan* in Indonesia and emphasize that its usage is the assemblage of both national and international semantic and political histories and had a special salience for the New Order regime. An indication of the importance of *pembangunan* was a declaration by the 1983 parliament that gave Suharto the title 'Father of *Pembangunan*'. That this occurred, as Heryanto (1988) notes, at precisely the time that development became a target of criticism in other parts of the world indicates that *pembangunan* had a degree of importance in Indonesia independent to how development fared internationally. *Pembangunan* also extended to areas outside of the limits commonly sets for 'biopower', such as culture and economics.

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which would involve more analysis than required here. Alatas, in his book *The Myth of the Lazy Native*, provides an interesting and relevant exploration of the historical links between colonial and developmental discourses. He writes regarding the representation of indigenous Southeast Asians: 'The image of the indolent, dull, backward and treacherous native has changed into that of a dependent native requiring assistance to climb the ladder of progress' (1977: 8).

[10] Biopower encompasses phenomena that take as their subject living beings such as health, sanitation, birth rate, longevity and race (Foucault 1997).

Development was a rationality of government that was readily adopted within authoritarian states. It provided a rationale for intervention at the level of populations and individuals that had a large degree of independence from liberal concerns regarding individual freedoms but still received the approval of the international community and in particular the more powerful Western states. *Pembangunan*'s centrality to the New Order regime can thus be understood through the way it both provided a rationale for and legitimized the application of modern forms of state-power, providing the basis of an Indonesian, authoritarian 'normalizing society' (Foucault 1990: 144) with a focus on fostering both natural and human resources.

The origins of *pembangunan* were in the alliances that the New Order faction formed with two Indonesian groups and the international community when it first came to power and was connected to the economic problems that faced the regime in its early years. One of the groups, labelled the 'modernizing intellectuals' by Ward (1973) and R. William Liddle (1973) was the intellectuals and students from the action fronts. These groups were most responsible for a trend that dominated public debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Adopting the language of Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Samuel Huntington, these groups, which had been alienated during Guided Democracy, advocated a turn to a political system that focused exclusively on modernization and de-emphasized divisions within society. Ward (1973: 75) associates the 'cult of non-ideological pragmatism' that developed within these groups with the 'anti-ideology mainstream of American social science'. Many of the modernizing intellectuals became organizers of and spokesmen for Golkar[11] in 1970 and 1971.

The other group has come to be known as the 'technocrats'. The technocrats were a group of US-trained economists at the University of Indonesia that Suharto summoned to advise him on how to tackle the economic problems of the late 1960s. The technocrats utilized a market-oriented, outward-looking approach that included many elements of the orthodox liberal perspective on economic management. Their policies received the approval of the international community, demonstrated by debt rescheduling and increased aid donations. The techniques and technologies of *pembangunan*

[11] The Government party established by Moertopo on behalf of the New Order regime before the 1971 elections, Golkar was short for Golongan Karya, or Functional Groups, designating that Golkar was a collection of representative organizations from different parts of society.

were applied through the macroeconomic reforms of the technocrats, the programmes of the aid packages and the New Order regime's development projects. In 1969, *pembangunan* was confirmed as a central concept and goal of the regime through the advent of the first of the Five Year Development Plans (Rencana *Pembangunan* Lima Tahun, Repelita).

Lieutenant-General Ali Moertopo was one of the most prominent ideologues and political operators of the New Order regime. He also played a major role in laying the foundations of the understanding of *pembangunan* that became central to governance. Born in 1924, Moertopo began his Military career in the informal military forces (*laskar*) that fought for independence during the revolution. He was involved in crushing the PKI Tiga Daerah and Madiun revolts during the War of Independence and the PRRI/Permesta rebellion after it. Moertopo's career was predominantly in military intelligence. As a member of the newly formed regular forces (TNI), he became close to Suharto in the 1950s. After 1965, Moertopo was involved in many covert operations including the rigged 'Act of Free Choice' in Irian Jaya in 1969. Moertopo was a private adviser to Suharto from 1966–74 and held a number of intelligence roles (including responsibility for the emasculation of opposing political parties, the construction of Golkar, and its overwhelming election victory in 1971). His positions became increasingly high-profile. In 1974 he became Deputy Head of the State Board for Intelligence Coordination (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, Bakin) and was Information Minister from 1978 until 1983. As an important political player in the New Order era between 1965 and 1983, Moertopo was influential in the Department of Education and Culture, particularly during the 1978–1983 period when Daoed Yoesoef was the Minister of that Department (Pangaribuan 1995).

Moertopo's ideas on development took shape through his leadership firstly of the Special Operations Unit (Operasi Khusus, Opsus) and later with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that he helped establish in 1971.[12] Key members of Opsus later were prominent in CSIS and both organizations were important hubs of policy formation.[13] Through the role of the technocrats, Moertopo and Opsus, the New Order regime picked up on the corporatist logic of much modernization

[12] Robison and Hadiz (2004: 48) write that a 'sophisticated and pervasive apparatus of social control and mobilization was designed in the early 1970s within Moertopo's Special Operations Command (OPSUS), the New Order's most important security and intelligence office.'

[13] Krissantono (1991: 140) calls CSIS the 'kitchen of the New Order government'.

theory which identified a depoliticized society and technocratic reasoning as ideal for fast modernization (Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005; Heryanto 2005) and adopted certain of its discourses that justified the existence of a strong state. Moertopo published several books elaborating his ideas about *pembangunan* in the 1970s and 1980s. The first was Accelerated Modernization of 25 Years' Development (Akselerasi Modernisasi *Pembangunan* 25 Tahun (1973)). A few years later Moertopo turned his attention more specifically to the role of culture in development in his book *Cultural Strategies* (*Strategi Kebudayaan* [1978]).

Greg Acciaioli (2001: 8) summarizes Cultural Strategies as articulating 'a full-blown theory of cultural evolution, which situates the developmentalism of the New order Indonesian state [...] as the teleological realization of a process of cultural evolution that has characterized Indonesian society from its archaic beginnings'. The central thrust of Cultural Strategies was to plan the future changes in Indonesian culture in order to build human capacity and national strength. Moertopo's definition of culture was linked to the evolutionary development of humanity. He defined culture firstly as a form of 'strength' (1978: 9) which he later clarified as 'human resources potentials' (1978: 9). Moertopo then defined culture as 'all the processes of development of human life' (1978: 10) and finally as the process of 'humanization' (1978: 10). For Moertopo, culture was shaped by human agency in conjunction with outside influences, causing him to reject the East/West typology of earlier theories. Cultural Strategies was an exercise in outlining what elements Indonesian culture needed to 'culturalize' and as such operated as a normative plan for Indonesia's future.

A key feature of Cultural Strategies was the identification of cultural deficiencies in Indonesia's cultural evolution. Moertopo argued:

> The New Order must be capable of finishing the huge task that faces it, that is to make Indonesia into a stable subject, a strong subject, by the standards of world development. The New Order must be able to execute cultural tasks that are very important, executing cultural borrowing (acculturation) in the passage of world history both now and in the future. This is the cultural nucleus that we must formulate now. This includes thoughts and planning connected to scientific and technological progress, economic development, the development of social systems [...] progress in language and the arts and development connected with religion. (1978: 36)

Moertopo (1978: 44–45) held that Indonesians were not sufficiently developed in the areas of economy, technology, and information, and that these should be the focus of 'acculturation' that would bring Indonesians to the level of 'humanity' required by the international and domestic climate. Moertopo made the development of the capacities of Indonesians, in

other words the creation of idealized modern Indonesian subjects who could contribute economically, the primary goal of cultural development. The state's economic priorities overrode all other possible considerations, such as cultural identity, traditional knowledge and lifestyles and considerations of equity.

Moertopo's writings provide an example of how *pembangunan* and development theories more widely mirrored colonial understandings of governance including culture's role in governance. Like colonial administrators, Moertopo described Indonesians as backward and unable to respond to the demands of the times, qualities which he attributed to a culture shaped by an easy environment and climate. He held that 'a relaxed cultural style has clearly become the main source of various mental barriers that we are experiencing now, even though the current situation requires that the Indonesian society lives with a culture of work, whatsmore a culture of hard work' (1978: 42).

According to Moertopo (1978: 36), this situation required the New Order regime to 'save the historical process' of national evolution by directing national culture towards the priorities of *pembangunan*. Much modernization theory, linked as it was to the end of colonialism, also shared the hierarchy between modern and traditional ways of life. Liddle (1973: 181) writes that 'development ideology of Western social science' which was adopted in Indonesia by the modernizing intellectuals, had at its heart 'a sharp distinction between traditional and modern societies' and constructed a hierarchy between the two that privileged the modern and condemned the traditional. Moertopo premised the authority of the state on the 'improving' impulse for modernization, which legitimized an authoritarian approach to culture where development targeted traditional culture as backward and retarding development.

Moertopo's writing has been linked to the functionalist school in American sociology through the way it drew on the writings of Indonesian anthropologist Koentjaraningrat (Acciaioli 2001). Koentjaraningrat was the most influential Indonesian anthropologist of the New Order era (Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005). He made great use of the concept of 'cultural value orientation' which he borrowed from the works of Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn (Koentjaraningrat 2000). The Kluckhohns were part of the functionalist movement in North American social science and worked in one of its key engine rooms at Harvard between 1940 and 1960.[14]

[14] I discuss Koentjaraningrat's methodology in greater detail in chapter seven.

Utilizing his background, Koentjaraningrat (2000) expressed a popular version of the relationship between culture and *pembangunan* in a series of newspaper articles that were reprinted as a book in *Culture, Mentality and Development (Kebudayaan, Mentalitet dan Pembangunan)*.[15] Koentjaraningrat (2000: 32) preceded Moertopo, and followed Dutch colonial thought, in designating Indonesians' 'mental attitude' as 'generally not prepared for development'. His articles in Culture, Mentality and Development then mapped out a course for development, identifying 'cultural values' that needed to be repressed and traits that needed cultivation. Koentjaraningrat's ideas should be understood in the context of the 1970s where Indonesian social sciences were being reshaped by international academic training regimes that emphasized value-neutral research and an authoritarian regime that was using technocratic governance to contain criticism of its legitimacy and decisions. Vedi Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae write regarding the growth of the social sciences during the New Order era:

> [The] main inclination was still toward social science development that basically became part and parcel of the New Order's broader development agenda from the 1970s until its demise in the 1990s (2005: 9).

Moertopo's writings about culture built on Koentjaraningrat's ideas, drawing on the authority of the social sciences to legitimize the New Order regime's policies.

Moertopo also warned that economic, technological and scientific *pembangunan* may bring with it negative effects, such as disappearance of identity, and new social conflicts (1978: 45–48). Moertopo advocated that a process of 'enculturation' be undertaken by national leaders that involved the selective protection of elements of Indonesian culture in order to ameliorate undesirable consequences. Culture therefore played a double role in *pembangunan*. It encouraged Indonesians to expand their capacity for economic production through adapting to modern technologies and sciences and it protected against the negative effects of *pembangunan*. *Pembangunan* justified the authoritarian state through a civilizing mission creates the basis for an authoritarian cultural policy with similarities to the colonial cultural policy of the Netherlands, particularly the justification of restricted freedoms for Indonesians as impeding their progress to a state of full development. It also justified a command culture model with similarities to the colonial regime as it privileged modernization over political mobilization, but with more emphasis on state-led

[15] First printed in 1974.

modernization rather than the 'organic' model with the state as the cultivator favoured by colonial administrators. While Moertopo articulates a cultural model for the state, this is not to say that policies that drew from his model were effective. The results of development programmes, as is explored in the Case Study chapters, are located in the everyday details of a programme's planning and operation (what Tania Li calls the 'cultural framings embedded in the ethnographic details' (Li 1999). Moertopo was eventually excluded from power at the beginning of the Fourth Development Cabinet in 1983 as part of a Suharto clean-out that was suspected to be motivated by his desire to end continuing rivalries between political elites (Pangaribuan 1995). While Moertopo was absent from later political and policy decisions, his articulation of culture's role in *pembangunan* resonated with cultural policy from the early 1970s until the present. He passed away in 1984.

The New Order Regime's Political Discourses and Strategies

While *pembangunan* can be thought of as being a cultural process that includes a specific set of ideas about culture, the New Order regime's methods of governance also included cultural corollaries, or effects that were not intended by the regime. This section analyses four different discourses and strategies of government that included cultural components or cultural corollaries: political emasculation (what analysts have called 'depoliticization'), the New Order's use of nationalist language, the 'family principles' doctrine *kekeluargaan*, and the state/society divide.[16] While discourses are the languages, thoughts, and practices through which subjects and objects are given meaning, strategies include an element of choice in the designation of means, actions, or procedures in order to come up with winning solutions. Put another way, while discourses constitute meaning, strategies can alter how discourses are deployed.

The New Order regime employed a political strategy that analysts, such as David Bourchier (1998), have labelled 'depoliticization'. Depoliticization began in the early 1970s through three methods that the New Order power-holders employed to consolidate their political position. First, the new government undermined the autonomy of groups that could provide substantial opposition because of their mass support in society. The

[16] Since definitions of 'discourse' and 'strategy' are provided in the introduction, only a quick review of the difference between them is included here.

political parties, large Islamic groups, professional groups and unions were weakened and brought under the control of Suharto cronies, generally through the network of functional groups (Crouch 1978; McIntyre 1972). Second, the New Order elite used their position as military bureaucratic office holders to enrich themselves and their supporters, ensuring continued support through what has been labelled a system of patrimony (Crouch 1979; Robison 1986). Third, Suharto purged both the military and the bureaucracy of possible opposition, removing any internal opposition to his rule and appointed loyal individuals, often military officers who were reliant on his support, to important government and military positions (Bourchier 1996; Crouch 1978).

The strategy of political emasculation was further pursued around the 1971 and 1977 elections in ways that reached further into Indonesian society and strengthened the political hegemony of the New Order regime and in particular the position of its election vehicle, Golkar. In 1970 the government announced that government employees must observe 'monoloyalty' to the government, preventing bureaucrats from joining political parties except Golkar. The doctrine of the 'floating mass', a term coined in 1971, emphasized that Indonesia's rural and working classes were not to be distracted from the task of state-led development with political involvement in parties (Anderson 1990b). Another barrier to political participation was the 1975 banning of all political party branches below the regency level except for a few weeks before elections, effectively preventing them forming into mass organizations capable of challenging the government (Crouch 1978).[17] The political emasculation of Indonesian society attempted to bar political discussion from everyday life in New Order Indonesia, including into cultural and artistic expression. Themes and expressions considered 'political' were frowned on, banned and sometimes resulted in detention and even death.

Restraint of political expression was not applied uniformly to all Indonesians nor was it uniformly implemented across the period. Artists affiliated with groups considered political enemies, such as the left and Sukarno, were killed and gaoled in the 1960s and, after the release of political prisoners including many artists and writers beginning in 1979, experienced

[17] The New Order regime also attempted to depoliticise students following protests before and after the 1977 elections and undertook a number of repressive measures against student groups including the 'normalization of campus life' policy in 1978–79 (Aspinall 2000).

continued hostility and were excluded from their previous occupations (Hatley 1994). Regional arts (which I explore in the fourth section) experienced an immediate change in themes that Hatley (1994) characterizes as 'depoliticization'. In contrast to these two groups, the urban groups that had alliances with the regime when it came to power remember the years between late 1960s and the late-1970s as a time of freedom of expression. Following the Malari riots in 1974 the regime became less tolerant of dissent and launched another offensive again in 1978—the crackdown on dissent accompanied the end of the coalitions that brought the New Order regime to power. From 1989, the prospect of increased 'openness' for discussion was raised by New Order figures and there were some encouraging signs that there was room for freedom of expression (Bourchier 1996; Hatley 1994). However the 1990 banning of Teater Koma's play *Suksesi* and the 1992 crackdown against the performance genre *Ketoprak Plesenden*,[18] indicates that the expression of political dissent was still barred. Another crackdown on political activities began in 1994 with the closure of three political magazines and the 1996 attack on Megawati Sukarnoputri and the political offices of the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat Indonesia, PDI).

Second, the New Order regime articulated its policies through nationalist idioms and authoritative discourses that were known and accepted by the political elite, the army and the broader populace. New Order spokespeople made particular use of Sukarno's concepts and expressions and Western social science through the discourse of *pembangunan* as previously explored. The New Order regime made good use of a type of speech that Roland Barthes calls 'myth' (1972) which allowed the regime to represent their policies as nonpolitical. Barthes identifies myth as the mechanism that produces 'naturalized' (or depoliticized) speech. Certain symbols evoke shared memory of, for instance, nationalism or a well-known story or an ethnic group. Myth is the mechanism that evokes such a memory and therefore hides the specific history of the symbol. Barthes gives the example of a picture of young African in a French uniform saluting with his eyes uplifted. To Barthes, the picture signifies that 'France is a great Empire, that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag' obscuring the history of French colonialism in

[18] *Ketoprak* is a form of popular theatre in Java that developed early in the twentieth century. *Ketoprak plesedan* subverted the conventions of the genre for humorous effect and to engage in social comment and critique (Hatley 1994).

Africa [...] What French imperiality obscures is also a primary language, a factual discourse which was telling me about the salute of [an African] in uniform' (1972: 122). New Order discourse was replete with a 'mythology' of Indonesian nationalism, tradition and *pembangunan*.

Sukarno's genius, as mentioned in the previous chapter, lay in his ability to unite diverse groups through his use of language and symbols. Strong support for Sukarno in the early years of the New Order regime concerned Suharto and his followers. They undermined popular support through repositioning Sukarno's popular symbols of Indonesian identity. The most prominent was the *Pancasila*, which had its meaning reworked in the early years of the New Order regime such that it became one of the key ideological documents of the conservative, authoritarian state.[19] The 1945 constitution was also reinterpreted through the *Pancasila* with similar emphasis (Bourchier 1996; Ramage 1995). A third example is Sukarno's concept of *gotong royong*. From a term again aimed at facilitating popular participation, under the New Order regime *gotong royong* became a way of legitimating top-down programmes through its connection with an imagined indigenous lifestyle (Bowen 1986).

Third, the discourse of *kekeluargaan* or family principles was an important element of the governmental rationality of the New Order state. Bourchier (1996: 164) depicts the 'spirit' of *kekeluargaan* as one 'of organic wholeness, harmony, stillness'. Elsewhere, Bourchier (1998: 204) gives a more critical description of *kekeluargaan* as 'a word with overtones of stasis, patriarchy and a feudalistic 'know thy place' traditionalism'. The basis of *kekeluargaan* is an idealized model of traditional Indonesian society drawn from Dutch adat scholarship.[20]

Kekeluargaan became a state model for Indonesian society in three different locations. Firstly, *kekeluargaan* establishes relationships within the family. The standard text for indoctrinating schoolchildren, *Pancasila* Moral Education, states:

> In the family there is a feeling of mutual consideration and empathy. The father works in the interests of the whole family. Your mother cares for your father and all the children. Often your father puts the needs of his family above his own needs. He postpones buying himself shoes because he has to buy your schoolbag. It is the same with your mother [...] Father and mother see you and the interests of the family as more important than their own.

[19] The process has been well documented by Morfit (1981) and Ramage (1995).

[20] Parker (1992: 8) writes: 'The state ideology of Indonesia [...] drew upon a vision of integrated nation and state within the ideological framework of *kekeluargaan*'.

> How happy is a household with such a mother and father. (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1984, in Bourchier 1996: 234)

A second location is the community. *Kekeluargaan* reflects the notion that the traditional (and therefore authentic) Indonesian community operates without conflict and in a state of balance. Leaders are 'spiritually united' with their communities and 'everyone cooperates in a spirit of community mindedness and family-ness' (Bourchier 1997: 162). The third location is the nation-state. *Kekeluargaan* became the guiding principle of the state's relationship to society. The most obvious manifestation of 'family principles' at the national level is Suharto's title as the 'Father of Development'. According to Heryanto (1988: 20), this title emphasizes 'a 'natural' authority and over-all order.'[21]

Fourth, a significant strategy of the New Order regime was its articulation of the relationship between state and society. The variety of ways the incorporation of society into the state has been achieved has been well documented.[22] The point is made succinctly by Bourchier:

> The dismantling of the party system; the corporatization of youth, women, farmers, workers and professionals' organizations; the requirement that all social organizations submit to government supervision; and the proliferation of restrictions on the freedom to organize are all consistent with the idea of a progressive incorporation of civil society into the state. (1997: 176)

Michel Foucault (1991) identifies the articulation of the dividing line between state and society as an important governmental strategy. In the case of the New Order regime, the state's agenda was considered paramount and civil society was considered important because it was a means to achieve that agenda. The dividing line between state and society was blurred through representing the interests of the state and civil society as organically linked. However, in practice the regime would not allow civil society to challenge its articulation of the national interest. Authorities sought to impose a high degree of regulation on the institutions of civil society (including intervening in appointments and banning organizations) and any actions that authorities considered a critique of state action or a barrier to the achievement of state goals were labelled

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[21] Kitley (2000) demonstrates that *kekeluargaan* also extended into the state-owned mass media in his analysis of the TVRI soap opera, *Keluarga Rahmat*.

[22] On corporatism in Indonesia, see MacIntyre (1990). On political parties, see Ward (1973), Ricklefs (2001) and Mackie and MacIntyre (1994). On legal structure (which began with MPRS Resolution No.XX/1966), see Bourchier (1996). On the parliament, see Feith's (1968a) discussion of the March 1968 MPRS session.

antisocial and anti-Indonesian. The New Order's articulation of the state-society relationship, like *kekeluargaan*, was used to justify the repression discussed in the previous sections.

Exploring the discourses and strategies that have informed cultural policy provides a partial picture of how the New Order regime understood the task of government. Philpott writes:

> The techniques, technologies and rationalities of the New Order were a particular form of governmentalization of the state, with 'development' as its leitmotiv. This entails thinking about New Order authoritarianism as an activity that made government thinkable and practicable as an art dependent upon particular knowledges to give form to the domain it sought to govern, rather than treating it in institutional terms. (2000: 167)

Cultural policy was given shape within the New Order regime's governmental rationality. When the New Order regime came to power in 1965–66 it erased many of the discourses that had informed cultural policy since independence and in particular during Guided Democracy. Gone was the political mobilization, the concept of 'national personality' and the goal of creating a socialist society that had been at the centre of cultural policy since 1959.

The new justification for cultural policy was culture's role in *pembangunan*, which became a key governmental discourse in 1969 and remained important across all portfolios for the regime's duration. Depoliticization was an important tool of the regime that was enforced in conjunction with *pembangunan* and justified through *kekeluargaan* and the related conceptualization of the relationship between state and society. Depoliticization severely limited the cultural practices of all groups although some periods within the New Order era offered particular groups more room for cultural expression than others. In particular, the early New Order period from 1966 until the late-1970s provided contemporary artists who had been amongst its supporters a space where they could practice their arts with a degree of freedom than had been absent since the early 1950s as I explore in the next section. The freedom for this group was curtailed in 1978 and, despite promises of 'openness' in the late 1980s, was restricted until Suharto fell in 1998. Similarly, New Order language was asserted more vigorously at different times, in particular the late 1970s and 1980s. For instance, in 1982–84 Suharto successfully pushed for the *Pancasila* to be made the sole philosophy (azas tunggal) of all socio-political organizations in the face of complaints from Islamic groups.

An implication of the strategies discussed here is the way they supported the return of the command culture model of cultural provision.

Discouraging dissent, embracing the notion of an organic connection between state and society, and erasing boundaries between the state and society are all steps that support the notion that the state can and should actively shape cultural life rather than leaving this to market mechanisms. However, the state did not develop its ideas in a vacuum. Although the regime has been represented as making decisions independently from non-state actors, much like trade and industry policy was influenced by businesses (MacIntyre 1990) official cultural policy was also influenced by non-state groups and cultural workers. During the early part of the New Order period when these groups were at their most popular and energetic, their ideas and agendas exerted influence over cultural debate and discourses and their influence can be noted in cultural policy.

The Pan-Indonesian Arts Community and the New Order Regime

The term universal humanism was constructed during the debates about the life and works of Chairil Anwar, a young poet active in Jakarta during the Indonesian War of Independence, and a group of poets and writers that surrounded him (Foulcher 1993a). A loose-knit group of cultural workers who were colleagues of Chairil issued a statement the year after Chairil's death in 1949 known as the Gelanggang Testimony of Beliefs (Surat Kepercayaan Gelanggang). They made their commitment to universalism clear in the statement's opening words: 'We are the true heirs of world culture and must perpetuate this culture in our own way.' The concept of humanism, defined as 'a conviction that the problems of humanity start within universal human nature' (Foulcher 1993b: 240) was also attributed to Chairil in articles written after his death. In 1951, H.B. Jassin, a literary critic later closely involved with Manikebu, defined the term universal humanism to summarize the rationale of Chairil and the other writers of what was becoming known as the Generation of '45. As the radical challenge strengthened, universal humanism, understood slightly differently in the 1960s as the assertion that 'the autonomy of the individual artist, free from political involvement, was the precondition for genuine aesthetic achievement' (Foulcher 1993b: 246), became the rallying point of the liberal artists who disagreed with LEKRA. Their position became increasingly marginalized by Sukarno, LEKRA and the PKI during the period of Guided Democracy.

As was discussed briefly in the last chapter, in September 1963 the magazine Sastra printed Manikebu that outlined the opposition of a group of twenty-one 'universal humanist' artists and writers to the then dominant

radical nationalist position. The signatories included Jassin, Wiratmo Soekito, Trisno Sumardjo, Goenawan Mohamad, Arief Budiman and Taufiq Ismail (Mohamad 1993). The marginalized position of the signatories would in three years come to dominate the thinking of the arts community in Indonesia. The supporters of universal humanism (from now on referred to as universal humanists) were at their most united in opposition to radical nationalism after the publication of the Manifes Kebudayaan (Manikebu) in 1963 and during the early years of the New Order regime. They were a loose knit group, rather than an organized faction of modern artists, who tended to work in pan-Indonesian arts (such as Indonesian language literature, contemporary theatre, contemporary fine arts and certain musical genres).

The first prominent alliance between the army and universal humanists occurred around the time Manikebu was signed. The significance and extent of the contacts is a widely contested point.[23] However, all commentators agree that the army sponsored and facilitated a national Indonesian Authors Conference (Konferensi Karyawan Pengarang Indonesia) in the middle of the ongoing debates in March 1964. The universal humanists aligned themselves with the army against the groups that supported Sukarno. In the face of ferocious attacks, it is neither surprising nor unjustified for the universal humanists to seek protection from the only group powerful enough to resist the PKI, LEKRA, Sukarno and their allies. As such, the Manikebu had a political function. David Hill (1984: 33) reports academic and cultural critic Arief Budiman's statement to a conference about Manikebu in October 1982 that the 'manifesto could not be seen as neutral for it was a rallying point for the anti-Communists who sought military support for their ideological position.' Universal humanism and the military had established a point of contact.

The alignment became more concrete in the dramatic atmosphere of Jakarta in the days following the attempted coup. Universal humanist artists became closely aligned with young artists associated with the student movement and the modernizing intellectuals discussed above. PKI had always struggled to gain the support of the university educated who

[23] Analysis of Manikebu has been undertaken by a number of observers of Indonesian cultural politics including Foulcher (1986), David Hill (1984), Maier (1987) and Mohamad (1988). Although not all of the signatories were connected with the military, some have since acknowledged their ties. Wiratmo Sukito (Soekito 1981, 1982, in D.T. Hill 1984), the primary author of Manikebu, later admitted to working 'voluntarily' for the secret service of the armed forces in the time leading up to and following Manikebu.

predominantly came from elite families and considered the PKI particularly responsible for the corruption and hypocrisies of Guided Democracy (McVey 1990). An example of the nexus between the three groups is the literary magazine Horison which began publication in July 1966. Horison has been described as 'the literary vanguard of the then student movement' (D.T. Hill 1993: 252). Positioning itself as humanist and the defender of creative freedom, Horison was stridently anti-Sukarno and anti-communist. The editorial board consisted of signatories of Manikebu (Jassin, Zaini, Taufiq Ismail, and Arief Budiman) and was headed by the similarly inclined Mochtar Lubis. The poetry of Taufiq Ismail, himself a student, became the catch-cry of the 1966 student movement where he was prominent at rallies and in the press. Similar commitments to Western models of artistic and social development cemented links between the groups which were initially built on increasing unease with Sukarno's radical nationalist policies. After being marginalized within Sukarno's National Front, both groups rose to prominence during the brutal dismantling of the communist organizations and were initially aligned with the New Order regime.

The universal humanists and the New Order regime were not comfortable companions. Universal humanism's commitment to artistic integrity and the importance it placed on independence did not sit easily beside the New Order regime's ideal of a servile and politically inactive populace and emphasis on a command culture model of cultural provision. After the initial alignment, some artists began to criticize the regime in the late 1960s for human rights abuses of their former adversaries alongside the changing attitudes of the modernizing intellectuals (Southwood and Flanagan 1983). The New Order regime tolerated a degree of dissent from these former supporters. For instance, Rendra's popular, politically-critical poetry was tolerated in the 1970s. However the changed political climate after the national elections in 1977 led to a clamping down on dissent and Rendra was jailed in 1978 then banned from public performance for seven years. Arief Budiman was also consistently critical of the state in the national press from the late 1960s as were other artists and intellectuals.

The actions of the politically active universal humanists at this time can be characterized as dissidence or tolerated political dissent from former allies within defined boundaries.[24] Much like the student movement,

[24] I take the idea of dissidence from Aspinall (2000). Much of his analysis about the student movement and intellectuals during the early New Order period is relevant to universal humanists due to their close correlation and similar outlooks.

they saw themselves as a 'moral force' rather than a political force. They were allowed to operate within a 'dissident niche' albeit one that narrowed considerably until the period of 'openness' beginning in the late 1980s. Their opposition was a 'purely expressive politics' that did not focus on transformation of the social order, mass mobilization or the development of politically active groups (Aspinall 2000: 37). Of course it should be remembered that many supporters of universal humanism did not publicly demonstrate any political commitment at all, either in their work or otherwise. When a universal humanist made a political statement, he or she did so as an individual rather than as a representative of a particular group.

The rise of the universal humanists is historically associated with the rise of the New Order regime. Political links were established around the Manikebu and the universal humanists' support of the new regime was initially forthright and adamant in the hope of establishing a free environment for artistic expression. They gained support from the regime through the institutionalization of their position and their acceptance as a valid (although at times a barely tolerated) element of Indonesian society. They also shared some commonalities with the regime's methods of governance. Particularly notable are: (1) their disavowal of mass-politics; (2) the apolitical position of many of the universal humanists; (3) their artistic aesthetics that gave preference to spiritually uplifting art (a version of which was adopted within the cultural policy of the new regime discussed in the next chapter) and (4) their opposition to communism. While not linked to the political programme of the regime to the extent of LEKRA and LKN under Sukarno, they were allowed to dominate the arts community for many years and received institutional support through positions in universities and arts colleges, government grants and access that was denied to ex-radical nationalists.[25]

An important instance of the institutionalization of universal humanism was the establishment of the Ismail Marzuki Arts Centre (Taman Ismail Marzuki, TIM). TIM immediately became the most prominent performance venue in Indonesia after its creation in 1968 and hosted more performances and audiences than any other venue in Indonesia in the 1970s. It was the location of numerous national festivals and conferences,

[25] Hill (1984: 1) writes: 'By 1968 [artists] who shared the values of the political force which swept aside all leftist opposition gained government blessing and established their cultural hegemony from a base in the capital.'

the most popular theatre and dance performances and widely-reported discussions of the arts and culture. TIM was the creation of Major-General Ali Sadikin, the Sukarno-appointed Governor of Jakarta[26] and the artists associated with Manikebu.[27] The universal humanists dominated the formateur committee, the Jakarta Academy (Akademi Jakarta), the Jakarta Arts Council (Dewan Kesenian Jakarta) and the Jakarta Arts Council Daily Worker's Council which were formed to organize and run TIM. In accordance with universal humanist principles, the involved artists desired, as stated in the programme for TIM's official inauguration, a cosmopolitan centre of artistic creativity and freedom where 'nevermore the arts will be subject to and tool of political bickering and suppression'[28] ("Peresmian pusat kesenian Jakarta Taman Ismail Marzuki" 1968: 26), leading prominent playwright and actor Umar Kayam to label TIM a 'cultural oasis' (Wahono 1994a: 47). This metaphor gains a darker edge when considering the brutal events that surrounded TIM's construction, the absence of the left and changes in community art forms discussed in the next section.

According to researcher Bisri Effendi (2001), the three problems that dominated discussions of the establishment of TIM were (1) the threat of left-wing artist's involvement in TIM; (2) concern about bureaucratic intervention; and (3) the problems of shaping and managing a cultural centre. The first concern is reflected in the enforced absence of artists who supported Sukarno from TIM for many years (D.T. Hill 1993). Although many universal humanists appear to have easily reconciled the apparent contradiction of artistic freedom with limiting expression, the exclusion of these artists did not sit easily alongside other universal humanists' commitment to freedom of expression. For instance, Arief Budiman's (1969) article in Kompas criticizes TIM for excluding the left from the new arts institutions. The second issue was not so easily resolved. While Sadikin was Governor, artists enjoyed a large degree of creative freedom thanks

[26] Despite Sadikin's connection with Sukarno, he remained Governor of Jakarta until 1977. After his term, Sadikin became more openly critical of the New Order regime and was a prominent signatory of the critical 'Petition of Fifty' in May 1980.

[27] The process of TIM's creation has been reviewed a number of times. See Effendi (2001), Hill (1993), and Mohamad (1993). For the official view, see Murgiyanto (1994b).

[28] Other statements in the programme confirm the centrality of universal humanism. For instance: 'The aim of today is to free artistic life forever of depressing trends of the past and to promote instead the socioartistic climate that knows no political occupation and recognises the artist's real responsibilities' ("Peresmian pusat kesenian Jakarta Taman Ismail Marzuki" 1968: 25). Goenawan Mohamad's (1993) discussion of TIM in 1977 is another example, based as it is around an (often unflattering) assessment of TIM's achievement of its goal of 'creative freedom'.

to his financial and political patronage (although on occasions Sadikin himself intervened to request the banning of performances, (Mohamad 1993)). However, a change of Governor brought new political and financial pressures to TIM, changing the ecology of the 'cultural oasis'. The state, through the Jakarta provincial government, increasingly intervened in Jakarta Arts Council appointments, using its authority to influence inclusion and exclusion in the premier national performance space. Still greater interventions followed in the 1980s and 1990s. While Hazil Tanzil was General Manager of TIM (1982–1990), he brought TIM into line with the system of human resource management employed by the Province of Jakarta and made TIM workers civil servants (Murgiyanto 1994a). In 1991, management of TIM was taken away from the original management team of TIM, the Jakarta Arts Council, and given to the Jakarta Arts Foundation (Yayasan Kesenian Jakarta), which was formed in 1989 in an attempt to address funding shortfalls through collaboration with the private sector (Gondomono and Murgiyanto 1994; Wahono 1994b).[29]

However, government intervention did not reduce but instead reinforced the dominance of universal humanism. Hill writes:

> Despite sporadic friction between the DKJ and the government, ostensibly of the 'independence' of TIM, the existence of the Arts Centre, none the less, is a sign of official government backing for a stream of Indonesian culture which has become dominant after the destruction of the left in 1966. Having gained government blessing and funding for their Arts Centre, these artists dominated 'New Order' Indonesian literary and artistic life from their base in the national centre of the performing arts. (1993: 250)

Despite the ideas of universal humanists and their institutional strength relative to other groups, having an artistic space run by artists has not produced a popular version of national culture. Instead, after initial successes, art in TIM has been increasingly isolated from the populace and cultural provision has been increasingly dominated by commercial enterprise (Hill 1993). TIM itself has not operated within a vacuum, separated from broader social change. Declining attendance figures in the 1980s and 1990s forced TIM to open itself to commercial ventures such as a cinema complex, craft shops and its management became increasingly oriented towards attracting private capital. Additionally, the views of the

[29] These changes are examined in greater detail in chapter six in the context of the state sponsored spread of Arts Councils across Indonesia.

universal humanists (which were engrained in much of the arts establishment) were challenged by the development of alternative perspectives such as the New Art Movement (Supangkat 1990, 1994) and contextual literature (*sastra konteksual* [Foulcher 1987]).[30]

While universal humanism was not 'deployed' by the New Order regime, universal humanists did play a role in filling the cultural space created by the erasure of the elements of the arts community affiliated with the left and Sukarno. As a discourse that generated a set of ideas about culture, universal humanism generated its own understandings about the role of artists and cultural expression in society that can be differentiated from the New Order regime's governmental discourses. However, the relationship between the supporters of universal humanism and the New Order regime created points of contact and mutual support that should not be ignored. The universal humanists had no qualms in representing the annihilation of the left as deserved and moved quickly to suppress their legacy by asserting their own version of history and ideas about culture. Also important is the overlap between features of universal humanism and the regime's methods of governance that facilitated the adoption of elements of universal humanism, such as a commitment to spiritually uplifting art and freedom from politics (but not freedom of political or creative expression), into the New Order regime's cultural policies. The universal humanists were at their most influential between the late 1960s and late 1970s when the regime was formulating its cultural policy. Decline was brought by the crackdown on political dissent in the late 1970s, declining attendance figures and increasing provincial encroachment in TIM and challenges from alternative perspectives in the arts. However, proponents of universal humanism continued to dominate the arts establishment (including continued involvement in TIM) while politically critical art was further marginalized. Throughout this time, New Order economic policy opened Indonesia to multinational companies and the economy began to boom. The marketplace increasingly became the provider of cultural goods for the majority of Indonesians in the 1980s and 1990s, winning the competition with pan-Indonesian cultural forms and Indigenous ethnic cultural practices.

[30] For a discussion of cultural expression in Indonesia during the New Order period with a focus on the state of critical cultural practices, see Hatley (1994). Hatley demonstrates that political art was still being performed albeit in a marginalised position.

Indigenous Ethnic Cultures

Indigenous ethnic cultures are collectively known in Indonesia by the term suku bangsa, which literally translated is 'part of the nation'. While each ethnic culture constitutes a separate set of discourses with separate histories, groups and conflicts, the term suku bangsa captures that they were subject to a similar set of national pressures and uses as they were also considered national culture, particularly when linked to a political unit (such as a province, a city, or a regency). Discussions of indigenous ethnic identity in previous chapters have demonstrated that it has been an important element of governance since the colonial era. Indigenous ethnic culture became one of the central focal points of New Order era cultural policy, surpassing its importance during Guided Democracy. This section describes the historical continuities and breaks between previous eras and the New Order era regarding how ethnic cultures were used in governmental programmes. I explore two areas, regional art forms and official representations of cultural pluralism.

Due to the traumatic events at the beginning of the New Order era, many regional art forms went into hiatus, particularly within Java, until the early 1970s. Before 1965, political parties made use of the links between communities and local arts in their attempts to build support and consensus for their programmes. The scale and viscousness of the attacks following 1965 caused many artists to fear for their lives if they had affiliations, however tenuous,[31] or even if their art form had been affiliated with leftist organizations.[32] When troupes began performing again in the early 1970s, they did so with bureaucratic or military backing (Effendi 1998; Hatley 1994; Van Groenendael 1985). The state replaced the political parties as an important sponsor of the regional arts and began to increasingly intervene in performance techniques. Performance texts also became increasingly

[31] The experiences of a female shadow puppeteer (*dalang*), Bardijati, demonstrate the extent of the repression (Antariksa 2001). Bardijati was popular in Central Java before 1965. She was a member of LEKRA but, it should be noted, was not familiar with LEKRA ideology and was not a LEKRA leader. Bardijati and her husband were arrested four days after Gestapu, were jailed for eighteen months and many of her possessions including her puppets and gamelan were permanently 'borrowed' by the military. She was not allowed to perform again until receiving official authorization in 1976 and after this time until today she has not received the recognition and income that her talents previously brought her.

[32] See Hatley (1994), Effendi (1998), Widodo (1995) and Hefner (1987) for reports on the influence of the political events of 1965 on regional arts.

aligned with the regime's priorities. An insight into the regime's role for regional arts can be gained from the six ethical rules from the *dalang* association Ganasidi, formed on 12 July 1969.[33] Ganasidi itself was an initiative of Major General Surono, the commander for Central Java and the Special District of Yogyakarta, who had the desire to guard *dalang* 'against future political erring [and] improve the level of the art and performance style [...] so that these might make a positive contribution to the development of the Indonesian people' (Van Groenendael 1985: 146).

Regional art forms were altered by their use as a means of communication between the regime and ordinary citizens. The alteration of regional art forms occurred because of three interlinked processes. Firstly, as was demonstrated above, content was directly altered through the insertion of *pembangunan* slogans and lessons. The military and the Directorate of Culture ensured that 'actors and singers incorporate government messages into their speeches and song lyrics' (Yampolsky 1995: 711). Secondly, the regime discouraged political topics and discussion. Political themes were erased and replaced with generic, inoffensive stories and *pembangunan* messages. Thirdly, a broad process of improvement took place, including reduced performance time, use of Indonesian language and the alteration of elements that were considered 'immoral'. Philip Yampolsky (1995: 711) characterizes 'respectability' as the 'essence of the notion of upgrading artistic quality'. Andrew Weintraub's (2004b) analysis of *wayang golek*

[33] Dwi-Warsa Ganasidi's Six Ethical Rules (Ganasidi 1971, in Van Groenendael 1985):

1. In the fulfilment of his duty as a counsellor and educator, the *dalang* is the servant of the people. As a provider of healthy entertainment, it is his duty firstly to support the people in its struggle to achieve social well-being and security, and secondly to boost the morale of the Indonesian people.
2. As the servant of his country, it is the *dalang*'s duty to give precedence to the National Interest by honouring the *Pancasila* and the Constitution of 1945 and obeying and observing their injunctions in conformity with the government's policy.
3. As a servant to the Indonesian culture, that is to say, as someone devoted to the preservation of its originality and purity, the *dalang* is bound to do his utmost for and assist in the development of his arts, in harmony with the advancement of the Indonesian people.
4. In his private life, it is the *dalang*'s duty to guard the dignity of his office and put his art into practice, as well as to devote his energies to the mastering of all the facets of his art.
5. As leader of the performance, it is the *dalang*'s duty to watch over the morals of his company, in addition to honouring and defending his culture.
6. It is the *dalang*'s duty to promote cooperation and harmony between artists and to avoid all that is likely to conduce to conflict.

during this period provides an example about the extent of the influence of these policies. He argues that *dalang* balanced state pressure against the need to appeal to the expectations and desires of audiences. Two outcomes of this balance were that *dalang* developed a separate performance style for state competitions, and development messages were incorporated into performances alongside the jokes and critiques audiences desired. These changes are returned to in the next chapter and in both of the case studies in Part II.

While the New Order regime was working hard to erase the discourses of Guided Democracy, its model for managing indigenous ethnic cultures was quite similar. A process of improvement including a concern with morality remained central to the regime's treatment of regional cultural forms and slogans continued to be inserted into performances. Much like McVey (1986) identified for LEKRA, this process was a continuation of a middle-class reform agenda linked to the urban culture of the politically powerful. Art forms that expressed regional and national identity could not be seen in either era to include 'immoral' or 'backward' behaviour, invoking a range of cultural programmes discussed in the next chapter. Where Guided Democracy and the New Order differed was not in their methods but in two other important respects. First, the normative model that lay at the heart of their treatment of regional cultural forms rejected Sukarno's overtly political priorities and privileged the political priorities of *pembangunan*. Instead of encouraging involvement with achieving political goals and the achievement of a socialist society, regional art forms were to encourage a focus on economic development and an acceptance of the social hierarchy. Second, the resources they invested in regional cultural programmes far outstripped previous political regimes and were applied across a much longer time period. Cultural policy programmes increasingly impacted Indigenous ethnic cultural practices.

The second issue discussed here, Indonesia's diversity, presented a particularly tricky problem for the new regime due to its multiple potentials for conflict and intractable differences. How could they acknowledge Indonesia's obvious pluralism while preventing discord and the rise of regional powers based on cultural groupings? Keith Foulcher argues that 'region' is incorporated into national culture through appropriation of the visual and decorative traditions as evidence of the harmony of 'national' and 'regional' cultures (1990). The representation of pluralism through decorative traditions performs two important functions. First, the process removes pluralism from the political field and places it in the cultural

field, stripping it of political content and reducing the possibility of political mobilization. Second, the process of representation was an important method of inculcating the New Order model of pluralism into the population as part of the process of shaping national characteristics. Cultural institutions, through their representations of Indonesian cultural diversity, taught Indonesians what it meant to be Indonesian in the New Order era. A particularly high-profile example of such an institution in Indonesia is the 'Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature' Theme Park (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, Taman Mini). Taman Mini was opened on 20 April 1975. Students had protested against the building of Taman Mini because of its extravagance in a time of economic hardship for many Indonesians (Pemberton 1994b). Its stated purpose was to educate Indonesians about their nation and themselves. At Taman Mini's opening, Suharto said: By visiting this park we will know ourselves better, we will know our nation better and we will love our motherland more. Therefore the 'Beautiful Indonesia' Park is also a real effort to strengthen national development, now and in the future. (Writers-Group 1978: 9, in Acciaioli 1996) Similarly the Minister for Education and Culture, Daoed Yoesoef (1981/82: 6–7), in a speech at its sixth anniversary, defined Taman Mini as a 'cultural park' in that it contributes to cultural growth 'towards civilization' and an 'educational park' in that it illustrates 'the unity-in-diversity-ness of the values we revere.'

Taman Mini has been analysed repeatedly in order to demonstrate the New Order state's construction of national culture with similar conclusions (Acciaioli 1996; Errington 1997; Hellman 1999; Pemberton 1994b). Acciaioli's article 'Pavilions and Posters' provides a sustained analysis of the park's representations of regional cultures in its geography, displays, and posters and finds similarities in their representations about Indonesia. From a relatively close representation to regional forms in Java, Sumatra and Bali, the representations become increasingly homogenous as the ethnic group is situated further from the 'cultural centre' (which coincides in the Taman Mini itself with its geographical location of the ethnic group further from the centre the park). Acciaioli argues: [Taman Mini] constructs the generic Indonesian, and presents all the local variety of Indonesian cultures as regional variations, defined by administrative divisions in matters of detail, upon basic shared themes, the purported 'local genius' or basic cultural substratum of Indonesianness. What diversity is evident is generated centrally, permitted embroidery upon an homogenized broadcloth dictated by government officials bent on constructing a generic type, whether of abode or costume, promulgating the message of

sameness rather than difference. (1996: 39) Pluralism is sanitized and produced for Indonesians to internalize and foreigners to absorb.[34] Benedict Anderson notes the similarities in New Order pluralism to the cultural management promoted by Dutch colonial policy. The reasons he gives for the regime's 'strong support for conservative ethnolinguistic community leaderships' centre around preventing strong, coherent oppositional movements from forming (1987b: 77). However, New Order cultural pluralism was more than a 'Machiavellian policy of divide and rule' (1987b: 77). By inscribing a hierarchy within ethnic cultural forms and practices, New Order cultural pluralism had the model of the regime's ideal cultural subject inscribed within it. Cultural institutions, such as Taman Mini, were governmental in that they taught lessons about both being Indonesian and the relationship between different indigenous ethnic populations and between indigenous ethnicity and the nation.

The construction of regional cultures became the vehicle for New Order cultural pluralism and an important focus for New Order governance. Regional cultures both managed populations through inculcating lessons about the proper relationship between ethnic groups and their place in the nation as well as disseminating lessons to individuals about morality, and proper conduct. The New Order regime's model of indigenous ethnic identity was a reforming discourse. As indigenous cultural forms increasingly became the focus of cultural programmes, they were subject to greater observation and alteration in an effort to make them accord with the discursive formation that surrounded them. However, the outcomes desired by the regime were not guaranteed. Indonesian society may have been increasingly targeted through programmes but it was not a programmed society.

Responses to Changing Social Conditions and Political Imperatives in the 1980s and 1990s

The 1980s and 1990s were a time of economic growth that led to social change as the ranks of the urban middle class grew. The success of the New Order regime's economic policies, while providing the resources for the

[34] John Pemberton's discussion of Taman Mini notes that it also taught lessons about the nature of power in New Order Indonesia. Through its representations of tradition, Taman Mini normalized hierarchical power relationships, demonstrated the proper attitude for Indonesians to take towards authority and legitimizing New Order regime's authority and right to rule (1994b). There are similarities here with the notions of power inherent within *kekeluargaan* and *pembangunan* discussed in the first section.

regime's activities and a form of legitimacy, also had two other effects that concerned the regime that were canvassed in the Introduction through the assertion of Asian values amongst Southeast Asian states: first, success lead to a huge growth in circulation of consumer goods and forms of conspicuous consumption which the regime worried would offend other elements of society; and second, economic growth fed groups in the middle classes that hoped for reforms for greater freedom of expression and towards democracy. The growth of these groups concerned the Suharto regime which responded through the repression of opposition groups and critics[35] and through a form of 'cultural politics', which forms the subject matter of this section.

Merle Ricklefs (2001: 370) writes: 'Being anti-communist, suspicious of radical Islam and in favour of capitalist-style development, Indonesia in the late 1970s was well placed to maintain the support of the United States, and therefore of other Western powers.' Ricklefs' continues to note that this gave Indonesia a degree of freedom over other internal matters such as East Timor and Aceh. However, it was also a choice to incorporate particular forms of governance, in particular market mechanisms that were viewed as desirable by Western states. Indonesia's economic policy changes of the 1980s reflect the regime's engagement with the international order, although the outcomes were at times far from those desired by Western states and international economic institutions (Robison and Hadiz 2004). When oil prices fell after 1982, the regime responded through a process of deregulation (including the financial sector), catalysing increased investment from both domestic and international financiers (H. Hill 2000). The most prominent and sustained manufacturing boom of the New Order era began with the economic policy change of the mid-1980s. This change was aimed at fostering export-oriented growth and encouraging private investment. The boom lasted until the economic crisis in 1997.[36] Industrialization had transformed Indonesia's economy which, by the mid-1980s, had become dependent on private investment and business. However, business remained dependent on the regime for

[35] For a brief summary of repression in the 1980s, including the Tanjung Priok massacre and subsequent arrests, see Ricklefs (2001). Repression was more frequent in the 1990s, including the mid-1994 banning of three major news magazines, Tempo, Detik and Editor, subsequent battle through the courts (D.T. Hill 1994) and the 1996 attack on the *PDI* headquarters and subsequent arrests and disappearances.

[36] Manufacturing exports grew at an annual average rate of between 20 to 30 percent from 1980 until 1996 (Asian Development Bank 2001).

Table 4.1: GDP at constant 2000 prices ($US million) and growth rates of real GDP

Year	GDP	Percentage Growth
1985	297,085	2.5
1987	330,033	4.9
1990	919,243	9.0
1991	1,001,311	8.9
1992	1,073,621	7.2
1993	1,151,493	7.3
1994	1,238,315	7.5
1995	1,340,105	8.2
1996	1,444,876	7.8
1997	1,512,784	4.7
1998	1,314,202	−13.1
1999	1,324,600	0.8
2000	1,389,770	4.9
2001	1,440,406	3.6
2002	1,505,216	4.5
2003	1,577,171	4.8
2004	1,656,517	5.0
2005	1,750,815	5.7
2006	1,847,127	5.5
2007	1,964,327	6.3
2008	2,082,316	6.0
2009	2,176,976	4.5

Source: Asian Development Bank

opportunities and was precluded from exerting pressure for reforms that would damage the private interests of the power holding elite.

Years of economic growth brought significant social change. Indonesia's cities were crowded and jammed full of the signs of industrialization: office blocks, housing estates, cars, motorbikes, mobile phones, designer clothes, their cheap imitations, shopping malls, stores, traffic jams, pollution, and advertising. Between 1990 and 2000 (which includes three years of severe economic downturn), motorcycles grew from 2.3 per 100 households to 7.7 and telephones increased from 1.3 to 10. During the same period, consumer expenditure increased by a factor of 7.6 (from 117,120 billion rupiah to 888,631 billion rupiah). The mass media also expanded, facilitating the circulation of more images, information and advertising. The number of colour televisions in use grew by 89.6 percent (to over 26 million) and the number of homes having access to satellite television increased by 97.3 percent between 1995 and 2000. Newspaper circulation increased by

14.3 percent for daily newspapers and 63.7 percent for non-daily between 1995 and 2000.[37] The increasing use of mass media, particularly cassettes and televisions, also influenced popular Indigenous cultural forms. Weintraub (2004b) links increasing access to mass-produced, mediated performances to the rise of the 'superstar' *dalang* in *wayang golek*, and a diminishing number of *dalang* and regional variations. Clearly major social changes were taking place across Indonesia with implications for cultural practices.[38] The cultural effects of the changes to the Indonesian economy received the regime's attention from the late 1970s and were increasingly criticized in the 1980s and 1990s. The most noticeable and far reaching change has been the spread of consumer culture. Ariel Heryanto, in his account of the identity politics of the new rich,[39] states:

> Lifestyle and consumer culture have not simply occupied a larger slice of the nation's quantitative spending and public discourse. They have participated, to say the least, in the changing dynamics of the nation's social hierarchy, providing new profiles to the new rich, and modifying or undermining the profiles of others. Lifestyle has become a crucial site for the construction, negotiation, and contestation of identity in Indonesia (1999: 178).[40]

Although Heryanto is focussed on particular strata of the population (the bourgeois and middle class), the spread of mass consumer goods and mass culture have had a far reaching impact on Indonesia that became more apparent as Indonesians' purchasing power increased. The decision to open some sections of the Indonesian markets to international business allowed a range of goods and lifestyles into Indonesia that had previously been banned or discouraged by the Sukarno government or simply were difficult to access. The state's cultural programmes had to compete (or at least coexist) with a rapidly expanding array of market-driven cultural products and practices. Economic policy and economic growth, in particular in industries centred on consumption, opened up avenues to

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[37] The economic crisis no doubt hampered growth during this period but the explosion of print media following the end of the censorship practices of the New Order regime also stimulated growth.

[38] The source for all of these statistics is Euromonitor (2003).

[39] A concept Heryanto critiques but still uses (1999). Richard Robison (1996) provides a careful analysis of the different groups that have been grouped under the label 'middle class' from a Marxist perspective. As was noted in the Introduction, conspicuous consumption has also been adopted by members of the working class (Gerke 2000; Jones 2008; Murray 1991).

[40] See also Gerke (2000) who also emphasizes the importance of consumption in Indonesia despite the impact of the economic crisis which was not assessed in the Heryanto article.

novel cultural commodities and new subjectivities to a broader section of the population.

The regime's response to the growth of consumption was ambiguous and changed over time. From the mid-1970s, the regime moved to combat what it regarded as excessive consumption and individualism amongst middle-class Indonesians. One programme it employed was a 'Simple Life Style' campaign, which began in 1974 but was reinvigorated in 1983, 1986 and mid-1993 (Heryanto 1999). Although targeted at the lifestyles of the upper class, the campaigns only claimed a few victims, who were state officials, never the privately employed. Another attempt to limit the influence of commerce was the ban on television advertising on the state station TVRI. When he announced the ban, Suharto said that his reasons were 'to focus television more on facilitating the development programmes and to avoid the detrimental effects [of advertising] which do not promote the spirit of development' (Kitley 2000: 64). Philip Kitley (2000) places the ban on advertising in the broader political context where there was a widespread dislike of foreign companies and investors who tended to dominate television advertising and that it could leave Suharto open for attack by Islamic groups during the 1982 election campaign. Kitley writes: 'The advertising ban was linked to a polemic that constructed foreign capitalism as materialistic and based on assumptions and a way of life inimical to idealized principles of Indonesian national culture' (2000: 69). Advertising remained off the television airwaves until August 1990 when two commercial stations opened in Jakarta.

By the 1990s, the regime was taking credit for the Indonesians' increased capacity to consume brought by its liberal market policies (Heryanto 1999). However, the regime also felt that the pressures brought by these changes raised issues of concern. In addition to concerns about the compatibility of the new lifestyles with conservative cultural discourses and *pembangunan*, the regime was also concerned that the uneven division of the spoils of economic growth could cause unrest amongst the Indonesian poor and working class. The state responded through efforts (some sincere) to combat the economic imbalance between rich and poor (and also indigenous/Muslim and Chinese/Christian owned business, (Hefner 1998)) through financial assistance, loans, and corporate partnerships (Heryanto 1999; Yoon 1991).

A third area of concern for the regime was the political commitments of the new rich. David Bourchier (1998: 212) identifies that 'rapid growth of the middle classes [...] together with the accelerative integration of Indonesia with the global economy and the ending of the Cold War led

to increased pressure on the government to loosen its grip and extend political rights to vocal sections of the population.' The regime responded through asserting 'Indonesian values'. Through Indonesian values, the regime critiqued liberalism, individualism and excessive consumption through the revival of conservative indigenous discourses. It is worth revisiting Adrian Vickers and Lyn Fisher's comment on the application of Asian values in Indonesia: "All the elements of 'Asian values' can be found in the way the New Order attempted to clarify and institutionalize 'Indonesian values'. The ideals of family and authority were there, as was a construction of a Western 'Other'" (1999: 398). An example of 'Indonesian values' that Bourchier identifies as the regime's response to the pressures caused by the growing middle class was the return of integralism as a legitimizing discourse of New Order ideologues.

The key text in Indonesian integralism is a speech given by constitutional lawyer Raden Supomo in 1945. Supomo differentiated integralism from liberal individualism and class theory before defining it as a theory where 'the state was committed not to individual rights or particular classes but to society conceived of as an organic whole' (Bourchier 1997: 160–161). It was revived after 1965 in the thinking of Moertopo and conservative historian and Minister of Education and Culture (1983–5) Nugroho Notosusanto. Integralism allowed the regime to appeal to the conservative ideals of 'family', 'community', and 'tradition' in the face of calls for greater freedom and individual rights. Integralism was incorporated into the P4 courses and by the end of the 1980s was a common feature of the speeches and language of New Order figures. Providing a political history that legitimated the absence of criticism and autocratic political strategies, it resurfaced when the regime identified that its greatest threats were no longer political Islam and communism but instead liberalism and individualism. In particular, Bourchier (1996) identifies criticism of human rights abuses and calls for democratic and liberal reform based on the constitution—both of which were the products of a growing middle class. Although integralism was devastatingly critiqued by Marsillam Simanjuntak (1994) in the early 1990s, references to conservative indigenous ideals continued until the regime fell in 1998.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter supports the conclusion that the command culture model of cultural provision was strengthened during

the New Order. The underlying rationale of colonial cultural policy had an important distinction from New Order thought in that it relied on a model of organic growth of ethnic cultures cultivated by the state. The discourse of modernization, so prominent during the New Order era and particularly in its first decade, was unambiguously state-led and justified greater state intervention and control. In the New Order era, culture under Suharto was used to explain and justify hierarchical relationships of power that were represented as ingrained cultural heritage and ultimately supporting the continuation of authoritarian rule. While Moertopo rejected the cultural division of east and west, notions of indigenous Indonesian culture returned to an association of individualism, liberalism, and materialism with a foreign West, and organic wholeness and spiritualism with Indonesian culture. The strengthening of the command culture model had a large influence over the cultural practices of the New Order era, particularly in the management and repression of regional artists and politically radical artists.

The regime's response to a changing society in the late 1980s and 1990s was to attempt to reinforce the political order and their governmental discourses. It attempted to strengthen the official 'cultural process' in the face of a broader and more pervasive cultural process unleashed by New Order economic policies. However, official discourses were increasingly out of step with the lifestyles of a large portion of the political elite, of which the most conspicuous were Suharto's children, and the expanding middle class. Nonetheless, the regime continued to assert the necessity of authoritarian control and utilize the discourse of *pembangunan* throughout its period of rule, as well as incorporating influences from other sources such as the universal humanism. Through the deployment of these discourses, the features of a normative 'authoritarian' subject were inscribed into New Order era cultural policy, as I explore in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

NEW ORDER CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROGRAMMES: CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN A POWERHOUSE STATE

As discussed in the last chapter, the state in the New Order era has been marked by a rapid expansion of its capabilities. Driven firstly by foreign aid and foreign investment and then the boom in oil prices, real government receipts between 1966 and 1978 grew at an average annual rate of 27 percent compared with a 21 percent average decline in receipts between 1961 and 1966 (Schiller 1996). In 1977–8, government expenditures were 22.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) compared with 9.3 percent of a vastly smaller GDP in 1966. The increasing level of state intervention into the lives of Indonesians through a rapid growth in personnel and programmes has been characterized as the rise of the powerhouse state (C. Geertz 1972; Schiller 1996). To execute its broadening ambitions, the state hired personnel and expanded programmes to promote national cul-ture and the arts. The Directorate of Culture was the primary beneficiary of the funding boosts to cultural policy. An exploration of the trends, policies, and tensions within the Directorate provides a picture of the approaches and pressures within New Order era cultural policy.

This chapter is tied to the preceding chapter in that it explores how the 'cultural processes' of the New Order period were translated into policies and programmes. In particular, it argues New Order cultural policy was authoritarian due to the way it justified intervention in the cultural practices of its subjects, which was engrained in the mechanisms for generating and funding cultural policy. After assessing the broad influences on cultural policy across the New Order period, this chapter addresses three broad areas of policy making: archaeology, museums, and history; languages policy; and arts policy. While the focus here is on the broad direction of policies, the two case study chapters in Part II provide a detailed analysis of the application of programmes. Assessing the policies and programmes provides an opportunity to explore the extent to which New Order cultural policy operated as a command culture model, a form of cultural provision that always centres the state in planning, creating, policing, and revising cultural practices, in a country where cultural consumption in many places occurred through strong regional cultural

practices, but was also changing due to sustained economic growth driving consumption of mass cultural forms.

Cultural Policy Trends and Influences

In his article 'Old State, New Society', Benedict Anderson (1990b) argues that an important break between policy behaviour at the end of Guided Democracy and the start of the New Order periods is the change from encouraging popular mobilization behind nationalist policies to an overriding concern with state strength and stability. While the concern with state strength and stability was present in New Order cultural policy, there is also evidence of continuities in the techniques through which culture was used within governance. General evidence of culture's continued use as a civilizing tool are the continued association of culture with education and the absence of significant changes to the internal structure of the Directorate of Culture beyond reorganizing the various policy areas within different branches, which occurred ten years after the New Order regime took power.[1] The major structural change of the Suharto period was the creation of the Directorate of Local Beliefs (Direktorat Pembinaan Penghayat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, Ditbinyat), which focussed on Javanese spirituality, at the request of President Suharto and the consternation of Islamic groups.[2] The Cultural Office under Sukarno and the Directorate of Culture under Suharto both viewed culture as a necessary part of the development of Indonesia as a nation. However, the understanding of what it meant to be Indonesian and how Indonesians should behave differed considerably.

While the focus here is clearly on the Directorate of Culture, it is worth reviewing the other state institutions that had an influence on cultural practices, particularly in the context of expanding consumer culture, particularly mass media. While the Directorate of Culture focussed on fields designated as cultural by the state, the Department of Internal Affairs could

[1] For instance, an Office of History and Anthropology existed alongside an Institute of Archaeology and National Relics from 1960 until 1975 when an Office of History and Archaeology was formed alongside a Research Institute of Archaeology and National Relics and a Research Institute of History and Culture.

[2] The existence of Ditbinyat, proclaimed in a Suharto speech on 16 August 1978, was strongly criticized by the Muslim United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) at the time and in 1997 the conservative Indonesian Committee for World Solidarity (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia, KISDI) called once again for Ditbinyat to be abolished (AS 1997).

designate money for cultural activities to the Provinces. The Department of Information and the Department of Communication were responsible for regulating the media. The Directorate of Tourism in the Department of Communication had an influence on cultural practices through the promotion of cultural tourism, and the Department of Industries could influence the production of craft products, particularly through its Directorate for Small Industries. Finally, the Department of Foreign Affairs could also influence policy through its control of cultural diplomacy both entering and exiting Indonesia. Turf wars occurred on more than one occasion between state institutions (such as Borobudur discussed in this chapter).

The Directorate of Culture justified its continued existence (and expenses) through a New Order version of what Toby Miller and George Yudice (2002: 24) label 'cultural citizenship' or the governmental work that culture can do for the state. But Miller and Yudice use a pluralistic definition of cultural citizenship, defining it as a democratic ideal, concerning 'the maintenance and development of cultural lineage via education, custom, language and religion, and the acknowledgement of difference in and by mainstream cultures' (2002: 25). The contrasting New Order version placed the power to define cultural lineage in the hands of the state, leaving Indonesians with little recourse for contesting state definitions of their cultures. Indonesians had to learn the state-sanctioned versions of Indonesian multiculturalism: the unity of Indonesian culture, the different groups that lived together in Indonesia, how they lived together in harmony, the way that Indonesia was modernizing and how modern Indonesians lived. They were taught Indonesian history, about their and other ethnic identities, the things the state had done and was doing for them and the proper relationship to foreign cultures and technologies. In short, Indonesians had to be taught after the Sukarno years how to be Indonesian in New Order Indonesia.

The discourse of development was the most important organizing principle of New Order era cultural policy.[3] The prioritization of development changed the focus of cultural policy from encouraging mobilization behind Sukarno's political plans to build a socialist society to supporting

[3] Within the Directorate of Culture, the term *pengembangan*, which also means development but in the sense of cultivation, was preferred to pembangunan. However, *pengembangan* subjected culture to similar instrumental usage by the regime. In a booklet outlining cultural policy, *pengembangan* clearly retains the transitive character of pembangunan that foregrounds human action to shape culture. It states that *pengembangan* refers to activities that 'increase quality', 'enrich values', and 'strengthen national cultural identity' (Direktorat Kebudayaan 1994/95: 14).

state-led domestic growth. More importantly, development provided an enduring cultural policy rationale that explained the purpose and goals of cultural policy to cultural bureaucrats and justified its existence as part of the broader goal of state led modernization. Three elements in particular merit discussion.

In a speech in 1978, the Minister for Education and Culture, Daoed Yoesoef, made the observation that in a 'democratic' nation like Indonesia, the state should facilitate the actions of non-government organizations in undertaking cultural activities rather than organizing activities itself (1978: 35). Yoesoef then included a significant proviso: "It must be acknowledged, in a state that is developing like Indonesia, where the nongovernment sector is still relatively weak in the areas of funds and facilities, the government is pushed to undertake actions in many areas, including culture" (1978: 35).

Indonesia's status as a 'developing nation' provided a rationale for action within the country itself as well as defining its place within the international order. Increased state intervention in cultural policy was necessary due to apparent deficits (that it can be assumed are relative to 'developed' countries) within society. After sixteen years of sustained economic growth, a booklet outlining the policies of the Directorate of Culture produced in 1994/95 was still emphasizing that Indonesian society is 'bound by tradition that does not always support readiness and maturation to think, behave and act openly and progressively, respecting time and prepared to engage in healthy competition' (*Direktorat Kebudayaan* 1994/95). The justification for greater state intervention and control remained the state's characterization of Indonesian society as backward and immature. Second, a development rationale reconstructed cultural policy as a necessary supplement to economic modernization. A 1970 report of the Department of Education and Culture outlined the problems facing the New Order regime's goal of accelerated development. Chief among them were 'traditional elements that impede [...] economic development'; in particular, the report spelled out that:

> The value system from traditional society usually tends towards an attitude that leans towards fatalism because of development's slow growth [...] Although economic improvement continues smoothly, it is obviously harder to change attitudes and mentalities to accept the relevant changes that accompany the needs of socio-economic development and rational, realistic politics. (Harmidjojo et al. 1972: iv)

Cultural policy is charged with the task of 'directing the way of thinking of Indonesian society [...] towards a modern outlook' (Harmidjojo et al. 1972: v). Economic development was not enough. It needed to be supported by cultural change. The state, in addition to leading economic development, was to lead cultural development. The transition to modernity also facilitated the move away from previous political and social commitments and a greater commitment to the state and state projects. Science and technology, for instance, were to be integrated into Indonesian culture by the state, which was careful not to oppose culture and science.

The third element related to the negative effects of modernization. A summary of cultural policy written in 1976 dramatically cautioned that modern technology, along with 'bringing prosperity and profits, can also cause detriment and, what's more, danger for humankind' (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1976: 5). Modernization could weaken social harmony and the spirit of the nation and cause conflict. Additionally, modernization could bring 'negative foreign influences' that could poison national culture. A prominent aspect of New Order era cultural policy was combating the negative social changes of modernization such as ethnic and social conflict (which is largely explained through reference to weakened social ties). Cultural Policy did so through strengthening those elements of national culture that the New Order regime viewed as desirable. Rather than leading to specific measures, combating the negative effects of modernization tended to be a justification for the existence of cultural policy in general with its larger goals of promoting 'spiritual development' and nationalism.

The 1985 UNESCO publication *Cultural Policy in Indonesia*, written by the Director-General of Culture Haryati Soebadio, confirms the importance of Indonesia's programme of development for Cultural Policy and the double-bind it presented: "On one hand, development needs a culturally congruent environment to be successful, while on the other, it also tends to bring negative side-effects in its wake, which may only be solved through cultural measures" (1985: 12). Soebadio's statement provides a short summary of how regime-led development defined the broad goals of cultural policy across the New Order era. Yoesoef's speech similarly defined the role 'cultural development' as providing an environment conducive to economic development and ameliorating its negative effects. The role of the state as intervening due to the developmental lag of its subjects is linked to the colonial state's justification of its greater intervention in the lives of its Indigenous subjects relative to its European subjects.

This exception to liberal rule, where the rights and freedoms of subjects are respected by the state, allows for authoritarian control and state intervention with few limits. The extent to which such a justification is used as the basis for cultural policy reflects the degree to which a cultural policy can be characterized as authoritarian.

The changing structure of Indonesian society brought by years of economic growth exerted some pressures on cultural policy, which are connected to the regime's response to the increasing penetration of Indonesia by consumer goods and lifestyles discussed in the previous chapter. Cultural policy in the 1970s and 1980s tended to emphasize the positive features of the development discourse about culture: directing national culture to assist economic development. In the 1990s, the balance shifted towards negative features: combating negative outside influences that were considered to be weakening national culture. In the booklet *The Guidance and Development of Culture* (*Pembinaan dan Pembangunan Kebudayaan, Direktorat Kebudayaan*, 1994/95), the primary challenge for cultural policy was to redress the flow of Western popular culture into Indonesia. The booklet states: "The entry of values that are opposed to *Pancasila* and other lofty values through television programmes from outside, films and reading materials are a threat for national cultural development" (*Direktorat Kebudayaan* 1994/95: 20). The changes in social structure that occurred during the New Order era did not evoke novel policy responses but instead shifted the emphasis within existing policy directions towards the protection of national culture against intruding influences. The two features remained the same: creating a culturally-congruent environment for national development while ameliorating its negative effects.

Policy Making: Funding Programmes, Appointing Officials

One of the most significant techniques that the regime used to ensure a centralized system of policy development and implementation was funding. There were two kinds of funding within the New Order era bureaucracy. The first kind was the recurring budget that covered the costs of basic operations and maintenance. Although the routine budget expanded markedly over the course of the New Order era (see Table 5.1), it tended to barely cover the costs of employment and maintaining facilities. The second system of implementing policy, the development projects,

Table 5.1: Directorate of Culture budgets (Rp. Thousand)[4]

Year	Routine Budget	Development Projects	Year	Routine Budget	Development Projects
1969/70	295,579	163,000	1981/82	3,480,156	23,556,700
1970/71	308,579	205,325	1982/83	3,556,287	26,886,588
1971/72	223,023	205,685	1983/84	3,875,149	19,021,500
1972/73	360,585	300,000	1984/85	4,371,649	29,500,000
1973/74	509,564	576,053	1985/86	5,598,272	31,293,959
1974/75	695,849	2,181,246	1986/87	6,109,121	17,573,125
1975/76	1,191,004	4,499,400	1987/88	5,969,087	6,426,659
1976/77	775,737	6,683,291	1988/89	Not available	Not available
1977/78	1,047,331	8,907,646	1989/90	Not available	9,277,988
1978/79	1,174,952	10,289,365	1990/91	Not available	17,638,795
1979/80	1,386,397	11,315,269	1991/92	Not available	23,079,995
1980/81	2,367,817	18,319,587	1992/93	Not available	28,240,304
1981/82	3,480,156	23,556,700	1993/94	Not available	36,940,488
1982/83	3,556,287	26,886,588	1994/5–98/9	57,385,014*	54,928,491*

* Average of the five year period as the single year statistics were unavailable at the Directorate of Culture

was a much more creative and lucrative distribution of state-resources for all parties involved.

Beginning with the first Five-Year Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Repelita) in 1969, development projects quickly became the regime's primary means of meeting its policy objectives. The word 'project' (*proyek*) in Indonesia brings with it, in addition to links with state development programmes, also the management techniques employed by officials who often made money from their involvement. In his analysis of the changing state in Jepara during the 1970s and early 1980s, Jim Schiller makes the point that for bureaucrats, 'the most important source of legal income was *uang proyek* or *uang pelaksana proyek*' (project money or project manager's money, (1996: 154–5)). Compared to other sections of the bureaucracy, there was not much money in the Directorate of Culture.

However, projects promised prestige, a larger than usual pay cheque and possibly financial kickbacks for senior officials working for the national and provincial level bureaucracies. Cultural policy was formulated through a highly centralized system of policy making that worked in

[4] Compiled from date in Directorate of Culture reports: Mantra (1978) and Direktorat Kebudayaan (1987, 1993, 1999a).

a five year cycle. Part of the Supreme Advisory Council's (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat, MPR) tasks when it convened every five years was to decide on policy directions for the next five years. They envisioned this task as translating the New Order regime's key ideological documents, the *Pancasila* and the 1945 constitution, into policy programmes that addressed current problems and positioned Indonesia for future prosperity. The resulting document, the Broad Outline of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) was passed across to the National Planning Board (BAPENAS), who, in consultation with the bureaucracy, translated the GBHN into the Repelita. The Repelita were the basis of the policies developed and put into place by the various departments and directorates. Over the life of the Repelita, BAPENAS and the Directorate of Estimates (Direktorat Anggaran) determined which programmes were approved or rejected in accordance with the Repelita.

Thus programmes and projects had to demonstrate a direct link with the Repelita, the 1945 constitution and/or the *Pancasila*, explaining the constant references to these three documents in Directorate of Culture publications and reports. As the juridical basis for cultural policy, the explanation for culture in the 1945 constitution remained significant throughout the New Order era.[5] Culture was mentioned in each of the five year plans although it was only briefly touched on in the first plan (1968/69–1973/74). From a two page section in Repelita I that also covered sport, culture grew to 40 pages in Repelita V (1989/90–1993/94). Both Philip Yampolsky (1995) and Jörgen Hellman (1999) note the developmental emphasis. Hellman also identifies an expanded focus on local cultural sites and knowledges in Repelita II (1974/75–1978/79) that increased further in the later Repelita. The concern with regional art forms, cultural objects, sites and knowledges was part of a broader concentration of focus on regional cultural practices within the Directorate. The increased number of references to the 1945 constitution in successive Repelita sections about culture placed concern with regional culture at the centre of cultural policy, continuing a trend begun in 1956. Although tourism was only occasionally mentioned in the cultural sections of the Repelita (generally in the context of cross-sector cooperation but also briefly in Repelita V in connection with developing historical sites for tourism), culture was often mentioned in the tourism sections both as an important resource and as an object that needed

[5] Since the elements of the Repelita that are relevant to culture have been analysed at length elsewhere (Hellman 1999; Yampolsky 1995), only a brief summary is provided here.

careful management in the context of tourism. Cultural tourism, in large part due to tourism growth in Bali, was viewed as a potential source of revenue by the regime (Picard 1997).

Both foreign and Indonesian observers challenged the patriarchal quality of the cultural development projects. Mary Zurbuchen writes in relation to state-sponsored cultural research: "Research (*penelitian*) itself is a kind of 'project,' one with a narrowly defined subject and a limited period for implementation, generally defined by calendar or fiscal year. To earn government support, cultural research usually must have some relation to questions of government policy and the achievement of some aspect of development" (1990: 139). Benny Yohanes, the Head of the Indonesian College of Performing Arts (Sekolah Tinggi Seni Indonesia, STSI) in Bandung, took aim at the way that people involved in New Order government projects prioritized profit over artistic quality in a newspaper article published two years after the fall of Suharto:

> At the same time, the behaviour of the arts bureaucracy too often views art as a 'project', so that suggested ideas aimed at conceptual innovation are not accommodated. The 'projectization' of art, which is a legacy of the decadent New Order bureaucracy, has infected the distorted behaviour of arts institutions that exist in a collegial environment. The tendency to exploit the potential of artistic authenticity and profitability always surfaces through camouflaged pretexts. (2000)

Although the system of policy making was successful in inscribing the New Order regime's version of culture at the centre of cultural policy, it attracted criticism which was articulated before and after the fall of the regime.

Another method that can be used to control the cultural policy direction is the appointments process for senior positions. There are remarkable similarities between the Director-Generals of Culture that indicate the importance of a particular background and emphasis. Ida Bagus Mantra, the Director-General of Culture from 1968 until 1978, established the policy framework that continued within the Directorate of Culture throughout the New Order era. Mantra had received a Dutch education as a child before completing postgraduate study in India in the area of cultural history. He had lectured in the University of Indonesia in Jakarta and, after his time as Director-General, went on to be appointed as Governor of Bali (Leirissa and Katartadarmadja 1984). His major achievement as Director-General was to establish a series of national cultural projects that absorbed much of the funding increase of the 1970s. He was followed by Haryati Soebadio who was Director-General until 1988 and also taught in the same Faculty at the University of Indonesia in the area of ancient

languages. G.P.H. Poeger, the brother of the Sultan of Yogyakarta, was Director-General from 1988 until 1993. The next Director General was Edi Sedyawati, a well-known dancer who had been involved in the establishment of Ismail Marzuki Arts Centre (Taman Ismail Marzuki, TIM) and who had once again taught and studied in the Literature Faculty in the area of ancient archaeology. She held the position until the fall of the New Order government in 1998.

There are some remarkable similarities between the Director-Generals. All were either from Central Java or Bali. More significant still, three of the four had taught in the Literature Faculty at the University of Indonesia in areas associated with ancient texts and archaeology, and the other Director-General was Central Javanese royalty.[6] Mantra, Soebadio, and Sedyawati all viewed national culture as a system that formed the basis of a way of life common to all Indonesians, and that was connected to the notion of civilization (Mantra 1978; Sedyawati 1995/6; Soebadio 1986). The similarities in ethnic background and education are symbolic of the New Order preference for high Javanese and Balinese cultural forms, particularly practices and objects connected with past kingdoms. It should be noted that Archaeology was a more developed section of the Directorate of Culture due to its bases in the colonial era Archaeological Service (established in 1913), which included a larger number of qualified experts and was supported by training programmes at the University of Indonesia and Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, so it did not suffer from the human resources issues faced by other sections (Directorat Kebudayaan 1973). As such, it had a stronger institutional basis for developing bureaucratic careers. Under the leadership of these people, cultural policy for the New Order era shared the purpose of shaping an Indonesian civilization as part of the goal of national development. However, Soebadio took a more instrumentalist view of culture that aligned it closely with the interests of the New Order regime.[7] The Director-Generals also shared a focus on cultural heritage and expanded programmes concerned with recording cultural history and archaeology that were begun by Mantra.

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[6] The Director-General in office was drawn from the same faculty in the same University for all but five of the thirty years between 1968 and 1998.

[7] For instance, Soebadio placed the concerns of the New Order regime at the centre of her writings about culture, such as her statement that 'cultural identity is no other than what in Indonesia is called national defence' (1985: 21). The same article uses the 1945 constitution to interpret Indonesian culture itself whereas both Mantra and Sedyawati use the 1945 constitution as the basis of Indonesian cultural policy.

International Connections

After taking power, the New Order regime moved quickly to reengage with the international community, including forging cultural partnerships. After some goodwill was gained from the foreign policy changes of the first decade of the New Order period, Indonesia's invasion and military-style rule of East Timor was roundly condemned by the international community. Political researcher Henri Warmenhoven writes that at the Fourth Summit Conference in Algiers in 1973, Foreign Minister Adam Malik 'stressed the ways nonalignment could be utilized in the current climate of rapprochement in order to help the developing nations to accelerate their process of nation-building and economic development' (1973: 276). From the mid-1980s, Indonesia began once again to reassert its claims for leadership amongst the non-aligned nations, particularly through negotiations with Vietnam over the occupation of Cambodia. Despite the peaceful resolution in Cambodia, Indonesia could not beat Yugoslavia for the 1988 Presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Merle Ricklefs observes that Indonesia's standing in this group was undermined by the occupation of East Timor. By 1991, concern over East Timor had faded to the extent that Indonesia was able to win the NAM Presidency (Ricklefs 2001).

Although Indonesia was located within NAM when it began asserting its numerical weight in the United Nations and UNESCO and began to argue for a New International Economic Order and a New World Information and Communication Order, its commitment to reforming the economic and cultural order was not as clear cut as Sukarno's commitment during Guided Democracy. The New Order regime's cultural anti-Western rhetoric was at best ambiguously supported by its economic and foreign policies. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the New Order regime opened the door to international markets and cultural products and its rule of East Timor contradicted the notions of national sovereignty and non-intervention that were important elements of NAM.

A major part of Suharto's rapprochement after the oppositional international politics of the Sukarno period was a quick return to the United Nations and UNESCO, facilitated by Foreign Minister Adam Malik in 1966. Of the international institutions, UNESCO is important to cultural policy across this period as the driver of programmes and reforms at the national level, particularly in developing countries. While it has run cultural programmes since its inception, UNESCO documents note the low level of UNESCO activities in Indonesia in the cultural space during the first

twenty years of independence. A *Report of Inspection* in 1964 states that: "The big gap in Indonesia is the absence of UNESCO cooperation in the cultural field. This I do not understand for this is a country rich in culture and this is the field which offers a window to the world in the midst of its political preoccupations' (UNESCO 1964: 2). Across this period, UNESCO consistently ran programmes in the areas of education, science and technology, social science, culture, and (from the 1970s) communication. The most prominent programmes in Indonesia have always been in education and then science (in no small part because of the location of the ROSTSEA (Regional Office for Science and Technology for Southeast Asia) in Jakarta).[8] However, culture received increasing attention during this period, in no small part because of a change in focus in UNESCO towards encouraging the development of cultural policies amongst member states from the late 1960s, along with more attention to the identification and conservation of world heritage. The cultural and communication programmes were the most contentious areas for Indonesia. UNESCO functioned as a forum where positions were created as much as expressed, particularly for developing countries like Indonesia, and new ideas were grappled with and translated into national policy. It was where Indonesia expressed its opinion on cultural issues, including the relationship between developed and developing countries, and articulated its cultural programmes and policies to the world. It is worth noting that the Head of the Indonesian Delegation in the New Order period was always the Minister of Education and Culture, and the delegation included high level bureaucrats from the Department of Education, the Directorate of Culture and the Ministry of Information. The way that Indonesian cultural policy followed the debates in UNESCO, towards cultural policy expansion and culture and development in the 1970s and 1980s, and then incorporated a creative industries focus in the 2000s, is more than a coincidence and is linked with the international programmes that Indonesia embraced.

Two UNESCO initiatives have particular relevance to Indonesia (and were regularly mentioned in the Indonesian Delegate's speeches to the UNESCO biannual General Conference) due to their scope and timing at the start of the Suharto era. The first is Indonesia's participation in cultural policy initiatives, in particular the ASIACULT Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Asia that Indonesia hosted in Yogyakarta

[8] ROSTSEA is now named the Regional Science Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, and Office of the UNESCO Representative to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

in December 1973. ASIACULT was the third in a series of international cultural policy conferences, beginning with the Venice Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional, Administrative and Financial Aspects of Cultural Policies in 1970. These policies signalled an international change in the way that states were encouraged to understand cultural policy. Mr. René Maheu, Director General of UNESCO in his opening address at ASIACULT expressed the emerging status quo: "It falls to each government, with due regard for the characteristic spirit of the nation, to lay down a coherent set of aims and to furnish the means of accomplishing these aims, in short to define a national cultural policy, in the same way as it defines an economic policy, a social policy or an educational policy" (UNESCO 1974a: 54–55).

ASIACULT identified themes and issues for cultural policies in Asia, with a particularly pertinent theme for Indonesia being cultural development. Emerging as a key international concept in the 1970s, cultural development highlighted the role of cultural policy in managing the relationship between technological progress and cultural identity. ASIACULT had a high profile in Indonesia, and was attended by President Suharto as well as Maheu. While ASIACULT documents indicate that there was a trust in the robustness of 'traditional' cultures in the face of changing conditions, also present were concerns over the effects of consumerism and commercialization of culture. Contradictions are present throughout records from the conference, as a number of disparate positions were expressed, and exerted an influence on the final recommendations. The recommendations for member states were far-ranging, and included calls for greater funding for cultural policies, a focus on the relationship between culture and development, and Asia was constructed as different to developed countries as culture in Asian countries was integrated into everyday life and life rituals. Through this process, cultural policy in Asia, and also in Indonesia more specifically (Directorat Kebudayaan 1973) was constructed as lacking resources and content. Engagement in UNESCO meetings and programmes created expectations that encouraged the cultural policy focus and growth of the Suharto period.

The second initiative was the International Campaign to Safeguard Borobudur. The Borobudur programme was particularly important due to its size (where over $US6.5 million was raised internationally through UNESCO activities of a total cost of over $20 million (UNESCO 1982b)), its timing, and what it came to signify. The timing of the beginning of the project in the 1970s provided the Suharto government with added legitimacy as the conservator of an important national and international

monument, and as the manager of a multi-million dollar international project. Borobudur also reinforced the importance of Javanese pre-Islamic heritage for both the New Order state and Indonesian cultural policy, and also created a large national archaeological programme. The Borobudur project is discussed in detail in the next section.

Cultural Policy Sectors: Archaeology, Museums, History

I divide Indonesian cultural policy here into three general areas: archaeology, museums, and history; language; and arts policy. Archaeology, museums, and history have overlapping institutional history under the Indonesian state. While archaeology and museums have links to institutes under the colonial regime, history policy can be traced to the Sub-Division of Customs and Traditions created in 1956 (Soebadio 1985: 16), which later was combined with archaeology to become the Institute of History and Anthropology (Lembaga Sejarah dan Antropologi) in 1960. This Institute was split into the Directorate of History and Archaeology (Direktorat Sejarah dan Purbakala) and the Research Centre for History and Culture (Pusat Penelitian Sejarah dan Budaya) in 1975 before becoming the separate Directorate of History and Traditional Values (Directorat Sejarah dan Nilai-Nilai Tradisional, Ditjarahnitra), the Directorate for the Protection and Management of Historical and Archaeological Artefacts (Direktorat Perlindungan dan Pembinaan Peninggalan Sejarah dan Purbakala) and the National Research Centre for Archaeology (Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional) in 1980. The feature that links History, Archaeology and Museums together was each one's role in constructing what Miller and Yudice (2002) call 'historical citizenship'. They state, in the context of museums: "Historical citizenship emerges in the contemporary moment, but in reaction to the past. It knows that errors lie back there, before we knew. The past's commemoration in museum form is rendered as a strictly delimited ethical zone, a space that divides worthy and unworthy conduct" (2002: 148). In the case of Indonesia, a concern about the political affiliations of citizens limited the extent that the past could be constructed as negative. When the affective commitment of a citizen is doubted, the past tends to be glorified rather than critically assessed. However the Indonesian museum, archaeological site and history book were still 'delimited ethical zones'. They combined lessons in conduct with attention to professionally-correct display, viewing, and behaviour in an attempt to ensure that the lessons were correctly imparted and absorbed.

A 1972 report assigned archaeology the goal of 'completing humankind with knowledge and consciousness about themselves' (Harmidjojo et al. 1972: 120). The report adopted the term 'know yourself' to justify archaeology's importance, declaring 'Therefore, if we want to participate and be active in shaping the future of our nation, like it or not we must first truly know ourselves now' (1972: 120). In order that Indonesians could know their 'national past', the state needed to support the continued work of archaeology, the protection of important sites and objects, the introduction of new techniques and start to spread information about archaeological remains in schools. A later article noted that society needed to be taught to appreciate the importance of archaeological remains' 'cultural value' (Tjandrasasmita 1976: 33).

Probably the largest cultural project since the conception of the Indonesian state was in the archaeological field. The International Campaign to Safeguard the Borobudur Temple ran between 1970 and 1983. The reconstruction and conservation work on Borobudur was important in a number of respects for Indonesian cultural policy. The Archaeological aspects of the project were managed by the Directorate of Culture, and it provided an impetus to archaeological work and training in Indonesia. It also set a precedent for how archaeological projects would proceed, and today Indonesia has seven World Heritage sites.[9] It also facilitated the establishment of a close relationship between UNESCO and the Indonesian state, with Indonesia taking the lead in Southeast Asia in a number of policy areas. While UNESCO work on Borobudur began in 1956 with a study by Belgium national Paul Coremans, Indonesia did not approach UNESCO for assistance in technical studies and fundraising until 1967. UNESCO funded studies in the late 1960s identified that work was urgently required to prevent Borobudur from collapsing. Work commenced in 1972 and the project was completed in 1983. While the Indonesian state managed the project and undertook the work, UNESCO managed the international funding and provided comment through the International Campaign to Safeguard Borobudur Executive Committee. Three conflicts within the Borobudur project provide an insight into its dynamics and a chance to reflect on its broader implications for cultural policy. The first

[9] The three cultural sites are Borobudur, Prambanan and Sangiran Early Man site. The four natural sites are Komodo National Park, Lorentz National Park, Tropical Heritage Rainforest History of Sumatra and Ujong Kulon National Park.

conflict was between UNESCO and the Indonesian government. UNESCO experts recommended a smaller intervention than was pursued by the Indonesian government, leading to concerns about cost overruns and, on the Indonesian side, complaints about international intervention including in the UNESCO General Conference in 1974 (UNESCO 1974b: 84). Indonesia was able to assert its control over the project, in no small part because UNESCO's reputation was also connected to the project's success. The nation-state was proven to be paramount in the protection of internationally significant heritage. The second conflict was internal to the Indonesian state over who would manage the site. The eventual decision was that the Directorate of Culture would manage the Borobudur temple, which is the innermost zone of the complex, and the Directorate of Tourism would manage the Borobudur Archaeological Park, which surrounds the inner zone. The limits of cultural policy appear here to be in the realm of conservation and protection of heritage, while marketing and cultural tourism are outside of this sphere. Three other zones surround the park and were intended to also limit the scale and types of development with the stated aim of protecting the site from inappropriate development. However, a UNESCO report in 2006 found that zones 3–5 did not have restrictions on development, and that these were necessary due to 'the extraordinary importance of the integrity of the wider landscape setting of the Temple to maintain its spiritual character and sense of sacredness and communion with nature typical of a Buddhist religious site' (Boccardi, Brooks, and Gurung 2006: 8). The 2006 report was undertaken in response to a commercial development on the edge of the park surrounding the temple.

The third conflict also relates to the management of the Borobudur site. Before the restoration, a village was located next to the Borobudur temple. Approximately 150 families were relocated to a newly constructed village nearby, with new mosque and infrastructure, in order to create the two inner zones and create a particular ambiance around the park. Unease was expressed over the relocation of the village a number of times throughout the project, in particular in 1981 and 1982, although the need to move the village was never questioned. The villagers did not want to move (UNESCO 1982a), but were forced to do so.[10] In 1995 the Conclusions

[10] An article by the journalist Mochtar Lubis on Borobudur in 1983 to promote the completion of the project was edited to remove a paragraph critical of the movement of the villagers, which he noted was to the financial detriment of the villagers.

to The Third International Meeting of Experts on Borobudur judged the movement of the village to have been beneficial.

> [The] existence and growth of the Borobudur Temple Recreation Park has made the Borobudur Temple, which is included in the World Heritage List', more magnificent and grand. In the past, the temple was heavily surrounded by village houses and other public facilities, such as markets and bus stations. Now, visitors can admire the beauty of the temple from a distance. Besides, it becomes easier to control the deterioration of the temple because of nature as well as of human action [sic.].' (Directorat Kebudayaan 1995: 9)

Such a judgement excludes assessment of impacts on villagers or the state of the new village.[11]

The plight of the village with respect to the Borobudur Temple Recreation Park (as it was renamed) indicates the strength of cultural discourse within archaeology specifically, and cultural policy more broadly. The Borobudur project did not just restore a temple. It also constructed a landscape around the temple that moved a village and controlled activities and movements.[12] In this new landscape that circled around the rejuvenated temple, what is to be appreciated? The Director General of UNESCO at the time of the project's completion, Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, described Borobudur as an 'admirable expression of the aspiration towards the elevation of the spirit and purification of the heart, and ultimately the 'culmination of a spiritual and cultural quest' by many people across the ages (UNESCO 1983: 3). While M'Bow's speech aligns with the tendency in Indonesian cultural policy to focus on the spiritual aspects of culture that lead to creative fulfilment, an event that followed indicated that the state viewed Borobudur as primarily a national monument.

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[11] It should be noted that this assessment differs from the vision of the Director General of Culture when the project was conceived, Ida Bagus Mantra. The minutes from the first International Campaign to Safeguard Borobudur Executive Committee meeting (UNESCO 1973: 7) state: 'Professor Mantra expressed his personal profound conviction that the surroundings of Borobudur should be in full harmony with the monument and maintain its high cultural values, with its serenity and tranquillity of the surroundings, which is important to spiritual enhancement. The area should be strongly protected against the polluting effect which may result from mass tourism. There should be a full integration of the present local population with the development of the surroundings of Borobudur. Other aspects of cultural development (performing art, handicrafts, etc.) should also be part of this planned development.'

[12] The Executive Committee recommended making controls for a 10km radius around the temple that regulated 'design, height, materials, function and location of all new construction' (UNESCO 1977), which later became the location of the new village.

On 21 January 1985 at 1.30am, nine bombs damaged reliefs and statues at Borobudur. While the perpetrators were later found to be a retaliatory attack for the 1984 killings (of at least 28 people) of protesters outside a mosque by the military in Tanjung Priok, Minister for Education and Culture Nugroho Notosusanto immediately denied that the bombing was 'a religious problem' and Suharto stated that the bombers were 'people who have no national pride, because Borobudur is a national monument, that has become known throughout the world' ("Nine bombs blast Borobudur" 1985). Borobudur, and archaeology in Indonesia more broadly, was primarily used to construct a glorious national past.

Museums policy was similarly justified as teaching an appropriate commitment to the Indonesian nation. A quote from a speech by Director-General Mantra in 1970 captures the rationale behind museums and the relationship between historical objects and society:

> From the angle of cultural management, the important meaning of research and care for historical artefacts [and] works of high art which are kept in museums as valuable artistic objects is able to become a source of information from generation to generation in the effort to cultivate the national personality. The disappearance of valuable artistic objects from Indonesia means we lose our source of inspiration and self-belief. (1970: 4)

Thus both archaeology and museums were viewed as caring for culturally valuable objects that could contribute to building national identity. However, Mantra neglected to mention in his quote that Indonesians needed to be trained in an aesthetics of viewing to appreciate culturally valuable objects. Through the process of acquiring the viewing aesthetics and learning to appreciate those objects' historical importance and value, the viewing public became Indonesian.

Museums expanded as part of the growth of government beginning in the early 1970s. By 1976 there was a plan and government support to build a museum in the capital city of every province (Herman 1976: 36). By 1990, there were 140 mainly state-sponsored museums in Indonesia (Taylor 1995: 113), a substantial increase on the 24 museums that were in Indonesia after World War II (Zurbuchen 1990). The centralized system of museum development was also reflected in design and exhibition practice. Exhibits followed a standard format that reinforced the New Order state's ideas about the essential sameness of cultures within Indonesia (Taylor 1994, 1995). The concern with representing national unity in museums remained throughout the New Order regime as can be seen in a statement by Sedyawati on 17 January 1994 in her opening address to the 'Indonesia-Dutch Seminar On Museum Development Problems':

> As an educational instrument, a museum in Indonesia should also have a presentation strategy that is in line with Indonesia's national development policy. The idea of nationality, of national unity, and of the supporting position of different ethnic groups within the Indonesian nation are basic ideas that should underlie any strategy of presentation (1995/6: 26)

Acciaioli's (2001: 7) research into a *Bajau* museum exhibition demonstrates how the state used elements of various ethnic cultures in order to tie them back into the nation while excluding other elements that are in conflict with the state's governmental discourses.[13] The similarities, enforced through government regulations, are an entry through a space devoted to the geography of the earth, especially Indonesia, a core series of displays about the regional culture (generally coinciding with a bureaucratic region such as a province, city, or regency), and a *nusantara* (archipelago) room where visual comparisons are made between local artifacts and those from elsewhere in Indonesia (Taylor 1994). Hence the distinctiveness of the culture displayed in the museum is always linked back to the nation. In addition to representing cultural unity and harmony, museums also instructed Indonesians in other ways. Museums themselves were regulated spaces that compelled certain behaviours and prohibited others. Take for instance a 1976 article on correct lighting by a bureaucrat working in the Directorate of Culture. The correct technical expertise needed to be used to both protect display objects and guarantee that visitors both enjoy their visit and absorb information correctly (Herman 1976). Concerns with methods of museum management and display have remained present in Indonesia since the Dutch established the first museums. Similarly, museums have retained their didactic role, in particular their mediating role between different ethnic populations. The key difference was that they changed to serve the development priorities of the New Order regime.

Two related terms ran through the areas of archaeology, museums and history: 'cultural values' (*nilai-nilai budaya*) and 'cultural heritage' (*warisan budaya*). In his end of term report in 1978, Mantra placed 'values' at the centre of the activities of these three sections: "The importance of the glorious values that are contained inside archaeological artefacts, history and the other elements in cultural anthropology are a reminder that the efforts [...] to develop and research them need to be increased" (1978: 20).

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[13] The Bajau are a nomadic people indigenous to Indonesia who live on ocean-going boats. Acciaioli (2001: 12–17) also connects the normalization of the state's version of Indonesian culture in museums with broader political strategies and rationales.

Cultural values were viewed as the cultural heritage of the nation that was threatened by negative outside influences. Mantra also outlined future steps that needed to be taken in regards to cultural heritage:

> Protection of cultural heritage is implemented through the activities of research, excavation, safeguarding, restoring, protecting, appreciating, documenting and publication of the cultural heritage of the nation and the regions. The environment (for these activities) entails the areas of history, cultural anthropology, archaeology and historical/archaeological artefacts. (1978: 58–59)

The concept of cultural heritage was central to the Research Centre for History and Cultural Anthropology which became the Directorate of History and Cultural Values in 1980. The activities associated with this area of the Directorate of Culture expanded rapidly in 1973 with the announcement of an ambitious publication programme in Repelita II. Under the title, 'Saving and Caring for Historical and Cultural Heritage,'[14] the New Order regime made regional cultures a focus of research and data collection and announced its intention to publish the information to 'spread knowledge' of Indonesia's cultural heritage (Departemen Penerangan 1974: 225–229).

The Directorate of History and Traditional Values was thus generated within, and then carved out of the Archaeology Section. Like Archaeology, it was oriented towards protecting and preserving 'cultural values' but the focus of its activities was the cultural practices and knowledges of regional ethnic groups, events and figures in Indonesia's nationalist history. Its programmes involving history and regional cultures cannot be viewed as only recording and spreading 'cultural heritage'. Research in the Directorate of History and Traditional Values was greatly influenced by developments in the Indonesian social sciences in the 1970s. As was briefly explored in the last chapter, the social sciences in Indonesia were subject to both a North American research paradigm (Hadiz and Dhakidae 2005: 13) that was apolitical in perspective and promoted American-style modernization and the requirements of the New Order regime. Vedi Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae argue: "It was during the New Order [...] that social sciences and academia were geared towards fulfilling the requirements of the exercise of state power. This clearly shaped the orientation of social science research, activity and training" (2005: 7). State-run research projects played a major role in influencing research directions. In state

[14] Penyelamatan dan Pemeliharaan Warisan Sejarah Kebudayaan.

sponsored cultural research, most of which was managed by the Directorate of History and Traditional Values, the ideas and research methods of the Indonesian anthropologist Koentjaraningrat were influential, particularly the use of quantitative surveys and the focus on cultural values and their relationship to development. Chapter seven is a case study of the research publications generated by the Directorate of History and Traditional Values that provides a detailed analysis of their methodology, topics and outcomes.

An article by the inaugural head of the Directorate of History and Traditional Values, S. Budhisantoso,[15] provides an interesting insight into how the most influential figure in the Directorate of History and Traditional Values understood its role. He argued that in addition to protecting culture from negative outside influences, history also played an 'active role' in shaping society through assessing the evolution of society and culture to identify areas of 'cultural lag' (1983/4: 16–17). Cultural lag was caused by the different stages in evolution between the technological system and the cultural system present in Indonesian society. According to Budhisantoso, the study of history could make society aware of the problems it faced in order to help it shape its future, but this is not the only role that history played in shaping society. Budhisantoso concludes his article with these words: "Historical instruction is not just about increasing the consciousness of national history, but it will also intensify the feelings of unity and unification, love of the nation, and national pride that is very much needed as the developmental allowance of a complete Indonesian mankind along with planning for the future of the whole of Indonesian society" (1983/4: 17)

Like the policies relating to museums and archaeology, concerns with national development and national unity undergirded the focus on cultural heritage. History policy reinforced rather than challenged or evolved the standard nationalist approach to Indonesian history that was developed during the Japanese Interregnum: the pre-colonial past was presented as a time of political unity and prosperity brought by the great Hindu kingdoms; and the often mentioned '350 years' of Dutch rule were represented as a time of oppression with resistance at some time or another of each Indonesian region and people.

[15] Budhisantoso's name has its own process of historical evolution. At this stage, he was S. Budhi Santosa.

Cultural Policy Sectors: Languages Policy

Language has been a political tool of rulers and social elite for centuries and in many countries, generally because of its role in unifying or distinguishing different social groups.[16] The Indonesian language is historically linked closely with the nationalist movement and its goal of modernization—an association that has been encouraged by the state since the Japanese occupation because of the overlap with a number of its own goals including (symbolically) unifying diverse social and ethnic groups within the nation, simplifying administration and providing a 'modernizing' language to construct Indonesian citizens. In an article titled 'The Political Function of the National Language' Amran Halim, a bureaucrat in the Directorate of Culture, argued:

> the existence of an agreement regarding the function and state of Indonesian as a national language is a symbol of the resoluteness of Indonesian national energy, a unifying tool of many societies with different backgrounds, languages, cultures and ethnicities inside a single Indonesian national society, and a communication tool between ethnic groups, between areas and cultures. Secondly, in its position as language of state, Indonesian is the formal state language, introductory language to the world of education, a tool of communication at the national level for planning and implementing national development, as well as a tool of cultural development, science and technology. (1976: 10)

Correct use of Indonesian was bound to the creation of productive citizens with a strong national commitment. Recommendations in the early cultural policy plans followed language programmes with educational programmes including such topics as farming, fishing, handcrafts and other skills needed to meet local needs (Harmidjojo et al. 1972: 94).

The Indonesian language did not only provide access to the state. It also provided access to a range of non-state institutions and information that contributed to economic, political and cultural citizenship. Indonesian provided access to national press, radio and film as well as to books about science, literature and culture (Halim 1976: 12). Indonesian created opportunities for citizens to undertake self-education and thus improve themselves and Indonesia. The national media also provided a valuable state service through the creation of a national viewing public. Citizens

[16] See Miller & Yudice (2002: 5–7) for a short discussion or Anderson (1991) for a discussion of the importance of language and literature in the process of nationing.

could be constantly reminded of their place in the national community and the state could disseminate information directly into their homes and lives.

Indonesian cultural policy expressed great concern about the regulation of the national language. The unity of the Indonesian people was only symbolically complete when they were all speaking exactly the same national language and not misusing words or disobeying grammar. Bureaucrats also thought vocabulary growth presented a problem as new words would continuously enter the lexicon and threaten to destroy its homogeneity and, most disturbing of all to the cultural bureaucracy, cause misunderstanding. Misapprehension of the national language threatened to subvert state led development and slow Indonesia's journey to prosperity. The answer to these problems was through the state-led creation and promotion of a formal language (*bahasa baku*). Language policy focussed on creating and promulgating 'standard Indonesian' across all islands and to all people within the borders of Indonesia with a single spelling and grammar to promote modernization. The 1972 report summed up the feelings at the time of cultural policy bureaucrats about Indonesian: 'Indonesian still lacks in scientific terms and modern technique as well as definite structures to fulfil its function as a scientific language or a language of modern culture' (Harmidjojo et al. 1972: 84). However the report continued by forecasting that, with the right guidance (like Chinese and Japanese), Indonesian will overcome its difficulties (Harmidjojo et al. 1972).

The management of languages was completed with policies about local and foreign languages. The reasons given for the state management and protection of local languages are both cultural and connected to the development of formal Indonesian. Local languages, as part of local cultures, come under state protection which involved their formalization (*pembakuan*). The formalization of languages which are largely oral and informal renders the language calculable and amenable to programmes, particularly in the field of education (Halim 1976: 13). Foreign languages were viewed as desirable because of the access they give to science and technology. Although not concerned with the development of foreign languages themselves, there is a concern that foreign expressions could come to dominate Indonesian (Halim 1976: 14). Within the state's framework, both local and foreign languages had the potential to help or hinder the development of Indonesian. Proper understanding and management, according to the state, would assist the state's goal of every citizen speaking

and comprehending standard Indonesian. Later reports indicated the strength of this model throughout the New Order era (Direktorat Kebudayaan 1994/95: 28–29).

Cultural Policy Sectors: Arts Policy

Arts policy in the Arts Directorate (Direktorat Kesenian) within the Directorate of Culture during the New Order period was predominantly focused on regional art forms rather than pan-Indonesian arts.[17] While the emphasis on regional forms strengthened a policy direction begun during Guided Democracy, there were significant changes at the beginning of the New Order period. Pan-Indonesian artists' engagement with the state during Sukarno's Guided Democracy was heavily criticized. The changing relationships between artists and the state were driven by four reasons. First, the regime's initial alignment with the supporters of universal humanism entrenched an artistic rationale in the pan-Indonesians arts that discouraged political engagement and made pan-Indonesian artists uneasy about incorporating the regime's development messages into their works. Second, regional art forms were reinvigorated through the patronage of the New Order elite at the beginning of the New Order period in order to overcome the stigma that had been attached to them due to engagement with LEKRA and other politically-affiliated arts organizations during Guided Democracy. Regional art forms were therefore more easily entered within the regime's cultural programmes. Third, the interpretation of the 1945 constitution emphasized regional ethnic cultures as the basis of national culture. Regional art forms were the most symbolic expression of regional cultures. Fourth, regional art forms were a good fit with the notion of cultural heritage, with its emphasis on historical connections. Regional art forms became the focus of a broad range of programmes with the twin development goals of the development of Indonesians and the development of Indonesian art.

Arts policy in particular drew on universal humanism in its understanding of art and the role of the arts. Universal humanism made its entry

[17] Arts education was originally under the control of the Directorate of Culture before being transferred to Education in 1976. Although arts educational institutions were important points of mediation for New Order cultural discourses, they are not examined in detail here due to the split in 1976. For detailed analysis of two educational institutions, see Hough (2000), Hellman (1999) and the collected articles of musician and teacher Dieter Mack who taught and performed for a number of years in Indonesia (2001a, 2001b).

into cultural policy in the late 1960s and was at its strongest in the early 1970s[18] before weakening in parallel with the influence of the groups that were its strongest supporters. For instance, a report in 1970 published by the Department of Education and Culture included a long criticism of the 'paternalistic' Sukarno era and called for a range of reforms including a constitutional bill of rights, independent judiciary, free elections, freedom of opinion and freedom of association demonstrating the connection with the urban modernizers (Harmidjojo Adikoesoemo, Surjaman, Wibisono, Harsojo, and Sukmono 1972: 41).

After the 1972 elections, the changing political climate reduced the scope of the Department to call for such reforms. However, the 'spiritual value' of culture remained as can be seen in a summary of arts policy in the first issue of the Directorate of Culture's magazine in 1976, *Warta Budaya*:

> Especially in traditional art the creativity of artists and appreciators needs to be developed and spread [by the state] so that we are completely able to appreciate our present Indonesian culture. On the other hand, the development of modern Indonesian art must also be directed to appreciation of Indonesian cultural values, including universal values. (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1976: 9)

The connection to universal humanism as well as modernizing intellectuals is present in the emphasis on universal values for the former and development for the latter.

The spiritually improving qualities of art were often emphasized in contrast to its political role, which is an important difference with arts policy during Guided Democracy. Art that included political commentary was not considered national because it reduced the spiritual value of art. However, Indonesians still needed to be taught how to appreciate the intrinsic qualities of national art works and Indonesian art works themselves needed to be made spiritually uplifting. For instance, the 1972 report announced that

> The goal of arts management is not only safeguarding arts that are already there but also trying to increase the quality of that art so that it correctly is able to be spiritual food for its admirers. Serving up quality art requires

[18] The connections between the Directorate and the universal humanists in TIM were multiple. At the time, TIM was at its most popular and some TIM personnel, like Sedyawati, also worked for the Directorate. Additionally, there was collaboration between the Directorate and the Jakarta Arts Council under the leadership of Ajip Rosidi, most notably conferences and seminars on regional performing arts.

> complete concentration, full dedication and an outpouring of pure spiritual character from its makers and doers. (Harmidjojo et al. 1972: 114).

This aesthetic discourse regulated the inclusion and exclusion of arts and artists into the category of 'national art'. If art was not sufficiently 'spiritually uplifting' it was deemed to be of inferior quality, and therefore in need of aesthetic transformations.

The use of a discourse of aesthetics hid issues of class and ethnicity. From associations between various socio-cultural groups, their cultural practices and political parties, Indonesians were to engage with their culture as an inspiring spiritual experience much like watching an opera or listening to a symphony. Miller and Yudice recognize the unifying function of aesthetics: "'Standards of taste' [...] are part of hegemony, a key means of differentiating and stratifying society. The value projected by aesthetic hegemony is ultimately premised on a series of exclusions [...] Social harmony is bought at the expense of those whose tastes are not only aesthetically unacceptable but, more importantly, potentially contestatory" (2002: 11). It is in the field of aesthetics that high Javanese and Balinese arts exerted their influence, as they largely set the basis for the aesthetic judgements across regional art forms when artists engaged with the bureaucracy for patronage or promotional opportunities. However, it should also be noted hierarchies existed at provincial and sub-provincial levels that could also influence bureaucratic tastes.

While the emphasis on spiritual improvement differentiated New Order arts policy from the arts policy of Guided Democracy, there were a number of continuities in how it functioned to alter behaviours and its goals were ultimately not that dissimilar. Much like the regime's use of regional art forms discussed in the previous chapter, there was a continuity in what was considered technical improvement across the two eras that is located in the shared middle class background of the political elite and extends back to the 1920s (McVey 1986). The New Order era process of making art 'spiritually improving', like Guided Democracy's emphasis on 'quality' (Setjonegoro 1956: 568), aimed to change regional arts to suit the tastes of an Indonesian middle class as defined by a political and artistic elite drawn from that class. Regional arts were subjected to a similar set of 'national' aesthetic criteria in both periods. This continuity was governmental in that it altered the behaviour of cultural workers and audiences to accord with the desired behaviour of the state and centred on the state's preferred forms of regional and national identity. While there were significant differences between the messages of the two periods,

their methods and broad aim to improve Indonesians and Indonesian art remained similar.

Within arts programmes, two terms were particularly important due to both their frequency and how they tie together different discourses about the arts: guidance or management (*pembinaan*) and development (*pengembangan*). National development, in the context of arts programmes, referred to both developing the arts and developing Indonesians. A 1976 article provides definitions for the terms in the context of the arts:

> The implementation pattern in the Indonesian arts includes a particular understanding of management (*pembinaan*) and development (*pengembangan*). *Pembinaan* refers to activities of caring for, protecting, researching, excavating, recording, giving guidance and direction along with processing and increasing quality. *Pengembangan* refers to activities of dissemination, including activities to increase quality, art appreciation, and whatsmore to spread expertise and art works as far as possible into society to complete cultural life. (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1976: 6)

The terms continued to feature prominently in the 1994/95 publication *The Guidance and Development of Culture* (Direktorat Kebudayaan 1994/95). Arts policy, through activities like *pembinaan* and *pengembangan*, involved both the preservation of regional arts and its improvement, as a part of the project of national development, in accordance with the aesthetic criteria that dominated the Directorate of Culture. The two terms also inscribed a relationship between the holders of knowledge (the bureaucrats) and the receivers of knowledge (artists, society) where knowledge flows from the former to the latter, in the process transforming artistic practices.[19]

A major restriction on both regional and pan-Indonesian artists throughout the New Order period was the licensing regime for arts events. Although for the most part managed by the police, the Directorate of Culture was also involved in the licensing of arts events. Licences for arts events were required by a 1963 piece of legislation[20] that was revised in 1995.[21] Under the legislation, various types of meetings required either

[19] A number of observers have critiqued the New Order regime's arts policy, in particular its aesthetic changes to regional art forms. See Yampolsky (1995), Acciaioli (1985), Hefner (1987) Widodo (1995), Effendi (1998) and Suanda (1995). A case study of an institution administered by the Directorate of Culture that ran a variety of arts programmes is provided in chapter six.

[20] Undang-Undang No. 5 Pnps 1963 tentang Kegiatan Politik.

[21] Surat Keputusan Bersama Menteri Dalam Negeri dan Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan Republik Indonesia No. 153 thn.1995 tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Perijinan Sebagaimana

a license, a police notification of the activity, or did not require police involvement. 'Cultural meetings', according to the police field directives, are gatherings that aim to discuss or perform music, dance, drama, poetry, opera, pantomime and other related art forms. According to the legislation, cultural meetings did not require either a license or notification unless they could possibly cause a public or traffic disturbance. In practice, 'cultural meetings' required a license in most places in Indonesia. Such licenses had to be applied for at least seven days before the event and would be deemed granted if either the police affirmed the request or there was no response prior to three days before the event. According to the law (which is still in place), police could charge for licenses at their discretion.

Although modern artists were affected,[22] traditional artists were generally more restricted by the licensing regime. Due to the distance they had to travel and the number of shows they performed during their times of high demand, they often did not apply for licenses and were forced to bribe police.[23] Askadi Sastrasuganda, a senior dalang who has performed for over fifty years in Cirebon and also worked for the Directorate of Culture at the local level, argued that the level of regulation forced regional artists to pay bribes:

> If a traditional artist wants to travel, he needs a travel licence for every trip outside the local area. He also requires a performance licence from the police and Office of Education and Culture and the Office of Tourism. If an artist is performing every night across different regencies and cities, they do not have the time to fulfil all of the bureaucratic requirements. Therefore, if they encounter police, they pay a bribe. [...] Therefore paying the police becomes the norm. This is a huge obstacle for artists. The focus is on the needs of the bureaucracy not on the needs of artists.[24]

It should also be noted that many performances went late into the night, so artists often slept late during the day. Dancer and researcher Endo

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Diatur dalam Pasal 510 KUHP dan Pemberitahuan Sebagaimana Diatur dalam UU No. 5 Pnps 1963.

[22] See, for instance, the experiences of Theatre Comma (Teater Koma) (Budianta and Budiman 2001; Cohen 1991; "List of art works that were banned" 1995; Wahono 1994b), playwright Ratna Sarumpaet ("Playwrite plans to sue police" 1997) and even *dangdut* singer Roma Irama ("List of art works that were banned" 1995) because of his affiliations with Islamic organizations.

[23] Suanda's (1995) account of a trip by a group of Cirebon mask dancers (Topeng Cirebon) includes a negotiated bribe with police.

[24] Askadi Sastrasuganda, interview, 29-11-2001.

Suanda (1995: 122–123) notes that artists in Cirebon Regency had to pay fees to the Office of Tourism, pay for 'Artist Cards' every two to three years, and ask the Office of Education and Culture for permission before every performance whereas artists in the provincial capital Bandung only required a permit from the police.

Command Culture, the Authoritarian State and Cultural Policy

From the features and characteristics outlined in this chapter, New Order state clearly aspired to a command culture model of cultural provision. The key governmental rationality for cultural policy was national development. Although development was an important part of liberal rationalities of government, development discourses had some important differences in Indonesia. Instead of the state facilitating the activities of cultural workers through mechanisms that provided resources while giving a degree of freedom with regards to the activities pursued, New Order cultural policy was constructed around a normative cultural subject defined by the state. The reason why this version of the command culture model should be distinguished from socialist command culture models is the justification that culture in Indonesia was backward and inappropriate for economic development. Socialist models were political in orientation and were attempting to encourage a socialist society, but they were not authoritarian in their justification. New Order cultural policy was authoritarian, which allowed the state greater scope for intervention in more elements of cultural practices, beyond inserting government messages to the staging and aesthetics of performances. Other areas, such as history and archaeology, had similar justifications, which led to instrumental uses of history and cultural heritage to support development agendas.

The expansion of the Directorate facilitated the spread of the regime's version of national culture. At the end of Repelita VI in 1998, 74,722 people were employed full-time under the supervision of the Directorate of Culture across Indonesia and many more were employed for specific tasks (Direktorat Kebudayaan 1999a). There were sizable line-offices in every province and offices in every city and regency. Within each city and regency, a Penilik Budaya or Cultural Officer was designated to every subregency in Indonesia with a centrally determined set of tasks.[25] Outside

[25] See Keputusan Kementerian Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 0304/0/1984.

of the Directorate and the line offices, there were a number of institutions located in various provinces that reported to the Directorate. These were the 24 cultural parks, 11 Historical and Traditional Values Research Bureaus, 9 Preservation of Historical Remains and Archaeology Reserves, 10 Archaeology Bureaus, 6 specialized museums, 25 provincial museums and the Borobudur Research and Conservation Bureau. The change in scale of the cultural bureaucracy was perhaps the defining feature of the New Order period, with corollaries in other developing countries, encouraged and coordinated by international initiatives. Centrally defined programmes were being run across Indonesia by a large organization that coordinated a variety of different institutions.

There was a large degree of continuity within cultural policy throughout the New Order era. An event that confirmed the direction of New Order era cultural policy, while simultaneously linking it to the days of the independence struggle, was the 1991 Fourth Cultural Congress (Kongres Kebudayaan IV). The Cultural Congress had the theme 'from art until development' and, unsurprisingly, confirmed the direction of the regime's cultural policy in its recommendations despite the opposition of some participants (BHS 1991). In the 1990s, the regime's cultural discourses still privileged a highly regulated model of cultural provision. However, the command culture model of the early New Order period had been impacted substantially by the fruits of its economic policies: booming manufacturing, media and tourism industries and related changes in the lifestyles of Indonesians. The unplanned competition for market share between official cultural provision and market provision was a significant change in how the majority of Indonesians accessed culture and the choices available for them. Regulation of media, for instance, was increasingly difficult in the 1990s because of the proliferation of different media types, providers and means of production and distribution (Sen and Hill 2000). Artists and observers also became more critical of the Directorate's policies and positions, such as the criticism of Director General Sedyawati's support of the banning of Ratna Sarumpaet's play *Marsinah* about a female labour activist who was killed by the military in 1993 (Mohamad 1998). These changes indicate a weakening of the command culture model, which increasingly became a mixed model of cultural provision. The New Order experience confirms Miller and Yudice's (2002) association a mixed model of cultural provision with postcolonial states.

The regime responded to the competition with its command culture in two ways. First, as discussed in the section on 'development', the regime shifted its emphasis in cultural policy from the positive elements

of national development such as developing national culture to assist economic development, to its more negative features of combating negative outside influences that would weaken national culture and protecting cultural values and heritage. The authoritarian elements of cultural policy were strengthened, but were increasingly ineffective due to the size and appeal of mass-produced culture. Next, some attempts were made at adopting cultural policy to the changing situation. Contemporary culture became a topic of cultural research in the 1990s[26] although it was still dwarfed by the attention given to regional cultural forms. Additionally, the Directorate began to organize a triennial Indonesian Arts Festival (beginning in 1995).

Conclusion

New Order era cultural policy can be broadly identified as a continuation of a reformist use of culture that had been an element of every government in Indonesia since colonialism. The element of cultural policy where changes (like those identified by Anderson [1990b]) occurred was not its techniques or its governmental function but in cultural policy's normative model. In other words, cultural policy was attempting to shape a new type of cultural subject suitable for the New Order era. Guided Democracy's emphasis on political messages and mass mobilization was replaced by national development messages and the call for stable and ordered development. Development goals and messages were spread through cultural institutions and programmes with the twin aims of developing individuals and strengthening the national population. New Order cultural policy also emphasized the spiritual value of culture and a conservative notion of cultural heritage and values in contrast to the emphasis on engagement during Guided Democracy. The changes in the Directorate of Culture were due to the inculcation of new norms connected to the new political, social and economic imperatives felt by a conservative authoritarian regime.

The changing role designated to artists was more complex. Pan-Indonesian artists generally did not incorporate regime themes or messages into their work. Regional arts were treated more instrumentally. Artists who worked with regional art forms were subject to training regimes and made to incorporate development themes and messages.

[26] See Keputusan Kementerian Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 0304/0/1984.

Artists linked to the left and other political parties that supported Sukarno in the 1960s were killed, jailed or banned for performing. The normative models for the arts in the two periods also included some similarities. The most noticeable was the aesthetic standards within the cultural programmes, with their emphasis on technical innovation, performance quality and morality. Additionally, both Guided Democracy and the New Order period employed a version of the command culture model where the state undertook the task of controlling cultural provision and exchange rather than relying on the market. However, the authoritarian justification of cultural policy was more prevalent during the New Order period, and in concert with this, the cultural bureaucracy had greatly increased resources and scope to intervene and change cultural practices. Indonesians were characterized as requiring state guidance and as needing protection from anything that could distract them from the state-defined path to development, such as political comment.

The New Order state was able to secure the conditions for the deployment of its governmental discourses to an extent unprecedented in Indonesian history since it had unparalleled resources and technologies with which to govern. Cultural governmental discourses were disseminated in programmes and institutions across Indonesia unlike ever before, although they also had more intense competition than ever before. They had to contend with the challenge of growing cultural consumption through the expanding Indonesian market. Apart from responding to the threat of marginalization from the cultural lives of Indonesians, New Order cultural policy remained remarkably unchanged from the mid-1970s. But a raft of changes accompanied the fall of Suharto in 1998.

CHAPTER VI

CULTURAL POLICY IN THE REFORM ERA: ETHNIC IDENTITY, DECENTRALIZATION AND TOURISM

Reformasi
Whose numerous victims
Appear to already exceed the revolution
Turned out to be mere niceties
Because it could not eliminate corruption
To say nothing of prosecuting ex-authorities
Acep Zamzam Noor (2001) Dongeng Dari Negeri Sembako[1]

A transition to democratic elections, a powerful legislature and a popularly elected president indicates that Indonesia now has a democratic political system. Additionally, the Indonesian national parliament has passed far reaching decentralization laws that have delivered many areas of policy, including the power to raise revenue and the area of cultural policy, to local government (the regency or city level). On their face, these reforms bode well for a diverse and active cultural policy that connects with a variety of cultural practices. The existing literature on cultural policy, including the earlier chapters in this book, are largely focussed on the authoritarian, Suharto-era state, raising the question of their continued relevance in present-day Indonesia with its freely-elected parliament and significantly changed political system.

However, the extent of democratic reform has been questioned, and these initiatives have not been the only influence on cultural policy. Acep Zamzam Noor's poem summarizes not just the feeling amongst many Indonesians about the *reformasi* movement but also amongst many political analysts. Despite the hope and energy that it initially generated, the critics of *reformasi* held that it did not produce democratic reforms to the extent expected by its early advocates and did not break with

[1] Reformasi
Yang jumlah korbannya
Konon sudah melebihi revolusi
Ternyata hanya sekedar basa-basi
Sebab tak mampu menghapus korupsi
Apalagi mengadili para mantan petinggi

many questionable past practices. Additionally, Indonesia experienced a growing tide of ethnic and religious sentiment that at times resulted in violence.

In this new and complex configuration, pre-existing ideas about Indonesian cultural policy need to be questioned. Are the concepts of command culture and the authoritarian cultural policy model discussed in the previous chapters still relevant in the post-Suharto, or what is known in Indonesia as the Reform (*Reformasi*) era? Has cultural policy changed, and if so, what are the drivers of change?

This chapter examines the four most important changes of the Reform era: the immediate response of artists and the media to Suharto's resignation; an ongoing struggle within the national bureaucracy over supplementing its long-term goals of creating national citizens and shaping national unity with a more commercial orientation; political decentralization (which includes cultural policy) and the related growth of ethnic and local identity politics and attached cultural traditions; and the changing effects of debates over public morality in Indonesia on culture and the arts. It finishes by assessing the continued relevance of the authoritarian cultural policy model and identifying four broad uses of culture that are driving cultural policy change across administrations in Indonesia.

Political Change in the Reform Era

Suharto's successor, Habibie had little choice but to institute reforms, most notably decentralization of political and financial control, given the demands from numerous groups, the mass popularity of the *reformasi* movement and his need to prove his democratic credentials before the 1999 elections (Bourchier 2000; Emmerson 1999). He was assisted by the power that Suharto had concentrated in the Presidency and its dominance over the legislature (DPR and MPR). However, his reformist initiatives were mitigated by his close relationship with Suharto-era elite.

The two presidents who followed did not implement wide ranging reforms. Following the 1999 elections, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president despite his National Development Party having only won eleven percent of the seats in parliament. This low level of support and Wahid's idiosyncratic leadership style caused widening divisions within his cabinet and in parliament (Fealy 2000), prevented pursuit of any extensive reforms, and led to the premature end of his government. Unlike Habibie and Megawati, Wahid attempted a number of cultural initiatives, perhaps

because of his background as a serious intellectual with longstanding connections to the artistic and literary community. Two key Wahid initiatives were his pronouncements on ancestral religions, which helped relax restrictions around related cultural practices, and his decree legalizing communism, which led to a conservative backlash that precipitated his removal (Bourchier 2001). Megawati followed a conservative political agenda from her inauguration in 2001. Following widespread celebration, Megawati disappointed reform-minded supporters and observers through her lack of leadership, particularly in contentious policy areas, and her lack of zeal fighting corruption (Crouch 2003; Malley 2003). The first three post-Suharto presidents were thus unable and/or unwilling to pursue reforms that would extensively alter the existing power structure. The presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been more stable than his predecessors' and has made progress on both economic and anti-corruption fronts (Gunawan and Siregar 2009; Van Klinken 2008). Yudhoyono has not, however, claimed his place as a forceful, independent leader of the nation; one commentator called his style of governance 'hesitant, procrastinating—if more consultative' (Mietzner 2009: 148).

Initial assessments of the Reform era classified it a 'transitional period' when Indonesia was gaining the features of a liberal democratic polity (Budiman 1999; Van Klinken 1999). Indeed, Indonesia developed some of these attributes including free and fair elections and a legislature that is now central to law making. However, the political and electoral reforms also entrenched the power of the legislature and political parties without resulting in a clear and direct accountability to voters (Fealy 2001). Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz (2004) argue that the political-business groupings (oligarchies) of the New Order regime have adjusted to take advantage of the new political climate and institutions, limiting the possibilities of political and economic reform. Moderate observers, like Harold Crouch, came to similar conclusions regarding the limited extent of reform. Crouch (2003: 33) writes that 'the state is weak because it itself is made up of powerful competing vested interests. The state has been penetrated by interests that are opposed to reform'. Although there have been more positive signs under Yudhoyono (Van Klinken 2008), the process has been slow. The picture that emerges from political analysis is of a country where the groups most committed to democratic reform have struggled to exert influence over political processes and far-reaching democratic change has been resisted. Institutional change did happen, but it was initiated within divided political institutions that were responsive to groups and interests that favoured the status quo.

Immediate Impact of Reformasi*: Winding Back State Control of the Arts*

An immediate impact of *reformasi* was a widespread demand for freedom of expression that quickly manifested in the candid reporting of the crisis in the media and amongst contemporary urban artists. The early manifestations of *reformasi* need to be distinguished from later changes that emanated from the bureaucracy and the Reform era governments. The immediate changes were generated through popular pressure for reform combined with demands from media organizations and their audiences for a more critical media (Sen and Hill 2000) and carried out without the involvement of the state. Contemporary urban artists were among the groups that were most involved in *reformasi*. They quickly began to incorporate *reformasi* themes in their works and became increasingly critical of social and political events. Another effect of the reformist tendencies amongst modern artists was the almost immediate rejection of the state's licensing regime for arts events in many urban areas.

In the cities, the licensing regime ended quickly after the fall of Suharto as the organizations and individuals who held arts events stopped asking for permits and the police no longer enforced the regime. The end of the licensing regime has facilitated the emergence of small arts institutions and performance venues. One such venue is Rumah Nusantara in Bandung, West Java. A group of local artists headed by Aat Soeratin, a well known local actor from television and theatre, began Rumah Nusantara at the end of 1998. Rumah Nusantara is based in a house on the outskirts of Bandung that has been transformed into a performance space, shop and cafeteria. The house has been provided rent free and, instead of paying set ticket fees, donations are collected from audiences at the end of a performance. Performers usually donate their time and are friends of the organizing committee. Although this arrangement makes programming difficult, there are regular performances that are reasonably well attended. An arts institution like Rumah Nusantara could not have survived the New Order era level of regulation with any public prominence. A similar type of venue is Kedai Kebun in Yogyakarta. Another new venue is Komunitas Salihara in Jakarta, a comparatively well-funded project that provides an alternative performance space to artists, and would have been difficult to run under the New Order censorship regime. The increased degree of flexibility has provided space for initially smaller, and now larger, arts organizations to grow.

The end of the licensing regime has only been partial. At the end of 2003, artists outside of the large cities, such as in Cirebon, were still

seeking permits from and paying police and their local cultural office. This difference between the contemporary urban artists and the practitioners of indigenous arts (known as 'traditional artists' in Indonesia) reflects the uneven impact of the *reformasi* movement and the continuation of a division between how the two kinds of artists relate to the state. Pan-Indonesian artists adopted *reformasi* themes and became increasingly vocal in their criticism of social and political events in addition to benefiting from the end of the licensing regime of arts events. There was not an equivalent impact amongst traditional artists who were less involved in the largely urban *reformasi* movement.

Decentralization and the Growing Importance of Ethnic and Local Identity Politics

In contrast to the immediate, fragmentary changes initiated by citizens inspired by Reformasi, the changes brought about by institutions during the Reform era have altered cultural policy more broadly and consistently across the archipelago. Following the fall of Suharto, observers of Indonesian politics noted a change in the level at which important political decisions were being made. For instance, Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (2003: 11) emphasize the new political importance of sub-national levels through their call to focus on comprehending 'what is happening at the local level', and Gerry van Klinken (2001b: 3) has called for a 'disaggregation' of the Indonesian state in Indonesian political analysis. Such changes have implications for cultural policy. The overlap among a number of new conditions—such as the splintering of political power, the mobilization of ethnic and local identities through cultural events and groups, and institutional changes to the state's cultural apparatus due to decentralization—is complex. To understand how these conditions intersect, we must consider the social and political pressures at the national and sub-national levels.

The fall of Suharto was accelerated, in part, by increasing opposition from regional elites who had felt ignored and sidelined during the New Order era. Particularly prominent among the regions that demonstrated separatist and federalist aspirations were four provinces rich in natural resources: Aceh, Papua, Riau, and East Kalimantan. The East Timorese struggle for independence also gained momentum with Suharto's resignation. Habibie responded with a piece of legislation which has shaped Reform era politics. The Regional Autonomy (Otonomi Daerah) legislation

was passed in August 1999, and was touted as a response to federalist and separatist ambitions and proof of the President and parliament's democratic credentials (Jones 2002). The central element was the decentralization of various areas of government, including education, health, the environment, labour, public works, natural resource management, tourism, and culture, to the regency/municipal level along with a much larger share of revenue and the power to raise revenue. Another important element is that appointments at all levels of government are now made by the concomitant legislatures, not the national executive as was previously the case.

In the context of these changes it is not surprising that local elites made use of ethnic identity. Van Klinken (2001c), in his exploration of the new political configurations emerging in Central and East Kalimantan, demonstrates the increasing importance of ethnic identity to local elites in local political configurations, particularly in contests over control of the state. Research from this time records a growing politicization of ethnic identity in a variety of locations across Indonesia (Henley and Davidson 2007; Sakai 2003) including Jakarta (Shahab 2001). A related trend is the widespread demand that important local positions in the bureaucracy be given to candidates from ethnic groups indigenous to that region, known as 'native sons' (*putra daerah*) (Aspinall and Fealy 2003).

The Reform era has also seen an explosion of new political units with associated legislatures and administration. Between 1999 and 2007, the number of provinces has expanded from 26 to 33, and regencies/municipalities have expanded from 303 to 456, with over 5000 local government bodies (*kecamatan*). State recognition can have a substantial impact on the funding and promotion of regional culture, particularly when certain cultural practices are promoted as representative of the largest ethnic group and also the locality (Harnish 2007). Evidence is emerging of a revival of cultural practices by ethnic groups that had previously figured as minority factions in comparatively large administrative regions, but have become the majority groups since the administrative regions in which they reside have shrunk. There has also been a revival of royal houses (*kraton*) in a number of locations, which in West Kalimantan and Banten have connections to new administrative areas, while the phenomenon itself is closely linked to political decentralization and the increased importance of local support (Van Klinken 2007).

Accompanying the political mobilization of people along lines of ethnic and local identity is the growth of ethnic and local cultural practices. The links between political decentralization, local and national power

structures, and traditional practices in a number of locations across Indonesia is explored in the edited book *The revival of tradition in Indonesian politics* (Davidson and Henley 2007). Davidson and Henley (2007) note that the 'revival' encompasses both increased interest in regional practices with broad political and governance implications, as well as more narrowly artistic cultural revivals with little political influence, and that the revivals can be either secular or connected to religion.

While the dynamics of this general 'revival of tradition' are diverse, there are increasing opportunities for groups with traditional knowledge to contest political decisions usually made by the political elite due to increasing use of and reference to regional traditions and customs (Erb 2005). The dark side of this revival is the use of tradition to justify excluding migrants from resources or targeting them for discrimination, including monetary payments (Warren 2007) and in some cases deadly violence (Davidson 2007). Bali and West Sumatra have both strengthened versions of the traditional systems of local governance and weakened the *desa* system forced on them by the New Order regime (Biezeveld 2007; Warren 2007). Another example is Greg Acciaioli's (2002) account of a return to traditional legal systems amongst the To Lindu people in Central Sulawesi following the end of New Order centralism. Local content, particularly regional languages, customs and crafts, also began to find their way into school curriculums.[2]

The growth of ethnic identity politics also produced a series of large conferences on local ethnic cultures, often sponsored by local government and international organizations. These conferences have a much wider scope than the artistic events organized by the New Order which tended to showcase only the performing arts. An example is the International Conference of Sundanese Culture (Konferensi Internasional Budaya Sunda, KIBS) held in Bandung from 22 to 25 August 2001. Six concurrent panels ran which addressed: Literature and Sundanese Culture; History, Archaeology, and Philology; Religion, Spirituality, and Outlook on Life; Economy, Society, and Politics; Art; and Lifestyle, Architecture, Food, and Clothes. KIBS followed similar conferences in Central Kalimantan in December 1998, Riau in January–February 2000, Papua in May–June 2000, Minahasa in August 2000 (Van Klinken 2001c), and about Malay identity

[2] In 2001 the regencies in Bandung had drafted legislation to include the viewing of local arts in the curriculum of all Primary school aged children. Dana Setia, interview, 20-11-2001.

in Batam in September 2001 (SMN 2001). KIBS was opened by a representative of the Governor of West Java and was sponsored by the Province of West Java for approximately $31,000 AU (150,000,000 Rp.) and the Toyota Foundation, a Japanese non-profit organization for approximately $72,500 AU (350,000,000 Rp.) (Maulana 2001). The role of regional governments in many of these conferences is substantial due to their willingness to fund such causes in return for an association with large ethnic constituencies, although they are generally cautious of claims that would alienate the national government and the military.[3] These conferences are product of the links between regional culture, customary governance structures and electoral politics, which have been strengthened by political decentralization and international organizations.

The cultural agendas of regional ethnic organizations prioritize the place and prosperity of ethnic constituencies and their cultures and draws attention to communal concerns with their decline under the Indonesian nation-state. Ajip Rosidi (2001), a well known poet, novelist and academic from West Java and head of the Sundanese cultural organization RANCAGE, provides an interesting example of how ethnic cultural organizations frame their agendas in his opening speech at KIBS. Ajip Rosidi begins by discussing the years after 1942 in West Java where there was a twenty year period of turmoil (due to the Japanese occupation, the revolution, and the Darul Islam rebellion) that interrupted local lifestyles and cultural practices. From the beginning of the New Order period, the state turned its attention to modernization and industrialization. According to Ajip Rosidi, Sundanese culture and society was even further weakened during this period due to the 'Westernization' which accompanied modernization and in-migration of 'other people' to take advantage of economic opportunities. Sundanese began to lose interest in local arts and practices as their society began to 'disintegrate' (2001: 3). Ajip Rosidi then turns his attention to the Indonesian state. He claims that the state has never seriously addressed the issue of culture:

> To defend culture against extinction, a political will is required from the state and national leaders. And until now, we have not yet seen a political will. How will a political will to restore cultural life surface if consciousness of and understanding about culture's importance to shaping the nation has never existed? (2001: 4)

[3] See Colombijn (2003) for an account of the Riau Malay movement including the relationship to the provincial government.

Ajip Rosidi then outlines the failure of the state to address the decline of traditional ethnic cultural practices, particularly in the case of education to which he devotes a third of his speech. He concludes by stating that the role of KIBS is to encourage the development of a political will. KIBS, he hopes, will increase interest about and appreciation of Sundanese culture in both the local, national and international communities and will increase pressure on the state to develop a meaningful and effective cultural policy.

Six characteristics can be identified within Ajip Rosidi's speech that often recur within the analysis of ethnic cultural organizations from the late 1990s. The first characteristic is the historical decline of an ethnic culture. A once thriving culture declined due to the tides of history, in particular modernization and the entrance of Western popular and high culture. The second is the identification of culture as a neglected area of governance. Ajip Rosidi accuses the state of failing to protect or seriously address cultural issues throughout the independence period and in particular the developmentalist New Order period. In an article addressing a similar topic, Al Azhar (1997a), who was later to become the head of the Free Riau (Riau Merdeka) movement, goes further to claim that Riau Malays were marginalized culturally, economically, and socially during the independence era in the lands they once owned. The third characteristic is the conservative agenda underlying the argument. Sundanese culture tends to refer to older cultural forms and lifestyles, rather than emerging local/global practices and tends to exclude non-indigenous ethnic groups living in the region from the cultural and political arena. The fourth is that the state is compelled to act to protect local indigenous practices. An underlying element of such demands is competition for resources within the local arts community, which is discussed in chapter seven on the Cultural Institutions. The fifth characteristic is a focus on the relationship between local and Indonesian culture. In politically aware organizations like Ajip Rosidi's Yayasan RANCAGE, the relationship between the ethnic culture in question and Indonesian culture is clearly spelt out. Ajip Rosidi, for instance, clearly states that Sundanese culture is also Indonesian culture (2001: 8) whereas Al Azhar (1997b), in his description of the growth of Riau Malay identity, rejects that Riau Malay culture is Indonesian. The final characteristic is increased attempts engage with international groups and individuals.

Ajip Rosidi makes a plea for more international academics to study Sundanese culture and for more international interest. Ethnic cultural organizations are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of

international recognition for the wellbeing of their organization and culture. The original declaration of Riau sovereignty (Daulat Riau) included an interpretation of the demands in English (Colombijn 2003) and a Malay culture conference in Batam in 2001 fostered links between Riau and Malays in neighbouring countries. International recognition generates cultural prestige, breeding local interest and pride and improved funding opportunities from the state, international organizations and tourism. Growth in organizations like Yayasan RANCAGE and stronger links to regional government indicate a loss of central control, which is reflected in debates and changes in the Directorate of Culture.

Structural Change and Resistance in the Directorate of Culture

A potential sea change in cultural policy signaled in 1999 through a restructuring of the Directorate of Culture, so that culture is now linked to tourism rather than education. The move to tourism, although accomplished during the Reform era, had its origins in the structure of Suharto's short-lived final cabinet. The national guiding policy document for the early Reform era, the Broad Outline of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara 1999–2004, GBHN) provides insights into how this restructure interacted with the authoritarian cultural policy model. The GBHN indicates that New Order era discourses remain important for framing cultural policy, particularly through the following broad statement:

> To cultivate and manage the national culture of the Indonesian nation, which has its origins in the noble cultural heritage of the nation, national culture that contains universal values including belief in the one true God has the goal of supporting the care of harmony in social life and developing the national civilization (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat 1999: 30).

The high priority given to the promotion of tourism also brought about some change, in particular through configuring "traditional arts and culture" as a "vehicle" for the development of national tourism and its promotion overseas (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat 1999: 31).

Internally, the Directorate has been restructured. The key elements of the restructure were the division of the Directorate of Culture into two Directorates, and the inclusion of mass cultural forms, specifically film and video, within the purview of official cultural policy.[4] Two broader

[4] The new Directorates are the Directorate of Cultural Values, Art and Film and the Directorate of History and Archaeology (Directorat Nilai Budaya, Seni dan Film and

changes also reconfigured the culture portfolio: the process of decentralization and its downgrading to a state ministry (LOK 2004). In the cultural portfolio, decentralization meant that both regional offices that had previously been part of the national bureaucracy and a number of special purpose units, which included the cultural parks (*taman budaya*), provincial museums, and a range of research institutions.[5] In addition to watching the institutions that they had built and run disappear from their grasp, culture and tourism became a state ministry rather than a department, which meant less funding and reduced staffing. Bureaucrats within the Directorate of Culture have generally not responded well to the changes. Most have a commitment, through their own studies and work history, to culture as a tool of national development and conceive of culture's role as central to maintaining national cohesion and identity. Cultural commentators Teuke Jacob and Rahman Arge, free from the burden of state employment, accused the government of neglecting their duty of cultural leadership as set out in the 1945 constitution and therefore 'stunting' cultural growth. Protests also occurred at the Fifth Cultural Congress in West Sumatra on October 2003, where one of the formal recommendations from the congress was for an 'autonomous' Department of Culture (MAM 2003). Despite such efforts, Presidential and cabinet support for the move could not be overcome.

More recently, the state has proposed legislation intended to establish intellectual property laws that seek to address and protect cultural traditions. (Aragon and Leach 2008). Based on World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) initiatives to strengthen intellectual property regimes in developing countries and trade agreements, Indonesia's 2002 copyright law protects individual creators in a similar way to western legislation. It also includes cultural property provisions that awards 'folklore and people's cultural products' to the state in perpetuity and 'works whose creators are not known' to the state 'on behalf of the interests of the creator' for 50 years. The specific implementing legislation was not passed

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Direktorat Sejarah dan Purbakala). The goals for film may not please either commercial or independent film makers. According to the GBHN, film is included to ensure 'healthy' cinematic developments in order to 'improve religious morality and national astuteness, develop positive public opinion and increase economic value' (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat 1999: 31).

[5] These were the Historical and Traditional Values Research Bureaus (11), the Preservation of Historical Remains and Archaeology Reserves (9), Archaeology Bureaus (10), special museums and the National Museum (6), the National Gallery, and the Borobudur Research and Conservation Bureau.

by the end of 2012, despite intentions to address this legislation before 2010, and the release of a draft law. The draft law escalates bureaucratic supervision of regional cultural practices through regulation of reproductions or adaptations of material arts, music, theatre, dance, stories and ritual ceremonies, under the rationale of protecting artists' and communities' rights and increasing national prosperity through wealth creation. Improper attribution, offensive uses of these forms, or a failure to obtain the appropriate agreements and licenses would lead to civil or criminal penalties. In their analysis of this legislation, Lorraine Aragon and James Leach (2008: 620) argue that the division between individual rights and community rights ignores the priorities of practitioners, which they characterize as 'locally autonomous access to, and culturally normative use of, their arts canon, not exclusive and legalized ownership'.

The most recent cabinet reorganization, in October 2011, has seen the culture portfolio moved and linked once again to education in the Ministry of Education and Culture (Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan), but a policy portfolio of the 'creative economy' has been left with tourism in the Ministry of Tourism and the Creative Economy (Kementarian Pariwisata dan Ekonomi Kreatif). The two directorates of culture will be once again united, but with question marks over the relationships between different ministries and directorates. The division splits the regulation of mass cultural forms (including mass media, music) between the Department of Communication and Informatics (Kementarian Komunikasi dan Informatika, formerly the Ministry of Information), and the Ministry of Tourism and the Creative Economy, while including other areas, such as performing arts and fine arts, in the latter Ministry and the Ministry of Education and Culture. This division signals that the state has decided to pursue the creative economy agenda through trade and industry policies in specific areas of activity rather than through the Directorate of Culture and its view of culture as influencing development through shaping the behaviours and attitudes of Indonesians (Kolompok Kerja Indonesia Design Power 2008).

Underlying both the amalgamation of cultural development with tourism and the drafting of intellectual property legislation was a shift in the function of culture for the state; culture is no longer perceived as exclusively a tool of nation building, intended to foster national unity, but has shifted to a greater emphasis on generating employment and revenue from culture, via tourism, and now also a creative industries model. Such a change, although consistent with patterns in other countries and the push

for creative industries, contradicts the New Order era focus on protecting culture from outside influences, although this perspective is still prominent in the bureaucracy. Yampolski suggests there is little contradiction between these sets of goals if they are viewed from a wider perspective. Addressing the state and tourism, Yampolsky argues that the processes are not opposed but instead reinforce each other, as they both redesign indigenous arts 'for external consumption, whether by tourists . . . or festival audiences' (1995: 714). Viewed from this perspective, the directorate has not altered its character significantly, for it remains an intrusive and state-oriented entity that continues to justify its own activities by asserting that they strengthen the nation by fostering economic growth. The degree to which the creative economy agenda will involve the Directorate of Culture is unclear at this stage, as is the extent to which it will influence its traditional policy areas.

Cultural Policy in Decentralized Indonesia: The Characteristics of Regional Diversity

Decentralization, in addition to making the state more sympathetic to popular concerns about local majority ethnic cultures and the demands of ethnic cultural organizations, has also created opportunities for non-national levels of government to reassess policy content. Although the responsibility for most cultural policy activities was decentralized to the regency and city governments, some responsibility was shouldered by the provincial governments including management of the cultural parks, museums and the provincial level cultural office and coordination of province-wide cultural activities. Decentralization created opportunities for provincial and regency level governments to restructure the cultural apparatus that came under their control and reassess their priorities. In West Java, four departments were brought together to form the Provincial Office of Culture and Tourism.

The West Java strategic planning process for 2001 to 2005 continued to reflect the 'development' approach of the New Order period. 'West Java regional culture' was defined as 'the basic capital and the dominant factor in supporting the success of national development', and therefore in need of close supervision (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata 2001b: 222). The new Office of Tourism and Culture limited the scope of culture to the traditional indigenous culture and arts of West Java, excluding contemporary and popular culture and arts and the culture of migrants from other

places inside and outside of Indonesia. A second planning document, put together by the United States-educated Head of the West Java Culture and Tourism Office, advocated the implementation of 'good governance' through a strategy of 'customer service'. This document was couched in terms that reflected a neo-liberal policy approach that promotes individual development, primarily through staff development, and partnerships with the private sector (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata 2001a).

An event in West Java that incorporated a variety of (at times contradictory) approaches was the stakeholder policy-planning process held in November 2001. The purpose of the Planning Dialogue for Culture and Tourism in West Java was to establish an agenda for culture and tourism and address the issues, concerns and potential benefits of combining the two areas. While being critical of cultural policy for focussing too much on state institutions and not enough on public participation, the final report also drew from New Order era policy discourses in its focus on 'preserving' Sundanese culture (the largest ethnic group in West Java) and combating negative foreign influences (Aritonang et al. 2001).

Table 6.1 provides a summary of the suggestions. Journalist Abdullah Mustappa (2001) observed that not many of the suggestions were new and some differed little from present practice. However, the access granted to a broad group of stakeholders and a broad set of cultural practitioners from across West Java constitutes a substantial change from the nationally-centralized process of cultural policy making that prevailed during the New Order era. In West Java, new discourses about the role of the state and a greater inclusiveness in policy formation indicate that change is possible, but through what looks like a slow and incremental process.

Table 6.1: Recommendations of the different groups at the Planning Dialogue for Culture and Tourism in West Java

Area	Summary of Recommendations
Language, Literature and Script (Traditional)	This group critiqued the literature and everyday usage of Sundanese language and called for it to be 'resurrected' to 'strengthen identity and enrich cultural diversity' (19). They recommended: legislation to encourage new books in and about Sundanese and other local languages including dictionaries and translations; improve formal and informal Sundanese language teaching through new publications, better teacher training and language competitions; and developing and promoting Sundanese electronic and print media.

Table (*cont.*)

Area	Summary of Recommendations
Language, Literature and Script (Contemp.)	This group called for 'good and correct' language to be encouraged. They recommended the teaching of language and literature be upgraded through: formalisation of Sundanese language for education; increased funding for Sundanese language teaching; compulsory local language teaching in all schools; more Sundanese language competitions; facilitating Sundanese language author school visits; printing Sundanese language articles in the mass media; and publishing local Sundanese folk stories as comic books.
Fine and Performance Arts	This group began with the position that human resources in the arts were weak. They were critical of past policies as being insular and not representing artists' aspirations or addressing their problems. They recommended: improving understanding and appreciation of the arts through researching, writing about, documenting and mapping the arts of West Java, developing an arts network, publicising West Javanese arts through performances and festivals and socialising art in schools; improving the legislative framework; improving human resources and management; and improving financing and financial procedures through training seminars and encouraging donations.
History	This group focussed on making 'inherited values' and 'the wisdom of Sundanese history' the basis of Sundanese society's worldview and also encouraging research into and writing about local and regional histories. They recommended: inventorying, documenting and 'making functional' cultural artefacts and their environment; 'guidance' (pembinaan) for local historians so that they could undertake thematic local histories; upgrading the history curriculum; organising a history conference; and developing historical archives.
Calender of Arts Activities and Festivals	This group recommended that tourist industry activities that contribute to culture be developed and the group developed a number of ideas for festivals. They recommended: the legislative framework be broadened to include other areas of culture; human resources in tourism and the arts receive more training; and a series of festivals be developed including festivals for

Table (*cont.*)

Area	Summary of Recommendations
	film, theatre, West Javanese culture (in Indonesia and overseas), for localities (regencies and municipalities) and an international percussion festival. They also recommended a working committee be formed to organize workshops, seminars, dialogues, festivals and promotion.
Traditional Values	This group called for the two contradictory goals of preserving traditional values and for traditional values to be 'transformed for conditions today' (20). They recommended: promoting traditional Sundanese values; inventorying local sayings and adat; organising a forum for research and tradition; working through families, the mass media, education and groups to promote cultural values; encouraging appreciation for the 'cultural values' of other ethnic groups; and developing research initiatives into cultural traditions.
Museums and Other Cultural Venues	This group began by noting that museums and cultural sites in West java lacked professional staff and were not appreciated by the public. They also noted that cultural venues lacked a legal foundation. They recommended: standardising recruitment for staff; management training; technical training in conservation, restoration and marketing; organising seminars; increasing cooperation between organisations through networking sessions; organising activities to grow public participation; and developing promotional and marketing activities.
Archaeology	This group called for increased preservation and use of archaeological assets. They began by highlighting the absence of legislation, planning, and training relating to archaeology. They recommended: developing a legal framework that addresses cultural artefacts; a programme of research and development involving inventorying, cultivating and securing artefacts; the development of cultural artefacts as tourist assets including training for engagement with the tourist industry.

Source: Aritonang et al. (2001).

The impacts of decentralization on cultural institutions were varied. While the cultural parks (*taman budaya*) were no longer conducting activities and were only used as practice venues in some regions (such as West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and South Sulawesi), other cultural parks had

received increased funding from provincial administrations (for instance, in West Java, Surakarta, and East Java). The cultural parks are discussed in detail in the next chapter. In the Bantul regency in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, a group of performers and admirers of the indigenous popular theatre genre *ketoprak* established the Bantul Ketoprak Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Ketoprak Bantul, FKKB). The FKKB draws its membership from each of the areas within the regency and has broad based support. It successfully lobbied the government for public funding to subsidize performances and regularly reports how it uses those funds to the local legislature. *Ketoprak* is expensive to produce due to the large scale of its productions (some involving hundreds of people) and its elaborate costumes. The FKKP organized two large *ketoprak* festivals in 2005, one of which was broadcast on local television, and a popular local radio show. The relationship between the FKKB and the Regency reflects a liberal approach to cultural governance where a group of active cultural workers can lobby for public funding for mutually agreeable goals and then report outcomes to an elected assembly. This arrangement contrasts with the New Order era where the vast majority of state-funded cultural activities were implemented by state institutions.

However, in decentralized Indonesia, funding for cultural policy depends on the attitude of the regent. FKKB was fortunate in that the Regent of Bantul supported local culture, but members were concerned about future funding should the regent step down. In other regencies where Islamic political parties were in the majority, such as Depok and Indramayu, cultural policy funding had been stopped altogether.[6] Conservative Islamic politicians do not view culture as an appropriate medium for learning the lessons of citizenship, instead preferring Islamic education. While there are increased opportunities to make claims for resources based on cultural rights, competition for funding is fierce and many cultural workers I spoke to reported reductions in public monies for cultural activities.

The New Public Morality in Indonesia

The growing debate over public morality, often linked to religious groups, has also influenced cultural policy. Religious groups in Indonesia have censured behaviour throughout the twentieth century, and their actions,

[6] FKKB executive, interview, 5-1-2006.

along with the state, customary and ethnic bodies and cultural organizations, have long been part of the milieu that has debated and shifted the boundaries of acceptable public performance (see, for instance, Harnish on performance in Lombok (2007) and Picard on Bali (1997)). While this configuration has never been uniform and is more diverse still in decentralized Indonesia, two changes do indicate a trend towards increased policing of public behaviour by religious bodies.

> First, open elections have led to the return of Islamic political parties, who have been particularly vocal regarding a perceived national decline in morality as state control has relaxed.

Second, the reduced reputation of the military has emboldened Islamic groups (including Islamic paramilitary organizations), who have intervened in the activities of other Indonesians, often with violence, when they perceive that there has been an affront to Islamic teachings. Two events of national significance illustrate the current influence of public morality debates on cultural practices and its potential to influence cultural policy. While concern over the interventions of Islamic groups, like the Islamic Defenders' Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and Laskar Jihad, has an influence on cultural activities at the local level across Indonesia, the impact of these groups is most clearly demonstrated through the response to an artwork at the inaugural CP Biennale in April 2005. Pinkswing Park by Agus Suwage and Davy Linggar displayed at the Bank Mandiri Museum, but was forced to close following public statements and an attack by FPI members. Pinkswing Park displayed multiple depictions of model Isabel Yahya and soap opera star Anjasmara naked amongst trees with white dots providing cover to protect the sensibilities of modest viewers. Following the actions of FPI and the reaction of public figures in the media, the CP Biennale's curator, Jim Supangkat, closed the Biennale permanently (Dirgantoro 2006).

The second example is anti-pornography legislation that has been before parliament since 2002. Originally a bill to address the distributors of pornography and the media, in 2005 the bill was expanded to include 'porno-action' (*porno-aksi*), which referred to 'pornographic' or erotic dress or behaviour in public. Under the draft bill as it stood in late 2005 and early 2006, public kissing, 'erotic' dancing, and displaying a 'sensual' part of the body were banned. There were exceptions for (indigenous) cultural performances, sports, and arts activities, but these were restricted to sports buildings and arts spaces, which required government permits. Early in 2006 there were large protests across Indonesia and debates raged in the media and parliament over the draft bill. While supporters focussed

on supposed moral decline and the welfare of children, opponents of the bill focussed on its effects on women (who were held to be responsible for violence against women due to their clothing) and its effects on culture.[7]

The cultural arguments against the bill took two forms.[8] First, the draft bill imposed Saudi (or Wahabi) culture on Indonesians. Second, the bill ignored Indonesia's multiculturalism by attempting to homogenize local cultures. This argument was made by both politically liberal groups (generally in major cities) and by conservative cultural organizations around Indonesia. In Bali, a number of 'Defenders of Tradition' (Penjaga Budaya) were appointed to prevent any outsiders interfering with local ceremonies. The most telling and effective move against the bill was by the provinces of East Nusa Tenggara, Bali and North Sulawesi (Fahmi 2006), who indicated that the draft bill was unlikely to pass through the Peoples Regional Representative Council, the national house of review that represents regional interests. A watered-down version of the law, which still included broad definition of pornography that includes public performances and nudity, was passed in October 2008 (Gelling 2008). The Governor of Bali quickly stated that the law would not be applied in Bali, due to that island's reliance on tourism and its strong cultural lobby (Suriyani 2008).

Legislation shaped at the national level needs to be considered alongside the many laws passed at the regency and city levels that regulate individual behaviour in ways that can be highly restrictive on local arts and cultural practices perceived as incompatible with Islamic laws. Public displays of affection, inappropriate dress, and the consumption of alcohol have been regulated in provinces such as Cianjur and Garut, West Java. In places where syariah law has been implemented, new legal guidelines for behaviour have often been justified as both already engrained in local customs (adat) and as defining and taking precedence over those customs. Such a definition of adat has long been held by conservative Islamic groups that seek to resolve conflicts between their interpretation of Islam and adat practices in their own favour. In 2008, approximately 160 local religious regulations were made by local government in at least 24 of Indonesia's then 33 provinces. Bandung took a different route with its religious programmes, choosing instead to engage a variety of religions in

[7] Radical Islamic groups like FPI have also lobbied against groups that practice versions of Islam that they consider flawed, with some success (Van Klinken 2008). This impacts the cultural practices of those groups.

[8] The public statement by Aliansi Bhinneka Tunggal Ika incorporates both of these arguments: http://lists.indymedia.org/pipermail/imc-jakarta/2006-April/0418-sd.html.

a civic programme called "Bandung: Religious City" (Kota Agamis Bandung). Representatives from Islamic, Catholic, Buddhist, and Hindu organizations produced a declaration that called for mutual tolerance and respect, and for the groups to strive together to address social and environmental issues. However, a pluralistic approach to religion is not necessarily in itself pluralistic for the broader community. The "Religious City" programme was invoked when the authorities chose to relocate prostitutes from the Saritem entertainment district, to ban singer Dewi Persik from Bandung, and to pressure local night clubs to close during Ramadan (Millie and Safai 2010).

Cultural Policy in the Reform Era

Decentralization and democratic elections in Indonesia have not led to a widespread, innovative, and inclusive cultural policy. The absence of a strong political alliance that could drive far-reaching reform has severely limited the scope of policy reform. In this climate, the authoritarian cultural policy model established during the New Order remains relevant to Indonesia in the Reform era, although its influence has substantially declined due to the fracturing of cultural policy. Its influence is still strong in the national cultural bureaucracy, in national policy, and in particular regions where there is strong continuity between the Suharto and post-Suharto eras in political and policy approaches. However, the process of political decentralization and the weakening of the central state have created opportunities for conservative and liberal-minded opposition to contest this model. There are some similarities here to the early years of the New Order era, during which a number of competing discourses about culture and its uses vied for dominance, and regional arts were being revived through associations with the state. In contemporary, decentralized Indonesia, however, state support is now being provided through new units at the lower levels of government associated with specific ethnicities, rather than through a strong central state. Since the central state has reduced its control, there are more opportunities for non-elites to use culture to influence political and civic decisions, and the approach of the previous, Suharto-era government has not been as comprehensively rejected as was the case with Sukarno-era cultural policy. The competing approaches to cultural policy are also unlikely to be resolved in the same way they were in the 1960s, with the imposition of the authoritarian cultural policy model by a strong central government.

It is worth reflecting here on the continued relevance of the concept of command culture, where a state articulates the characteristics of a national, regional, or other cultures, then attempts to create policy to disseminate and entrench those characteristics. While Indonesia aspired to a command culture model, the previous chapter demonstrated that market provision of culture severely eroded this model, and decentralization has caused greater divergence in cultural policy implementation across Indonesia. Increasing cultural policy plurality renders the enforcement of a centrally-defined command culture impossible, although the sentiment survives in the cultural bureaucracy. The move of culture into the tourism portfolio signalled a small step towards a model that regulated market provision but even this step, because of the way it combined culture and profit, was resisted by the cultural bureaucracy and established cultural observers. It also signalled an increased scope for tourism bureaucrats to intervene in cultural practices that were deemed to have tourism potential. The centralized command culture model, a feature of cultural policy for much of the twentieth century, has become more ineffective during the Reform era.

A way to understand the current set of influences on the state's cultural policy is to examine the competing ways that culture is being used as a tool of governance. This chapter has demonstrated that broadly similar trends are occurring across Indonesia, and the examples from West Java indicate that strikingly different trends can exist in close proximity and sometimes in the same municipality. Using the trends and events of the Reform era, four different uses of culture can be identified in policy, although any conclusions drawn at this point in time are tentative and need to be borne out in further research due to the fractured and slow process of policy and institutional change in Indonesia.

First, arguments by certain Islamic groups for a strict control over morality threaten to cause a closer regulation of cultural activities, and a related rejection of the importance of culture as a mechanism for altering the conduct of Indonesians. These groups advocate religious activities and education as a more appropriate tool, and now have an increased scope to control or influence policy. Second, liberal understandings of the role of culture continue to be evident in cultural policies (for both indigenous and contemporary culture) that utilize culture for progressive social change and in the arguments for the creation of a tolerant multiculturalism and cultural activities. In this approach, the state's role is to facilitate and protect contemporary and indigenous cultural practices that contribute to a tolerant and creative multicultural society. Third, conservative

indigenous elements are making use of local ethnic sentiment for either their own political goals and/or to strengthen a conservative version of local indigenous culture. A conservative approach to regional culture also argues for state protection of multiculturalism, although their goal is to protect particular indigenous practices linked to a local ethnic constituency. Finally, the authoritarian cultural policy model has survived, with a continued if not increased focus on national economic development. Cultural policy continues to be justified as a tool of social and economic development and as a way to offset the effects of development. The consequences of the increasing emphasis on wealth generation again appear to most negatively affect regional artists. There appears to be little consideration of their priorities in the copyright legislation, and the state has allowed continued heavy-handed intervention.

Cultural policy in the Reformasi era is influenced by the ongoing presence of the authoritarian cultural policy model among a bureaucratic elite with close ties to cultural academics that emphasize national culture and national development, and liberal and conservative groups' advocacy of local cultural rights. In some locations, the existence of cultural policy is under threat, along with the legitimacy of cultural difference, with Islamic political groups rejecting the use of culture as a tool of governance altogether. In most localities, there is a trend towards more opportunities in cultural policy for tradition and locality to contest nation and modernity, from conservative and progressive positions. Cultural policy outcomes at the local level vary and protection of cultural diversity is far from enshrined; what the state has enshrined is a diversity of cultural policy.

PART TWO

CULTURAL POLICY CASE STUDIES

CHAPTER VII

THE DIVERSE OUTCOMES OF CENTRALLY ADMINISTERED CULTURE: CULTURAL PARKS AND ARTS COUNCILS IN THE NEW ORDER AND REFORM ERAS

The first case study examines two key cultural institutions of the New Order and Reform eras: the cultural parks (*taman budaya*) and the arts councils (*dewan kesenian*). The cultural parks were the product of central government planning that dates back to a Minister of Education and Culture Decree in 1978. Twenty-four cultural parks were established between 1978 and 1994 in provinces across the archipelago and managed through guidelines fashioned by the Directorate of Culture. The Reform era brought substantial change when, as part of the decentralization process, the cultural parks were removed from central control and placed within the jurisdiction of provincial governments. The arts councils present a more diverse set of institutions in regards to both how they were established and the way they were run. Although they were based on the model of the Jakarta Arts Council (Dewan Kesenian Jakarta, JAC), there has never been a requirement to follow a single mode of operation. They exist at both the provincial and sub-provincial levels and may or may not receive state funding. The majority of the arts councils were established after 1992 following an initiative driven by Salim Said, the then Director of the JAC, and the Interior Ministry that provided funding for arts councils to the provincial governments.

The cultural parks and arts councils provide an opportunity to examine how the cultural policy of a singular, centralizing state can result in a plural and diverse array of outcomes and occurrences at the lower scales of government. For this reason, they are a reminder of the diversity of culturalities in Indonesia and the agency of different groups and individuals, despite the presence of a strong central state. Discourses can be redeployed or redefined to suit local outcomes, or misunderstood. Similarly, programmes and directives can be ignored or subverted to suit bureaucrats, artists, or other groups. Despite the tendency towards a highly centralized mode of policy creation and implementation, the diversity of local power structures across Indonesia produced outcomes through the cultural parks and arts councils that were at times far removed from the regime's expectations.

The ethnic regional arts were a focus for the New Order regime in its governmental programmes, and were particularly important for both policy makers in Jakarta due to concerns with national unity, and for bureaucrats and cultural workers in the region due to their symbolic power and local following. These two cultural institutions present an opportunity to examine how cultural policy influenced ethnic cultural practices through programmes, and how decentralization influenced their operations.

The cultural parks

A desire to create a series of cultural centres across Indonesia was expressed as early as 1955 (UNESCO 1958) and again in 1964 (Prijono 1964). However, the resources of the New Order state gave its initiative in the 1970s the capacity to be achieved nationally and sustained until the *reformasi* period. The cultural parks were developed in the late 1970s following the success of two cultural institutions that served as models. The first kind of cultural institution, the cultural centres (*pusat kebudayaan*), were encouraged by the Director-General of Culture from 1968 to 1978, Ida Bagus Mantra. Following trips to Europe where he observed the role of European cultural centres in sustaining culture and the arts and encouraging tourism, Ida Bagus Mantra began to orchestrate the establishment of cultural centres in provincial capitals in Indonesia (Yuga 2000).[1] A cultural centre was established in Bali in 1972 that was judged particularly successful at stimulating activities and attracting locals and tourists.

The other institution was the Ismail Marzuki Cultural Park (Taman Ismail Marzuki, TIM) that was enormously successful in the first half of the 1970s (see chapter three for a more detailed description and analysis). TIM, as the premier national performance venue, became the space of choice for national conferences and competitions managed by the Directorate of Culture who worked closely with TIM's managing body, the JAC. Many of the Directorate of Culture's employees, including Ida Bagus Mantra, attended or participated in its activities.[2] Both TIM and the Cultural Centre in Bali were showcasing indigenous arts and performance styles although TIM was better known as a venue for contemporary arts.

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[1] Surya Yuga, the author of the thesis, is a senior bureaucrat in the Directorate of Culture.

[2] Edi Sedyawati, Director-General of Culture from 1993 until 1999, was an active participant in events at TIM during this time and was a member of the JAC and Chair of its Dance Board (Badan Tari), including corroborations between the Directorate of Art and JAC in the 1970s.

In TIM, artists explored indigenous cultural forms with a new-found freedom to alter and interpret them without regard for the political imperatives of Guided Democracy, in the process attracting a new audience amongst the urban middle-class youth. Keith Foulcher, in his analysis of the revival of the Betawi performance genre Lenong in TIM, captures something of this climate when he writes: "[When] modernization came [to Lenong], it was at the hands of a new metropolitan culture, the great wave of confidence and rebuilding which characterized the period after the demise of the communist party [PKI] and the thinking about Indonesian culture that came to be associated with it" (2004: 3). Putu Wijaya (1997) labelled the movement the 'New Traditionalism' (Tradisi Baru) and called it the most important development in TIM. This is a reminder of the shared 'metropolitan superculture' of Indonesia's political elite and its quest for progress of which TIM was a part. Both TIM and the Bali Cultural Centre were regularly attracting large numbers of visitors and contributed to a revival of traditional art forms in the 1970s.

The 'modernization' of indigenous performance genres was particularly attractive for state planners. Performers in TIM rejected the promotion of political ideologies and messages that had occurred in Guided Democracy but continued to make technical changes that state-planners considered desirable. The process of adapting the indigenous genres for stages and urban audiences has continuities with the concept of 'upgrading' by state bureaucrats that has been the target of much criticism from anthropologists and cultural observers (Acciaioli 1985; Widodo 1995; Yampolsky 1995). Of course this should not overshadow the differences between Guided Democracy and New Order cultural policy. The rejection of the promotion of political ideologies by TIM's founders was interpreted through the ideological lens of the state in the cultural parks. While political ideologies (such as communism and liberalism) and criticism of the regime's policies were rejected, the New Order regime's priorities were designated as 'modernizing' and integrated into art forms, as will become apparent when the programmes in the cultural parks are examined. Also important was the status of TIM and the cultural centres. TIM self-consciously styled itself as a national performance venue while the cultural centres were state-run provincial centres.[3] They provided a showcase of the arts and were able to exert some control over the representation of nation and province.

[3] TIM conducted many debates and seminars about national culture, some of which are collected together in *Pembebasan budaya-budaya kita* (Sarjono 1999) and *Mengok tradisi* (Malaon, Malna, and Dwi 1986) and it should be noted that a variety of views were

Table 7.1: Cultural parks by Province and year established

Province	Year	Province	Year
Aceh	1978	Bengkulu	1982
North Sumatra	1978	Lampung	1984
West Sumatra	1978	West Java	1991
West Kalimantan	1978	Riau	1991
East Kalimantan	1978	West Nusa Tenggara	1991
North Sulawesi	1978	Central Sulawesi	1991
South Sulawesi	1978	Maluku	1991
Central Java	1978	West Papua	1991
Yogyakarta	1978	Southeast Sulawesi	1992
East Java	1978	Jambi	1993
Bali	1978	Central Kalimantan	1993
South Kalimantan	1982	East Timor	1994

Mantra's plan to build centres of artistic and cultural activity across Indonesia received approval from the National Planning Board (BAPENAS) on the strength of the examples of TIM and the Bali Cultural Centre. The cultural parks were created by Ministerial Decree No. 0276/0/1978 of the Minister of Education and Culture. The New Order regime's support was confirmed when the cultural parks were included in the third Five Year Development Plan that began in 1979. Eleven cultural parks were officially established in 1978, most of which were converted cultural centres established during Mantra's time as Director-General. Three more were established in the 1980s and another nine in the 1990s. Jakarta does not have a cultural park because it has TIM. The cultural parks predominantly utilized architectural styles derived from traditional houses of the region, reinforcing their relationship to the regionally dominant indigenous ethnic groups. The buildings are generally large, spectacular, and dominated by markers of ethnicity. But once constructed, they are often poorly maintained due to the small size of the recurring budget. State-built buildings in quasi-traditional styles and various states of disrepair are a feature of most provincial capital cities.

A document that provides insights into the purposes of the cultural parks at the time they were established is the *End of Term Memorandum* for Mantra when he left to become the Governor of Bali in 1978. The *Memorandum* (which, despite its title, is a document of over 100 pages)

expressed without any one view gaining dominance. This is an important difference between TIM and the cultural parks.

discussed the purpose and functions of the cultural parks in two sections that emphasized slightly different elements of its operation. The first section, 'Basic Policy of Cultural Development' emphasized how the cultural parks provide spiritual sustenance through cultural activities (Mantra 1978: 24). The report then outlined two core functions for the cultural parks. First, the cultural parks were a 'means of communication' that enrich society's information and experience about all aspects of national culture (1978: 24). Second, the cultural parks introduced different kinds of indigenous cultures to each other, increasing initiative and creativity for society in general and for cultural experts in particular who were perceived as the 'managers, supporters and developers of Indonesian national culture' (1978: 24). In the second section, 'Implementing Cultural Development', the report emphasized the cultural parks' role in developing the arts, rather than culture more broadly, and their role in 'improving and cultivating society's appreciation for art' (1978: 24).

The differences in emphasis between the sections reflect the role of the cultural parks. First, the cultural parks were to contribute to the evolution of a national culture that accorded with the Directorate of Culture's model. Two elements of the first section tie the cultural parks to the broader goal of spreading a state-defined version of the national metropolitan superculture: it demonstrated an understanding of aesthetics that positions culture as a way of improving spirituality; and it reflected the Directorate's increased attention to cultural heritage, in particular indigenous cultural forms. The second section displayed the privileged role of the arts within the cultural parks. The cultural parks' programmes were predominantly centred on the indigenous arts in the region where the cultural park was located, but with the imperative of 'modernizing' indigenous forms. Subsequent reports and legislation indicate that the goal of the cultural parks and its emphasis on indigenous arts only underwent minor changes during the New Order period, focussed on standardization of operations across the country.[4]

Unlike TIM, the cultural parks were subjected to the strictures of the Directorate of Culture and its command culture model. They were

[4] A 1982 directive from the Directorate of Culture standardized the infrastructure requirements of the cultural parks so that there would be parity between different regions (Pedoman Standardisasi Taman Budaya Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1982). In 1991, a Ministerial Decision simplified the administrative structure of the parks themselves to facilitate their spread to new provinces and formally made the cultural parks responsible to the Director of Art rather than the Director-General of Culture (Keputusan Mendikbud No. 0221/0/1991).

expected to adhere to centrally-created guidelines regarding their operations and they reported their activities to the Director of Art. The Directorate envisioned the cultural parks as sites where indigenous cultural forms could be articulated within its national cultural project. From this perspective, the cultural park buildings were a metaphor for the project as a whole. They were large, modern structures, built by the state that utilized the cultural symbols and forms of indigenous groups, often with little regard for their original purpose or meaning. However, the Directorate viewed the changes it made to art forms as improvements that were entirely in accordance with their indigenous character.

Programmes in the cultural parks

A feature of the cultural parks is the broad range of programmes, activities and responsibilities that they have been assigned by the Directorate of Culture. In his 1978 *Memorandum*, Mantra listed sixteen activities that were undertaken by the cultural parks (Mantra 1978: 35). The number of activities increased over the New Order era. The *Technical instructions* for the cultural parks, published in 1997, list twenty one tasks that are within the parks' field of operations (*Direktorat Kesenian* 1997). The diversity of activities within the cultural parks meant that they were sites where different practices of government that utilized the arts were situated next to each other, but with common goals connected to shaping Indonesians' capacities and subjectivities.

The 1991 Ministerial Decision gives the cultural parks four 'functions':

1. Develop the quality of the arts through training.
2. Providing cultural activities.
3. Documenting and providing information about the arts.
4. Administering the cultural parks.[5]

Of the twenty-one activities outlined in the *Technical Instructions* (*Direktorat Kesenian 1997*), twenty correspond with at least one of the first three functions. The fourth function, 'administering the cultural parks' refers to maintenance and is not specifically addressed in the *Technical Instructions*. The activity that does not align with the first three functions is the activ-

[5] Keputusan Mendikbud No. 0221/0/1991, pasal 3. Mantra's *Memorandum* also lists four functions for the cultural parks. The first three of both are quite similar. However, Mantra neglects to mention the administration of the park itself in the parks' functions and includes the provision of 'healthy entertainment' for the community, which is arguably an element of the 1991 function of 'providing cultural activities' (1978: 35).

ity of *pengolahan* that, according to the legislation, referred to the entire operation of the park. The term *pengolahan* in the context of the cultural parks was the task of making art or increasing art expertise in order to create a situation where the arts were 'effective, efficient, have quality and are relevant' for Indonesia today (1997: 2). The process of bureaucratic management and intervention into the arts encapsulated by the term *pengolahan* was central to the cultural parks' centrally defined operation.

Table 7.2 below lists the activities of the cultural parks. Listed alongside each of the activities is the function to which it most closely corresponds. Training has been used to capture those activities which are concerned with increasing the quality of art but does not include performances in front of audiences. Activities refer to programmes that involve a public performance. There is some overlap with training because most performances are preceded by instruction from bureaucrats for the performers. Documentation refers to activities oriented towards documenting the arts, data collection and dissemination of information. Each of the three functions is discussed separately in the rest of this section.

Table 7.2: Cultural park activities as specified in the Technical Instructions for the Management and Development of the Arts in the Regions

No	Activity	Description	Function
1	*Pengolahan*	*Pengolahan* refers to the operation of the cultural parks as a whole. It is the task of making art or increasing art expertise to create an arts dynamic that 'is effective, efficient, has quality and is relevant' to Indonesia today.	
2	Performance rehearsal	A process of rehearsing performance art in order to make it 'worthy of staging'.	Training
3	Repair and prepare works	Caring for, restoring and improving the condition of an artwork.	Activities
4	Technical guidance and training art workers	Activities to enhance the capabilities and skills of people that work in the arts.	Training
5	Translation	Translation of texts (generally from local languages) into Indonesian.	Documentation
6	Changing scripts	Translating scripts of local languages into the Latin alphabet.	Documentation
7	Art training and development	Activities involving the polishing and enhancement of arts using creative ideas and a systematic organizational framework to bring about creative adaptation in an art form.	Training

Table (*cont.*)

No	Activity	Description	Function
8	Experimentation	Introducing new ideas and mixtures into art activities or applying a system, method or technique to create an artwork to encourage the artistic creativity of artists.	Activities
9	Staging performances	Presentation of art performances.	Activities
10	Exhibitions	Staging fine arts exhibitions of any fine arts genre.	Activities.
11	Lectures	Giving guidance and instructions to arts workers in order to ensure the survival of an art form.	Training
12	Seminars	Organizing seminars to discuss problems and disseminate information about the arts.	Training
13	Artist meetings	Organizing meetings between artists of the same profession to exchange ideas and knowledge.	Training
14	Workshops	Giving guidance and technical instructions regarding art works and techniques.	Training
15	Arts libraries	The cultural parks were to be centres of information for arts related research.	Documentation
16	Arts documentation	Collecting and keeping data on the arts in the region.	Documentation
17	Administer documentation	The cultural parks were to organize and manage their documentation in order to ensure its relevance and easy access.	Documentation
18	Compilation of art works	Collecting art works through donations or purchases and by type and function.	Documentation
19	Organising documentation	Making sure that the cultural parks have the tools to undertake arts documentation and storage.	Documentation
20	Advertising activities	The cultural parks were to advertize all of their arts-related activities to the public.	Activities
21	Arts information	To provide information and explanations about the arts to the public through writings, publications and recordings.	Documentation

Source: Direktorat Kesenian (1997).

The training function of the cultural parks had two broad goals. The first was to increase the capacity of artists and arts workers. For example, the task of 'Technical guidance' had as its goal 'preparing educated and competent arts workers,' (1997: 5) while 'art training and development' had the goal of forming 'artists with creative potential' (1997: 9). Although the first goal related to altering art workers, the second goal was to shape the 'art' itself. For instance, the goal of 'performance rehearsal' was to produce a work of art that is 'as optimal as possible, both in interpretation and in its technical production,' (1997: 3) while the desired results of an 'artists meeting' was 'the birth of quality art' (1997: 19).

The dual aims of training reflected the two elements of the training regime. The first goal of maximizing the potential of artists and arts workers was disciplinary. Training programmes aimed to increase the capacity or artists and art workers in areas such as their performance skills, productivity, knowledge, and creativity and also to increase technical skills in staging performances. Training programmes were structured around a hierarchical relationship between the organizing bureaucrats and the participants that was present in the technical instructions themselves. For instance, the 'explanation' of a 'performance rehearsal' states: "A performance rehearsal of an art work is a process of presenting a performance (of dance, music, theatre, and wayang) to reach a suitable standard for a stage, both in its script production and the technical capabilities of its actors" (1997: 3). The standards were not taken from the actors but were present within the institution. The bureaucrats in the cultural parks selected the performance, the artists, and most importantly set standards (of acting, technical skills and script) the performance was to achieve in order to be deemed suitable.[6]

The second goal referred to the characteristics that the Directorate was trying to inscribe within the arts through training artists or commissioning performances. The 'performance rehearsal' aimed to change an 'art work' to be 'suitable for a stage'. It is safe to assume that the term 'art work' here referred to local community practices, given the prioritization of the cultural parks and arts policy more broadly towards such practices. To call such practices 'art works' (*karya seni*) already positioned them within New Order era discourse of aesthetics about art and its function. In order to appear on the regional stage, indigenous arts were adapted to

[6] This model of training for indigenous art forms was widespread within the arts bureaucracy across Indonesia (Effendi 1998; Van Groenendael 1985; Widodo 1995; Yampolsky 1995; Zurbuchen 1990).

the aesthetic criteria that were considered appropriate. One ex-Director of a cultural park during the 1990s stated that he would often participate in changing local practices for the stage in the cultural park. If a song repeated ten times, he would 'suggest' that the artists reduce it to five times.[7] He also held that the artists who participated in traditional community practices were 'agrarian' in outlook and 'did not know time or money' and therefore needed instruction about making their performance 'agreeable for conditions today'.

Other commentators have noted how the state's cultural training regimes were geared towards reproducing a local version of the metropolitan national culture rather than providing training to strengthen indigenous arts within the local communities. The art that was produced was, to borrow from Philip Yampolsky, 'neat and orderly, disciplined, inoffensive, attractive or impressive to look at, pleasant to listen to' (1995: 712). Additionally, Amrih Widodo notes that training was likely to remove any elements of the performance considered immoral or likely to offend religious groups (1995). It is also, in the case of many community practices, completely different from its original form. Widodo notes in relation to *tayuban*: 'Once it had become a symbol of district identity, however, *tayuban* could no longer be associated with prostitution [...] and other activities considered immoral by the state' (1995: 9). The many references to 'improving' the quality of art or the skill of artists refer to this process of aesthetic transformation through programmes (Direktorat Kesenian 1997).

The cultural discourse that underpinned the training regime within the cultural parks was the discourse of national development. 'Development' encapsulated a particular relationship between the state and society where the state leads society in order to 'develop' at a faster rate. Development informed training in two ways. Firstly, training turned the arts into a tool to disseminate lessons about behaviour and development messages. The second method of assistance was more prominent in the regulations and was a less direct governmental method of achieving development goals: the New Order cultural apparatus perceived the cultural parks' training role as making the arts 'relevant with the developments of the age' (1997: 1). National art forms, which included regional arts, were to be made appropriate for the pastimes of a 'developing' national population. From this perspective, bureaucratic intervention is not viewed as negatively influencing indigenous art forms but as improving them and updating them

[7] Interview, 13-11-2001.

to remain in step with national development. The political implications of 'training' programmes reside in the weakening of links between local arts and local communities and the strengthening of links between the revamped art and the Directorate's concept of a national community.

As state-resourced performance venues that were focussed on the local arts of particular regions, their second function was to provide cultural activities. They were particularly important as the site of state-run arts competitions (*lomba*) and festivals (*festival, pesta*) across Indonesia. The most prominent event that was held in the cultural parks was *Arts Week* (*Pekan Kesenian*) which was held annually across Indonesia. Arts Week was usually run by the Provincial Cultural Office in conjunction with the cultural parks. Its goals were to increase appreciation of the traditional arts, promote the revitalization and preservation of traditional arts, to develop the creativity and skill of artists and, in the words of the Governor of West Java, to protect and care for 'regional arts in accordance with the effort to develop the national arts.' (Wibisana 1983: 3) The preparations for Arts Week began months ahead with a request for each regency and city to choose a group of artists from an indigenous genre to represent it. Either a competition was held at the city or regency level or a group was chosen by a committee to perform at the Arts Week festival in the provincial capital city (Hough 2000; Wibisana 1983).

The Arts Week was often the busiest time for the cultural parks as they are the primary location of performances. The size of Arts Week celebrations differed substantially between provinces. The equivalent of the Arts Week in Bali, for instance, is the Bali Arts Festival (Pesta Kesenian Bali). It was originally called the Bali Arts Week but changed its name after it was extended to a month (Foley and Sumandhi 1994). It incorporates events at night and during the day, displays of handcrafts, stalls, cooking, the wearing of traditional dress and also the attendance of participants from other parts of Indonesia and/or overseas. Most Arts Week celebrations tended to only involve performances, held at night, over the course of one week. At the end of most festivals, two groups were chosen to go to Jakarta to represent the province in a national Arts Week festival. Although the Arts Week festivities were generally the largest event held in the cultural parks, other festivals and competitions were held there on the instigation of local bureaucrats. The frequency of such events varied considerably between cultural parks.

The activities function of cultural parks included training as part of the production of festivals and performances. The incentives for artists to accord with the changes were great: the chance to perform in front of

larger audiences at the provincial and national level, prizes, prestige and an expectation of more work due to the fame of 'winning' (Hough 2000; Yampolsky 1995). While some commentators are highly critical of these activities (Yampolsky 1995), there are productive aspects. Festivals also offer opportunities for artists to innovate and experiment. Kathy Foley highlights how removing arts from their traditional contexts in festivals makes them a 'significant forum for modern experimentation and development' (1994: 276). The cultural parks provided an opportunity, albeit limited by the cultural discourses of the New Order regime, for experimentation and creativity.

A goal of 'activities' within the cultural parks was to provide state-sanctioned cultural entertainment for the local residents. 'Providing entertainment for all of the community' was a function of the cultural parks that Mantra (1978: 24) listed when they were created in 1978. Two of the goals of the 'staging performances' activity listed within the Technical instructions indicate that the role of parks as entertainment venues was continuing:

> To give opportunities to society to increase their comprehension and appreciation of performance arts [and an]
> effort to cultivate the community of performance arts fans. (Direktorat Kesenian 1997: 11)

The parks were all constructed with stages and theatres and the larger parks had galleries for fine art exhibitions. These venues accord with the qualities that were viewed as suitable for national culture. They were large, imposing structures that separated actors and audience while providing a clear view of the performance. Such an area was far removed from the homes, streets and fields where many community arts were usually performed.

The final element examined regarding the activities provided within the cultural parks is their role as a gateway to the national stage. In order to reach the state-run national festivals, a performance had to satisfy a set of conditions. A 1983 report on Arts Week in West Java provides an insight into the 'relevant criteria' for the musical and dance performances that would be sent to Jakarta to represent West Java in TIM. Four criteria are listed:

1. Qualities of the genre of art that was considered to increase the prospect of positive interest from observers, the jury and spectators;
2. The extent to which the art is authentically West Javanese when viewed from a national viewpoint;

3. The extent to which the art still contains its ambience or the spirit of traditional community art after there is a process of 'training' from peers; and
4. The extent to which the art, and its accompanying music, is established and has received 'training'. (Wibisana 1983: 2)

By the time the arts reached the national stage, they had already undergone a thorough process of training and vetting which had weeded out the arts viewed as immoral, lacking in quality or not yet developed, leaving art forms which accorded with the regime's preferred cultural discourses. Sanitizing ethnic arts produced representations of ethnic cultures that accorded with New Order notions of the place of ethnicity within the nation. Nowhere was this clearer than during national performances in TIM in Jakarta, where the arts of different regions could be seen together. National festivals provided an example of the regime's construction of cultural difference. All of the arts admitted had been viewed in the cultural parks and chosen by agents of the state, excluding politically radical or uncouth art, and were now placed together, side by side, in the national capital.

The third function of documentation tended to only receive serious attention in the larger cultural parks and even here the libraries tended to be small and with relatively few new additions besides the cultural parks' own reports. Given that most of the cultural parks' resources were allocated to training and activities, documentation is not discussed in detail here. The key goal of documentation was to preserve the indigenous arts, as an element of national cultural heritage, through recording it (via written description, audio or video) or, in the case of the visual arts, building a collection. The cultural parks were also envisaged as information centres for both accessing information through libraries and archives, and for disseminating information about the arts through articles, publications and recordings (for instance, see the libraries, documentation, compilation and arts information functions in table 7.2). Finally, the cultural parks were also given the tasks of translating both local language texts to Indonesian and local language scripts to the Latin script, although I did not come across any evidence that this task was carried out in any of the cultural parks I visited. The direction of both of these tasks was towards making local cultures accessible to all Indonesians and creating the possibility of inclusion within both the national metropolitan culture and the officially recognized regional culture.

The cultural parks were sites where ethnic indigenous arts were remade to accord with the New Order regime's governmental discourses. The

changes the programmes sought to make can be identified as belonging to one of two groups. The first group, discussed in my analysis of training regimes, consisted of changes aimed at 'developing' the arts to both be appropriate to Indonesia's advancing stage of development and to assist in achieving the regime's goal of achieving a 'developed' society. The cultural discourses of the New Order era were important here in defining the features that were deemed 'developed' and therefore to be incorporated into indigenous art forms. Particularly important was an aesthetic discourse that applied the standards of contemporary urban arts (such as staging, costumes, time limits) to community arts. Other changes were more oriented towards assisting the development of Indonesians by excluding 'immoral' elements and incorporating development messages. These changes were made through putting performers through disciplinary regimes. However, the policies were ultimately aimed at local populations. The regime wanted to ensure that Indonesians partook in 'healthy' entertainment that would assist, rather than impede, national development.

Secondly, the cultural parks attempted to regulate the relationships between ethnicity and the nation and between different ethnic groups. The disciplinary regime was justified through the identification of indigenous arts as elements of national culture. Popular forms considered foreign were excluded from the cultural parks since they were not deemed Indonesian or local while popular forms considered indigenous were included in the cultural parks' programmes. The result of inclusion was the incorporation of particular art forms into the official canon of regional/national arts at the cost of the exclusion of elements that were deemed inappropriate. The cultural parks' version of ethnic arts positioned ethnicity to contribute to national goals and created regional art forms that could sit comfortably next to each other. Hence the national festivals could safely showcase the 'unity in diversity' of Indonesia where all ethnic groups lived harmoniously next to each other and had a place in national development.

Uniformity and Diversity within the cultural parks

The operation of the parks outside of the Arts Week struggled to match the expectations of the Directorate. The Directorate of Culture only rated five cultural parks as being of a good standard (*dinilai baik*) since they

conducted one or more activities a week (Direktorat Kebudayaan 1999b).[8] The Directorate's acknowledgement of differences between the operations of the cultural parks indicates that there is divergence between their uniform instructions and goals and how the cultural parks functioned in specific locations. It is in these differences that the culturalities of different locations can be revealed and explored. It could be that the highly centralized state had produced a diverse set of institutions despite its command culture model of operation and detailed instructions. The ambitious goals of the centrally-determined policy could not be achieved by cultural parks that were only organizing one to two activities a month that involved the public. The major cause of the parks' haphazard programme was lack of funding. According to a 1999 report, the 19 cultural parks that were not assessed as being of a 'good standard' received an average yearly recurring budget of Rp. 16.3 million (approx. $2,750 Australian) and an average yearly grants budget of Rp. 10.6 million (approx. $1,800 Australian) (Direktorat Kebudayaan 1999b).

Local communities and in particular artists often felt alienated from the cultural parks. This alienation was evident even in the cultural parks that were considered to be of good standard as became evident in interviews I conducted with artists and observers about the West Java Cultural Park (WJCP) in 2001. A local journalist expressed the view of many local artists when he said that even though activities are continuing in the WJCP, there were not many attendees and there is no artistic community connected with it. He said that the government facilities in Bandung were isolated from the busy places and that the cultural bureaucracy had money and projects but no support.[9] The issue of the WJCP's location recurred in many of the interviews with artists and has to a degree become a symbolic expression of the WJCP's prioritization of reaching administrative goals over engaging with local artists. Deciding on a location for the Cultural Park had been a long process. Five different locations were explored between 1981 and 1991 as possibilities before the current site at the Dago Tea Rooms was chosen and developed. The choice of the final location at the Dago Tea House was criticized by many artists for being far from Bandung's centres of activity. Deputy-Governor of West Java then lead a Study Team which concluded that the Tea House was the 'correct'

[8] These are West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java and Bali (Yuga 2000).
[9] Interview, 30-10-2001.

location and the WJCP was subsequently built.[10] Most performances at the WJCP were of regional arts. The community of contemporary artists in Bandung rarely performed there and certainly not for events organized by the WJCP itself which were exclusively focused on 'traditional' performances.[11]

Observers and artists have voiced similar complaints about cultural parks in other locations. Brett Hough (2000: 279–280) has noted that 'there has been a great deal of criticism' directed at the Bali Cultural Park 'for not fulfilling its perceived role of providing a venue conducive for artistic expression' and for being 'too bureaucratic in its operation'. A more passionate criticism was made recently by Elmustian, the Director of the University of Riau Press. Elmustian focuses on the Riau Cultural Park's place in the bureaucratic hierarchy that leads to TIM and Jakarta which has proven difficult for artists from Riau to access. He states: "The [Riau] Cultural Park, with all of its bureaucracy, came to be seen as impeding artists' capacity for self-expression and ultimately was also considered an extension of the Centre colonizing the artistic periphery in Riau" (2001: 754). Such criticisms underline the problems caused by the cultural parks' preoccupation with the programmes set by the Directorate of Culture and a subsequent lack of support from local arts communities.

Like many of the New Order era bureaucratic institutions, the cultural parks suffered from corruption. An ex-Director of a cultural park in the mid-late nineties was quite open in an interview about fabricating reports for the Directorate of Culture in order to avoid the Directorate's strict guidelines. He would run activities according to his own prescriptions then submit a report that met the Directorate's expectations. At the end of his time as Director, he gave each of the staff a present of money taken from his Cultural Park's funds. Artists who had dealings with the cultural parks also complained about the cultural parks' use of funds that should be going to artists and the arts.[12]

One cultural park demonstrates how a culturality could be constructed that both satisfied artists and bureaucratic requirements. The Surakarta Cultural Park (SCP) is well known for its regular performances of indigenous arts, particularly kroncong, wayang kulit, and karawitan. The SCP also regularly stages performances of contemporary arts from local and

[10] There were also protests by Padjadjaran University (Unpad) staff that were renting housing on the area and were forced to move by the state.

[11] Iyus Supriatna, Director, West Java Cultural Park, interview, 5-10-2001.

[12] Interview, 29-11-2001.

visiting Indonesian artists and occasionally artists from outside Indonesia. During the 1990s, the SCP staged several national festivals such as the Indonesian Theatre Assembly (Temu Teater Se-Indonesia), the contemporary arts festival Nur Gora Rupa and Reflections on the Republican Half Century (Refleksi Setengah Abad Republik). Its regular performance schedule and involvement in the arts in Surakarta has raised its standing amongst the cultural parks and its Director, Murtijono, who has been Director of the SCP for over twenty years, was considered a 'star' of the Indonesian cultural parks.[13]

More importantly, the SCP has been embraced by artists. Suyatna Anirun, a famous thespian and theatre director who resides in Bandung and has never performed in the WJCP, has said that the SCP feels like his 'own house.'[14] Credit for the support from artists should go to Murtijono. Halim HD, an organizer and observer of the arts who resides in Surakarta, states that Murtijono was 'open, accommodating, and had the courage to accept differences in artistic perspectives'.[15] Halim HD has related an event in the early 1980s which illustrates how Murtijono's management assisted the staging of new and exciting contemporary art and gain the support of artists for the cultural park.

The theatre group Dinasti wanted to perform the play 'Beloved Statue' and 'Cone Mask', but the police banned it and the Yogyakarta Cultural Park (YCP) would not consider using that theatre group, because there must be a license from the police. The YCP would only consider performances if there was police approval. [...] I offered Dinasti the chance to perform in Solo. I contacted SCP. And Murtijono asked me for the script. He read it. Then, he allowed the performance to take place.[16] Dinasti's two plays were then performed in Surakarta, Surabaya and also Malang, which would not have been possible without Murtijono's initial support. The SCP did not have to seek licenses due to an agreement with the local police, providing a degree of protection from the repressive arm of the regime.

The success of the SCP has not been built around its attention to the centrally defined guidelines which would have hampered its operation. Halim HD states:

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[13] Halim HD, email, 16-12-2004.
[14] Halim HD, email, 16-12-2004.
[15] Halim HD, email, 16-12-2004.
[16] Halim HD, email, 16-12-2004.

> I am certain that Murtijono as the Director of the SCP made a subjective interpretation of the instructions from the centre. By subjective interpretation, I mean that the SCP's activities would be organized only in accordance with the needs of the group of artists that are in Solo and are known by Murtijono, who indeed received much input and information from many artists in Solo and what more in other cities.[17]

It was Murtijono's support of the local arts community that gave the SCP the opportunity to be successful.

Despite the uniform brief and detailed instructions from the Directorate of Culture, the cultural parks were not uniform in their operation. Small budgets, fabrication of reports, corruption and the creativity of particular directors all contributed to an array of culturalities within the parks. In the cultural park that most successfully managed to engage with the local arts communities, it was 'interpreting' the centrally defined directives to suit local conditions that made the SCP's success possible. Open criticism of the cultural parks' bureaucracy is, however, a nation-wide feature at least since the 1990s. By the end of the New Order era, observers and artists were demanding a more autonomous operation connected to local community agendas rather than a nationally determined set of practices, thus indicating dissatisfaction with the command culture model. With this in mind, the decentralization of cultural parks in the Reform era could provide further incentives for localized artistic engagements.

Decentralization and the cultural parks

In January 2001 control of the cultural parks was passed from the Directorate to the provincial governments as part of the broader decentralization process. The impact of decentralization on the cultural parks has been varied. In some areas such as West Sumatra, South Sulawesi and North Sumatra, the cultural parks have collapsed and are now only used as venues for rehearsals. The Riau Cultural Park also is used less frequently and the Provincial government has funded the creation of a separate arts centre with a broader brief, the Bandar Seni Raja Ali Haji which is discussed further in the analysis of the arts councils. However, other cultural parks, including those located in Surakarta, West Java and East Java, have had their funding increased since they have been located under the provincial governments. Funding in decentralized Indonesia is dependent on

[17] Halim HD, email, 16-12-2004.

the relationship between the Director of the cultural park, the Director of the Provincial Office of Tourism and Culture and the members of the provincial legislature. The relationships are varied and unstable.

The WJCP has become more focussed on holding performances and exhibitions and drawing in visitors from the local community and abroad. The increased activity has assisted its standing amongst the local arts community although it is still viewed as overly concerned with bureaucratic goals rather than contributing to the arts. Iyus Supriatna, the Director of the WJCP, has noted a slight change in performance types. While the WJCP was under the Directorate, there were more visiting performances from other areas while the Provincial government is more focussed on art from West Java. Supriatna also noted that although approval now comes from the provincial government for the budget and yearly schedule of activities, at the end of 2001 the same *Technical Instructions* were being used and that the WJCP's routines remain unchanged. In the strategic plans developed by the West Java Provincial Office of Culture and Tourism (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Parawisata Propinsi Jawa Barat), the WJCP was given the task of 'developing culture and increasing the appreciation of society towards culture' (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata 2001c: 1). Its three tasks were: developing art through collaboration, revitalization, increasing appreciation, increasing the creativity and capacity of artists; nurturing art through protecting, researching, inventorying, reconstructing, and documenting art; and using art for education, rituals, religion, helping the economy, tourism, and enriching art diversity (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata 2001c). In summary, the role and programmes of the WJCP has remained relatively unchanged although it is becoming more prominent as a performance venue.

The arts community desired a change in operation as demonstrated by their suggestions at a seminar to discuss the 'repositioning' of the WJCP following decentralization. The thrust of a number of the speakers was similar to criticisms made during the New Order era. The most frequently mentioned reform was to minimize the 'bureaucratic style' of the WJCP through increasing its flexibility, increasing its networks with other arts institutions and artists and making strategic decisions to make the WJCP a 'public possession' (Maulana and Imran 2000). Suggestions included privatization, reducing the number of events to focus on large, popular performances, broadening the performance genres, and making the institution independent from the provincial government.

There were few signs of change in the programmes and techniques of cultural parks that were still functioning when I conducted my fieldwork

at the end of 2001. Cultural parks retained the practices of the New Order era despite the change in their political masters. Many artists I interviewed felt that attention was still directed to the goals of power holders rather than the arts community. However, there was evidence that change was on the way in some locations. The SCP had continuous support and more funding and steps were being taken in Bandung to consult a much wider group of stakeholders in the arts community in an effort to change cultural policies to address their concerns while also growing tourism. The cultural parks in general have only slowly moved away from their Suharto era roles and practices even when funding has increased, and have consequently struggled to capture public support.

The Arts Councils: From Jakarta to the Regions

The arts councils were established in two waves. The first wave, initiated by artists outside Jakarta as a response to the success of the JAC in the early 1970s, was largely inactive by the 1980s. The second wave began in 1992 and was driven largely by the New Order government, although independent arts councils were also established during this time. Arts councils were still being established well into the Reform era (including the West Java Arts Council which is studied in detail in the final two sections). The operations of the arts councils are therefore influenced by space through regional histories, differences and interpretations, and time through the shifting priorities of governments and artists since 1968 when the first arts council was established in Jakarta. An important division in the ranks of arts councils was between those that were state-funded who were responsible to the provincial governors for the use of their funds, and the arts councils that were not state-funded. Given the focus here on state-run and sponsored cultural institutions, my analysis is limited to the state-funded arts councils. The arts councils' structure was determined in each location. Their autonomy from each other and the absence of tight central government control shaped a plurality of institutions that used the same name despite quite different aims. For this reason, the arts councils are assessed individually below rather than following the method used to assess the cultural parks, which were much more uniform in their expressed operation and goals.

The rest of this section outlines the historical development of the arts councils, in particular the inaugural Arts Council in Jakarta (JAC), and provides the reasons for their spread across Indonesia in the 1990s. The

JAC receives close attention because it was the inspiration and model for the subsequent arts councils, and because the dynamics between the JAC and the provincial government provide an insight into what has generally been the most important relationship for all of the arts councils. The two arts councils explored in the next section provide examples of the regional differences between arts councils, despite facing similar pressures. The final section identifies the shared features and differences of the arts councils and assesses the changes of the Reform era.

The JAC originated from the activities of artists who were planning the establishment of TIM and exploring possible management structures. Following general discussion about the establishment of an arts centre in Jakarta, a group of seven artists[18] met with Governor Ali Sadikin on 9 May 1968. The seven artists present (known as the formateur committee) were charged with choosing twenty-five members of the Cultural Management Board (Badan Pembina Kebudayaan) which later renamed itself the Jakarta Arts Council in its first meeting (Yusra 1994). In a decree on 7 June 1968, Ali Sadikin endorsed the first JAC (D. T. Hill 1993). According to Ali Sadikin's decree, the JAC was to be the 'only artistic/cultural institution at the highest regional level for the territory of the special Area of the City of Jakarta' and was responsible for the management of TIM (Rosidi 1974). Its founders intended the JAC to be funded by the Province of Jakarta while operating with a large degree of autonomy in an attempt to secure artistic freedom within TIM. The June 1968 decree also called for the establishment of an honorary council of artists and cultural intellectuals who were recognized as paramount in Indonesia called the Jakarta Academy (Akademi Jakarta). The Jakarta Academy was responsible for determining membership of the JAC every three years (which would then be inaugurated by the Governor), as well as granting awards and providing advice to the Governor (Wahono 1994a). It was to consist of ten members who were prominent in the fields of art and culture, displayed dedication, and were over forty years of age at the time of their appointment (Hill 1993; Wahono 1994a). The Jakarta Academy appoints its own members for life with the approval of the Governor.

The concern with creative freedom reflects the 'universal humanist' affiliation of the artists that were central to TIM's establishment and were

[18] These artists were: Usmar Ismail, Rudi Pirngadi, Mochtar Lubis, Asrul Sani, D. Djajakusuma, Gayus Siagian and Zulharmans (Yusra 1994).

well-represented in the JAC.[19] Taufiq Ismail, in an editorial in the literary magazine Horison, cited Ali Sadikin's statement at the opening of TIM that: 'Politics may not intervene inside this arts centre, as occurred during the times before the 1965 coup' (Ismail 1968, in Mohamad 1993: 107). The notion of protecting artistic expression from political intervention paradoxically gave rise to exclusion from and exclusivity within TIM from its beginnings. Artists who had been affiliated with LEKRA were barred from performing (Budiman 1969). David Hill (1993: 255) writes that TIM tended to focus on 'the 'modern', 'high' cultural forms, appealing to a metropolitan elite' and, as explored in the first section, the indigenous arts that were performed in TIM had been altered in a way that appealed to this audience. TIM and the JAC were fostering a particular version of artistic expression and a particular group of artists.

Although the JAC and the Jakarta Academy were at times subject to Province of Jakarta intervention under Ali Sadikin,[20] in practice the Province of Jakarta and the two institutions generally had a good working relationship during Ali Sadikin's tenure. It was not until after Ali Sadikin's retirement in 1977 that pressure between Province of Jakarta and the two institutions escalated due to increased Province of Jakarta interventions.[21] Hill's (1993) research into TIM outlines a series of standoffs during the 1980s over appointments to the JAC, largely because the Jakarta Academy would not submit the candidates that Province of Jakarta requested. Additionally, two ex-ministers were appointed to the Jakarta Academy as a compromise by the Academy to have its JAC nominations accepted in 1982.[22] It was between 1977 and 1991 that TIM (and the JAC) most felt the tension between artists' aspirations for complete freedom of expression and the will of the interventionist state. A series of changes in the provincial legislation that reduced the JAC's autonomy reflected this tension. In 1973, the JAC was made to consult with, and made responsible to, the Jakarta Academy for all of its activities. In 1986, it was made responsible

[19] The inaugural JAC was led by Trisno Soemardjo and included Arief Budiman, Goenawan Mohamad, Taufiq Ismail, H.B. Jassin who were all active in the Manikebu polemics in the late Guided Democracy period.

[20] This includes the appointment of the Director of the Provincial Cultural Office (*Dinas Kebudayaan DKI*) to the JAC board (D.T. Hill 1993) and Sadikin's criticism of works in TIM as 'wrong' (Mohamad 1993: 113).

[21] Sadikin himself calls the term of Governor Tjokropranolo beginning of TIM's decline. He made the criticism: 'The Jakarta Government did not seek money to develop TIM but instead made TIM a tool to seek money' (Chudori 1990).

[22] These were H. Boediardjo (formerly Minister of Information) and Mukti Ali (formerly Minister of Religion).

to the Governor for its administration and to the Jakarta Academy for its artistic direction.

The largest change for the JAC came in 1991 when responsibility for the management of TIM was taken away from the JAC and, as was mentioned in chapter three, given to the Jakarta Arts Foundation (Yayasan Kesenian Jakarta), which was formed in 1989 in an attempt to address funding shortfalls through collaboration with the private sector (Gondomono and Murgiyanto 1994; Wahono 1994b). TIM was effectively removed from the system that was designed to allow a degree of artistic freedom, and placed in the hands of an institution that was much more amenable to Province of Jakarta direction. With the removal of its core function, the role of the JAC was redefined with a broader focus than activities within TIM. Sri Warso Wahono, a fine-artist and member of the JAC from 1985–1993, writes: The JAC functions as an institute of arts cultivation that is shaped by the community of artists and is inaugurated by the Governor. [. . .] The JAC manages all arts activities in society, especially in the capital city of Jakarta. (1994b: 53) The JAC was envisioned after 1991 as a tool for shaping the arts rather than the management body of an arts-space and the Governor was to retain control over the appointments process. The 1991 speech by then State Minister for Population and Environment Emil Salim at TIM's 23rd anniversary celebrations highlights this change in perspective. Salim encouraged the JAC to 'not situate art as art, but art activities as a basic element of culture in development' (Wahono 1994b: 56–57).

The third Indonesian Arts Councils' Assembly in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi, in November 1992 was a pivotal point in the history of the arts councils. It was at this assembly that Salim Said, the Director of the JAC, successfully lobbied for the arts councils to be spread across Indonesia. We can get a sense of the model Said was advocating, and that the JAC had adopted, through the recommendations presented at the end of the conference. These recommendations included:

> That in the Broad Outline of National Policy, art is declared to be an integral part of the effort to increase the quality of the Indonesian people.
> 1. That cultivating arts appreciation and achievement be increased in order to generate energy and passion to develop national pride.
> 2. That a climate be developed that better encourages artists to create quality art (Wahono 1994b: 57).

The recommendations of the conference demonstrate that the arts councils had moved a long way from the original concerns of the JAC with freedom of artistic expression. Instead, the concern is with positioning the arts as a potential tool for achieving governmental goals of the state—improving

the 'quality of the Indonesian people' and strengthening national pride. On 7 December 1992, Salim Said presented the recommendations of the Indonesian Arts Councils' Assembly to Suharto (Ridwan 2000). Suharto responded positively and made the observation in a speech at the end of 1992 that every province should have an Arts Council (Elmustian 2001). BAPENAS agreed to allocate funds for arts councils to the Department of Internal Affairs which would be distributed to the provincial governments who in turn would supervise the establishment of the arts councils.[23]

Suharto's announcement in 1992 inspired the creation of a number of arts councils across Indonesia including in Riau and West Sumatra. However, these were not the first arts councils created outside of Jakarta. Following the establishment and early success of the JAC in late 1960s and early 1970s, artists began forming arts councils using their own initiative and often with funding from the provincial governments. The Surakarta Arts Council started in 1972 and two arts councils were formed in Ujung Pandang in the 1970s: the South Sulawesi Arts Council and the Makassar Arts Council (Halim HD 2000). More arts councils followed the fall of Suharto in 1998, such as the Cirebon Arts Council, as artists took advantage of the freedom of association of the Reform era to form groups that could lobby for the arts in the cities and regions where they lived and performed.

The general reasons why the arts councils were attractive to the New Order regime can be gleaned from the 1993 directive from the Minister for Interior Affairs that executed Suharto's expressed desire for every province to have an arts council.[24] This brief piece of legislation consists of only five sections. Its primary purpose is achieved in its first section where the governors are informed that provinces without arts councils are to form them, with their membership consisting of artists, intellectuals interested in culture and other related parties. Payment to establish arts councils is to be made to the governor through the annual provincial budget allocations. It is also worth noting that the JAC is designated in the legislation as the official consultant on any plans to build new arts council facilities.

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[23] The decision to bypass the Directorate of Culture was the cause of much friction between the National Planning Board, the Department of Internal Affairs and the Directorate of Culture which was not pleased about its exclusion from a project so squarely in its field. However, they came to an agreement that the creation of arts councils in the provinces would involve the arts sections of the regional offices of the Directorate of Culture.

[24] Instruksi Menteri Dalam Negeri 5A/1993.

The role that the regime envisioned for the arts councils is indicated in two of the sections. Sections two and three state: "Guidance and development of the arts should consider characteristics of the region. In the effort of guidance and development of art, the art councils should become a catalyser of the entire potential of art in each region" (Instruksi Menteri Dalam Negeri 5A/1993). Instead of leaving the arts councils to develop whatever art is most creative or most popular, the state directs them to focus on the regional 'characteristics'. The arts councils were to become the stimulators and regulators of the arts in the regions. Like the cultural parks, the arts councils were to be a part of how the state constructed regional and national culture. However, the actions of arts councils varied from supporting the regime's vision and plans, to opposing them.

Following the fall of Suharto, the JAC and Jakarta Academy sank further in stature and had lost the last of its vigour from the 1970s. By 2002, the JAC had been languishing under interim management for over two years. Artists had lost faith in the management and gone elsewhere and attendance levels had dropped further. The Jakarta Academy was, in practice, defunct. Some members had passed away and not been reappointed. Others were elderly and no longer actively involved. On 11 October 2002, a team was formed to review the activities and finances of the JAC (NAR 2002a). Starting from the review, a growing movement began amongst the arts and cultural community to review the roles of the JAC and the Jakarta Academy. After public criticism from some highly regarded public individuals,[25] the membership of the Jakarta Academy was reviewed and twenty seven members appointed, twenty of who were new. The appointments included a number of prominent figures from the New Order period such as W.S. Rendra, Taufiq Abdullah, Goenawan Mohamad as well as Sitor Situmorang who had been imprisoned by the New Order in 1966 for his leftist connections (NAR 2002b). Although the institutional structure of the Jakarta Academy has not changed, it now has a more critical and charismatic membership with greater sway in the Indonesian arts community.[26]

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[25] These included Salim Said, widely regarded poet Sapardi Djoko Damono, cultural observer Mohamad Sobary, and poet, critic and essayist Goenawan Mohamad.

[26] Two well regarded members of the arts community, arts critic and researcher Nirwan Dewanto and poet Remmy Novaris were very supportive of the new members. Interestingly, two of the antagonists from the mid-1960s from opposite sides of the political spectrum, Pramoedya Ananta Toer and Taufiq Ismail, were not prepared to become members of the Jakarta Academy.

Regional Arts Councils: Riau

The arts councils have some shared characteristics that correspond with the JAC, although there is no single organizational structure. The arts councils all consist of artists and were formed to be advocates for the arts in particular regions. Like the JAC, most arts councils are divided into seperate sections addressing different branches of the arts. Arts councils also generally viewed themselves as the organizers of discussions, performances, festivals, and other arts events, with sponsorship from the state, the private sector, or artists themselves. Within these broad parameters there was much diversity. The two arts councils discussed below are chosen to demonstrate the arts councils' variations in goals and operation. The Riau Arts Council demonstrates a quite different engagement with local politics when compared to the JAC. Secondly, the arts councils in West Java (two were formed simultaneously), which were established in the Reform era, provide an example of an ultimately failed attempt to set up an arts council. The events in West Java and the critical reflections of artists provide a window onto the arts councils' culturalities.

The Riau Arts Council (Dewan Kesenian Riau, RAC) has fashioned quite a different role for itself when compared to the JAC. Although there had been plans to establish an arts council in Riau since 1978, it was not until after Suharto's speech that the Riau Arts Council was formed (Elmustian 2001). Following Suharto's announcement, a series of meetings was held in late 1992 and early 1993 that were attended by senior bureaucrats in Riau from the national and provincial bureaucracy, artists, and intellectuals. The RAC was one of four institutions that the Riau provincial government formed to address the concerns raised in these forums that were established in 1993.[27] The model adopted was based on TIM and received substantial support from the Governor and the Provincial legislature. The RAC included eight committees that were devoted to different streams of the arts.[28] While most of the senior positions in the RAC were filled by bureaucrats, including the post of Director which was held by the Director of the Regional Planning Board (Kepala, Badan Perencanaan

[27] The others were the Riau Arts Deliberation Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Kesenian Riau), Riau Cultural Centre (Balai Budaya Riau) and the Riau Arts Foundation (Yayasan Kesenian Riau) (Elmustian 2001).

[28] These were: literature; fine arts; music; dance; theatre; film; research and development; and promotions, publications and documentation (Elmustian 2001).

Daerah), the council fulfilled two important functions for the arts in Riau. Firstly, the RAC stimulated arts activities through providing funding for arts activities. Payments to artists for large performances increased from Rp. 250,000 in 1993 to Rp. 600,000 in 1998. Secondly, the RAC provided a degree of protection from interference by the police who closely monitored arts performances during the New Order era. Permits for performances were not always granted and required a fee. The RAC provided a government-backed body that was regularly granted police permits and covered all costs.

Additionally, the regular presentation of local arts and artists contributed to a broader cultural movement in Riau based on ethnic Riau-Malay identity. Elmustian, Director of the University of Riau Press and active participant in this movement, notes that the RAC is one of a number of institutions that have a shared goal for the Riau Malay population: "The institutions, which are based upon the same scenario, enrich local society by building self confidence, 'moral villages' as has occurred in several attractive fishing villages, moral-cultural strength, and new local genuses [such as local art]" (2001: 761). This movement reached the high point of its popularity following the fall of Suharto in 1998.[29]

A change in position holders in 1998 coincided with a growing movement in Riau for increased autonomy from Jakarta. The following year, a new foundation focussed on the arts and culture was created by the Governor: the Raja Ali Haji Arts Centre Foundation (Yayasan Bandar Seni Raja Ali Haji, SERAI Foundation). The SERAI Foundation was responsible for building and managing a new arts centre in Pekan Baru that would include facilities for the RAC. In practice the activities and staff of the RAC overlapped considerably with the SERAI Foundation. In 1998, artists and intellectuals were moved into key positions in the RAC and, not long after, into the SERAI Foundation. Al Azhar, the Head of the Free Riau Movement (Riau Merdeka), was prominent in both institutions. The RAC's activities were also altered to fit with the changed climate in the arts in Riau. For instance, one of its 'significant' programmes from this time was running workshops for artists about 'rereading' old Malay texts that originated in Riau with the goal of reinterpreting them for contemporary times (Elmustian 2001: 762).

[29] See Al Azhar (1997a, 1997b), and Colombijn (2003) for a discussion of the growth of the cultural movement in Riau.

The provincial government and artists coalesced around the goal of strengthening local identity and self-confidence through the arts, in particular through traditional art forms. In contrast to the JAC, the local arts community in Riau has been generally supportive of the RAC's programme and agenda and continues to support the SERAI Foundation. The RAC's integration into the broader cultural movement to build local identity and confidence strengthened its relationship with both the provincial government, which has been fostering links with the indigenous peoples of Riau, and with local artists who are attracted to its advocacy of indigenous arts and artists. While these activities are benefitting the Riau Malay community, it is worth noting that forty percent of the population is Minangkabau from West Sumatra, and their cultural activities and heritage does not receive public funds in Riau.

Regional Arts Councils: West Java

The first arts council in West Java was formed in 1968 and, after a few years with little activity, it disbanded (Romli HM 2000). Following Suharto's 1992 speech and the 1993 legislation, the Province of West Java began preparations for the creation of a new arts council and in 1996 the legal framework was established.[30] According to the legislation, the West Java Arts Council (WJAC) was to be shaped by and responsible to the Governor and was focused on 'regional' art and culture, which was defined as 'having a root in local traditions and giving features to national cultural life'.[31] Although the legislation preceded the fall of Suharto, steps to establish the arts council were not taken until 1998. It is important to remain cognisant of the two year intermission in assessing the legislation and the events surrounding its creation and collapse since the early Reform era promised much more for independently minded artists than the late New Order period. The chasm between the legislation and the expectations of a large segment of the arts community was central to the series of events that resulted in the demise of the arts council.

In 1998, Salim Said asked the leadership of a local arts body, the Board for Cultural Concerns (Badan Pertimbangan Kebudayaan) to establish an

[30] Peraturan Daerah Tingkat 1 Jawa Barat No. 7/1996 tentang Pelestarian, Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Seni Budaya Daerah Jawa Barat.

[31] Perda Jawa Barat No. 7/1996 (1)f.

arts council in West Java.[32] The Board for Cultural Concerns accepted and put together the Preparatory Body for Shaping the West Java Arts Council (Badan Persiapan Pembentukan Dewan Kesenian Jawa Barat). A concept of the basic structure and goals was formed and an Artists' Assembly (Musyawarah Seniman) in West Java was held on 30 March, 1999. The Assembly put in place regulations for running the WJAC. The WJAC was responsible to the arts community through a three yearly Assembly and not to the Governor as is usually the case.

A structure was formed at the Artists' Assembly and positions were filled through election by attendees. The majority of positions were filled by 'modern' artists rather than 'traditional' artists (*seniman daerah*) who did not feel adequately represented.[33] As a result of their feeling of exclusion from executive positions, some traditional artists organized a closed meeting at the restaurant in the Hotel Homan after the Assembly on 30 March 1999, resulting in the formation of the West Java Regional Arts Council (WJRAC). A letter was sent to the Governor with fifty six arts related institutions backing the change. The support of most traditional artists shifted to the WJRAC. A point of contention was the appointment process for positions on the WJRAC. The appointments were made in a closed meeting without informing some of the appointees.[34] In order to prevent dissent, many of the position-holders in the WJAC were offered positions in the WJRAC. The General Chair, Yusuf Affendi,[35] and central committee were chosen privately in the Hotel Homan although the appointments were meant to occur through the committee structure. The Governor sided with the WJRAC and the WJAC was disbanded.

According to participants in the events, there were two elements to the Governor's decision. First, the WJRAC represented itself in its letter as standing for the indigenous arts in West Java and therefore in accordance with the Provincial Regulations, while the WJAC lacked the support of practitioners of indigenous arts.[36] Second, the decision was a choice

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[32] In provinces that did not autonomously establish an Arts Council or have an equivalent organization, the central state initiated the process of forming an Arts Council. The Badan Pertimbangan Kebudayaan was established in 1976 by artists in Bandung.

[33] A particularly sore point was that the Chairperson of the Dalangs' Union (Persatuan Dalang), nationally prominent dalang Asep Sunarya, was not chosen for a position.

[34] Ari Nurtanio, the Secretary IV (of four), learnt of his appointment through a letter which was sent to them and signed by the governor, demonstrating the WJRAC's legitimacy. Ari Nurtanio, interview, 15-11-2001.

[35] A professor in fine-arts at Bandung Institute of Technology.

[36] Interview, 15-11-2001.

between two groups within the arts community and the Governor chose the group that was closer to government officials and tended to have positions in the bureaucracy. In that sense, the WJRAC outmanoeuvred the WJAC through its political contacts and by representing itself as the institution envisioned within the legislation. Both the WJRAC and the WJAC were of considerable size. The WJAC had 41 positions including eight committees for various branches of the arts. The WJRAC had 87 positions including thirteen committees beneath three supra-committees. The large structure reflects the desire for both the groups to be inclusive. According to the WJRAC's official structure, the committees would consider proposals from various groups and artists and recommend which should receive funding to the Central Committee. However, the structure was never used despite the disbursement of almost all of the funds.

Internal corruption crippled the WJRAC in a public and embarrassing manner. The office of Affendi in the Bandung Technological Institute also doubled as the office of the WJRAC. Over a period of eighteen months from April 1999, almost all of the money (Rp. 417,785,865, approximately $90,000AU) was dispersed without using the WJRAC committee structures. Complaints were made about the conduct of the WJRAC throughout the year 2000 but bank reports were not produced until August 2000. On 17 August 2000, Agus Safari, one of three treasurers of the WJRAC, wrote a letter drawing attention to the misappropriation of funds, criticizing Affendi and highlighting the moral obligation of the position holders of the WJRAC. After a series of three meetings,[37] the WJRAC was effectively ended on 19 September 2000. A report was produced listing the activities that the money went to (but not the names of those involved) although none of my interviewees, most of whom were active members of the arts community, could recollect any of the activities ever taking place. At the end of March 2001, the Provincial Legislature called all of the position holders to account. Yusuf Affendi did not attend. A small group attended. The Governor was asked to account for the WJRAC and all concerned were still waiting for a call from the Governor nine months later. The term of the WJRAC ended in May 2001 and the Governor discontinued the funding.

[37] A meeting was organized on 3 September 2000 where a number of position holders withdrew from their positions ("Mayoritas pengurus DKJB mundur" 2000). Another meeting followed on 7 September and a third on 19 September. The first two meetings concluded that the short, medium and long term plans were not realized and that the blame lay with Affendi and Faturohman. The third froze the Rp. 40,000 (approximately $9AU) of the funds that were left and effectively ended the WJRAC.

The problems facing cultural policy were amplified in West Java by divisions within the arts community and within the arts councils. There was always a high level of disaffection amongst the arts community with the arts councils.[38] There were also two additional councils formed in opposition to the WJAC in March 1999. The West Java Arts Assembly (Majelis Kesenian Jawa Barat) which was formed by Taufik Rahzen. A second protest council was the Bandung Jeprut Arts Council (Dewan Kesenian Jeprut Bandung) formed by Tisna Sanjaya.[39] The deeply felt diversity of artists in Bandung made the creation of a representative body difficult.

Assessing the Arts Councils

The events surrounding the arts councils in West Java opened up an opportunity for reflection on the role of arts councils and the state's attempts at government. After the WJRAC was wound up, artists voiced their opinions in the local media where a conflict was revealed between artists and the state over the role of the arts councils and cultural governance more generally.

The Bandung daily newspaper *Pikiran Rakyat* published a number of critical articles in September and October 2000 in response to the WJRAC's collapse. Of particular interest are four longer opinion-style pieces published on 26 October 2000 for a seminar titled 'Discussion of the Problem of the Arts Council' held on the same day. The pieces were written by four prominent artists working in Bandung: Suyatna Anirun (a famous actor and director of Indonesian contemporary theatre), Benny Yohanes (a theatre director and Director of the theatre section at the Indonesian College for the Arts, Bandung), Saini KM (well-known poet and Director of the Indonesian Arts College) and Juniarso Ridwan (a poet and former Director of the Preparatory Body for Shaping the WJAC). All four identified the WJRAC as a 'top down' institution with little support from artists. Suyatna Anirun, Juniarso Ridwan and Yohanes (2000) went further and

[38] When the Governor held a ceremony to commemorate the beginning of the WJAC on 27 March 1999, a group of artists and students protested outside the opening (Imran 2000).

[39] Jeprut is an art form that is spontaneous, anti-order and anti-hierarchy. The purpose of the Bandung Jeprut Arts Council was to make the point that the arts do not need an Arts Council. The Indonesian acronym for the Bandung Jeprut Arts Council is the same as the West Java Arts Council (DKJB).

put forward that the institution was, in the words of Suyatna Anirun, 'a political accessory of power-holders'. Juniarso Ridwan states:

> The Arts Council's presence, as we accepted, much less than assuming a form as a partner of the government that gave various considerations in the arts, still continued to be subordinated to the influence of power-holders. All the actions of the Arts Council's position-holders had to be justified to power-holders. In my view, that is where power demonstrates its domination. (2000)

Suyatna Anirun and Juniarso Ridwan call for artists to shape an independent Arts Council or similar institution that is autonomous from government. Benny Yohanes (2000) makes a similar call for independence but based it on a modernist conception of art as having intrinsic qualities—creativity, flow, anti-hierarchy—that would be lost if it comes into contact with a political power-structure. Benny Yohanes' view of art is commonplace amongst artists in Bandung. Saini KM (2000), in contrast to the other three artists, views the WJRAC's role as at odds with role of an Arts Council. He views arts councils as advisory bodies that exist only to make recommendations to government, not to run programmes, organize events or make policy. He suggests a model like the city of Mannheim where nine respected critics, all of which have over 25 years experience in the arts, distribute funding. He argues that confusion over the role of the Arts Council caused considerable problems.

Indeed, the confusion over the role of both arts councils in West Java underlies the series of events. The national legislation clearly establishes the arts councils as 'advisers' to the governor and the provincial legislation confirms this role. Power still rests in the hands of the governor to shape the councils and accept or reject the advice. However, a substantial portion of the active artists in Bandung desired, or at least said they wanted, an independent body that could develop arts infrastructure and plan for the future. They wanted the WJAC to be an advocate for artists and the arts communities with a large degree of autonomy.

The WJRAC was able to take advantage in the difference between the state's conceptualization of culture, as defined in the arts council legislation, and the view of the artists in the WJAC. Particularly relevant is the definition of culture in the provincial legislation which states that it should 'have a root in local traditions and give features to national cultural life'. The artists of the WJAC wanted to act independently of the state's national cultural framework and put in place structures that moved away from the administrative framework that was clearly present within the legislation. The WJRAC exploited this difference and used its closer links with the

provincial bureaucracy to outmanoeuvre the WJAC. The WJRAC's willingness to adopt the cultural discourses preferred by the bureaucracy and its ability to mobilize support from the Governor associated the WJRAC with the state's conception of national culture. The association with the state's paternalistic conceptions of national culture was at the forefront of many critiques of both arts councils when the WJRAC collapsed.

Hill writes about TIM: "TIM's identity was caught between that of a free-flowing artistic community [...] and that of a complex bureaucratic structure linked to an increasingly powerful and interventionist state" (1993: 247). The tension that Hill identifies in TIM provides an insight into an issue that was central to the success or failure of all of the arts councils: perceptions about the role of the arts in governance and governance in the arts. Following the elimination of the largest group of left-wing artists and the marginalization of their perspectives on the arts and culture, a key issue for artists in Indonesia has been freedom of expression. The role artists have defined for themselves has tended towards that of providing insight from the perspective of unattached individuals, as can be seen from the issues identified in many of the arts centres discussed previously. However, the central government during the New Order era and continuing into the Reform era has defined the arts and artists within its cultural discourses that have centred on attempts to shape the attributes and behaviours of Indonesians in accordance with national development. The place of artists in the regime's governmental discourses has often been resisted by groups of artists, as can be seen in the clashes surrounding the JAC and the arts councils in West Java. This was not the case in all locations. In the RAC, one of the most active arts council in the 1990s, artists agreed with the governmental programmes of the provincial government that used culture as a way of building indigenous identity and worked hard to see them succeed.

The initiatives of the Reform era have impacted the arts councils in two ways. Firstly, the body that oversees and finances many of the arts councils, the provincial governments, has a greater degree of autonomy from the state and has greater incentives to build constituencies in local communities through promoting local arts and culture because of decentralization. In some provinces, there is more money and a larger degree of freedom in forming budgets. In Riau, new organizations have been formed that have incorporated the role of the arts councils. The West Sumatra Arts Council was the most active organizer of festivals in the province in the early 2000s despite low levels of funding. But the freedom of provincial government also includes the freedom not to fund the arts

councils while either funding other bodies (like in Riau) or spending the money elsewhere. Lampung, for instance, abolished both its cultural park and its arts council. Secondly, the end of repressive measures such as the licensing of arts events and censorship of the mass media has encouraged artists to become more openly critical of government policy. The RAC and the SERAI Foundation could not have been as openly critical of central government policies before the Reform era. Criticisms of the JAC resulted in a revision of its role and a series of new appointments. However the changed climate has not automatically produced clean and active institutions as the case of the West Java arts councils demonstrates.

Conclusion: Uniformity, Diversity and the Importance of Local Support

The cultural parks and the arts councils were the product of central initiatives and as such were formulated within the governmental discourses of the New Order regime. Both cultural institutions were concerned with producing art that was appropriate for the regime's broad goal of societal development and the management of ethnic/regional identity. These concerns were particularly evident in the cultural parks but were also evident in the arts council legislation and statements by political power-holders. However, the different locations of the cultural parks and arts councils counted against a uniform interpretation or agreement with the models provided by the central government. This underlies the importance of the concept of culturalities to cultural policy through the emphasis on the way that cultural discourses are deployed at particular locations. The cracks in the power of the central bureaucracy to dictate cultural development are apparent, as is the capacity of different groups and individuals to influence cultural outcomes, including better integration with local arts communities. The cultural parks had differing fortunes and outcomes across Indonesia during the New Order era despite having a single master in the Directorate of Culture. The arts councils demonstrated even greater plurality due to their reliance on artists' involvement and input into the institution and the coordinating role of provincial governments rather than the central government. The regime's preferred version of cultural governance through this plethora of institutions was not secured but instead was constantly under negotiation.

An important governmental issue within both the cultural parks and arts councils was regional identity. As representative institutions of particular regions, the cultural parks and arts councils had a privileged position

in articulating both regional identity and the region's place within the nation. The cultural parks were integral to the process of articulating a New Order regime-approved regional culture that fitted with its version of national culture. The arts councils, although not part of this network, were often articulated within provincial legislation that was focused on regional and national identity and citizenship. However, the arts communities of particular regions were often at odds with how the arts and the role of artists were articulated by both the provinces and the national government. Riau is a particularly interesting case since the RAC articulated a version of ethnic identity that was in conflict with the desires of the New Order regime and Reform era governments. In other locations, artists contested the subordination of their concerns to the state's concerns.

Without the support of local arts communities, the cultural parks and arts councils were always going to struggle. It was only where either the institutions accorded with the desires of local arts communities, like the SCP and the JAC in the 1970s, or where the governmental goals of the province were supported by artists, like the RAC, that they were able to attract broader support.

The changes of the Reform era that impacted these institutions were the transfer of cultural policy (including the cultural parks to the provincial governments) to the subnational levels of government and the sub-national levels of government's greater autonomy from the central government. These reforms brought about the decline of some of the cultural parks and arts councils but also an increase in funding and activities in others. In short, the diversity that always existed between the different regions has already begun to intensify and new state-sponsored institutions have already been formed. However, close examination of the operations of the state-sponsored cultural institutions reveals the uncertainties of change. The programmes of many of the newly decentralized cultural parks have been slow to change and the cultural discourses circulating in the legislation and reports are generally those of the New Order era. The arts councils, due to their greater autonomy, have responded more positively and, like the JAC, are adapting or being adapted to the new climate.

CHAPTER VIII

MAKING LOCAL CULTURE NATIONAL: CULTURAL MANAGEMENT, STATE PUBLICATIONS AND LOCAL CULTURES

The New Order regime's cultural discourses gained prominence in policy at the same time as the boom in oil prices sponsored an expansion of state-run activities in the mid-1970s. The Directorate of Culture was assigned the task of converting oil money into programmes that accorded with the regime's understanding of national culture and its political strategies. The revenue pumped into the Directorate was used to run, among other things, a series of cultural research projects that produced a large number of publications about Indonesian culture and history. Topics covered included biographies of national heroes, city histories, provincial histories of the struggle for independence against the Dutch, customary law, traditional architecture, folklore and, in some more recent texts published since 1995, the impact of television, changes brought by foreign culture through tourism and even relations between different ethnic groups, which was generally a taboo topic in all media during the New Order era.

The texts edited and published by the Directorate of Culture were generated by projects within its different sub-directorates. For instance, the Directorate of Museums managed the Museum Development Project, the Language Centre managed the Library Development Project and the Development of Indonesian and Local Language and Literature Project, and so forth.[1] The sub-directorate that produced by far the most texts including the texts that are the subject of this chapter was the Directorate of History and Traditional Values (Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai-Nilai Tradisional, Ditjarahnitra). The publications of Ditjarahnitra follow one of two streams. The history stream published texts focused largely on the revolution and national heroes. The second stream encompasses topics that investigate the local cultures of the archipelago, with each text focussing on a particular province. This chapter analyses texts in the second

[1] The Indonesian names of these projects are: Proyek Pengembangan Permuseuman; Proyek Pengembangan Perpustakaan; and Proyek Pengembangan Bahasa dan Sastra Indonesia dan Daerah.

stream. After providing an overview of the cultural research projects' history and administration, I analyse two texts produced by the cultural projects, focussing in particular on their representations of local cultures, and how the field of 'local culture' functions as a field of social management that shapes the features of objects located in that domain. As such, local culture itself can be read as a culturality produced by a set of relations within the Directorate of Culture and expressed within the publications, and therefore analysed for changes over a number of years.

In addition to analysing research into local culture, this chapter engages with two other cultural policy issues. The 'Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature' Theme Park (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, Taman Mini) has become the most important representation of, and most used research topic in analysing, how the New Order regime understood ethnicity. I use the research publications about local culture as a point of comparison to assess whether there were other models of cultural management with different constructions of ethnicity present within the New Order bureaucracy. Secondly, the time span of the research projects, which covers most of the New Order era and all of the Reform era, provides an opportunity to assess how cultural discourses altered as a result of the transition from the New Order to the Reform era and how the transition impacted the construction of local culture in the texts.

The phrase *kebudayaan daerah* can be translated as either local culture or regional culture due to the two meanings of the term *daerah*.[2] The slippage between 'regional' and 'local' is an interesting feature of the local culture projects. While the publications all focus on particular regions, the subject matter is generally much more localized cultural practices within the region. For this reason, I translate *daerah* as 'local' in the titles of the publications and the publication series.

State-run Cultural Research and Publications

State sponsored cultural publications preceded the New Order era. The Directorate of Culture's precursor, the Cultural Office (Jawatan Kebudayaan), released a small number of publications during the 1950s and

[2] A similar translation has occurred for the label of the Reform era decentralization process, *otonomi daerah*, which has been translated as both regional autonomy and local autonomy.

early 1960s.[3] The amount of publications produced during the New Order era far outstripped the pre-1965 publications in both numbers of titles and the number of copies printed. The Directorate of Culture first began publishing book-length texts about regional cultures in 1972. Ten separate projects have sponsored cultural research and publications in Ditjarahnitra (See table 8.1 for project names and details). The early projects focussed on cataloguing cultural artefacts and practices. From the mid-1970s, the projects can be divided into two types. Firstly, a stream of projects focussing on the customs and traditions of local cultures has continued to the present. Beginning with the Research and Recording of Local Culture Project (Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah, P3KD), this stream included the largest and most widely known project, the Inventorization and Documentation of Local Culture Project (Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah, IDKD), the Inventorization and Management of Cultural Values Project (Proyek Inventarisasi dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya, P3KN), and the Study and Management of Cultural Values Project (Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya, P3NB). These projects were concurrent and had overlapping themes such as folklore and customary law of various regions. This stream of projects produced the bulk of the cultural texts.

I group under the second project type 'all of the non-IDKD stream projects'—an eclectic mix of projects that focus on a variety of topics. The Development of Cultural Media Project (Proyek Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan, PMK) itself included an assortment of topics since 1975. Other projects have been focussed on the decorative arts and the production of photographic albums (Cultural Media Project, Proyek Media Kebudayaan, MK) while the Study and Management of Contemporary Culture Project (Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Kebudayaan Masa Kini, P3KMK) engages with a range of themes from contemporary life including the impact of tourism and television. The local culture projects primarily, but not exclusively, produced printed manuscripts. A Ditjarahnitra publication lists 1373 titles that were printed between 1976 and 1991 with small print runs of between ten and five hundred.[4] However, this

[3] The earliest of these that I have come across is a 1953 publication about the poet Chairil Anwar (Kirdjomuljo 1953).

[4] The titles are listed in a publication by the Sub-Directorate of Documentation and Publication (Subdit Dokumentasi dan Publikasi 1991) but the accuracy is questionable due to the poor documentation within the Directorate. Zurbuchen (1990) also notes the difficulty of evaluating the extent of the research.

does not include research carried out by the Regional Offices of the Directorate. The Australian National Library's Indonesian language collection has a list of 1,817 titles in the local culture projects series with publication dates between 1972 and 2003. In addition to the texts, a number of video and audio recordings of traditional rituals and practices were published and circulated. The local culture projects also funded a number of capital works projects including the building of Research Centres for Studying History and Traditional Values (Gedung Balai Kajian Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional), Centres of Cultural Documentation (Pusat Dokumentasi Kebudayaan) and Cultural Information Centres (Pusat Informasi Budaya) across the archipelago (Direktorat Kebudayaan 1994).

Ditjarahnitra's publications reflect the features of two streams of writing in Indonesia. Firstly, the publications within the history stream are bound to what Gerry van Klinken (2001a: 326) labels the 'orthodox nationalist stream' of Indonesian history).[5] The second trend relates more closely to the local culture projects. In the late 1970s, a stream of research about Javanese culture began in Yogyakarta by Professor Sudarsono. He labelled his research Javanologi and managed to procure state funding through the national cultural projects.[6] Budhisantoso, in his capacity as Director of History and Traditional Values, instigated a policy of various '*suku-ologi*' in order to balance the emphasis on Javanologi although this was limited to ethnic groups with written traditions. The 'ologi' studies, including Sundanologi, Batakologi, La Galigologi (on Bugis culture), Malayologi (based on writings found around Tanjung Pinang in Riau) along with Javanologi were funded through 'Research and Study of Archipelagic Culture Project' (P3KN) followed by the 'Study and Management of Cultural Values Project' (P3NB).

Table 8.2 lists the amount of money that IDKD received each year from 1989/90 until 1999/2000. Unfortunately, figures before 1989 were elusive due to the difficulties of accessing government archives of old reports. In any case, the figures can only give an indication of what impression the Directorate of Culture wanted to pass onto the National Planning Board. Budgets changed regularly under the New Order and budgeting defini-

[5] Particularly striking are the number of texts about heroes which were an important element of the 'hero' phenomena of Indonesian history writing identified by Reid (1979: 292–295) and elaborated on in local contexts by Cunningham (1989) and Hoskins (1987).

[6] Budhisantoso, interview, 7-9-2001.

Table 8.1: The ten local culture projects, their duration and a brief description

Years	Name of Project	Brief Description
1972–1976	Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Nasional (IDKN)	Focus was on listing local cultural practices and cataloguing cultural artefacts and manuscripts.
1975–	Proyek Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan (PMK)	A number of texts were produced in the seventies. Publication slowed then quickened again in late 1990s. Eclectic mixture of texts including pictorial albums.
1976–1979	Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah (P3KD)	Focus was on elements of local cultures such as folk law, marriage ceremonies and local customs.
1979–1987	Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah (IDKD)	Continues the local cultures themes from P3KD. This project produced more texts and is better known than any of the other projects.
1979–1984	Proyek Media Kebudayaan (MK)	Focus was on the decorative arts. Also produced a number of photographic albums and some recordings.
1984–1995	Proyek Penelitian dan Pengkajian Kebudayaan Nusantara (P3KN)	Focus was on written traditions, in particular local language manuscripts.
1989–1992	Proyek Inventarisasi dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya (IPNB)	Continuation of local cultures themes from IDKD.
1992–1995	Proyek Penelitian, Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya Daerah (P3NBD)	Themes covered education, modernization and economic systems. This project was oriented towards social-science themes.
1993–	Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya (P3NB)	Continuation of local cultures themes from IDKD. Includes republications of earlier texts.
1995–	Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Kebudayaan Masa Kini (P3KMK)	Examines everyday contemporary culture. Indicates a broadening in the meaning of culture.

tions are unclear. However, the figures do demonstrate some important information about the project. Until 1999/2000 the project used over 10 percent of the Directorate's budget indicating its centrality to the role of the Directorate. Also the decline in 1999/2000 reflects its more marginal position in the new, decentralized cultural bureaucratic structure.

Table 8.2: Funding for IDKD stream projects by year (Rp. Thousand)

Year	Programme	Project	Total	% prog./ total	References
89/90	1,381,271	1,159,052	11,218,572	12.31	Report 89/90–93/94 pp91, 106
90/91	2,379,042	1,799,035	16,034,187	14.84	Ibid.
91/92	4,176,675	3,016,500	25,874,187	16.14	Ibid.
92/93	4,897,786	3,045,132	32,048,478	15.28	Report 94/95, p48
93/94	5,187,864	3,171,765	40,023,152	12.96	Report 94/95, p49
94/95	6,521,300	3,859,026	46,596,570	14.00	Report 94/95, p50
95/96*	7,052,292	4,160,743	58,981,723	11.96	Ibid.
96/97*	7,052,292	4,160,743	58,981,723	11.96	Ibid.
97/98*	7,052,292	4,160,743	58,981,723	11.96	Ibid.
98/99	7,423,422	4,363,376	69,750,000	10.64	Report 94/95–98/99, p14
99/00	6,649,138	4,357,203	74,232,158	8.96	Report 99/2000, p41
99/2000 Total	59,773,375	37,253,320	492,722,473	12.13	

* Average amounts are given for the 95/96–97/98 period as records of individual years were not available.

The choice of topic and research process was, and still is, intricately tied up with the bureaucratic structure and policy-making system discussed in chapter four. The annual process begins with a meeting between the Head of Ditjarahnitra and the Heads of the Sub-directorates. The results of the discussion are taken to the technical team within the Documentation and Publication Sub-directorate who formulate the Terms of Reference (ToR) between May and June. The ToR are checked by Bappenas and the Directorate of Estimates, guaranteeing their connection to the Repelita and the 1945 constitution as the connection determines the amount of money that is given. Around June all of the regional coordinators are flown to Jakarta for a meeting after which they return to their areas and complete the research between June and October. The research is returned to the technical team who edit the drafts and prepare them for publication between November and December. Publication takes place the following year.

The Directorate of Culture attempted to demonstrate through the ToR that they were implementing the policies outlined in the Repelita. A quick examination of the ToR for the planning of the 'Rainbow of the Archipelago Series' (Seri Pelangi Nusantara) in 2001, which produced texts for children, reveals the priorities of the Directorate. The most revealing section of the ToR is the 'Background and Problems' section which also

serves as an introduction. The ToR began by connecting the Republic of Indonesia together with cultural diversity through the state-slogan, 'Unity in Diversity'. It continued with a statement that summarized the purpose of the series:

> These days, knowledge of cultural differences and similarities between Indonesian ethnic communities has become important for strengthening national unification and unity. Knowing and having an attitude that values and respects differences and develops intercultural similarities needs to be constructed in the generation that are the future of the Indonesian nation. (Pemimpin Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya Jakarta 2001: 1)

A second concern in the ToR was the absence of children's books about the diversity of ethnic cultures. These two concerns came together in the 'Objective' of the series: to spread information about cultural diversity in Indonesia to children in a form that is easily read and understood and develops knowledge and empathy about other cultures and helps children 'understand and revere the meaning of the slogan of the Indonesian nation: Unity in Diversity' (2001: 1). Once these concerns were outlined, the ToR turned to the features of local cultures that were considered suitable for inclusion within the texts. These features included the regional environment including natural and manmade features, histories (including 'heroes'), traditional knowledge and technology, customs, cultural values such as folk tales for children and art, social solidarity and cultural and natural tourism. Finally, the ToR listed the writing style and format appropriate for children's texts.

The ToR thus established the governmental goals of the series, including the national framing of local cultures within the texts, before the features of the local cultures were mentioned. The bureaucrats in the Directorate of Culture had to conform as closely as possible to the New Order regime's cultural discourses in order to guarantee continued funding for their projects and the accompanying extra salary and professional prestige. The policy system gave financial and professional incentives for the continuation of the local culture projects and discouraged variance from the established model.

Locating Local Culture

When discussing the New Order regime's concepts and management of ethnic culture, scholars regularly invoke the image of Taman Mini. Patricia Spyer (1996: 26) observed that when discussing the state's interpretation

of cultural diversity, 'it has become almost perfunctory to invoke the image of Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park.'[7] A recent study that uses Taman Mini as a representative example of the links between culture and governance in the New Order era is Tom Boellstorff's (2002) article, 'Ethnolocality'. Boellstorff (2002: 25) defines ethnolocality as the 'spatial scale where 'ethnicity' and 'locality' presume each other to the extent that they are, in essence, a single concept.' In other words, ethnolocality refers to the various indigenous Indonesian ethnicities—Javanese, Balinese, Torajan—that are linked to spatial locations.

Boellstorff (2002: 32) uses Taman Mini to illustrate how ethnolocality was instrumental to the New Order regime's construction of an 'archipelagic culture' for Indonesians. The centre of Taman Mini is a reflective pool containing small artificial islands that form a map of Indonesia, surrounded by twenty-seven pavilions, one for each province. Each pavilion includes a customary house that contains arts and crafts from each province. Boellstorff writes:

> Taman Mini draws together ethnicity and locality so that each presupposes the other. Region and *adat* are rendered isomorphic in a spatial scale that claims the mantle of ethnolocal tradition but is incomprehensible outside the reworked logic of racial dualism, the 'framework generated by the unifying agency of the state' (Spyer 1996: 31). (2002: 32)

Boellstorff uses Taman Mini to demonstrate how the New Order regime contained and depoliticized ethnic cultures within Indonesia. To be Javanese or Batak or Torajan is also to be an Indonesian citizen.

Greg Acciaioli's article (1996) 'Pavilions and Posters,' provides a more detailed analysis of Taman Mini. Acciaioli writes that Taman Mini was more than an illustration of an ideal but was envisioned as an educational tool for influencing Indonesian's subjectivity. He writes: "[Taman Mini] stands now and through the future as the New Order's exhibitionary showcase for building citizenship, for fulfilling its project of constructing the subjectivity and subjection of the Indonesian citizenry" (1996: 40). As has already been demonstrated here, Acciaioli (1996: 27) notes that 'cultural development' was 'one of the priorities of the New Order state' that shaped how ethnic culture was represented in Taman Mini. The core of Acciaioli's argument is similar to Boellstorff's argument that ethnicities were articulated within the framework of the Indonesian nation-state, which he expresses through identifying a 'purported [...] basic cultural

[7] See Bowen (1991), Anderson (1990a) and Hellman (1999).

substratum of Indonesianness' within Taman Mini's representations of ethnic cultures (1996: 39). However, he provides greater detail about how different ethnicities were articulated. Four points in particular require greater attention here.

First, Acciaioli uses a number of different illustrations to demonstrate that the more peripheral a culture, the more likely its features are to be an 'assemblage' of generic traits considered suitably Indonesian. He demonstrates this point through analysing the location of the pavilions around the lake and demonstrating that the distance from the centre of the park coincided with the marginality of an ethnic group's culture to the nation. Hence the pavilions for the provinces in Java and Bali are close while West Papua (until 2000 called Irian Jaya) and East Timor are given the most peripheral locations. Acciaioli emphasizes the marginal position of particular ethnic cultures within the nation by examining the 'traditional costumes' of the different ethnic groups. The Javanese styles were reasonably accurate depictions while the 'regional style' for West Papua was silk pants and blouse, well removed from the penis sheaths for which the region is renowned. If regional cultures varied too far from the styles of cultural centre, like West Papua, they were erased in Taman Mini in favour of broadly 'Indonesian' generic styles.

Second, Acciaioli notes the existence of a number of 'children's gardens, parks and museums' around Taman Mini that were not devoted to ethnic cultures. The museums told the success stories of the New Order regime. They were devoted to the armed forces, sports, information services, oil and natural gas development, science and technology and communications. Acciaioli (1996: 32) writes that celebrating the success stories of development emphasizes how the regime provides the 'shelter of modernity which can allow regional cultures to thrive, be renewed and reinvigorated.' Third, Acciaioli, following John Pemberton's (1994a: 40) research, notes how Taman Mini effaces time through reproducing cultural symbols that are 'more complete and more perfect' than their originals. The cultural symbols of Javanese and Balinese royalty that saturate the structures situated at the entrance to the park link the New Order regime to the traditions of the previous rulers. Finally, Acciaioli offers a slightly different spatial scale to Boellstorff. While Boellstorff (2002) is careful to note that ethnolocality, as an intermediate spatial scale, does not necessarily correspond to an administrative area, Acciaioli (1996) notes that Taman Mini tends to conflate administrative region and cultural region. Where ethnicities are represented as coexisting within a province, they tend to be attributed to a lower level of administration such as regencies.

The local culture project texts, as another form of representation of the New Order regime's models of local culture and cultural diversity, offer a point of comparison to Taman Mini regarding the New Order regime's cultural management techniques. There is a large overlap in subject matter and both were governmental interventions into Indonesians' understandings about themselves. In her research into writings about customs and folklore, Susan Rodgers (2003: 135) notes that the regional identity under consideration ('Angkola Batak-ness') was 'an ideological construct, built up in relationships with other 'peoples' and with states.' Rodgers (2003: 135) continues: 'More recently, other parties to the conversation have been authors in the New Order state's own investigations of Batak customs, through programmes such as the Proyek Dokumentasi dan Inventarisasi Kebudayaan Daerah.' Here we have an Indonesian example of how culture is 'a historically produced surface of social regulation' (Bennett 1992: 27) that is contested at many levels. Whereas Rodgers' analysis pursues how Angkola Batak writers have resisted colonial and New Order representations of their local culture, this chapter pursues a trajectory focussed on the New Order regime's production of local culture and its links to governance. The local culture texts provide an opportunity to explore a state-constructed culturality, including both the systems that held it in place and the textual characteristics of local culture it produced.

The New Order Text: Acehnese Marriage as a National Cultural Ritual

The local culture projects cover a broad range of topics over a period of almost thirty years, making the choice of representative texts difficult. I have chosen the two texts analysed here, *Marriage Law and Ceremonies in the Special Region of Aceh* (Syamsuddin 1978/9) and *Yogya in Passing* (Guritno and Setiawati 2000), for two reasons. Firstly, the two texts were produced in two different periods. The Aceh text was the product of early New Order cultural policy and one of the first waves of texts sponsored by oil revenues whereas the Yogyakarta text was produced and published during the Reform era. Comparing texts from two different periods opens up opportunities to assess the changes that have occurred since the beginning of the project and to assess the impact of the reform movement within an official cultural text. Secondly, the geographical and historical differences between the two regions raise interesting questions about cultural representations. Aceh is located at the North-Eastern tip of Indonesia

and was one of the last areas incorporated by the Dutch after prolonged warfare. The long resistance to Dutch control has made Aceh an 'exemplary case' for Indonesian nationalist historical consciousness constructed in the Sukarno and Suharto eras (Reid 2005). Yogyakarta by contrast is located in Java and is often represented as the cultural centre of Java. It was the location of the government of the Indonesian republic for much of the War of Independence. Although both provinces are important for the nationalist imagination, their differences open up interesting points of comparison given the nationalist framing of the texts. I do not dispute or accept the accuracy of the texts' depiction of Acehnese marriage law or life in Yogyakarta. The issue I engage with is the representation of local culture.

The series of government publications about marriage law and ceremonies was part of the 'Research and Recording of Local Culture Project' (Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah, P3KD). Unlike IDKD, whose primary goal in the late 1970s was to collect and disseminate information about local cultures that would strengthen national unity and national values, P3KD's primary goal was to collect as much information as possible about marriage law and ceremonies for the Department of Education and Culture to assist with policy development and implementation. In *Marriage Law and Ceremonies in the Special Region of Aceh* (henceforth, *Marriage Law in Aceh*), this goal was tied to strengthening nationalism: Marriage law and ceremonies in the region of Aceh, as an element of national culture, makes a contribution to securing nationalism in the younger generation. (Syamsuddin 1978/9: 1).

The New Order Text: State Research Methods for Local Culture

In this section I explore the two most important elements of the discursive structure that underpins the process of articulating Acehnese marriage law and ceremonies. First, I analyse how local culture was located within a national spatial-cultural order through exploring the history of *adat* and how it was represented in the text. Second, I explore the research methodology used in the texts and reveal its links to the Indonesian intellectual climate and related research trends in the late 1960s and 1970s. This form of research expertise was central to how knowledge about local culture was generated in the local culture project texts.

The topic of marriage law in Aceh can be summarized as marriage *adat*. *Adat* is often translated as 'customary law' (Boellstorff 2002: 28) and can

incorporate related ceremonies and practices. Although the word *adat* appears on almost every page of the text, it was never defined and its history was never interrogated. However, the term *adat* carries a long history with many links to governance. Spyer captures the complex uses and history of *adat* when she writes:

> Itself a foreign term and a derivative of the Arabic word for custom, *adat*, which applies today somewhat paradoxically to that which is held to have evaded the influence of time itself, clearly developed within the historical context of a complex interaction between Dutch hegemonic ambitions, colonial practices of rule (or divide and rule), foreign religions, and the political alliances that ordered the populations of the Malay region along religious and ethnic lines (1996: 28)

The formative period for ethnolocalities was the colonial era (Gouda 1995; Lev 1985). Although fashioned by a complex group of factors, ethnolocalities were strengthened by the Dutch administration's need for an organizing principle that was larger than the village and smaller than the categories of native and Islam (Boellstorff 2002). The Dutch administration found their mode of organization through the concept of '*adat* groups'. The Dutch conceived *adat* in legal terms as the traditional law of a particular area. In the decentralized Dutch system of governance, Indonesia was divided into *adat* areas with their own set of laws.[8] Legal status was conflated with a generalized, politically expedient concept of cultural identity. Over time these areas became the ethnic groupings of Indonesia today.

The idea of *adat* continued to play a role in governance in independent Indonesia as can be demonstrated in *Marriage Law in Aceh*. *Adat* was used in the text to order different cultures and regions within a national framework. To illustrate the breadth of this issue, I return to a statement from the previous paragraph: "Marriage law [*adat*] and ceremonies in the region of Aceh, as an element of national culture, makes a contribution to securing nationalism in the younger generation" (Syamsuddin 1978/9: 1). Here Acehnese *adat* is tied to the nation ('an element of national culture'), and at the same time links particular indigenous law and ceremonies to a particular region, which conflates region with indigenous ethnic groups. This second point was soon put into action by dividing the province into

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[8] Boellstorff (2002: 29) writes: 'Colonial rule was predicated not on a different customary law for every 'village', nor a single customary law for all 'natives', but upon a mediating spatial scale, formed through a drawing together of bloodline and place, ethnicity and locality'.

ten administrative regions and seven '*adat* regions' (1978/9: 2). The marriage *adat* of five of the seven *adat* groups identified as indigenous to Aceh form the basis of the study. Each of these five *adat* regions was identified with an administrative region or regions. Thus by the end of the second page a spatial scale was established between nation, region and constituent *adat* groups.

The organizing principle of nation-region-ethnie was an ideal that even the text itself had trouble maintaining. Despite the focus on the particular ethnic groups within Aceh, the historical section (1978/9: 24–33) wrote the history of the province, rather than the histories of the ethnic groups that were the subjects of the research. The demographic data raises more issues. Although some of the groups dominated particular regions (for instance, according to the text the Gayo make up 90 percent of Central Aceh), most of the areas were culturally plural (for instance, the Alas are 60 percent of Southeast Aceh and the Aneuk Jamee are 35 percent of South Aceh). In addition, migrants are a significant portion of the population. Batak Indonesians, for instance, made up 35 percent of Southeast Aceh and the Javanese were also noted as a sizable ethnic group. However, the nation-region-ethnie ideal did not allow for the *adat* of migrant groups to be analysed and they were ignored in this and other local culture projects publications. Even in the text the cultural model was fragile.

The second element of the discursive structure on which the text relied was the use of a particular research methodology and the research was conducted with certain methodological assumptions not disclosed in the text and possibly not recognized by the researchers. An indication of these methodological assumptions was the organization of the chapters that provide details about marriage *adat*. The authors broke down each practice or ceremony into their constituent parts, recorded its symbolic meaning and made comparisons between the different *adat* groups. This research methodology was closely linked to the dominant trend in Indonesian cultural research in the 1970s that was labelled by its critics 'culturalism' or 'the cultural approach' (Heryanto 2005: 75) and was closely related to the theory and research methods of the anthropologist Koentjaraningrat.

Koentjaraningrat, as was mentioned in chapter three, made use of the concept of 'cultural value orientation' (*orientasi nilai-budaya*) which he borrowed from the works of Clyde and Florence Kluckholm (Koentjaraningrat 2000), who were involved in the functionalist movement in post-World War II American social science. According to Koentjaraningrat: "A cultural value orientation system consists of concepts, which

live in the natural thought of the largest part of a society, about the things that they must consider to have the most value in their lives" (2000: 20). Cultural value orientations function as the 'highest directive for human action' (2000: 25) and, following Florence Kluckholm and Fred Strodbeck (1961), differed between societies through variations in decisions regarding universal problems (Koentjaraningrat 2000). Koentjaraningrat pursued a qualitative research method using formal questionnaires with the aim of identifying cultural value systems and recommending changes where they conflicted with his ideal values for national development.[9] Heryanto (2005: 70) writes that 'Koentjaraningrat's model was reproduced, albeit with methodological distortions depending on the practical needs of the different groups making reference to his model'.[10] *Marriage Law in Aceh* adopted a methodology that used quantitative surveys and description and an official, simplified version of cultural value orientation, where the discovery of traditional values, and how they are maintained, was an object of study.

This method reflected a form of analysis that Rex Mortimer (1973) identifies as 'comparativism' in his critique of Indonesian Studies in Australia. Developed from the functionalist theories in American social science research and related to theories of political and economic development, comparativism, like the local research projects, broke down social and political systems into their constituent 'functions' in order to make comparisons based on a normative set of ideal functions. Parallels between 'comparativism' and the research in the Directorate of Culture are not surprising given the Indonesian intellectual climate of the 1970s (Liddle 1973; Ward 1973)[11] before the structuralist critique of the 1980s (Heryanto 2005). Ward (1973) notes that intellectuals that supported these theories were averse to investigating older indigenous traditions which they denigrated as impeding national development. When these traditions

[9] See Koentjaraningrat (1999) where he discusses his ideal cultural values for development and uses a table (1999: 375) to assess if different aspects of different Indonesian regions (with 'Chinese' as a separate category) are barriers or catalysts for development.

[10] Hadiz and Dhakidae (2005: 12) write: 'More than any other Indonesian anthropologist, it was [Koentjaraningrat] who established the parameters of anthropological concerns in Indonesia in the 1960s—which included 'defining' the features of 'an Indonesian culture'—and therefore played a major intellectual role in the state-led modernization and nation-building process'. They also highlight Koentjaraningrat's importance for the prominence of quantitative research methods in Indonesian social science research (2005: 12).

[11] The goal of the social and political transformation promoted by leading intellectuals, particularly in the early 1970s, was economic and social development in line with the 'idealised, pragmatic stability of American democracy' (Ward 1973: 78).

were explored in the local culture projects, the use of a 'comparativist' methodology meant that indigenous traditions were articulated within a framework that did not acknowledge larger social formations, such as gender and class.

Another feature of the research methods in *Marriage Law in Aceh* is the absence of informants in the texts. The authors only mention the names of their informants in a list attached to the end of the text. They do not record personal interactions between informants and researchers or give accounts of their experiences at particular ceremonies. Instead, following the North American tradition of empiricism, the authors recorded Acehnese marriage *adat* from the standpoint of an observer who impartially records practices and interprets symbols at a remove from the ceremonies themselves. This method accords with what Pierre Bourdieu calls objectivism:

> Objectivism constitutes the social world as a spectacle presented to an observer who takes up a 'point of view' on the action, who stands back so as to observe it and, transferring into his object the principles of his relation to the object, conceives of it as a totality for cognition alone, in which all interactions are reduced to symbolic exchanges. This point of view is the one afforded by high positions in the social structure. (1977: 96)

Locating meaning in the exchanges allows the researchers to reify community practices and ignore how the practices change to address new circumstances as well as ignoring their political and personal dimensions. Research takes the form of typology where marriage *adat* was divided into its different ceremonies and interpreted in a symbolic way that ignores the relationships that create meaning. The process of classification was central to how the text produced Acehnese marriage *adat*. The visiting researcher interpreted data to fit within a pre-existing framework devised by cultural bureaucrats.

The adoption of a research methodology that emphasized symbolism over sociopolitical formation is an important feature of *Marriage Law in Aceh*. Objectivism is a version of what David Spurr (1993: 53) describes as aestheticization: 'a certain possession of social reality which holds it at arm's length and makes it into the object of beauty, horror, pleasure, and pity'. Through this process, the text separates local culture from other areas of life as a realm that is saturated with 'noble values' that can be used to provide pedagogical lessons in behaviours and attitudes. In this sense they operated in a similar way as Toby Miller and George Yudice (2002: 148) identify for museums: they were a 'delimited ethical zone, a space that divides worthy and unworthy conduct'.

Marriage Law in Aceh drew on an established discourse about *adat* and Western research and writing methods to construct awareness that local culture is an element of the Indonesian nation and to present its particular organization of the text as objective and logical rather than subject to the political goals and preferences of the New Order bureaucracy. The critical reading of the texts in the next two sections explores two aspects of the research that are touched on by the previous discussion of research methodology: first, how the 'comparativist' typology constructed cultural difference and second, the normative ideals that formed the basis of comparisons between types.

The New Order Text: Controlling Cultural Difference

The 'Kinds of Marriage' section in the '*Adat* before Marriage' chapter (1978/9: 55–85) provides an interesting example of how the five ethnic groups whose marriage law and ceremonies under consideration were compared in the text. The text lists six kinds of marriage in Aceh. These are: the 'usual type'; elopement; polygamy (up to four wives); the 'exchange of mats' where one spouse will marry an in-law if their spouse dies; a 'hanging marriage' that involved a long engagement and was generally used for underage engagements; and 'special types' that included the 'temporary marriage' category[12] and two other variants. The practices and variants of the ethnic groups for each 'type' of marriage were listed within the sub-sections.

An example of the organization of the text is its analysis of the 'usual type' of marriage. After defining the 'usual type' as marriages that were undertaken in accordance within the parameters of Islam and the ethnic groups' customs and stating other similarities (it occurs between a man and a woman and is monogamous), the text began moving chronologically through the different stages and listing the differences between different ethnic groups. The first step was the proposal from the groom's family to the bride followed by an engagement period and an exchange of dowry. The text lists the local language words for the engagement period and presents. The multiple listings of different words for what was represented as the same object are a feature of *Marriage Law in Aceh*.

[12] The 'temporary marriage category was for couples that have divorced three times and according to Islamic law can not be wed again but wish to proceed despite previous experiences.

Over half the text (three of six chapters consisting of 92 of 177 pages) lists the customs and ceremonies of the five ethnic groups using this method. Instead of tackling these groups separately, the text divided then subdivided their customs and ceremonies into predetermined categories then noted the differences and similarities in languages, tools, customs and meanings. Starting from a typology of marriage laws and ceremonies defined as analogous hides the assumptions that allowed the laws and customs to be represented as analogous. Instead of locating cultural differences as elements of larger variations in social structure or history, small differences became the markers of the cultural plurality of Indonesia. This construction of cultural difference can be distinguished from how cultural difference was represented within Taman Mini. Instead of the details of culturally marginal groups blurring, cultural differences in the Aceh text are articulated in detail within a framework that assumes an underlying cultural similarity. Cultural difference, in this location, strengthens the nation as difference becomes a local variation of a shared national activity. The various ethnic groups are articulated into the nation as Indonesia's local cultures.

Although there are differences between the Taman Mini and local culture project versions of state-approved cultural difference, they both are consistent with the New Order regime's strategy of depoliticization of the populace to reduce older forms of identification and 'naturalize' the state's preferred forms of identity. The 'comparativist' methodology, which it should be remembered was the preserve of groups that were averse to traditional forms of affiliation, concealed broader sociopolitical groupings. Spyer notes a similar trend of 'depoliticization' in the New Order regime's use of *adat*, which she illustrates with a familiar example. She writes: Since the colonial period, and in particular under the Suhartos, the domain to which *adat* is applicable has been shrinking, while *adat* has become increasingly bereft of power as it is redefined to codify highly limited aspects of 'traditional' sociocultural life—those for instance, reflected in the emblematic silhouettes of the *adat* houses contained in Jakarta's Beautiful Indonesia pond. (1996: 28)

A popular interpretation of the New Order's representation of difference is that it is limited to a cultural sphere that is shorn of political and historical connections. While *Marriage Law in Aceh* affirms this interpretation, it also suggests that this process was an element of the production of a new organization of social and cultural life that was connected to the spread of a new social knowledge. Heryanto writes that:

> a specific ideology about the world, truth and social knowledge had gained momentum from the material and immaterial conditions of the time to develop and become dominant in the socio-political context of the New Order. (2005:70)

Acehnese marriage customs were represented through this process as part of the local culture of national citizens, who, as I explore in the next section, were subject to national priorities as part of the national community rather than the reproduction of pre-existing community structures.

The New Order Text: Development Priorities and Acehnese Marriage Adat

In the opening chapter, the authors make the following point about marriage law and ceremonies in Aceh:

> In facing the current state of development, one needs to ask what extent of efficiency is found in the implementation of marriage laws and ceremonies in the region of Aceh. From this point of view, the problems that need to be explored are the elements that cause wastefulness from the point of view of money, time and whats more human resources (1978/9: 4).

This statement draws attention to one of the core governmental principles behind the construction of marriage law and ceremonies as a field of cultural activity by the New Order bureaucracy. The cultural practices discussed in the text were held up against the regime's ideal norms for the practices of everyday life as articulated in its programmes for accelerated development. Although also underlying the categories and judgements discussed in the previous sections, the comparison was most clearly present within the final 'analytical' chapter and in particular the section about the relationship between marriage law and ceremonies and the state's family planning programme.

The Indonesian family planning programme was one of the New Order regime's success stories and one of the regime's most high profile interventions into the lives of Indonesians as part of its plans for accelerated development (Hull 1994; Mackie and MacIntyre 1994). Suharto was its patron from the late 1960s and it received substantial resources from the state budget and from international sources. *Marriage Law in Aceh* discussed family planning in the section 'The relationship between marriage law and ceremonies and the family planning programme'. The section, as its title indicates, traced how marriage practices supports and hinders the state's family planning goals. The section began with the statement that the family planning programme was opposed to the local priority of having large families and Islamic ideas of leaving such planning in God's hands.

However, the text then observed that local customs were a form of planning that included ensuring that births do not closely follow each other. These practices accorded with the concepts of the family planning programme, in so much as local customs indicated that people could take a degree of control over their fertility. Four practices are listed: constructing a temporary hearth to warm a mother after childbirth and a restricted diet; massage to stop menstruation; segregation of husbands and wives for nine months after the birth of a child; and a 'child tithe' (*zakat anak*) where the twelfth child born is given up for adoption to an elder or *ulama*.[13]

The authors (1978/9: 162) then considered the problem of population growth and its relationship to a host of different issues including education, unemployment and housing and note that all of these problems influenced the 'success of development and shape of society that is strongly desired'. Given the importance of the goals of national development, the authors declared that the family planning programme must be implemented. They then established that the principles of family planning accorded with the principles that underlay Acehnese marriage law and *adat*. The evidence for this similarity was the three goals of the Family Planning Programme that were represented as also underlying marriage law and customs:

1. Give marriage counselling;
2. Give assistance/medication for sterility;
3. Give advice/help for reducing pregnancies (1978/9: 172).

Additional evidence was Aceh's low rate of population growth that was understood as an indication that marriage customs kept birth rates down (1978/9: 163). The section then turned to some of the inconsistencies. The desire for large families was criticized as not according with the principles of family planning or marriage law and customs. The 'openness' of the family planning programme was contrasted with the 'guardedness' of the families in the areas studied regarding contraceptive discussion and purchases—a difference which was attributed to traditional Acehnese society 'not yet being able to receive modernization ideas' (1978/9: 163). Also noted were the tendency of couples to marry whilst young and the continued practice of polygamy. The authors argued both of these practices should be discouraged and claimed they were in decline.

[13] The text notes that the latter two forms of birth control rarely occurred by the 1970s.

The regime's development goals were understood as following the same principles as traditional practices. In matters where elements of local culture were viewed as impeding the implementation of these principles, the development goals were interpreted as perfecting local culture. Thus the state's programme of development was not understood in the text as clashing with local culture but as completing it. This provides an insight into how local culture was connected to the reformist programmes of the New Order regime. The way local culture was constructed here was normative in the sense that it made the lives of Indonesians amenable to the regime's development programmes. Marriage law and customs were articulated in the text through this normative grid that reconstructed them as practices to be encouraged or altered.[14] Development goals provided the set of ideal practices that are conceived of as both indigenous and modern.

The New Order regime's model of cultural management is completed when all of the marriage law and ceremony texts from each province are placed next to each other. Each of the texts had the same goals, chapter headings and sub-chapter headings. The framing and the issues addressed are identical in each region and the focus on national unity and the New Order regime's development goals are also shared. Together, these texts complete the articulation of local culture as part of the fabric of national life. The nation is divided into provinces. Each provincial region is divided into *adat* regions that neatly correspond with the administrative boundaries. Each *adat* region has a comparable *adat* that signifies both ethnic group and national culture and is assessed against the norms set out in the reformist agenda of the New Order regime. The New Order regime's version of local culture is produced through such state programmes and its features determined by the regime's governmental strategies and goals. From this macro perspective, the cultural order moved Indonesians towards the attitudes and behaviours desired by the New Order regime.

Taman Mini has its own version of an Indonesian wedding. Located on the ground floor of the Taman Mini museum, a large diorama depicts the wedding ceremony of a Central Javanese couple, attended by guests

[14] The relationship to development ideals does infer a hierarchy between groups in different texts. Tsing (1993: 172) writes of state-sponsored research about an indigenous group in South Kalimantan: 'All reports include an invocation of the narrative of progress and development in which the Meratus are portrayed as backward, illiterate, unhealthy, and disorderly'. She also notes that 'a stable structure of authority' (1993: 173) creates an equivalence between cultures.

wearing the 'traditional' ethnic costumes representing the other provinces of Indonesia. Jörgan Hellman writes of the wedding:

> The wedding reception staged in Museum Indonesia is intended to represent the diversity of the cultural heritage in Indonesia at the same time as it promotes a metaphor for grasping this diversity as a unified whole. (1999: 52)

This is a common metaphor used to understand how the New Order regime constructed plurality. The marriage law and ceremonies series of texts presented a slightly different use of ethnic culture to promote plurality, one that perhaps better accorded with the construction of cultural diversity across the nation and not just from the national capital. In the series, local culture was constructed through the discourses of archipelagic culture, national unity and modernization in a similar way to Taman Mini and confirmed the awkward attempts to merge administrative and cultural area. However, it also indicated a more complex construction that, rather than blurring cultural difference, incorporated it into national culture while all the time attempting to 'perfect' local culture in accordance with the state's discourse of national unity and the goals and discourses of development.

The Reformasi Text: Yogyakarta, Cultural Heritage and the Child-citizen

The 'Introducing the Cultures of the Archipelago Series' (Seri Pengenalan Budaya Nusantara) was planned, written and published in 2000 as part of the Study and Management of Cultural Values Project (P3NB). The text analysed below, *Yogya in Passing* (Guritno and Setiawati 2000), was conceived in a political climate with striking differences to *Marriage Law in Aceh*. During the publication of the latter, the New Order was strengthening its grasp on power and formulating its version of governance. *Yogya in Passing* was published after the Indonesian elections of 1999 during the Wahid administration at a time when democratic reform held a high priority in public debate and the press had a degree of freedom of expression not seen since the 1950s. Despite these changes, the goals of the Introducing the Cultures of the Archipelago Series, as stated in the preface by Director-General of Culture I Gusti Nurah Anom, were very similar to those of IDKD:

> The management of Indonesian cultural values is pushed towards trying to inventorize and socialise Indonesian cultural values that are based on the *Pancasila* and the 1945 constitution. Relatedly, the cultural management programmes are directed towards developing Indonesian cultural values

> that mirror noble national values in order to strengthen national character, increase selfrespect, create expressions of national pride and also further strengthen the spirit of unity. (Gurning and Lestariningsih 2000: iii)

Although differing slightly to the goals of *Marriage Law in Aceh*, there are similarities in the emphasis on national unity and cultural values.

An important difference between the two texts is that *Yogya in Passing* is written for children. Its language is simpler and it repeatedly uses the informal personal pronoun ku to refer to the narrator whereas personal pronouns were absent from *Marriage Law in Aceh* that represented the authors position as objective. The narrative also varies in an attempt to engage its child-readers. For instance, the first chapter is written from the perspective of the narrator who is returning to Yogyakarta to visit grandparents. The following chapters vary this theme slightly as they engage with different places and themes (see table 8.3).

Yogya in Passing begins with a description of Yogyakarta by a returning traveller. The view described is not what we would commonly expect from an infrequent visitor on a returning relative. The narrator notes, amongst other things, different methods of getting to Yogyakarta, the date the province was established and all of the names of its constituent regencies and their locations. The narrator continues by noting the percentage of land in Yogyakarta which is still forest, the major mountains and their heights and the names and locations of all the rivers. The narrator moves onto the official crest of Yogyakarta and explains the meaning of each of the crest's elements, providing an account of the city-region in accordance with the government's understanding of the 'province'.

In the second preface of *Yogya in Passing*, the project leader of the 'Introducing the Cultures of the Archipelago Series' writes: "With the

Table 8.3: Narrative structure of chapters in *Yogya in Passing*

Chapter	Narrative Structure
1	Return to Yogyakarta to visit Grandparents. Gives details of the area.
2	Trip along Malioboro Street giving details of the sights, sounds, statues and some historical buildings.
3	Discusses the building of houses in a customary regional style, listing the names of the tools, people involved and purposes of the rooms.
4	Relates a story told by the narrator's Grandmother and describes a traditional children's game.
5	Describes the Yogyakarta palace and gives the details and historical background on the rite of Sekaten, a festival honouring the prophet Mohammad's birthday.
6	Describes two museums and two tourist destinations.

publication of this book, it is hoped that children's knowledge about the diversity of Indonesian culture will progressively increase. Due to this, cultural imbalance can increasingly be addressed and the spirit of unification and unity can be further strengthened" (Guritno and Setiawati 2000: v–vi). In this respect, *Yogya in Passing* is more directly pedagogical than *Marriage Law in Aceh*. Its chapters are a series of lessons for the child-citizen about the meaning of culture and the kinds of relationships it establishes between different areas of life. Using Yogyakarta as the site for these lessons has implications for how Yogyakarta is represented in the text. Other characteristics of Yogyakarta, such as its diverse student population and important role as a centre of contemporary Indonesian art and performance, are absent.

A similar form of representation can be found in the *Yogya in Passing*'s twenty-four illustrations. Instead of using photographs, the illustrations are water-colour pictures that depict various buildings, rooms and objects mentioned in the text. The illustrations focus on a particular object and remove surrounding details. For instance, the Gending Archway, is illustrated with some detail in the middle on the page. However, it blurs on either side of the page before disappearing completely. The foreground is also a blur. People and cars are absent from the picture as are any indications of contemporary life such as signs, electricity wires, roads, rubbish or surrounding houses. The process of separating particular objects and items from their surroundings mirrors the process that occurs throughout the text. The authors identify certain things as cultural heritage and invest them with historical and cultural meaning and significance. This process involves a choice between objects and practices based on their cultural significance and worth or, in other words, judgements of cultural value.

The way that culture is framed in *Yogya in Passing* is in some respects quite similar to the understanding of culture within *Marriage Law in Aceh*. Three characteristics in particular indicate that some of the cultural discourses of the New Order regime remain important to cultural governance in the Reform era. Firstly, the text still divides the cultural sphere from the political sphere in the discussion of local customs and practices. The text emphasizes, like *Marriage Law in Aceh*, the 'traditional values' contained in the customs and practices. Chapter four, 'Drawing from Grandma's Experience', provides an example of how presenting the past as cultural heritage is used to identify and promote particular behaviours and attitudes rather than others. The chapter begins with a description of the location of Grandma's village. Grandma then begins to tell a folktale about the founder of the village, Ki Ageng Paker, that demonstrates how

the virtuous are rewarded.[15] The past is mined here for moral lessons for Indonesian children. In the text, 'traditional values' continue to provide a model of behaviour that the government regards as ideal although without the strong connections to state programmes, like family planning, that were in evidence in *Marriage Law in Aceh*.

The second characteristic is the continued use of the nation-state-province model that conflates location and ethnicity. The use of this model is not as transparent as *Marriage Law in Aceh* but two features of the text ensure it is still present. First, the opening chapter of the text quickly establishes that the borders of the text correlate with those of the province. On the second page, the province is situated in Java and its size compared to other provinces. As was mentioned earlier, the text lists the neighbouring regencies, the geographical features of the province and the official provincial symbol. Second, all of the local customs and ceremonies in the text are those of the Central Javanese and the buildings discussed in chapter three are traditional Javanese structures. Chapter four mentioned above discusses a Javanese folk-tale and game. Chapter five relates a customary ritual of the Sultan of Yogyakarta. Unlike *Marriage Law in Aceh*, there is no demographic breakdown of the place of birth or ethnicity of the inhabitants in the text, reinforcing the picture of the province of Yogyakarta as thoroughly and unambiguously Javanese.

The third characteristic is the use of the same model of national history to frame the history of Yogyakarta. Although not a central feature of *Marriage Law in Aceh*, the nationalist model of Indonesian history was important in the texts produced by other Ditjarahnitra projects. As noted previously, Anthony Reid identifies the central elements of the 'historical orthodoxy' as 'Great Hindu kingdoms bringing political unity to the archipelago, followed by 350 years of Dutch oppression dignified by the resistance at some time or another of each Indonesian region and people'

[15] The text relates the story as follows: 'Back in the time of Majapahit, Sultan Prabu owned a turtle dove with a beautiful call called Jaka Mangu. One day, Jaka Mangu escaped and could not be found. The Sultan sent out servants without success and eventually disguised himself and went looking for his dove. Jaka Mangu had been found by Ki Paker who was amazed by his melody. Ki Paker refused many offers for the dove. The Sultan eventually tracked down Jaka Mangu and met with Ki Paker. Ki Paker, without knowing who the Sultan was, gave him the bird and accepted no payment. A few weeks later, Sultan Prabu sent many riches to Ki Paker whose wealth became renowned. The story finishes with these lines: 'Even through [Ki Paker] was rich, nevertheless his behaviour remained simple and not arrogant. In his day-to-day life, Ki Paker continued to associate with anyone. He was not selective with his friendship, [associating with] people from wealthy and also not wealthy families' (2000: 52).

(1979: 298). The historical elements within the text emphasize Yogyakarta's connections to Majapahit empire, which nationalists have long used as evidence of Indonesia's unified past (1979: 287–292) and the nationalist struggle for independence. Grandma's story in chapter four clearly draws links between local customs and the Majapahit as does the account of the rite of Sekaten, which is discussed in detail below. In a recent article, Van Klinken has recorded challenges to the historical orthodoxies that the New Order regime promulgated since its fall in 1998 (2001a). Yogya in Passing, like *Marriage Law in Aceh*, belongs to the 'orthodox nationalist stream' which Van Klinken notes remains dominant after Suharto (2001a). The challenges to this view of history that have surfaced in the Reform era have yet to penetrate the bureaucracy which remains committed to the Suharto-era narratives.

Although there are a number of similarities between the Aceh and Yogya texts under discussion, two features in *Yogya in Passing* indicate that new governmental uses of culture have evolved in the period between the publications. The first is the way that tourism is embedded in the text. The narrator is established as a visitor to Yogyakarta in the first page of the text, through the method of discussing Yogyakarta as seen 'through the glass windows' (2000: 1) of a bus returning to the city. Other elements of the text reinforce the narrator's transient status. Malioboro Street is described as a tourist destination for 'both Indonesian and foreign tourists' (2000: 16). Forms of travel and the locations of bus terminal and train stations are routinely mentioned. The buildings that the text describes in detail, such as the Gedung Agung and the Sultan of Yogyakarta's palace, are tourist destinations. However, the chapter that is most notable for its tourist theme is chapter six, 'The Cultural Magic of the City'. Chapter six gives brief descriptions of two museums, including opening hours, and two prominent tourist destinations, Tamansari and Kota Gede. The text mentions the locations and origins of the areas and highlights points of historical interest. The text also mentions the importance of tourist guides in order to gain more knowledge about the Golden Carriage Museum (2000: 84) and notes that in Kota Gede, a region famous for its silverwork, 'tourists can see for themselves the process of making objects from silver' (2000: 91).

The text locates the reader as a visitor engaging with Indonesian cultural heritage rather than exploring the experiences of Yogyakartans whose lives are embedded in culture as was the case with earlier publications like *Marriage Law in Aceh*. Museums and tourist destinations of historical and cultural interest are placed next to folk tales, children's games

and palace rituals as elements of Indonesian's cultural heritage. The text encourages the child-citizen to engage with cultural tourism as a way of learning lessons about national unity and traditional values. The moves to sanction cultural tourism as an acceptable way to access national cultural heritage is linked to the relocation of the Directorate of Culture from the Ministry of Education to the State 328 Ministry of Tourism which began in 1997.[16] The administrative link established by the move has corollaries in the texts.

The second feature of *Yogya in Passing* is not as prominent as the presence of tourism. It involves elements of the description of Malioboro Street that do not conform with the character of the rest of the text. Malioboro Street is celebrated for its busyness, bustle and trade. It is 'always dense with cars' (2000: 15) along with bicycles and horse-drawn carts. The text emphasizes different features of the street. Shops pack both sides of the street and visitors are present from morning to evening. Tourists visit the shops and the side-walk stalls that line the road. The sounds of car-horns and horses-hooves hitting the street ring out all day along with street-singers playing guitar and singing. The authors then comment, 'You can imagine how interesting it is, all of those people mixed together with their own concerns' (2000: 16). The busy street-life becomes an object of attention for the reader. Traffic jams and commerce are considered a cultural attribute of this section of the city. The street life of Malioboro can be contrasted with chapter three's discussion of housing where only two forms of traditional housing are mentioned. Although not a prominent or large part of the text, the brief discussion of Malioboro Street does indicate that the definition of local culture has at least come under pressure to include practices and experiences that were not previously considered part of local traditions, such as shopping and the noises of commerce.

The Reformasi Text: Learning within the Cultural Sphere

An important element of *Yogya in Passing* is how it uses culture to construct relationships between different areas of life. For example, the discussion of the Sultan of Yogyakarta's palace includes a description of a large hall that the Sultan used to pass down decrees that governed his Sultanate but now is used as a museum (2000: 63). The changed status of the

[16] The restructure was explored in more detail in chapter five.

hall indicates that the feudal practices of the Sultan, although now part of Indonesia's past, are to be appreciated in the present as cultural heritage. Representations of how the past relates to the present are particularly prominent and repeated in the text. For instance, the phrase 'land of my ancestors' that was prominent in the first chapter, including in the chapter title, establishes Yogyakarta as a culturally relevant location whose history and customs the narrator is able to explore for lessons in life today.

A lesson about the complexity of the relationship between past and present is the account of the Sekaten ceremony in chapter five. Here I provide a truncated version of the text's description of the event. Sekaten is the name of an old gamelan that is one of the palace heirlooms. On the sixth day of the third month of the Islamic calendar, the rite of Sekaten begins when musicians begin to play the gamelan. People from the area flock to the palace on hearing the music. At midnight, the gamelan is moved from the palace to the Agung Mosque, accompanied by a large crowd. In the mosque, the gamelan is played again for six days straight until Thursday night prayers. After the Friday afternoon prayers finish at one o'clock, the gamelan begins playing again. At eight o'clock, the Sultan leaves the palace and proceeds to the mosque to attend the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad's birth, accompanied by crowds of people. Around a thousand crowd into the mosque. The sound of the gamelan is hushed as the Sultan enters. The Sultan indicates to the *Kyai*[17] that he is ready and the *Kyai* begins reading the tale of the Prophet Muhammad which finishes at midnight. The Sultan returns to the palace with the gamelan and a crowd of revellers.

After relating a detailed account of the ceremony, the text turns to the history of the ceremony. According to the text, Sekaten was present during the time of the Demak kingdom in the sixteenth century. During that time, a group of nine holy men travelled to Java to spread Islam. They are called the *Wali* and are still revered in Java today. One of the nine *Wali*, Wali Sanga, was a talented musician who could play the gamelan. Every year, the *Wali* would gather together to report their activities and celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad and Wali Sanga would play his gamelan that was named Kyai Sekati. Although this celebration was the start of Sekaten's links with Islam, the authors link it to an even older ceremony from the Hindu kingdoms that preceded Islam. The rituals of

[17] Islamic scholar and teacher.

Asmaweda and Asmaradana, which also went for seven days, were a time for offering up prayers and songs of praise to departed ancestors.

The ritual of Sekaten provides a location where a number of different elements within the discourse of cultural heritage are related to each other. Yogyakarta's history, Islam, Javanese culture in the form of the gamelan and Yogyakarta's links to the pre-Islamic Hindu kingdoms are brought together in this one ceremony. The text's ideal readers, Indonesian child-citizens, are given a lesson in the cultural complexity of their country. A number of legacies coexist here as elements of cultural heritage. However, the text emphasizes two points that have the effect of establishing relationships between the elements. Firstly, the text lists the goals of Sekaten as celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad and spreading the teachings of Islam. Islamic heritage is tied to the culture of Yogyakarta and the region's Hindu past is pushed back in history. Secondly, the text directly addresses the relationship between Islam and local culture. The authors write: 'Sekaten is proof that Islam is receptive towards local tradition and is not opposed to *adat*' (2000: 75). Sekaten provides a lesson in how Islamic and local cultural practices should peacefully coexist and an example of how the organization of different spheres of life is an important governmental function of culture.

Conclusion: The Continuing and Changing Construction of Local Culture

Underlying the use of local culture, in state-sponsored cultural research and Taman Mini, is its use as a field of social management. The Directorate of Culture intended the local culture projects to educate Indonesians about their own and other indigenous ethnic cultures and to strengthen national unity. However, it also defined the characteristics and limits of local culture itself. The local culture projects constructed a sphere of life that imparted lessons about the nation, appropriate behaviour and morals, and cultural difference. Such governmental use of culture is not restricted to Indonesia. Tony Bennett writes: "The concept [of culture] is caught up in and helps to constitute a normative grid through which the areas of social life to which it is applied are constructed as objects and practices to be acted upon" (1998: 101). In this sense local culture itself is a governmental concept that was used to understand and intervene into the lives of Indonesians while also defining the significance and purpose of the objects and practices that came within its scope.

While each text examined in this chapter is an intricate combination of a variety of discourses, the general operation of the texts is identifi-

able as a form of governmental power that was central to cultural policy during the New Order period. It applied a normative grid to the practices of Indonesians in order to make their attributes and behaviours accord with those articulated within national development, while also attempting to manage the relationship between indigenous ethnic populations within the nation. Particularly interesting was the construction of a cultural spatial-scale across the nation which, by ordering space, simultaneously incorporated some of the most intimate aspects of daily life, such as sexual relations, into national culture and disciplinary programmes. Techniques of representation and the priorities of cultural management were more influential in shaping the representation of local culture in local culture project texts than the practices of local communities.

The local culture projects, as a set of key programmes within the Directorate of Culture, indicate a large degree of continuity in perspective within the national cultural bureaucracy despite the advent of the Reform era and substantial institutional changes. The similarities in the representation of local culture in the two texts, despite disparities in location, culture and time of publication, are striking. The nation-region-ethnie spatial model, including the coupling of administrative and cultural regions, remains central to the construction of local culture and its placement within a national framework. Also still present is the aestheticization that ascribes 'noble values' to local cultures which allows them to be used for pedagogical lessons. Similarly, the advent of the Reform era had little impact on constructions of Indonesian history within local culture project texts with the orthodox nationalist stream remaining unchallenged.

Both texts produced a version of local culture preferred firstly by the New Order regime and also apparently by the Reform era governments. The breaks have been minor and are more connected to institutional change within the directorate, such as the promotion of cultural tourism and the change from targeting an adult audience to children, than any reconsideration of culture's utility for government or the importance of culture to local communities. This attests to the strength of an internal culturality within the Directorate of Culture, supported by systems of funding and planning, that has maintained a discursive formation constructing a local cultural sphere for over thirty years.

The similarities between Taman Mini and both of the analysed publications are conspicuous in both their representation of local culture and how cultural discourses are put to use. In all three instances, culture is cordoned off from politics and contemporary life and made a special sphere for the education of Indonesians. All three also accord with the regime's effacement of time through the connection of traditions from previous

eras to its political and social imperatives. The regime and its programmes were 'indigenized' in TIM and the local culture projects. Finally, TIM, like the local culture projects, demonstrates the connection between governmental programmes and the New Order regime's construction of indigenous ethnic culture.

Despite these similarities, the local culture projects indicate that there are variations in the regime's construction of indigenous ethnic cultures and possibly provide a more complete model of how ethnic culture was understood. The major difference between Taman Mini and the texts is the representation of cultural difference. In the local culture projects, the differences between ethnic cultures are emphasized and mapped within the nation which contrasts to the blurring of peripheral cultures in Taman Mini. Articulation of cultural difference in the local culture projects divides more thoroughly and offers more flexibility than is the case in Taman Mini. Taman Mini's centralization of Javanese court culture, rather than being reproduced in the local culture project texts, is replaced by the multiple centres of local indigenous cultures across Indonesia. The local culture projects also provide a more detailed account of how the daily routines of indigenous ethnic culture are invested with significance and meaning because of their location within governmental discourses. For instance, the texts demonstrate how bureaucrats relied on a particular kind of research expertise in their efforts to know and modernize indigenous ethnic cultures. Another example is how wedding customs were incorporated into development programmes through knowledge of the detail of the customs. Additionally, the local culture projects demonstrate that the characteristics and limits of local culture were in a constant state of revision and change.

The ongoing production of texts in the local culture projects constantly incorporated new elements and objects into local culture. The introduction of cultural tourism, particularly the constructions of Indonesians as cultural tourists, into *Yogya in Passing* replicates Taman Mini's own status as a tourist destination for Indonesians. Cultural tourism is not new to Indonesian cultural policy but its role and visibility have grown substantially since 1998. Another new element is the expanded definition of culture in sections of *Yogya in Passing* and local culture project texts published since 1995, which indicates a broadening of objects and practices considered appropriate for inclusion within the category of local culture and the realm of cultural policy.

CONCLUSION: INDONESIA'S CULTURAL POLICY JOURNEY

While cultural policy has its origins in liberal techniques of government, in Indonesia authoritarian cultural policy held sway for much of the twentieth century. Authoritarian cultural policy disregards the tastes and affiliations of groups and individuals using the excuse that those subjects do not have the capacity to maturely and rationally exercise their own judgement, allowing the state to direct cultural development with a heavy hand. Hence the civilizing function of cultural policy is maintained, but without the freedom of artists and audiences to make their own choices about aesthetics and subject matter. Cultural policy retained the same broad governmental function across the twentieth century that made it so useful for liberal approaches to governance, where it was used to shape the behaviour and attributes of and to manage the relations between populations, in particular relations amongst indigenous ethnic populations and between those populations and the nation. A review of the major changes in cultural policy indicates that there were differences in the operation of authoritarian cultural policy and periods where it was not dominant.

While cultural policy emerged from liberal democracies as a form of governmental power capable of shaping the attributes and behaviours of self-governing subjects, its application in the Indonesian colonial setting had significant differences. Imperial states did not grant their indigenous colonial subjects the same freedoms as the subjects of Western states, as they were assumed to possess lesser capacities. While considered to be on the same evolutionary path as Western populations, the racial hierarchy of colonialism placed indigenous Indonesians a few steps behind. Like minors, criminals, and the mentally unwell, colonial populations were subjected to greater state control as part of the liberal process of 'improvement'. The Japanese occupation dramatically reversed the racial hierarchy, placing Japanese culture at the top of the evolutionary ladder. While Dutch administrators had conceived their role as guiding a natural process of cultural development, the Japanese attempted to control cultural institutions and cultural expression. Japanese cultural policy in particular can be understood to be a command culture model, where the state defines and administers the planning, creating, directing, and policing of cultural practice. Colonial cultural policy displayed some features of the command culture model, but the model was more evident during the Japanese occupation than at any other time in Indonesia's history. Japanese

cultural policy, which was tied to wartime propaganda, had the twin goals of shaping East Asian subjects and contributing to the war effort. As the Pacific War progressed, the latter goal increasingly dominated cultural policy. A major change of the Japanese period was that an administration addressed indigenous populations for the first time as Indonesians and promoted an 'Indonesian' culture.

During the Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy periods, a liberal model was initially applied where Indonesians were understood to have the capacity for autonomous citizenship. Later, Sukarno implemented a model drawn from his critique of Western liberalism and promotion of mass mobilization, though the drive to 'improve' the population remained central. While cultural policy during Constitutional Democracy sought to facilitate cultural development through supporting the activities of non-government groups and individuals, developing educational institutions and giving commitments to maintaining artistic freedom, the cultural policy of Guided Democracy was more prescriptive of styles and content. This can be understood as a move initially towards a liberal model of cultural policy, before a return to a command culture model where Sukarno's concepts and pronouncements were intended to direct national culture. A more gradual change in the conceptualization of national culture across the period is also evident. Cultural policy during constitutional democracy began with the premise that a new synthetic Indonesian national culture would evolve for the new nation that would replace the different ethnic cultures. This perspective was soon challenged by the strength of ethnic cultures that increasingly became the focus of cultural policy. During Guided Democracy, ethnic cultures were sanctioned as forms of national culture as long as they were national in essence. Through these changes, ethnic cultures were linked to national culture and included in cultural policy programmes.

For the thirty two years of the New Order era, the longest period of continuous government since the end of colonialism, a cultural policy model was pursued that shared many features with colonial era policy. Like much of Southeast Asia, the New Order regime emphasized economic and social development in its policies and programmes while contrasting the spiritual and moral benefits of Indonesian cultural values to 'decadent' Western values. Once again, greater intervention and control was justified through the assumption that Indonesians were backward compared to 'developed' nations and had limited capacities. The imperialist 'improvement' of colonial populations was replaced, in both Indonesian and international discourse, by the imperative of 'development'.

The rationalization for the return to authoritarian cultural policy was the task of preparing Indonesians for economic development and making Indonesian culture 'developed' while 'protecting' Indonesian cultural values—processes that shaped cultural practices to fit with state-defined aesthetic and moral norms. The regime shaped the cultural subject of the New Order era to accord with its method of political rule and development goals. In contrast to Guided Democracy, cultural policy discouraged themes designated as 'political' and encouraged appreciation of Indonesian culture's spiritual qualities. As Indonesia's economic success integrated it more closely with international markets, increasing concern with the penetration of Western cultural practices did not cause a major cultural policy review. The regime's response was to strengthen the command culture model through a greater emphasis on protecting Indonesian values and negating the effect of foreign cultural influences. The cultural subject formulated in the first decades of the New Order era was not challenged or revised but confirmed and reinforced, while becoming increasingly irrelevant to the lives of Indonesians as they engaged with mass-produced consumer culture.

During the New Order era, regional cultures connected to ethnic groups became even more central to cultural policy. Managing the relations amongst ethnic populations and between their cultures and national culture was a priority and a justification for cultural policy. Regional cultures continued to be understood as elements of Indonesian national culture and therefore subject to Directorate of Culture programmes that had the task of regulating national culture. The process of subjecting indigenous regional cultural practices to programmes made them national in two senses: they were capable of teaching lessons about behaviours, aesthetics, and morals to shape a national population, and they exhibited the characteristics considered appropriate for national culture. Regional cultural forms, after undergoing this transformation, were then displayed together in national festivals. The sanitized plurality of these festivals encapsulated the relationship that ethnic populations had to each other and to the nation in cultural policy. Each ethnic population was constructed as harmoniously contributing to national development and displaying the characteristics considered appropriate for a developing nation. In contrast to regional cultural practices, contemporary cultural forms generally did not receive much attention from cultural policy makers, although the Western-influenced universal humanist group of artists was able to gain resources through their affiliations with educational and cultural institutions.

The New Order cultural policy did not have a singular rationale imposed by the central state. A variety of official cultural discourses informed cultural policy, and they were deployed differently in different locations. New Order cultural policy has frequently been seen as destructive—that is, in terms of what it banned, excised, or prevented. The critiques from the Indonesian left in particular tend to emphasize how New Order cultural policy negated and repressed local, working class, or oppositional cultural practices. While to some extent confirming that critique, the previous chapters also focussed on cultural policy's productive effects, in particular how cultural policy contributed to the shaping of Indonesian subjects with the capacities to participate in accelerated development, who would peacefully coexist with other indigenous ethnic groups and who would accept the regime's claims to legitimacy. Cultural policy was powerful because it promoted and circulated a particular set of practices for everyday life while discouraging other practices. It created certain options and choices while foreclosing others.

Another characterization of New Order national culture has been that it was a construction based on upper-class Javanese culture. While there was slippage between national culture and Javanese and Balinese culture in Taman Mini, also central to New Order cultural policy was the discourse of development with its goals of shaping modern Indonesian subjects and making indigenous culture appropriate for such a society. Even the most emblematic of Javanese art forms, *wayang*, was subject to 'development' ideals and aesthetics, and was made to include development messages (Sutton 1991; Van Groenendael 1985; Weintraub 2004b). While Javanese and Balinese cultural symbols have been used as the emblems of New Order era national culture, the features of national culture in cultural policy have been determined by its use as a tool of government, in particular the normative framework applied in official cultural and educational programmes.

Alongside the importance of Javanese culture, research also needs to explore how the nation was represented at the sub-national levels of government in relation to regional cultures. If a regional culture was not affiliated with a specific geographically bounded level of government (such as a province, *kabupaten* or *kecamatan*), it is likely to be marginal and receive less support, and to escape cultural policy programmes. While culturalities have been considered throughout this book, they were most strongly demonstrated in the Part II case studies. The two case studies demonstrated the presence and effects of central control as well as the diversity of cultural policy outcomes across Indonesia. The culturalities explored, particularly

in the cultural parks and art councils, verified that, despite the presence of a strong central state, the operation and outcomes of official New Order cultural institutions were varied across Indonesia because of the specific circumstances in different locations. Although both types of institutions were centrally funded, they were active and broadly supported only where they prioritized the desires of local arts communities over centrally generated regulations. The culturalities in different locations often intervened to alter centrally defined programmes, indicating that agency was exercised through the differing interpretation and use of cultural discourses despite the power and reach of the central state. The local culture research project texts did not simply describe local cultural practices but instead imbued certain practices with cultural value and therefore were pedagogic texts for the training of citizens in appropriate 'Indonesian' behaviour. The kind of knowledge that produced the texts made local culture in two senses: it defined a sphere of social practices and objects that were labelled as local culture; and it made local cultural practices knowable to the state and therefore amenable to state programmes.

Unlike previous experiences of regime change, the so-called Reform era did not herald sweeping reforms of governance driven by the new political power holders. A drive for democratic reform instigated and sustained by popular and international pressure has been consistently mitigated by entrenched interests that survived Suharto's fall. More influential for cultural policy was the rise of ethnic identity politics and the most important policy initiative of the period—decentralization. All cultural policy offices below the national level were decentralized and came under the control of the local regency, municipality or province as did a number of other cultural institutions including the cultural gardens and museums.

The major direct cultural policy change of the early Reform era was in fact a Suharto era initiative that the Habibie, Wahid and Megawati administrations implemented—the separation of the culture portfolio from the education portfolio (these had been located under one ministry since 1945) and culture's reconfiguration with tourism. Bureaucrats in the Directorate of Culture resisted the move to tourism and generally adhered to the processes and discourses of the New Order era. For instance, the analysis of the local culture projects demonstrated that the Directorate has not substantially revised the cultural discourses it employed during the New Order era with the small exception of a greater recognition of cultural tourism. Greater changes have occurred outside Jakarta where the engagement of different localities with cultural policy has led to a plurality of outcomes across Indonesia, as was demonstrated by the case study of

the cultural parks and arts councils. Despite organizational changes, New Order era cultural discourses generally continued to dominate decentralized cultural policy and have interacted with new initiatives such as the copyright legislation. However, there have been initiatives in the more distant, politically marginalized provinces, such as Riau, to move away from New Order cultural policy. These could be the beginning of a movement towards new cultural policy models.

Understanding the Cultural Policies of Postcolonial Polities

Researching postcolonial polities like Indonesia required a rethinking of the purpose of cultural policy which in turn required a consideration of how contemporary techniques of government were applied in Indonesia. Colonial cultural policy in Indonesia was an expression of the liberal rationalities of government from which Western cultural policy emerged, but its features differed due to Dutch understandings of, and justifications for, colonial rule. A useful framework for thinking about the continuities and breaks between different periods of postcolonial government and Western and postcolonial settings is considering cultural policy as a set of governmental techniques and technologies focussed on managing populations and shaping individuals' attributes and behaviours. Undertaking cultural policy analysis in a postcolonial polity like Indonesia requires an appreciation of the varying expressions that contemporary methods of government took in non-Western locations. Analysing the types of populations targeted and the kinds of attributes and behaviours that were intended for annihilation or articulated as norms assists in divorcing cultural policy as a method of governance from liberal democracies and helps explore the forms it took in other settings.

The ideas for how to manage populations through cultural policy, or even an appreciation of its importance, may not have their origins within the nation. Institutions like UNESCO need to be considered as both forums where ideas about cultural policy were spread and national policies were defended, and advocates for cultural policy expansion and change. Additionally, institutions such as WIPO push towards integration of systems that have implications for cultural practices by particular international institutions, such as intellectual property legislation.

This book also draws attention to the importance of the colonial context for the features of postcolonial cultural policy, particularly during periods of authoritarian rule. Postcolonial governments inherited cultural policies that were based on a set of assumptions that although liberal in

origin were not democratic. While colonial cultural policy was critiqued by many postcolonial governments who developed alternatives, it was still the basis on which postcolonial cultural policy was built. It also provided a model for authoritarian cultural policy which was supported by international discourses about development, in particular cultural development. My account of the processes by which cultural policy breaks were made or continuities established with colonial cultural policy provides a starting point for cultural policy research in postcolonial settings.

Postcolonial cultural policy analysis also needs to consider the institutional changes that occurred at the advent of the independent nation-state. Colonial cultural institutions were inherited by the new nations, which could be the preeminent institutions inside cultural bureaucracies as their staff had established training programmes and strong institutional support. However, the greatest support from the public and politicians was often for nationalist cultural workers who had supported the independence movement, but who were not established in institutions and were used to working outside of state systems. The movement of styles and personnel from outside of colonial bureaucratic institutions to being incorporated by the new national bureaucracies, often through the creation of educational institutions, requires attention.

A Cultural Policy Research Framework for Indonesia

The approach pursued in this book has the advantage of providing a detailed account of the content and drivers of official cultural policy, generally at the national level, but it is by no means a complete account. The international influences on Indonesian cultural policy require more research in order to gauge their influence, which would provide important information for a number of developing countries given the scope of influence of organizations like UNESCO, WIPO, the UN, and the World Bank. This research also demonstrates that the lower levels of government, particularly since the Reform era but also before it, have their own interpretations and initiatives, so the culturalities of many of these locations remain opaque. Additionally and perhaps more importantly, a number of organizations, both foreign and domestic, have their own cultural policies and programmes within Indonesia. These organizations provide alternative cultural policy models that can be contrasted to the official model and, in many cases, can demonstrate how local organizations have resisted or contested official cultural programmes through their own policies and programmes. The benefits of such research would be twofold.

First, it would contribute to a more complete account of cultural policy in Indonesia. Second, it would challenge the limits of official cultural policy. Given the slow pace of official cultural policy change since the fall of Suharto, progressive cultural policy change is more likely to come from outside the existing official political and cultural institutions.

Néstor García Canclini, in an article about contemporary cultural policy challenges, makes a relevant statement regarding countries such as Indonesia that have exalted local traditions in the face of economic and cultural opening:

> In spite of the political, cultural, and aesthetic qualities sometimes found in artists in [...] localist movements, the decisive question for cultural policy is: how does one move on from the separatist exaltation of difference which in the long term perpetuates inequality and fosters discrimination, to the shared acknowledgement of the different and the heterogeneous in symbolic searchings capable of intercultural communication? (2000: 315)

Indonesian cultural policy has for the most part been 'localist'—focussed on retaining the authenticity of Indonesian culture through tightly controlled interaction with outside forces. This narrow focus has created tensions with the way that culture is circulated and consumed in Indonesia through increasing integration with international markets.

A reconsideration of the context of Indonesian culture in what is now a globalized system of cultural circulation could challenge cultural policy through centring on a different set of problems. For instance, according to Garcia Canclini (2000: 315), innovation and transcultural exchange are essential to creativity and critical thinking in a global society. Rather than attempting to protect the practitioners of traditional cultural practices from such interactions, would the state be better advised to assist such exchanges and provide information about how communities could retain as much control as possible of the representation of indigenous Indonesian cultures in a global environment? Such questions challenge the limited pluralism of official cultural policy by focussing on cultural exchange and innovation.

All policy analysis holds the danger of confirming inequalities rather than challenging them. Cultural policy researchers have to choose between projects that 'transform the social order [...] or replicate it—a struggle between cultural policy as a transformative versus a functionalist sphere' (Miller and Yudice 2002: 3). After all, researchers are not obliged to assist the efficient operation of the state but instead choose how, where, and to what causes they contribute.

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The New Order cultural policy did not have a singular rationale imposed by the central state. A variety of official cultural discourses informed cultural policy, and they were deployed differently in different locations. New Order cultural policy has frequently been seen as destructive—that is, in terms of what it banned, excised, or prevented. The critiques from the Indonesian left in particular tend to emphasize how New Order cultural policy negated and repressed local, working class, or oppositional cultural practices. While to some extent confirming that critique, the previous chapters also focussed on cultural policy's productive effects, in particular how cultural policy contributed to the shaping of Indonesian subjects with the capacities to participate in accelerated development, who would peacefully coexist with other indigenous ethnic groups and who would accept the regime's claims to legitimacy. Cultural policy was powerful because it promoted and circulated a particular set of practices for everyday life while discouraging other practices. It created certain options and choices while foreclosing others.